dangerous instrument in a situation where it is likely to damage others. Where collision occurs by reason of the voluntary casting adrift of a vessel to prevent sinking at its dock, it is liable for ensuing damages.2

Sec. 114. Vessels getting under way.-When anchored in the vicinity of others it is the duty of a vessel getting under way to make careful observance of the direction and force of the wind and current, and their probable effect in getting under way. When a vessel hoists her anchor, and, before steerage-way is obtained, drifts against another, it is liable for the damages it inflicts. The fact that the vessel getting under way first came to its anchorage, is no justification for negligence in leaving it, unless it is shown that the other came to anchor dangerously near, and the resulting damage was caused by such unlawful proximity, when the damages may be divided. Under such circumstances it is the duty of the one desiring to get under way to remain at its place, where it is apparent that collision will follow any attempt to move; and the other, if better situated, should move to a distance sufficient to enable the one desiring to move to get under way in safety.3

Getting under way in the presence of others is negligence, if sufficiently near to render collision possible, where the vessel is not sufficiently manned for the usual requirements of navigation.*

1 The Chickasaw, 41 Fed. R. 627. 2 Sherman v. Mott, 5 Ben. 372. Where a scow was moored to a stake-boat and went adrift with the stake-boat because of the anchor of the latter becoming unserviceable on account of entanglements which were not straightened, it was held that the scow was not properly moored, and that the defendant was liable for the damages resulting from such negligent mooring. Hastorf v. Mayor,

etc. City of New York, 64 Fed. R. 869.

3 Mayo v. The John S. Smith, 27 Fed. R. 398; The Julia M. Hallock, 1 Spr. 539; O'Neil v. Sears, 2 Spr. 52; The Petunia, 8 Ben. 349; Byrnes v. The Alexandria, 8 Rep. 390; Fed. Cases, 2273.

Comerford v. The Melvina, 43 Fed. R. 77.

A steamship collided with a bark lying at anchor in New York harbor, engaged at the time in get

Sec. 115. To anchor at a distance. vessel coming to anchor in the vicinity of another to keep at a distance sufficient to avoid coming in contact with it while swinging at anchor by the wind or tide; and it should anchor at such a distance that it can get under way without injury to others in its vicinity or being injured by them in doing so. It should anchor at a distance sufficient to avoid danger from the dragging of anchors, reasonably to be anticipated; and when it anchors imprudently near another, and is injured by reason of its fault in coming so close, it must bear the injuries sustained, and is liable for those inflicted.'

Sec. 116. Vessels at rest, not anchored. The situation of a vessel at rest upon the water, but not anchored, is analogous to that of a vessel at anchor, and an approaching vessel is required to keep out of the way.' The rules applicable to vessels under way do not apply to vessels one of which is under way and one at rest.2

A vessel not in motion, on the approach of another has no right to assume the attitude of a vessel at anchor and also of one in motion. If it desires to remain at rest, duty requires it to continue in that position, and not to embarrass the one approaching by signals indicating that it is in motion. Where it gives such answering signals as vessels in motion are required to give, it is its duty to comply with the intelligence conveyed by its signals, and move in the direction indicated.3

Sec. 117. Collisions with vessels aground. The situation of a vessel aground is analogous to that of a vessel at anchor or moored, the duty of avoiding it being wholly upon the one in motion. Where a vessel is aground at night the statute prescribes that lights indicating its situation shall be exhibited, and prudence requires that in the day-time sufficient indication of its helplessness be given an approaching vessel in time to enable it to avoid approaching too near.* Where a vessel is aground in a narrow passage, or in a sit

1 Maine Steamship Co. v. The Cyclops, 45 Fed. R. 122.

2 The America, 29 Fed. R. 304. 3 The Bristol, 11 Fed. R. 156. Where a steam-tug was resting in fine weather in a fair-way waiting for employment, it was held bound to keep out of the way of passing sail-vessels.

