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honour, and which, on the other hand, if complied with, may be productive of the most serious confequences!

An engagement which may draw us into a war is of great momy's affoci- ment: in it, the very existence of the state is at stake. He who in an alliance promises a fubfidy or a body of auxiliaries, fometimes imagines that he only risks a sum of money or a certain number of foldiers; whereas he often expofes himself to war and all its calamities. The nation against whom he furnishes affiftance will look upon him as her enemy; and fhould her arms prove fuccefsful, fhe will carry the war into his country. But it remains to be determined whether the can do this with juftice, and on what oc. cafions. Some authors decide in general, that whoever joins our enemy, or affifts him against us with money, troops, or in any other manner whatever, becomes thereby our enemy, and gives us a right to make war against him:-a cruel decifion, and highly inimical to the peace of nations! It cannot be supported by principles; and happily the practice of Europe ftands in oppofition to it.

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make a

common

It is true, indeed, that every affociate of my enemy is himself my enemy. It is of little confequence whether any one makes. war on me directly, and in his own name, or under the aufpices of another. Whatever rights war gives me against my principal enemy, the like it gives me againft all his affociates: for I derive thofe rights from the right to fecurity,-from the care of my own defence; and I am equally attacked by the one and the other party. But the question is, to know whom I may lawfully ac count my enemy's affociates, united against me in war.

First, in that clafs I fhall rank all those who are really united Thofe who in a warlike affociation with my enemy, and who make a common caufe with him, though it is only in the name of that princaufe with cipal enemy that the war is carried on. There is no need of the enemy, proving this. In the ordinary and open warlike affociations, the is carried on in the name of all the allies, who are all equally enemies (80).

are his affo

ciates;

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and thofe who affift

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In the fecond place, I account as affociates of my enemy, thofe who aflift him in his war without being obliged to it by any ha, with treaty. Since they freely and voluntarily declare against me, out being they, of their own accord, chufe to become my enemies. If obliged to they go no farther than furnishing a determined fuccour, allowing it by trea- fome troops to be raised, or advancing money,--and, in other refpects, preferve towards me the accustomed relations of friendfhip or neutrality,-I may overlook that ground of complaint; but ftill I have a right to call them to account for it. This prudent caution, of not always coming to an open rupture with those who give fuch affiftance to our enemy, that we may not force them to join him with all their ftrength,-this forbearance, I fay, has gradually introduced the cuftom of not looking on fuch affittance as an act of hoftility, efpecially when it confifts only in

*See Wolf, Jus Gentium, $$ 730 and 736.

the

the permiffion to enlist volunteers. How often have the Switzers granted levies to France, at the same time that they refused such an indulgence to the house of Auftria, though both powers were in alliance with them! How often have they allowed one prince to levy troops in their country, and refused the same permiffion to his enemy, when they were not in alliance with either! They granted or denied that favour according as they judged it moft expedient for themfelves; and no power has ever dared to attack them on that account. But if prudence diffuades us from making use of all our right, it does not thereby deflroy that right. A cautious nation chufes rather to overlook certain points than unneceffarily to increase the number of her enemies.

Thirdly, thofe who, being united with my enemy by an offen§ 98. or who are five alliance, actively aflift him in the war which he declares in an offenagainst me, those, I say, concur in the injury intended against five alliance me. They fhew themfelves my enemies, and I have a right to with him. treat them as fuch. Accordingly the Switzers, whofe example we have above quoted, feldom grant troops except for defensive war. To thofe in the fervice of France, it has ever been a standing order from their fovereigns, not to carry arms against the empire, or against the states of the houfe of Auftria in Germany. In 1644, the captains of the Neufchatel regiment of Guy, on information that they were deftined to ferve under marshal Turenne in Germany, declared that they would rather die than difobey their fovereign, and violate the alliances of the Helvetic body. Since France has been miftrefs of Alface, the Switzers who serve in her armies, never pass the Rhine to attack the empire. The gallant Daxelhoffer, captain of a Berne company in the French fervice, confifting of 200 men, and of which his four fons formed the first rank, feeing the general would oblige him to pass the Rhine, broke his efpontoon, and marched back with his company to Berne.

