$295.

of civil war

to the nation. The duke de Montpenfier's infamous and barbarous exceffes against the reformed party in France are too well known: the men were delivered up to the executioner, and the women to the brutality of the foldiers. What was the confe quence? the proteftants became exafperated; they took vengeance of fuch inhuman practices; and the war, before fuffici ently cruel as a civil and religious war, became more bloody and destructive. Who could without horror read of the favage cruelties committed by the baron Des Adrets? By turns a catholic and a proteftant, he diftinguished himself by his barbarity on both fides. At length it became neceffary to relinquish thofe pretenfions to judicial authority over men who proved themselves capable of fupporting their caufe by force of arms, and to treat them, not as criminals, but as enemies. Even the troops have often refused to serve in a war wherein the prince expofed them to cruel reprisals. Officers who had the highest sense of honour, though ready to fhed their blood in the field of battle for his fervice, have not thought it any part of their duty to run the ha zard of an ignominious death. Whenever, therefore, a numerous body of men think they have a right to refift the fovereign, and feel themfelves in a condition to appeal to the fword, the war ought to be carried on by the contending parties in the fame, manner as by two different nations; and they ought to leave open the fame means for preventing its being carried to outrageous extremities, and for the restoration of peace.

When the fovereign has fubdued the oppofite party, and reduced them to fubmit and fue for peace, he may except from the amnesty the authors of the disturbances,-the heads of the party he may bring them to a legal trial, and punish them, if they be found guilty. He may act in this manner particularly on occafion of those disturbances in which the interefts of the people are not so much the object in view as the private aims of fome powerful individuals, and which rather deserve the appellation of revolt than of civil war. Such was the cafe of the unfortunate duke of Montmorency:-he took up arms against the king, in fupport of the duke of Orléans; and being defeated and taken prifoner at the battle of Caftelnaudari, he lost his life on a fcaffold, by the fentence of the parliament of Toulouse. If he was generally pitied by ali men of worth and fentiment, it was because they viewed him rather as an opponent to the exorbitant power of an imperious minifter, than as a rebel against his fo vereign,—and that his heroic virtues feemed to warrant the purity of his intentions *.

When fubjects take up arms without ceafing to acknowledge The effects the fovereign, and only for the purpose of obtaining a redress of diftinguish- their grievances, there are two reafons for obferving the comed accord- mon laws of war towards them :-First, an apprehenfion left the ing to cafes.

See the hiftorians of the reign of Louis XIII.

çivil war should become more cruel and destructive by the insurgents making retaliation, which, as we have already obferved, they will not fail to do, in return for the severities exercised by the fovereign. 2. The danger of committing great injustice by haftily punithing those who are accounted rebels. The flames of difcord and civil war are not favourable to the proceedings of pure and facred justice; more quiet times are to be waited for. It will be wife in the prince to keep his prifoners till, hav-i ing restored tranquillity, he is able to bring them to a legal

trial.

As to the other effects which the law of nations attributes to public war (See Chap. XII. of this Book), and particularly the acquifition of things taken in war,-fubjects who take up arms against their fovereign without ceafing to acknowledge him, cannot lay claim to the benefit of thofe effects. The booty alone, the movable property carried off by the enemy, is confidered as loft to the owners; but this is only on account of the difficulty of recognising it, and the numberless inconveniences which would arife from the attempt to recover it. All this is usually fettled in the edict of pacification or the act of amnesty.

But when a nation becomes divided into two parties absolutely independent, and no longer acknowledging a common superior, the ftate is diffolved, and the war between the two parties ftands on the fame ground, in every respect, as a public war between two different nations. Whether a republic be fplit into two factions, each maintaining that it alone conftitutes the body of the ftate,-or a kingdom be divided between two competitors for the crown, the nation is fevered into two parties who will mutually term each other rebels. Thus there exift in the state two separate bodies, who pretend to abfolute independence, and between whom there is no judge (§ 293). They decide their quarrel by arms, as two different nations would do. The obligation to ob ferve the common laws of war towards each other is therefore abfolute,-indifpenfably binding on both parties, and the fame which the law of nature impofes on all nations in tranfactions between state and state.

