75. EJECTMENT-Defense of Outstanding Title.-Defendant in ejectment may show outstanding title in stranger.-McGuire v. Blount, U. S. S. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1.

76. EJECTMENT-Voidable Tax Deed.-One who brings ejectment against a holder of a voidable tax deed may recover on showing that when defendant took possession plaintiff had for several years held peaceable possession under a claim of ownership.-Penrose v. Cooper, Kan., 81 Pac. Rep. 499.

77. ELECTIONS-Designation of Parties.-The name "Social Democratic Party" held substantially the same as "Democratic Party," and use thereof is prohibited by Election Law, § 56, Laws 1901, p. 1669, ch. 654 —In re Social Democratic Party, N. Y., 75 N. E. Rep. 415.

78. ELECTIONS-Preparation of Ballot. That elector voting straight party ticket may prepare it more quickly than one who does not held not an interference with freedom of election, within Const., art. 1, § 5.—Oughton v. Black, Pa., 61 Atl. Rep. 346.

79. EMBEZZLEMENT-Evidence.-In prosecution for embezzlement of fee paid to attorney for procuring bondsmen, evidence that he has tried to procure the bondsmen held admissible.-State v. Jones, Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 366.

80. EMBEZZLEMENT-Evidence.-On trial for embezzlement, proof that the money embezzled was received in several sums, at different times, and from different per. sons, will support a verdict finding the aggregate sum as the amount of a single embezzlement.-State v. Moyer, W. Va., 52 S. E. Rep 30.

81. EMBEZZLEMENT-What Constitutes.-Where under a contract an agent is employed to collect money on commission, he must turn over the whole amount co lected before being entitled to commissions.-State v. Moyer, W. Va., 52 S. E. Rep. 30.

82. EMINENT DOMAIN-Appearance to Contest Merits of Condemnation.-A general appearance to a contest of the merits of a condemnation proceeding constitutes a waiver of error in denying a motion to quash the service of summons -Eddleman v. Union County Traction & Power Co., Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 510.

83. EQUITY-Title to Land.-Courts of equity have at least concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law to adjudicate title to land.-O'Brien v. Murphy, Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 700.

84. ESTOPPEL-Permitting Title in Another's Name.Where a wife did not know that her husband had purchased property with her money in his own name, she was not estopped to assert title as against his creditors. -Mayer v. Kane, N. J., 61 Atl. Rep. 374.

85. EVIDENCE - Declarations of Vendor after Sale.— Declarations of a seller, made after the sale, not in the presence of or known to the buyer, held inadmissible to defeat the buyer's title.-Bruce v. Bruce, Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 435.

86. EVIDENCE-Letters.-A letter, purporting to have been written by defendant to plaintiff, held admissible on proof that it was signed in defendant's name by its sales manager. - Garfield v. Peerless Motor Car Co., Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 695.

87. EVIDENCE-Opinion of Expert.-It is not proper to permit a medical expert to give an opinion based on the testimony as he has construed it from having heard it.Elgin, A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 436.

88. EVIDENCE Records of Fire Department. The record of the fire department of a city, containing a report of a fire, held hearsay, in an action for damages for the fire caused by defendant's negligence.-Over v. Dehne, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 664.

89. EVIDENCE-Terms of Lease.-For a tenant, holding under a written lease, to recover on an alleged oral agreement of landlord to repair, the tenant must show that the agreement was collateral to the lease.-Greene v. Kerr, 95 N. Y. Supp. 569.

90. EVIDENCE-Written Contract. Parol evidence held inadmissible to show that certain requirements were not included in a contract made by the conditional acceptance of plaintiff's bid.-Sundmacher v. Lloyd, Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 368.

91. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-Effect of Discharge of Administrator.-County court held without jurisdiction to appoint another administrator de bonis non after the term at which a foriner administrator was discharged and the estate ordered closed.-Wallace v. Turner, Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 432.

