Penetration occurs at sled speeds of about 13 miles per hour in windshields without the improved interlayer and at about 23 miles per hour with the windshields with the improved interlayer. At subpenetration impact speeds, the injuries are lacerations, abrasions, and gouges in soft tissue. When penetration occurs, the injuries become much more severe, including deep lacerations and facial bone fractures. Incomplete evaluation of the dummy for use in determining the injury from glass impact indicates that the penetration speed can probably be ascertained with the dummy, but the extent of injury will have to be inferred from the conditions of break rather than from actual injuries observable on the dummy. Lawrence M. Patrick, a registered engineer in the State of Michigan, received his B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from Wayne State University in 1942. He received a B.S. degree in aeronautical engineering from Wayne in 1943 and his M.S. degree in mechanical engineering from the same university in 1955. From 1946 to 1955 Patrick was director of research, Wayne Engineering Research Institute, Detroit, Mich. In 1955 he became chief engineer, Ryan Industries, where he remained until 1958. At present Patrick is associate professor, Department of Engineering Mechanics, College of Engineering, Wayne State University. He is also engaged part time as a consulting engineer. Patrick is a member of the American Society for Testing and Materials Committee F-4 on Surgical Implant Materials (performance subcommittee chairman); the Society of Automotive Engineers; the American Standards Association, and the Instrument Society of America. R. P. Daniels, a design engineer for Ford Motor Co., was coauthor of the study. CERTIFICATE OF COMMENDATION: "A FOLLOWUP STUDY OF SEAT BELT USAGE" (By Dean I. Manheimer, Glen D. Mellinger, and Helen M. Crossley) Abstract Personal interviews were conducted with 1,851 Oakland, Calif., motorists between July and October 1963. The study, carried out by the California State Department of Public Health under a grant from the U.S. Public Health Service, focused on ownership and usage of seat belts. Among other findings the study determined that: 1. About one-quarter of the cars driven are equipped with belts. However, the portion of older cars so equipped is much lower. 2. Most cars with seat belts are equipped with only two. Back seat passengers seldom have seat belt protection. 3. About two-thirds of seat belt owners wear them regularly for highway driving, but only half of this number use them regularly around town. 4. The safety value of seat belts is widely accepted, even by drivers who do not own seat belts and by those owners who use them infrequently. Infrequent users get significantly higher scores than others on general measures of risktaking and impulsiveness. 5. The data contradict the pessimistic view that seat belts are a novelty which will be used less and less frequently as time goes on. The majority of owners report that their use of seat belts has no changed since the acquisition of the belts, and those who report changes usually indicate increased use of seat belts over time. 6. Since regularity of seat belt use was found to be closely related to whether or not one participated in the decision to acquire them, the proportion of seat belt owners who use belts regularly will probably decline as a result of mandatory installation, but the absolute number of motorists using belts will increase. Dean I. Manheimer is director of the Family Research Unit, California Department of Public Health, Berkeley. As such, he plans and conducts surveys in the areas of health and safety. He was formerly vice president of International Research Associates in New York, where he conducted survey research for Government agencies and industry, primarily overseas. He has also directed research projects at the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, for the American Jewish Committee and for the U.S. Defense Department. Manheimer received his M.A. degree from New York University in 1939. He is a member of the American Statistical Association, American Sociological Association and the American Association for Public Opinion Research. He has given courses in social research methods at Columbia University and Fairleigh Dickinson University and has served as consultant to numerous professional and business organizations. Glen D. Mellinger, associate director of the Family Research Center, California Department of Public Health, was coprincipal investigator. Helen M. Crossly, now with ArchCross Associates, a survey research consulting firm in Princeton, N.J., was a research specialist at the Family Research Center during the summer and fall she worked on this study. CERTIFICATE OF COMMENDATION: "CAUSAL FACTORS IN MICROBIOLOGICAL LABORATORY ACCIDENTS AND INFECTIONS" (By G. Briggs Phillips) Abstract This research was conducted to uncover causal factors of accidental infections and injuries in microbiological laboratories. It included a review of the literature, collection of data from four institutions, study of data from the U.S. Army Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, and an interview with accident-involved and accident-free laboratory employees. There was good agreement among the data from various sources with regard to (1) accident classes, (2) occupations of employees, (3) severity and nature of injuries and infections, (4) accident agents, (5) known and "unknown" causes of infection, (6) occupational diseases, (7) body parts injured, and (8) modes of infection. Less than 20 percent of the infections were caused by recognized and recorded accidents. As many as 80 percent of the infections were caused by unsafe acts that occurred without realization or