A steamer moving in a harbor came to a stop in order to avoid colliding with a sailing-vessel. While lying motionless it was run into by a tug under way, the ex

cuse given by the tug being that the sun blinded the pilot's eyes so that he could not see the steamer. The tug was held liable for not slowing up or stopping if the pilot was unable to see distinctly, as in a crowded harbor he might reasonably expect to meet other vessels. The steamer was also held liable for not sounding its alarm-whistle. The Wesley A. Gove, 27 Fed. R. 311. 4 Article 11, International Rules, 1890; Lenox v. Winisimmet Co., 1 Spra. 160; The Ant, 10 Fed. R. 294,

uation such as to make the passage of others dangerous, it is the duty of approaching vessels, on being apprised of the fact of grounding, to keep off until the other is released,' failing to do which they assume all risk attending an attempt to pass.2

Sec. 118. Dredges and wrecking vessels.-A dredge lawfully fixed in a channel for improving it is to be considered as a vessel at anchor, and is under obligation to use the same precautions to guard against collisions that a vessel at anchor is, in respect to the exhibition of lights, maintaining a watch, and measures calculated to make its situation known. But when the dredge is not stationary the same rules apply to its movements that do to those of any other vessel under way.

Sec. 119. Launching.- Liability for collision may arise by reason of defective or negligent launching. Where defects in marine-ways or other defective appliances precipitate a vessel on them against another afloat, liability on the part of the one inflicting the injury arises. The launching of a ship being an event of an unusual nature, the builder is required to take the utmost caution not to do injury to ship

The Merrimac, 14 Wall. 199, 203; The Stromless, 1 Low. 153; The Frank Moffatt, 2 Flipp. 291; The Sarah, 52 Fed. R. 233; The H. S. Nichols, 53 Fed. R. 665.

2 The Ellen S. Terry, 7 Ben. 401; The Industry, 40 L. J. Adm. 26; 3 L. R. Adm. 303.

In the case of Plathner v. The F. & P. M. No. 1, 45 Fed. R. 703, a steamer passed between two others aground, and near to a schooner moored at a dock, against which the passing steamer was thrown by the current produced by the propellers of the grounded vessels. The court held that because of the

appearance of the water indicating that the wheels of the grounded boats had been in motion, the passing steamer might reasonably have anticipated that they would resume, and it was in fault for passing so near.

3 American Dredging Co. v. The Bedouin, 26 Int. Rev. 38; The Austin, 3 Ben. 11; The Ciampa Emilia, 53 Fed. R. 155; Joseph Edward Dredge Co. v. The Nantique, 44 Fed. R. 399.

4 The Norge, 55 Fed. R. 347; The Lynn, 21 Fed. R. 815.

5 Baker v. Power, 14 Fed. R. 483.

ping, and is required to keep sufficient watch to prevent the near approach of passing vessels, and other precautions commensurate with the hazardous undertaking.1

Sec. 120. Presumptions.-Where a vessel in motion comes into collision with one properly moored at a dock, at anchor, or not in motion, the presumption of law is that it was the fault of the one under way, and it is presumptively liable until the contrary is shown, the burden of doing which is upon the vessel under way."

Where the vessel at rest is shown to be at anchor, or moored in an unlawful situation, the burden of proof is upon it to show that the collision did not occur by reason of its exposed or unlawful situation, and that it did occur by reason of the negligent conduct of the other.

The presumption of fault on the part of a moving vessel may be rebutted by showing that it exercised ordinary skill and caution, and that the collision occurred through unusual and extraordinary forces of nature, such as are not to be reasonably expected, and which amount to inevitable accident; and it must show that it was not in its power to prevent collision by any practicable precaution, or such presumption may be rebutted by showing that the collision was caused solely by the fault of the vessel at rest.3

1 The Glengary, 30 L. T. (N. S.) 341; The United States, 12 L. T. (N. S.)33. 2 The City of Lynn, 11 Fed. R. 339; The Rockaway 19 Fed. R. 449; The Echo, 19 Fed. R. 453; The Michigan, 52 Fed. R. 501; The Baltic, 2 Ben. 452; The Beaver, 2 Ben. 118; The Brady, 24 Fed. R. 300; The Helen R. Cooper, 7 Blatch. 378; The Jeremiah Godfrey, 17 Fed. R. 738.

3 The Worthington & Davis, 19 Fed. R. 836; The Granite State, 3 Wall. 310; The Virginia Ehrman v. Curtis, 97 U. S. 309; The El Dorado, 27 Fed. R. 762; The Julia M.

Hallock, 1 Spra. 539; The Ogemaw, 32 Fed. R. 919.

Where a vessel, after a collision at a dock with a ship in motion, allows a number of days to intervene without making complaint for the damages, and in the meantime has been navigating under such circumstances that it might have received the damages from other sources, the burden of proof is upon it to show that it received the damages complained of by colliding with the vessel charged with inflicting them. The Maryland, 14 Fed. R. 367.