Conduct to

Foreign nations are not to interfere in the internal government§ 296. of an independent ftate (Book II. § 54, &c.). It belongs not to be obferved them to judge between the citizens whom difcord has roufed to by foreiga arms, nor between the prince and his fubjects: both parties are nations. equally foreigners to them, and equally independent of their authority. They may however interpofe their good offices, for the restoration of peace; and this the law of nature prescribes to them (Book II. Ch. I.). But if their mediation proves fruitless, fuch of them as are not bound by any treaty, may, with the view of regulating their own conduct, take the merits of the caufe into confideration, and affift the party which they fhall judge to have right on its fide, in cafe that party requests their affiítance or accepts the offer of it: they are equally at liberty, I fay, to do.

this, as to efpoufe the quarrel of one nation embarking in a war against another. As to the allies of the ftate thus diftracted by civil war, they will find a rule for their conduct in the nature of their engagements, combined with the existing circumstances. Of this we have treated elsewhere. (See Book II. Chap. XII. and particularly §§ 196 and 197.)

Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embaffies.

CHA P. I.

DEACE

Of Peace, and the Obligation to cultivate it.

EACE is the reverse of war: it is that defirable state in which every one quietly enjoys his rights, or, if controverted, amicably difcuffes them by force of argument. Hobbs has had the boldness to affert that war is the natural state of man. But if, by" the natural ftate of man," we understand (as reafon requires that we fhould) that ftate to which he is deftined and called by his nature, peace fhould rather be termed his natural ftate. For it is the part of a rational being to terminate his differences by rational methods; whereas it is the characteristic of the brute creation to decide theirs by force*. Man, as we have already obferved (Prelim. § 10), alone and deftitute of fuccours, would neceffarily be a very wretched creature. He stands in need of the intercourse and affiftance of his fpecies, in order to enjoy the fweets of life, to develop his faculties, and live in a manner fuitable to his nature. Now, it is in peace alone that all these advantages are to be found: it is in peace that men refpect,

*Nam cum fint duo genera decertandi, unum per difceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium fit hominis, hoc belluarum,—confugiendum eft ad posterius, si uti non licet fuperiore. Cicero, de Offic. lib. i. cap. 2.

aflift,

§ I.

What

peace is.

$2.

affift, and love each other: nor would they ever depart from that happy ftate, if they were not hurried on by the impetuofity of their paffions, and blinded by the grofs deceptions of felf-love. What little we have faid of the effects of war will be sufficient to give fome idea of its various calamities; and it is an unfortu nate circumstance for the human race; that the injuftice of unprincipled men should so often render it inevitable.

Nations who are really impreffed with fentiments of humaniObligation ty, who seriously attend to their duty, and are acquainted with of cultivat- theit true and fubftantial interests,-will never feek to promote ing it.

§ 3. The fove

reign's obbigation

to it.

their own advantage at the expense and detriment of other nations: however intent they may be on their own happiness, they will ever be careful to combine it with that of others, and with justice and equity. Thus difpofed, they will neceffarily cultivate peace. If they do not live together in peace, how can they perform thofe mutual and facred duties which nature enjoins them? And this ftate is found to be no lefs neceffary to their happiness than to the discharge of their duties. Thus the law of nature every way obliges them to feek and cultivate peace. That divine law has no other end in view than the welfare of mankind to that object all its rules and all its precepts tend: they are all deducible from this principle, that men should seek their own felicity; and morality is no more than the art of acquiring happinefs. As this is true of individuals, it is equally fo of nations, as muft appear evident to any one who will but take the trouble of reflecting on what we have faid of their com mon and reciprocal duties in the firft chapter of the fecond book.

This obligation of cultivating peace binds the fovereign by a double tie. He owes this attention to his people, on whom war would pour a torrent of evils; and he owes it in the most strict and indifpenfable manner, fince it is folely for the advantage and welfare of the nation that he is intrufted with the government (Book I. 39). He owes the fame attention to foreign nations, whofe happiness like wife is disturbed by war. The nation's duty in this refpect has been fhewn in the preceding chapter; and the fovereign, being invefted with the public authority, is at the fame time charged with all the duties of the fociety, or body of the nation (Book I. § 41).

§ 4. Extent of The nation or the fovereign ought not only to refrain, on their this duty. own part, from difturbing that peace which is fo falutary to mankind: they are moreover bound to promote it as far as lies in their power,-to prevent others from breaking it without neceflity, and to infpire them with the love of justice, equity, and public tranquillity,-iti a word, with the love of peace. It is one of the best offices a fovereign tan render to nations, and to the whole univerfe. What a glorious and amiable character is that of peace-maker! Were a powerful prince thoroughly acquainted with the advantages attending it,-ere he to conceive what pure and effulgent glory he may derive from that endearing character, together with the gratitude, the love, the venera