92. EXPLOSIVES-Negligence.-In an action for death by the explosion of certain powder magazines, defend. ant's negligence specified held efficient causes of the accident.-Oulighan v. Butler, Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 726.

93. FEDERAL COURTS-Questions Reviewable.- Decision of state court construing state statutes so as to remove any question of repugnancy to the federal constitution cannot be reviewed by Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.-Tampa Waterworks Co. v. City of Tampa, U. S. 8. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23. 94. FEDERAL COURTS Decision on Non Federal Grounds.-Supreme Court of United States can review by writ of error decision of state court sustaining a statute claiming to impair contract obligations.—Attorney General of State of Michigan v. Lowrey, U. S. S. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27.

95. FIRE INSURANCE - Agents. - One who employs a broker to obtain insurance does not thereby incur any liability to pay the broker commissions.-Arndt v. Miller, Daybill & Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 604.

96. FIRE INSURANCE — Assignment Before Loss.-A clause prohibiting the assignment of policy does not prohibit its transfer as collateral security.- ScottishUnion & National Ins. Co. v. Andrews & Matthews, Tex., 69 S. W. Rep. 419.

97. FIRE INSURANCE-Property Insured -A policy insuring certain personal property under a trade name held not void because the property was owned distributively by certain persons doing business under such name.-New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Wail, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 668.

98. FRAUD-Ignorance of Truth of Representations.One who makes representations, which he does not know to be true, to another, whom he knows has no knowledge as to the truth thereof, is guilty of fraud.— Western Cattle Brokerage Co. v. Gates, Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 382.

99, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Limitations.-Suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance held not barred, the debt not being barred, and adverse possession of the land not having been for the statutory period.-James v. Mallory, Ark,89 S. W. Rep. 472.

100. GARNISHMENT-Construction of Statute. While the garnishment statute is to be liberally construed, the remedy is purely legal, and every case must be brought within the scope of the statute.-Wheeler v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 455,

101. HABEAS CORPUS-Violation of Court's Order.Where petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings for the custody of a child violated the order of court awarding her such custody by moving with the child into another county, respondent to the proceedings should have applied for relief to the court whose order was violated.Willis v. Willis, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 655

102. HOMICIDE - Criminal Negligence of Physician.Where a physician treating a patient does nothing that a skillful person might not do, and death results merely from an error of judgment or an inadvertent mistake, the physician is not liable.-Hampton v. State, Fla., 39 So. Rep. 421.

103. HOMICIDE-Provoked Quarrel. One who provokes a difficulty may defend himself against violence disproportionate to the seriousness of the provocation. -Sams v. State, Ga., 52 S. E. Rep. 18.

104. HOMICIDE-Specific Intent.-In murder in the first

degree, a specific intent to take life must be shown. while in murder in the second degree it is not necessary to prove such intent.-Petty v. State, Ark., 89 S. W. Rep. 465.

105. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Conveyance to Wife.-Where a husband conveys lands directly to his wife, he cannot convey the legal title to another, or incumber it by a deed of trust or otherwise.-Swiger v. Swiger, W. Va., 52 S. E. Rep. 23.

106. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Loss of Service.-In an action for alienation of affections of plaintiff's husband, an amendment to the complaint held not objectionable as materially changing the case made.-Gregg v. Gregg, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 674.

107. INDIANS-Lease of Lands.-Where a party holds a lease of Indian lands providing that he will not sublet without the approval of the secretary of the interior, a subletting without the consent of such secretary conveys no interest.-Reeves & Co. v. Sheets, Okla., 82 Pac. Rep. 487.

108. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Following Language of Statute.-To render an indictment good by fol. lowing the language of a statute, it must contain a statement of every necessary to constitute the offense.Commonwealth v. Gregory, Ky., 89 S. W. Rep. 477.

109. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-Larceny.-Where an indictment for larceny lays the ownership of the goods in a firm, without stating the names of the partners, it is fatally defective.-Buffington v. State, Ga., 52 S. E. Rep. 19.