recognition. These are described as "micro-mistakes" that result in the release of undetected amounts of infectious microbes to the workers' environment. More Lacerations, burns, and strains accounted for most laboratory injuries. than three-quarters of the injuries were caused by unsafe acts. The most frequent unsafe acts were (i) removing, altering, or not using safety equipment; (ii) performing operations prohibited by regulation, and (iii) failure to wear protective devices. Unsafe conditions caused about 10 percent of the accidents. Dried cultures, infected eggs, and aerosolized cultures were the most hazardous forms of infectious micro-organisms. Carrying out routine diluting and plating procedures or working with infected eggs were the most hazardous tasks. Younger people with less technical training experienced more accidents than older people with more training. Technicians and animal caretakers were involved in biological accidents twice as frequently as expected from their distribution in the exposed population. Comparison of the results of interviews with 33 accident-involved and 33 accident-free persons provided cause data that agreed with that from accident reports but provided more information on human factors involvement. Comparison of the two groups revealed that an accident-free group differed from an accident-involved group with respect to use of tobacco, divorce rate, family size, and strength of family ties. Accident-free workers were more conservative in evaluating safety efficiency and tended to develop defensive work habits to a greater extent than accident-involved individuals. With accident-involved people the lack of accident-perception ability and inflexibility of work habits were important cause factors. Moreover, accident-involved people were inclined toward excessive risk taking and intentional violation of safety regulations. The studies were in agreement with other analysis in regard to human error in accident causation; 82 percent of the accident-involved persons performed unsafe acts. Evidence was developed showing that working at an abnormal rate of speed frequently causes laboratory accidents. Human factors appeared as the most consistent common denominator in the causation of laboratory accidents. Accident-free persons more often appeared able to develop defensive work habits while accident-involved people tended to place excessive reliance on experience gained from accidents in avoiding later accidents. In role-playing situations, in which each accident-free person was asked to give safety instruction to a person taking over his position, it was clear that most persons realized the importance of human factors and admonished their replacements to avoid accident situations by obeying the safety regulations, and by having an awareness and respect for hazardous situations. Finally, the group studies revealed that interviews with people brought to light many facts about accident experiences that had important relationships to accident causation but were not contained in the official accident records. G. Briggs, Phillips received his B.S. degree in bacteriology from the University of Maryland in 1954. In 1965 he received his Ph. D. in safety education from New York University. At present Phillips is assistant director, Industrial Health and Safety Division, U.S. Army Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md. For the past 22 years he has been associated with a research and control program, the object of which is to discover and evaluate microbiological hazards arising from laboratory manipulations of infectious microorganisms and infected animals and to devise means of eliminating occupational infections. (Author's abstract.) AWARDS PRIOR TO 1964 Senator RIBICOFF. Before 1964 were there any awards in the vehicle design field? Mr. BLUMENTHAL. The awards before 1964 were in other areas. Mr. BLUMENTHAL. The research submitted for that date selected for the awards by a panel of experts from universities and research groups did not see fit to select vehicle research at that time for those awards. AUTO INDUSTRY COOPERATION Senator RIBICOFF. Governor, you call on the industry to accelerate the work on vehicle safety design, and you refer to "industrywide procedures." Just what do you have in mind by that? Mr. PYLE. We have discovered in our experience with the industry, that in the development of automotive safety devices they naturally have a tendency to work in consonance with each other, so we are perfectly willing to encourage that sort of thing. For example, in the field of turn signals, windshield glass, dual headlights and various other types of developments, the industry came out generally universally with the same items. As one corporation develops something that is worthy, there almost always follows industrywide recognition of the utility of this item and that it should be added in all cars, not just in the cars of some single organization. Senator RIBICOFF. How do you get them to do it? In other words how do you get the automobile makers not to just play the role of follow the leader but to become leaders? How do you get the automobile industry to be competitive, competitive with design? How do you get them competitive with one another to really develop substantial safety devices? Mr. PYLE. By requiring them to report periodically to the Secretary of Commerce on the progress of the work that they have been doing, as we suggest. Of course, this reinforces the privilege and the prerogatives of GSA to insist on safety standards wherever they are known to be accepted. FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON VEHICLE DESIGN Senator RIBICOFF. Yet, Governor, on page 21, I would assume that what you are saying, that you see no need for Federal legislation