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How a de

Even a defenfive alliance made exprefsly against me, or (which amounts to the fame thing) concluded with my enemy during fenfive alli the war, or on the certain profpect of its speedy declaration, is ance affoca an act of affociation against me; and if followed by effects, I ates with may look on the party who has contracted it, as my enemy. The cafe is here precisely the fame as that of a nation affifting my enemy without being under any obligation to do so, and chufing of her own accord to become my enemy. (See § 97.)

the enemy.

Another

A defenfive alliance, though of a general nature, and made before any appearance of the present war, produces alfo the fame cafe. effect, if it ftipulates the affiftance of the whole ftrength of the allies for in this cafe it is a real league or warlike association; and, befides, it were abfurd that I fhould be debarred from making war on a nation who oppofes me with all her might, and thus exhausting the source of thofe fuccours with which the furnishes my enemy. In what light am I to confider an auxiliary who comes to make war on me at the head of all his forces? It would be mockery on his part, to pretend that he is not my

enemy.

TOT. In what

cafe it does

effect.

enemy. What more could he do, were he openly to declare himfelf fuch? He fhews no tenderness for me on the occasion: he only wishes that a tender regard fhould be paid to himself. And fhall I fuffer him to preferve his provinces in peace, and fecure from all danger, whilft he is doing me all the mischief in his power? No! the law of nature, the law of nations, obliges us to be just, but does not condemn us to be dupes.

But if a defenfive alliance has not been made against me in particular, nor concluded at the time when I was openly preparnot produce ing for war, or had already begun it, and if the allies have only the fame ftipulated in it, that each of them fhall furnith a stated fuccour to him who fhall be attacked,-I cannot require that they thouid neglect to fulfil a folemn treaty, which they had an unqueftionable right to conclude without any injury to me. In furnishing my enemy with afliftance, they only acquit themselves of a debt: they do me no wrong in difcharging it; and confequently they afford me no juft grounds for making war on them (§ 26). Neither can I fay that my fafety obliges me to attack them; for I fhould thereby only increase the number of my enemies, and, inftead of a flender fuccour which they furnish against me, fhould draw on myself the whole power of those nations. It is, therefore, only the troops which they fend as auxiliaries, that I am to confider as enemies. These are actually united with my enemies, and fighting against me.

The contrary principles would tend to multiply wars, and fpread them beyond all bounds, to the common ruin of nations. It is happy for Europe, that, in this inftance, the established cuftom is in accord with the true principles. A prince feldom prefumes to complain of a nation's contributing to the defence of her ally by furnishing him with fuccours which were promised in former treaties,-in treaties that were not made against that prince in particular. In the laft war, the United Provinces long continued to fupply the queen of Hungary with fubfidies, and even with troops; and France never complained of these proceedings till thofe troops marched into Alface to attack the French frontier. Switzerland, in virtue of her alliance with France, furnishes that crown with numerous bodies of troops, and, nevertheless, lives in peace with all Europe.

There is one cafe, however, which might form an exception to the general rule: it is that of a defenfive war which is evidently unjust. For in fuch cafe there no longer exifts any obligation to aflift an ally (§§ 86, 87, 89). If you undertake to do it without neceffity, and in violation of your duty, you do an injury to the enemy, and declare against him out of mere wantonnefs. But this is a cafe that very rarely occurs between nations. There are few defenfive wars without at least some apparent reason to warrant their juftice or neceffity. Now, on any dubious occafion, each state is fole judge of the juftice of her own caufe; and the prefumption is in favour of your ally (§ 86). Befides, it belongs to you alone to determine what conduct on your part will be

conformable

conformable to your duties and to your engagements; and confequently nothing lefs than the most palpable evidence can authorife the enemy of your ally to charge you with fupporting an unjuft war, contrary to the conviction of your own conscience. In fine, the voluntary law of nations ordains, that, in every cafe fufceptible of doubt, the arms of both parties fhall, with regard to external effects, be accounted equally lawful (§ 40).