--

110. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION Joinder of Parties.-Principals and accessories before the fact may be joined in the same indictment, and in one count.Rawlins v. State, Ga., 52 S. E. Rep. 1.

111. INFANTS-Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem.While a guardian ad litem should be appointed by a formal order, yet the absence of such order is not fatal to his appointment where the fact of appointment appears by recitals or reference in the record. - Crane v. Stafford, Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 424.

112. INJUNCTION-Trespass.- Inconvenience and an. noyance, resulting from relatively harmless trespasses on real property, authorizes the issuance of an injunction to prevent their continued repetition.-O'Brien v. Murphy, Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 700.

113. INSOLVENCY - Fraudulent Preferences.-A creditor, receiving a fraudulent transfer to secure in part a pre-existing debt, held not entitled to a lien to the amount of the loans made after the transfer and on the faith of it.-Bolster v. Graves, Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 714.

114. JUDGES-Disqualification.-A judge who is a quasi party to a suit in a bill filed by plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and others, similarly situated, and who will have the right to come into the suit, is disqualified.-City of Grafton v. Holt, W. Va., 52 S. E. Rep. 21. 115 JUDGES - Reargument After Term Expired. Where a justice ordering reargument had been re-elected, and his term expired and new term commenced intermediate the order and the hearing, held that he had authority to proceed.-Jewett v. Schmidt, 95 N. Y. Supp. 631.

116. JUDGMENT-Entry Nunc Pro Tunc.-Where an infant, born after application for final judgment was submitted, was a necessary party, the court had authority to direct the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc in order to obviate any difficulty arising during the court's retention of the case for consideration.-Jewett v. Schmidt, 95 N. Y. Supp. 631.

117. JUDGMENT-Interrogatories.-Defendant held not entitled to a judgment on interrogatories based on complaint, notwithstanding the general verdict disregarding answers to interrogatories on cross-complaint.New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Wall, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 668.

118. JUDGMENT-Merger of Cause of Action.-Where a note is merged in a judgment, the ownership of the note and the running of limitations against the same are immaterial issues in an action based on a claim of subro

gation to the lien of the judgment. Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 438.

Brown v. Rash,

119. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata. A judgment for defendants, in an action by a widow, under the dram shop act, is not a bar to an action by the children.-Stecher v. People, Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 501.

120. JUDICIAL SALES-Laches.-One seeking to set aside a judicial sale on the ground of fraud is not chargeable with laches until he has acquired knowledge of the facts or of circumstances sufficient to charge him with such knowledge.-Mansfield v. Wallace Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 682.

121. JUDICIAL SALES-Technical Objections.-Technical objections to regularity of judicial sale during Spanish control of Florida will not be permitted to defeat the sale and conveyance thereunder, where sale has been held sufficient to convey title by commissioners appoint. ed under Act Cong. May 8, 1822, ch. 129, 3 Stat. 709.-McGuire v. Blount, U. S. S. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1.

122. JURY-Challenges by State.-Where two are tried jointly for a capital offense, and neither waives his peremptory challenges, the state is entitled to one-half of the number of challenges allowed to both. - Rawlins v. State, Ga., 52 S. E. Rep. 1.

123. JURY-Garnishment Proceedings.-A demand for a jury trial by claimants of credits garnished in a police court, made at the time claimants appealed to the superior court, was in time.-Hubbard v. Lamburn, Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 707

124. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Notice to Quit.—Where no objection to the introduction of a notice to quit signed by the landlord's attorneys was made, the tenant thereby conceded that the attorneys were authorized to give the notice.-McClung v. McPherson, Oreg., 81 Pac. Rep.

567.

125. LIFE ESTATES-Rights of Life Tenant.-A life tenant held not authorized to mine subsurface minerals in the land during his life estate; his predecessor in title not having so used the premises.-Hill v. Ground, Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 343.

