Arp v. Allis-Chalmers Co. 130 Wis. 454. sound mind" to "appear by attorney in every action or proceeding by or against him in any court except criminal actions." Sec. 2585, Stats. 1898. There is certainly no presumption that Irving Bovee was not of full age and of sound mind. He gave and signed the undertaking on such appeal as principal, and the same was approved by the county court. We have no doubt but that the circuit court had jurisdiction by virtue of the appeal. Manifestly, there was a mistrial. By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. ARP, Appellant, VS. ALLIS-CHALMERS COMPANY, Respondent. October 15, 1906-January 29, 1907. Limitation of actions: Non-residents: Foreign cause of action. Subd. 5, sec. 4222, Stats. 1898 (providing, among other things, that no action to recover damages for personal injuries shall be maintained unless a written notice thereof containing certain prescribed statements shall be served on the person responsible for the injury within one year after the happening of the event), is a limitation statute admitting of no exception, applies to both foreign and domestic causes of action, and acts like any other statute of limitations, extinguishing the right in a domestic cause of action as to all jurisdictions, and extinguishing the right in a foreign cause of action sought to be enforced in this state by a non-resident, as far as its enforcement in our courts is concerned. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: ORREN T. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. For the appellant there was a brief by Robert N. McMynn and C. H. Van Alstine, attorneys, and Darrow, Masters & Wilson, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. McMynn and Mr. Van Alstine. Arp v. Allis-Chalmers Co. 130 Wis. 454. For the respondent there was a brief by Vilas, Vilas & Freeman, and oral argument by E. P. Vilas. WINSLOW, J. This action was commenced August 10, 1904, and was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant as the result of an accident which happened at the defendant's shop in the city of Chicago, March 31, 1903. The defendant is a foreign corporation operating a manufacturing plant in Wisconsin, and on the 17th of September, 1901, had duly filed with the secretary of state an instrument appointing a resident attorney in this state as required by sec. 4231, Stats. 1898. The defendant by answer pleaded as a defense that part of subd. 5, sec. 4222, Stats. 1898, which provides that no action to recover damages for personal injuries shall be maintained unless a written notice thereof containing certain prescribed statements shall be served on the person responsible for the injury within one year after the happening of the event. It was admitted on trial that no notice as required by said subdivision had been served. A verdict for the defendant was directed, and from judgment thereon the plaintiff appeals. The controlling question presented is whether that part of sec. 4222 above referred to applies to a cause of action arising in another state when a resident of that state brings suit thereon against a resident of Wisconsin in a Wisconsin court. A few well-established principles seem to answer this question in the affirmative. The clause in question is a statute of limitations. Relyea v. Tomahawk P. & P. Co. 102 Wis. 301, 78 N. W. 412; O'Donnell v. New London, 113 Wis. 292, 89 N. W.511; Meisenheimer v. Kellogg, 106 Wis. 30, 81 N. W. 1033; Lawton v. Waite, 103 Wis. 244, 79 N. W. 321; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003. True, its operation is somewhat different from the operation of other statutes of limitation in that it acts upon the time within which a preliminary Arp v. Allis-Chalmers Co. 130 Wis. 454. notice shall be served instead of the time within which the summons shall be served, but it is none the less a limitation. upon the right to maintain the action. Troschansky v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 110 Wis. 570, 86 N. W. 156. It is the long-settled doctrine of this court that, when a statute of limitations has completely operated, it extinguishes the right of action by taking away the remedy. Eingartner v. Ill. S. Co. 103 Wis. 373, 79 N. W. 433. In the absence of any saving clause our statutes of limitation operate against nonresident plaintiffs who bring actions in the courts of this state as well as against residents. Winter v. Winter, 101 Wis. 494, 77 N. W. 883; Fields v. Estate of Mundy, 106 Wis. 383, 82 N. W. 343. Were the rule otherwise the result would be that nonresident litigants coming into our courts to enforce a foreign cause of action would possess greater rights and privileges than citizens of our own state. They are entitled to the same right and privileges-no more, no less. Eingartner v. Ill. S. Co. 