control of such state, they are nevertheless subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, as are other navigable waters, if used for carrying on interstate traffic.1 Sec. 10. Foreign waters. In law a vessel upon the high seas is a portion of the territory of the state or country in which its owner resides, and the fact that a maritime tort, such as a collision, occurred on navigable waters lying within the territory of a foreign country, constitutes no objection to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and suits brought for the same in the United States are tried according to the principles and practice of the admiralty courts of this country, unless the law of the flags of the respective ships be the same and different from the general maritime law in force here, when the law of the flag will prevail. In controversies between foreign ships and ship-owners, the jurisdiction of American admiralty courts is purely discretion ary. The right of federal courts to determine controversies between foreign vessels when within their jurisdiction is as full and complete as over ships of the United States, and our courts rarely refuse to entertain such actions if they deem it necessary to promote justice and equity." And it matters not that the collision occurred beyond the limits of our shores and upon the high seas, and between vessels of foreign ownership and build." Collision defined: The term collision, in the strict nautical and legal acceptation of the term, means the impinging of 1 The B. & C., 18 Fed. R. 543; Ma- was a Russian ship owned by resi loney V. The City of Milwaukee, 1 dents of Bremen, and the other a Fed. R. 611; The Avon, 1 Brown, Dutch ship owned by residents of Adm. 170; Dwight Scott v. The Holland, held, that the federal Propeller Young America, Newb, court had jurisdiction. The Jupi101; The Monitor, 9 Ben. 78; The ter, 1 Ben. 536. Oler, 2 Hughes, 12. 2 Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610. "The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435; The Howard, 18 How. 231; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15; The Bel- William Mason v. The Blaireau, 2 genland, 9 Fed. R. 576. 68. The Sailor's Bride, Brown, Adm. Where one vessel in a collision Cranch, 240. 6 The Belgenland, 9 Fed. R. 576 (114 U. S. 855). vessels together. Common usage, however, has extended the application of the term so as to include the impact of a vessel with other floating objects.1 The term in its strict legal sense does not include the contact of vessels with rocks, sunken obstructions or other fixed structure: losses arising from such mishaps are more properly embraced within the meaning of the term stranding. There are, however, species of losses arising from the striking of vessels with visible fixed structures, such as bridges, docks, piers, and buildings adjacent to navigable waters, that cannot properly be regarded as strandings, and which are a species of collision, though not coming strictly within the legal definition of that term. So that it may with no great impropriety be said that collisions are of two classes: those occurring between vessels and other floating objects, and those occurring between vessels and fixed or stationary objects. Some uncertainty has been expressed as to how far the term "collision" is applicable to impact between floating bodies. In the case of Richardson v. Burrows, Lord Coleridge held that the striking of a ship on a field of ice was not a collision within the meaning of the terms of a policy of insurance. The French courts restrict the definition of the term to contact between vessels. It would seem that this definition is too narrow. Our courts have repeatedly held that actions may be maintained in admiralty for damages arising from the contact of a vessel with rafts, and a variety of floating objects, and no reason is apparent why these mishaps may not be designated as collisions; and it is not thought that the term is of so fixed and inflexible a character as to be restricted in its meaning to the coming together of two vessels, especially in actions of tort. Sec. 11. Over what things.- Navigability is the test of admiralty jurisdiction, and it extends over all vessels navi 1 The Moxey, Abb. Adm. 73. 22 B. R. Ties, 40 Fed. R. 596; Muntz v. Raft of Timber, 15 Fed. R. 555; Cartier v. 3 Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. R. 511. gating United States waters, whatever may be the character of the trade in which they are engaged — whether foreign, interstate, or wholly internal to the state; and irrespective of the size, form or means of propulsion of the vessel.1 There was some uncertainty among the earlier decisions of the courts as to what class of floating property admiralty could take jurisdiction over. It was at one time held that a vessel to be within it must be capable of being propelled by steam or sails as a motive power, and that canal-boats, barges, small boats, rafts and floating property of similar character were not within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. The disposition of our courts has been to enlarge their jurisdiction rather than to restrict it, principally because they found that any test that could be applied where size, form or means of propulsion were taken as a standard was entirely arbitrary and not based upon any underlying principle of natural justice; and the later cases have extended the scope of admiralty jurisdiction so as to embrace all classes of floating property when navigating the waters of the United States. The variety of such floating craft being as numerous as their various models, no rule of law is applicable to one class to the exclusion of another. Congress has defined a vessel as being and "including every description of water-craft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on the water." While the jurisdiction of our admiralty courts cannot be limited or restricted by any definitions or 1 The General Cass, Brown, Adm. 334; United States v. The B. & H. Co. Ferry Co., 21 Fed. R. 332. "The Ann Arbor, 4 Blatch. 