126. LIFE INSURANCE-Sufficiency of Notice of Time for Paying Premium.-Prefixing the words, "the conditions of your policy provide," to the notice of the time for payment of premium required by Laws N. Y. 1892, ch. 690, § 92, held not to render such notice insufficient as a basis for forfeiture for nonpayment.-Nederland Life Ins. Co. v. Meinert, U. S. S. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15.

127. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Anticipation of Defenses. -Where a complaint alleged facts excusing failure to sooner institute the action, an answer alleging such failure is demurrable.-Ausplund v. Ætna Indemnity Co., Oreg., 81 Pac. Rep. 577.

128. MARRIAGE-Civil Contract. Marriage is a civil contract, and it is not indispensable that the minister should be present to confirm the contract.-Reaves v. Reaves, Okla., 82 Pac. Rep. 490. 129. MASTER AND SERVANT - Damages for Wrongful Discharge. The money earned by an employee wrong. fully discharged, made in doing other work during the term of the employment, must be considered in determining his loss.-Tenzer v. Gilmore, Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 341.

130. MASTER AND SERVANT- - Defective Appliances.Where plaintiff undertook to operate faster a stamping machine, on defendant's promise to repair as soon as certain work was done, defendant cannot escape liability because the promise was indefinite.-Anderson v. Seropian, Cal., 81 Pac. Rep. 521.

131. MASTER AND SERVANT-Defective Appliances.The rule, relieving an employer buying appliances from a reputable dealer, held not to apply where on a superficial examinatian the weakness of the appliances was discoverable.-Feeney v. York Mfg. Co., Mass., 75 N. E. Rep. 733.

132. MASTER AND SERVANT-Notice of Defective Car Coupling. In order to charge a railroad company with notice of a defective car, it is not necessary that such notice be given to the particular official designated by

its rules.-Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Walter, Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 441.

133. MASTER AND SERVANT - Defective Platform.Where a master has furnished reasonable material for a movable platform built by the men constructing the embankment, he has fulfilled his duty.-Fukare v. Kerbaugh, N. J., 61 Atl. Rep. 376.

134. MASTER AND SERVANT-Extra Compensation.-A servant regularly employed at a stipulated compensa. tion held not entitled to recover for extra services; no remuneration being contracted for.- Murray v. John Griffiths & Son, 95 N. Y. Supp. 573.

135. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow Servants.-Where an act or omission that caused the injury to a servant pertained to the duty of an operative, the employee performing it was a fellow servant.- Larsen v. LeDoux, Idaho, 81 Pac. Rep. 600.

136. MASTER AND SERVANT - Liability for Injury to Third Person.-The proprietor of a saloon held liable for injury to a customer by a servant serving a drugged drink. Tway v. Salvin, 95 N. Y. Supp. 653.

137. MASTER AND SERVANT-Mental Capacity of Servant. In an action for injuries to a servant, question of servant's mental capacity, etc., may be considered on the issues of assumed risk and contributory negligence. -Drake v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 407.

138. MASTER AND SERVANT Negligence. - Where a servant did not know all the facts, and the master knew of the danger and did not warn him, then the master would be responsible for any injury. — Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Sharber, Kan., 81 Pac. Rep. 476.

139. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence of Foreman.— Foreman of a switching crew held guilty of negligence in failing to revoke an order given for certain switching.-Kennedy v. Kansas City, St. J., etc., R. Co., Mo., 89 S. W. Rep. 370.

140. MASTER AND SERVANT-Safe Place to Work. —A master must take reasonable care to supply a reasonably safe place for his servant to work, and whether he has done so is for the jury.-Kalker v. Hedden, N. J., 61 Atl. Rep. 395.

141. MASTER AND SERVANT-Safe Place to Work.-The duty a railroad company engaged in repairing its track owes to a brakeman engaged in shifting cars is to provide rules for his protection.-Smith v. Boston & M. R. R., N. H., 61 Atl. Rep. 359.