relating to vehicle design. Mr. PYLE. I don't think any new legislation is required because I believe that the GSA's present authority here is far greater than is being presently exercised, and it is particularly responsive to this committee, I would think. EXHIBIT 87 SAFETY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION VEHICLE IMPROVEMENT With reference to legislation affecting vehicle design, safety equipment, or specific matters such as tires, there are now three pertinent pieces of Federal legislation in place-GSA specifications law, Beamer resolution, and Baldwin amendment, plus the States preexisting legal responsibilities in this field. The vehicle equipment safety compact was establishment under the Beamer resolution. Individually each of these elements has weaknesses. Collectively, their strength is significant-the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. That is, GSA provides a model to VESC, VESC issues recommended standards and the Secretary of Commerce checks on State use of the standards-this three-way approach can be strong. We have made recommendations for strengthening this machinery: 1. Updating the action program, and congressional review as a policy. 2. An accelerated pace of action by the manufacturers. 3. Higher GSA standards. 4. Investigations of Government vehicle accidents. 5. Strengthen VESC by appropriations. 6. Use the Baldwin amendment to persuade States to set standards equal to what the Federal Government does. 7. Increased Federal support for research. 8. Improved accident facts, with greater Federal support for R. & D. in this field. 9. Congressional review. 10. Supervision by the Executive Office of the President. We believe that, if our recommendations are followed, there will be more rapid attainment of the objective we have been stating for 10 years in this fashion-Vehicles progressively easier to operate safely and minimizing injury potential. Interaction of Vehicle Improvement Forces Senator RIBICOFF. Well, do you suppose, on the basis of GSA adopting a standard, then automatically the automobile industry would do so? Mr. PYLE. This has certainly been the case in recent months. Senator RIBICOFF. Well, it hasn't. Do you think if they hadn't been brought in here to testify that the automobile industry would have gone along with some of the items on the GSA list? Mr. PYLE. That is why we suggest that this committee maintain a continuous review of this whole problem, because we think the pressure of your attention is going to make the difference. Senator RIBICOFF. Well, the difference is this. While I am pleased to assume this role and intend to, it is not basically the function of a congressional committee to run Government policy. We are here in the nature of an oversight group with a job to call attention to shortcomings in the executive branch and elsewhere. Don't you think there should be centered someplace in the executive branch of the Government the responsibility for traffic safety? Shouldn't this be centered someplace in the Federal Government instead of this committee having to hold continuous hearings to try to force the hand of the different people involved.? TRAFFIC SAFETY IN EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Mr. PYLE. That is why we recommend that the Interdepartmental Highway Safety Board be moved to the executive department. Senator RIBICOFF. You know, I am rather surprised that you recommend this, having worked for a President of the United States at one time. Everybody says of their pet project, "Let's put it in the Executive Office of the President." He is the President of the United States. He has plenty of headaches with Vietnam, and he has all the basic problems, of trying to solve the great conflicts of civil rights and the problems of our cities and the health of our Nation, and the tax policy, the economic policy of the country. Do you really think that on a day-to-day basis the President of the United States should be the man responsible to carry out the safety programs of this country? Don't you think that this is something that belongs someplace in a centralized responsibility in some member of the Cabinet of the President of the United States instead of the Executive Offices of the President? Mr. PYLE. Well, if the Senator will permit, I recall the days of the Kestenbaum report on the Federal-State relationship and the recommendation of the report that an executive in the President's Office officially be named to preside over this activity. I happened to be the one assigned to that duty and I very happily served the President in this regard, and I hope very usefully. Ultimately, it was decided that there should be an intergovernmental relations commission permanently established by the Congress to do the work. I see nothing out of order about a problem of this gravity being moved into the White House for coordination, until such time, 2, 3, 5 years perhaps, as we determine what the next step should be. But as of the moment, I think this is the proper place for it, and I have no reluctance whatsoever about recommending it. Senator RIBICOFF. But again this means further delay, further procrastination, and again you have the problem of interdepartmental coordination. I think one of the great weaknesses in the Federal Government today is the proliferation of agencies assigned to do the same type of work. I think the time has come to pull all these functions together, whether in the field of transportation or the urban field or the field of traffic safety; shouldn't the Secretary of Commerce or the new Department of Transportation, if Congress grants this new Department at the President's request, be the place where you could centralize the responsibility of highway safety into one part of the executive branch |