205; McCormick v. Ives, Abb. Adm. 418; Jones v. The Coal Barges, 3 Wall. Jr. 53; Gastrel v. Cypress Raft, 2 Woods, 213; Raft of Cypress Logs, Flippin, 543. Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 75; Endner v. Greco, 3 Fed. R. 411; The acts of congress, the definition above stated is as comprehensive as can be given, and would confer jurisdiction quite as extensive as already existed, had congress had the power to do so. Public vessels: All ships or vessels are prima facie subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty courts; but ships of war belonging to a friendly foreign nation are by the rule of international law exempt from seizure.1 Vessels belonging to or operated by a municipal government on the grounds of public policy have immunity from arrest. The immunity continues, however, only during the period the vessel is operated by such municipality; there being no good reason why a vessel owned by a municipality and operated for hire by a charterer who runs her independently of the owner should be exempt from the ordinary burdens imposed upon vessels in general. It may also be questioned whether such a vessel is exempt from the usual liability of ships when engaged in other than the public business of the municipality. When a municipality enters upon a private enterprise, transacting a private business for profit, it assumes all the responsibility that attaches to individuals under like circumstances, and is liable to an action in personam; and it may well be questioned whether the vessel is not liable in rem.3 While a vessel engaged in the public business is exempt from attachment, a municipality, when the owner, is not relieved from responsibility, but like other owners is responsible for the tortious conduct of its vessel when engaged in performing corporate duties.* 1 Long v. The Tampico and Prog- second circuit that a municipal ress, 16 Fed. R. 491. 2 The Fidelity, 16 Blatch. 569. City of Philadelphia, 62 Fed. R. 617; 59 Fed. R. 303. corporation is not liable for the negligence of the members of its paid fire department in the management of their apparatus, or the 4 Workman v. The City of New performance of their duties in exYork, 63 Fed. R. 298. In this case it was held on appeal to the circuit court of the tinguishing fires; that no recovery could be maintained for injuries done by a fire tug while in the per Barges and similar nondescript craft having no means of propulsion, depending entirely on external appliances for motive power, are vessels within the admiralty jurisdiction.1 Lighters used in loading and unloading vessels are, while on navigable waters, subject to admiralty process. Dredges,3 floating bath-houses, a floating elevator," wharf-boats, rafts,7 canal-boats, have all been held to be within the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, so far as actions for tort are concerned. A floating dry dock has been held to be within the jurisdiction of admiralty in actions of the nature of tort, but not within the jurisdiction in possessory actions when the ownership of the property is sought to be established. 8 9 formance of its duty in extinguishing fires; these duties being of a public nature and such as the corporation has no private interest in. 1 The Enterprise, 17 Int. Rev. Rec. 68. An old steamboat from which the machinery had been removed, and which had no means of its own for propulsion, depending entirely upon another vessel for towing, and which had been fitted up as a dancing hall, was held to be within the admiralty jurisdiction. Mosser v. The City of Pittsburg, 45 Fed. R. 699; The Dick Keys, 1 Biss. 408. A barge without sails or rudder, used for carrying brick, on which men were employed in transporting and delivering brick, was held to be a vessel within admiralty jurisdiction. Distrow v. The Walsh Bros., 36 Fed. R. 607. In the recent case of Wood v. Two Barges, the circuit court for the eastern division of Louisiana held that coal barges which were only rough square boxes without motive power, master or crew were not ships within the admiralty rule governing possessory actions, but held that so far as maritime torts and certain other maritime contracts are concerned, such barges are within the jurisdiction of admiralty. 46 Fed. R. 204. 2 The General Cass, 1 Brown, 334; The D. C. Salsbury, Olc. 71. 3 Aitcheson v. The Endless Chain Dredge, 40 Fed. R. 253; The Pioneer, 30 Fed. R. 206; The Alabama and Two Scows, 22 Fed. R. 449. 4 The M. R. Brazos, 10 Ben. 435. 5 The Alabama and Two Scows, 22 Fed. R. 449. 6 The Old Nachez, 9 Fed. R. 476. 7 Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad Ties, 40 Fed. R. 596; Muntz et al. v. Raft of Timber, 15 Fed. R. 555; Cartier v. The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. R. 511. Per contra, Gastrel v. Cypress Raft, 2 Woods, 213; A Raft of Cypress Logs, Flippin, 543. 8 The Kate Tremain, 5 Ben. 60; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629; The John B. Cole, 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 373; The Curtis Park, 19 Fed. R. 797. 9 Snyder v. A Floating Dry Dock, 22 Fed. R. 685; Cope v. Vallette |