142. MASTER AND SERVANT-Wrongful Discharge. -It is a good defense to an action for wrongful discharge of a servant that he disobeyed orders to attend his employers' store at 8 o'clock in the mornings.-Costet v. Jeantet, 95 N. Y. Supp. 638.

143. MORTGAGES - Deed from Trustee. - Deed from trustee in mortgage conveys whatever title he had. Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. v. Washington, P. & C. R. Co., U. S. S. C., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25.

144. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure.-A mortgagor who has conveyed his equity of redemption has no interest in an action to foreclose the mortgage, and is not a necessary party defendant.-Bernard v. Shemwell, N. Car., 52 S. E. Rep. 64.

145. MORTGAGES Rights of Purchaser under Foreclosure Sale.-On foreclosure sale, the purchaser is not entitled to the rents and profits during the period of redemption, though there is an express provision to that effect in the trust deed.-Schaeppi v. Bartholomæ, Ill. 75 N. E. Rep. 447.

146. MORTGAGES-Time in Which Second Mortgagee may Redeem.-Time for second mortgagee to redeem on foreclosure of first mortgage must be reasonable, and, if not, will be extended by supreme court.-Rodman v. Quick, Ill.. 75 N. E. Rep. 465.

147. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Confirmation of Bond Issue. If an election to determine the issuance of bonds was legally held, a failure to provide for their payment before proceedings to validate the issue would not pre

vent a judgment of conflrmation.-Oliver v. City of Elberton, Ga., 52 S. E. Rep. 15.

148. MINES AND MINERALS-Construction of Lease.-A finding in an action for rent under a lease of oil and gas land held not a finding of such part performance as prevents the lessee from exercising the right to terminate the lease.-Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 659.

149. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Obstruction in Street. -A city held not liable for collision of a vehicle with an obstruction in the street; it having put a proper light thereon, and not having notice that it was taken away.Gedroice v. City of New York, 95 N. Y. Supp. 645.

150. NEGLIGENCE-Directed Verdict. - Where all rea. sonable minds would, on certain admitted facts, agree that an injury was the result of plaintiff's negligence, the court may direct a verdict for plaintiff.-Hewes v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., Ill., 75 N. E. Rep. 515.

151. NEGLIGENCE-Fright Resulting in Injury.-A cause of action exists for fright caused by the wrongful act of another resulting in physical injuries.-Hendrix v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 461.

152. NEGLIGENCE-Prior Physical Condition Affecting Personal Injury.-A plaintiff, in an action for personal injury negligently inflicted, held entitled to recover for an injury only aggravating a previously diseased condi tion.-Green v. Houston Electric Co., Tex., 89 S. W. Rep.

154. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Jurisdiction of Federal Court.-A petition for removal, filed by trustees of an unincorporated association, brought in as defendants in a suit against the association, by order of the court, after the service of process on them, held to have been in time.-Robert v. Pineland Club, U. S. C. C., D. S. Car. 139 Fed. Rep. 1001.

155. SALES-Assignment.-Where vendor on a conditional sale has delivered possession and assigns the contract to a third party, the assignee cannot have an attach ment on failure of the purchaser to make a payment.Barton v. Groseclose, Idaho, 81 Pac. Rep. 623.

156. TRIAL-Special Findings.-An itemized statement, made by the court, of the damages awarded to plaintiff from fire set by sparks from defendant's foundry, held not to make the finding of damages a special finding.Over v. Dehne, Ind., 75 N. E. Rep. 664.

157. USURY-Limitations.-Where there is a series of usurious transactions, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the transactions are closed.-Slover v Union Bank, Tenn., 89 S. W. Rep. 399.

158. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Bona Fide Purchasers. -The record of deed of F to R of land owned by the state, equitable title to which R afterwards acquires, held not notice to purchasers from C after patent was issued to him.-Rozell v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., Ark., 89 S. W. Rep. 469.

150. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Time for Performance in Contract for Sale of Land.-Where a contract for sale of land fails to specify time for performance, the law will imply a reasonable time, and the contract may be specifically enforced.-Ullsperger v. Meyer, Ill., 75 N. E. Rep.

482.

161. WAREHOUSEMEN- Action on Receipt. - A ware. house receipt in the hands of a subsequent bona fide holder held not subject to the defense that it was issued by mistake.-Star Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Meridian Cotton Co., Miss., 39 So. Rep. 417.

162. WITNESSES Conversations with Deceased Persons.-Plaintiffs having introduced evidence concerning conversations between defendant and certain persons since deceased, defendant could testify with reference thereto.-Hurd v. Fleck, Colo., 82 Pac. Rep. 485.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MARCH 9, 1906.

SOMETHING WITH REFERENCE TO CONFLICTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF MANY STATES.

If a statute is repealed in a state the business status of acts done in view of that statute are not affected by the repeal. If, on the other hand, an act has been done in accordance with the judge-made law, no matter if immense interests are rested on it, no one can tell when the court will change its base and thereby upset all calculations based on the previous law.

We have called attention in the last six months to several opinions of the Illinois Supreme Court, in which the previous opinions were overturned with as little compunction as though the matters concerned were holiday affairs. There is nothing more important in the affairs of a state than that of having sound and stable laws. If the attention of the attorneys in the various states inflicted with conflicting decisions, is not fully roused to the need of a change, the necessary reforms will be slow in gathering the force necessary for action. The attorneys individually and through their bar associations should be moving in this direction and not only see to it that good judicial material is chosen but also that enough judges are secured to keep up with the work, and to do this there probably should be better pay attached to the office. The very best legal ability ought to be in the supreme court of a state.

We take an illustration of the careful attention given previous opinions by the Supreme Court of Missouri from one of Judge Seymour D. Thompson's opinions while he was on the Court of Appeals bench in Missouri. It is found in 41 Mo. App. 379 in the case of Ashbrook v. Letcher, as follows:

The statute (R. S. 1879, sec. 4010) after providing that parties shall not be disqualified from testifying as witnesses, contains this proviso creating an exception to the rule thus established: 'Provided that in actions where one of the original parties to the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial is dead, or is shown to the court to be insane, 'the other party shall not be admitted to tes

tify in his own favor.' This statute has been the subject of many adjudications, and no very consistent line of interpretation can be deduced from the decisions. Some of them have been overruled, in terms, by subsequent decisions; others have been overruled without mentioning them. The supreme court started out by drawing attention to the purpose of the statute which abolished the common law rule of exclusion and retained the above exceptions to the new rule thus created." In the first opinion in which the statute was construed, it was said: "The great object and purpose of the law was to destroy the restrictions and incapacities which operated as a rule of exclusion by the law of evidence, and to permit every person, inclusive of parties, to give evidence; to allow all, without regard to interest, even though they were parties to the suit, to disclose all the facts within their knowledge or possession, and let whatever credibility they might be entitled to be passed upon by the jury. This may be calculated to draw forth the truth, though we entertain serious doubts about the wisdom of the enactment. But it was seen that where one of the parties was dead or disqualified by reasons of insanity, the parties would not stand on an even footing. He would be unable to oppose his oath to that of the opposite party, and, therefore, the party living or sane was precluded from testifying." Stanton v.

precluded from

Ryan, 41 Mo. 514. In the next decision in which the construction of the statute came before the court, the reason of the exceptions which the legislature reserved to the new rule which it thus created was pointed out, i. e., that it was to prevent the living party from having an undue and unfair advantage. Looker v. Davis, 47 Mo. 140, 146. "The object of the law," said the court in the next case in which the statute came before them, was to prevent one party from testifying to a contract in issue, when the lips of the other party were closed, so that his version of the contract could not be given." Such being the purpose of the statute, an effort is discovered on the part of the supreme court so to construe it as to give effect to that purpose. To this end the court has, on the one hand extended it to the cases within its spirit but not within its letter, and has, on the other hand, denied its application to cas es within the letter, but not within the spirit.