$ 102. Whether it

The real affociates of my enemy being my enemies, I have against them the fame rights as against the principal enemy be neceffa (95). And as their own conduct proclaims them my enemies, ry to deand they take up arms against me in the first inftance, I may clare war make war on them without any declaration; the war being fuffi- against the enemy's afciently declared by their own act. This is especially the cafe of fociates. thofe who in any manner whatever concur to make an offensive war against me; and it is likewife the cafe of all those whom we have mentioned in §§ 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

But it is not thus with thofe nations which affift my enemy in a defenfive war: I cannot confider them as his affociates (§ 101). If I am entitled to complain of their furnishing him with fuccours, this is a new ground of quarrel between me and them. I may expoftulate with them, and, on not receiving fatisfaction, profecute my right, and make war on them. But in this cafe there must be a previous declaration (§ 51). The example of Manlius, who made war on the Galatians for having fupplied Antiochus with troops, is not a cafe in point. Grotius* cenfures the Roman general for having begun that war without a declaration. The Galatians, in furnishing troops for an offenfive war against the Romans, had declared themselves enemies to Rome. It would appear, indeed, that, on peace being concluded with Antiochus, Manlius ought to have waited for orders from Rome before he attacked the Galatians; and then, if that expedition was confidered as a fresh war, he should have not only iffued a declaration, but also made a demand of fatisfaction, previous to the commencement of hoftilities (§ 51). But the treaty with the king of Syria had not yet received its confummation: and it concerned that monarch alone, without making any mention of his adherents. Therefore Manlius undertook the expedition against the Galatians, as a confequence or a remnant of the war with Antiochus. This is what he himself very well obferved in his fpeech to the fenate +; and he even added, that his first measure was to try whether he could bring the Galatians to reasonable terms. Grotius more appofitely quotes the example of Ulyffes and his followers,-blaming them for having, without any declaration of war, attacked the Ciconians, who had fent fuccours to Priam during the fiege of Troy ‡.

* De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. iii. cap. iii. § 10. Livy, lib. xxxviii,

Grotius, ubi fupra, not. 3.

§ 103.

Neutral nations.

Conduct to

nation.

CHAP. VII.

Of Neutrality-and the Paffage of Troops through a Neutral
Country.

NEUTE

TEUTRAL nations are thofe who, in time of war, do not take any part in the contest, but remain common friends to both parties, without favouring the arms of the one to the prejudice of the other. Here we are to confider the obligations and rights flowing from neutrality.

104. In order rightly to understand this question, we must avoid be obferved confounding what may lawfully be done by a nation that is free by a neutral from all engagements, with what the may do if the expects to be treated as perfectly neutral in a war. As long as a neutral nation wishes fecurely to enjoy the advantages of her neutrality, she must in all things fhew a ftrict impartiality towards the belligerent powers: for, fhould fhe favour one of the parties to the prejudice of the other, the cannot complain of being treated by him as an adherent and confederate of his enemy. Her neutra lity would be a fraudulent neutrality, of which no nation will confent to be the dupe. It is fometimes fuffered to pass unnoticed, merely for want of ability to refent it; we chufe to connive at it, rather than excite a more powerful oppofition against

But the prefent question is, to determine what may lawfully be done, not what prudence may dictate according to circumstances. Let us therefore examine, in what confifts that impartiality which a neutral nation ought to obferve.

It folely relates to war, and includes two articles,-1. To give no affiftance when there is no obligation to give it,-nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or any thing of direct use in war. I do not fay "to give affiftance equally," but "to give no affiftance:" for it would be abfurd that a ftate fhould at one and the fame time aflift two nations at war with each other; and befides it would be impoffible to do it with equality. The fame things, the like number of troops, the like quantity of arms, of ftores, &c. furnished in different circumstances, are no longer equivalent fuccours. 2. In whatever does not relate to war, a neutral and impartial nation must not refufe to one of the parties, on account of his prefent quarrel, what the grants to the other. This does not deprive her of the liberty to make the advantage of the ftate ftill ferve as her rule of conduct in her negotiations, her friendly connections, and her commerce. When this reafon induces her to give preferences in things which are ever at the free difpofal of the poffeffor, the only makes ufe of her right, and is not chargeable with partiality, But to refufe any of thofe things to one of the parties purely

becaufe

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