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664. This does not mean that our statutes of limitation have any extraterritorial effect so far as foreign causes of action are concerned. They do not reach over into Illinois and extinguish a right of action arising there. It only means that the foreign right sought to be enforced in this state after our statute has run has ceased to exist so far as regards its enforcement in this state, although the right and all remedies to enforce it in the state of Illinois. remain entirely unaffected. Of course, when a cause of action arising here between residents of Wisconsin is barred here the right is extinguished in all jurisdictions, but no one could reasonably claim that because it could not be enforced under the limitation laws of a sister state it is barred here. So we hold that the provision in question is a limitation statute admitting of no exception; that it applies to both foreign and domestic causes of action; that it acts like any other statute of limitations, extinguishing the right in a domestic cause of action as to all jurisdictions, and extinguishing the Baraboo Land, Mining & Leasing Co. v. Winter, 130 Wis. 457. right in a foreign cause of action sought to be enforced in this state by a nonresident, as far as its enforcement in our courts is concerned. This accords with the decision of the trial court. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. TIMLIN, J., took no part. BARABOO LAND, MINING & LEASING COMPANY, Respondent, VS. WINTER, imp., Appellant. December 6, 1906-January 29, 1907. Vendor and purchaser: Construction of contracts: Purchase or option? 1. A contract on which plaintiff founded its action provided that whereas plaintiff was the owner, as vendee, of certain leases and options on certain lands, describing them, it, for a valuable consideration, did thereby grant, bargain, and sell, assign, set over, and deliver to the defendant all its right, title, and interest in and to the options thereinbefore described, upon the following terms and conditions, to wit: "With the express understanding and agreement that this contract is to be in force for and during the period of nineteen months from the date hereof, and that on or before the expiration of said nineteen months the said [defendant] is to pay to the [plaintiff] for such options for all the lands described therein the sum of $300 for each and every acre thereof, . . . in other words, the whole 1934 acres to be taken and paid for at the rate of $300 per acre. At which time and upon the payment of which said sum the [plaintiff] is to deliver to or cause to be delivered to the [defendant] a deed of the premises described in said options." The contract further provided that "all liabilities attendant as on the option herein described, which are therein imposed" upon the plaintiff, were assumed by the defendant. Held: (1) The instrument was not an option to purchase, but an express sale and transfer of the plaintiff's right, title, and interest in the options to defendant, an assumption by defendant of liabilities thereunder, and an express promise by him to pay Baraboo Land, Mining & Leasing Co. v. Winter, 130 Wis. 457. the stipulated price per acre on or before nineteen months, with a promise on the part of plaintiff to deed the lands to defendant. (2) The provision that the contract was to be in force for nineteen months was not repugnant to or inconsistent with the express agreement to pay. (3) The covenants in the contract were mutual. (4) It was immaterial whether the options transferred gave the right to possession or not, since the options secured to plaintiff the right to acquire the ownership of the lands thereby covered and transfer the title to the defendant. 2. In such case the recital of a "valuable consideration" did not necessarily mean that the parties stipulated for a consideration separate and outside of the alleged purchase price of the lands, since a nominal consideration would satisfy the formal recital of consideration usually inserted in contracts. 3. The fact that plaintiff would make a large profit was not significant, since it could not be inferred, for the purpose of construing a contract to purchase into an option, that the stipulated price was unreasonable. APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Sauk county: E. RAY STEVENS, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court for Sauk county overruling the demurrer of the defendant Winter to the complaint of the plaintiff. The complaint is as follows: "(Title of Case.) "The above-named plaintiff, appearing herein by its attor-. neys, complains of the defendants, and for cause of action alleges: That the plaintiff herein is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Wisconsin, doing business therein, with its principal place of business at the city of Baraboo, Sauk county, Wisconsin. That the defendant, Emil Winter, is a capitalist, residing at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, who at the times hereinafter stated was a capitalist engaged in mining operations and in the purchase of lands and options in Sauk county, Wisconsin, and other localities, for the purpose of obtaining and holding mines and mining lands. That said defendant William C. Rodgers was at the times hereinafter stated a duly authorized representative and agent of said defendant Emil Winter, del |