Thus it has been held on the one hand, that where one of two parties justly bound by a contract is dead, the adverse party is not thus disqualified as a witness in an action on the contract between himself and the survivor. Fulkerson v. Thornton, 68 Mo. 468; Nugent v. Curran, 77 Mo. 323. On the other hand it has been held that where, in such a case, the transaction has been had with one of two partners who has since died, the opposite party is not competent as a witness to prove what has passed between him and a deceased partner in respect to the transaction. Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo. 302. To the same effect, see Williamson v. Perkins, 83 Mo. 379. So where the other party to a contract is a corporation and the corporation has been dissolved, and is hence dead in the sense of the law, this does not disqualify the opposite party as a witness, since the statute means natural and not artificial death, and refers to death of persons and not of artificial bodies. Williams V. Edwards, 94 Mo. 447, 450. Yet this, it is perceived, is within the letter of the statute but obviously not within its meaning. Williams v. Edwards, 94 Mo. 451." In the last citation, after citing numerous instances, the learned judge says (p. 382): "Decisions could be multiplied showing the manner in which the statute has been construed and applied by the court of last resort in this state. They would show that scarcely a position has been taken in one case which has not either been denied or ignored in some other case. The court started out with holding, though with some hesitation, that the statute only applies so as to exclude as a witness one who at once is a party to the contract, which is the subject of the suit and a party to the suit itself." Then he cites eleven cases predicated on the case of Looker v. Davis, 47 Mo. 14, which he says was "long the law of this state." "In all these cases,' says Judge Thompson, "Looker v. Davis, supra, was cited with approval and in some of them its doctrine was applied. Finally the supreme court, without citing Looker v. Davis at all, overruled that decision, and all the subsequent cases which had followed it, in an opinion in which the court said that 'the rules of evidence should not, like the color of the chameleon, change because of their former surroundings. Meier v. Thieman, 90 Mo. 433."

This illustration is sufficient to give charac ter to our oft-repeated efforts to call attention to the carelessness of many of the supreme court judges of some of our states, in writing opinions without citing previous opinions on the same question, and shows the ground to be well taken by lawyers in those states who make complaint against the vaccilating attitude of their courts of last resort on imporant questions of law. This is a condition, not a theory. The question is, what will the profession do about it? The profession will very soon lose the confidence of the public who look to it for advice if their opinions based on previous decisions of their courts of last resort are shattered by a subsequent case overruling or essentially modifying the decision on a former case. More sanctity should be attached to previous decisions of a court, even if wrong, and more respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

SLANDER · EXTENDING BY INNUENDO THE MEANING OF WORDS BEYOND THEIR NATURAL IMPORT.-Many false and opprobrious epithets not actionable in themselves often convey a meaning to the ordinary mind which is infamous. Nevertheless the rule of law seems to be well settled that an innuendo cannot extend the meaning of words beyond their natural import; it can only serve to explain some matter already expressed; it may show the application, but cannot add to or enlarge or change the sense of words. This principle is affirmed and applied in the recent case of Feast v. Auer, 90 S. W. Rep. 564, where the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that calling a woman "a dirty, vile woman" does not charge her with the offense of adultery, and is not actionable, and that the innuendo which some people might draw from the epithet (i. e. adulterous intercourse) was not sufficient to extend the ordinary meaning of the words used.

In this particular case the appellant charged the appellee with slander. It was averred in the petition that the appellee was a Catholic priest; that he had been in charge of St. John's Church as a priest for many years; that she and the ap pellee had a slight disagreement over a trivial matter; that the appellee became hostile towards her; that shortly thereafter, while the appellee was delivering a sermon to his congregation at St. John's Church, he said of and concerning her in the presence of the congregation that "she (meaning the appellant) is a dirty vile woman," thereby meaning and intending to have the hearers understand that she "was an immoral woman, a woman without virtue, and a woman of genera