claim protection under the statute. In appraising the ship, only such tackle, apparel and furniture can be taken into consideration as is usually considered a part of a ship. It does not include appliances placed on board for the purpose of pursuing a particular trade, occupation or other pursuit, independent of the ship's navigation and general use. The owner's interest includes his proportion of the freight in process of being earned."

Where under the rules of court a stipulation is given for the value of the vessel instead of a transfer of it, the amount of the stipulation can only be determined by an appraisement of the vessel, which is had by the appointment of suitable persons to ascertain its value. The liability of the owner is measured by his interest in the ship. By this is not meant his equitable interest in the vessel after all liens and incumbrances are paid, but his liability is measured by the value of the ship and freight, to be estimated as if the ship were clear of all liens or other incumbrances." That is, "the owner's liability is limited to such a proportion of all debts and liabilities of the ship as his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same shall not exceed the value of such vessel and freight pending." In case of prior liens arising either from operation of law or from the personal contract of the owner, they may be adjudicated and determined in such proceeding, and be required to be paid in the order of their priority, either out of the proceeds arising from the sale of the surrendered vessel, or its stipulated value. But such proceeding does not limit the liability of the owner on those contracts made by him, or which

1 Thomassen v. Whitwell, 30 U. S. (L. ed.) 156.

5 The Leonard Richards, 41 Fed. R. 818; The Giles Loring, 48 Fed.

2Swift v. Brownell, 1 Holmes, R. 463; Gokey v. Fort, 44 Fed. R.

467.

3 The H. F. Dimock, 52 Fed. R. 598.

4 Id.

364; The U. S. Grant, 45 Fed. R. 643.

6 Act of Congress, June 26, 1884. U. S. Rev. Stat. Supp., p. 443; In re Garrett, 141 U. S. 12.

have been adopted by him as his personal contracts, although his liability for damages may amount to the full value of the ship and freight. Under the maritime law the lien arising from collision takes precedence of liens for loans, repairs, and those of a similar character. The appraisement is of the value and freight pending; and where a vessel is sunk by collision, and has not been raised, the appraisement is of her value as she lies; but where the vessel has been raised before appraisement is made, her value after raising, less the expense of raising, is the measure of liability; and the value of the pending freight is to be determined by first deducting the expenses necessary in the earning of it.

Sec. 220. At what time value of the vessel is to be determined. The statute early gave rise to the inquiry as to the time at which the value of the vessel is to be determined in proceedings to limit the owner's liability. In the case of Norwich Company against Wright, the supreme court held that the act of congress adopted the maritime law as distinguished from the rule adopted by the English courts on the subject, and that the value of the vessel and freight is to be determined after, and not before, collision;

1 Pet. of N. & N. Y. Trans. Co., 8 the wreck by the insurer. ThomBen. 312. assen v. Whitwell, 12 Fed. R. 891.

An ex parte appraisement is not void; rule 54 of the supreme court not requiring prior notice of the appraisement to be given to any one; the only requisite being that a monition issue after surrender of the vessel, or a stipulation is given for its value. In re Morrison, 147 U. S. 14.

Where a vessel after collision was lost in the continuance of its voyage and abandoned to the underwriters, the liability of the owner was held to be limited to the amount realized by the sale of

Where a tug met with collision and the owner petitioned for a limitation of his liability, it was held that the towage was not freight pending, within the meaning of the statute. Pet. of the Owners of The Young America and The John E. Berwind, Eastern Dist. N. Y., Benedict's Adm. 331.

Demurrage has been held to be a species of freight. The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. R. 473; Whitcomb v. Emmerson, 50 Fed. R. 128. 213 Wall. 104.

but at what precise time subsequent to the collision was never fully established until the same case again came before the court in The City of Norwich,1 nearly twenty years later, when the court, after a full consideration of the matter, held that the voyage upon which the ship is entered at the time of the collision defines the limits to which the law is to be applied; that it is at the termination of the voyage entered upon when collision occurs that the value of the vessel is to be appraised, and the freight be added, to determine the owner's liability; and if the ship is lost and the voyage is not completed, the owner's liability ceases; or if the voyage is broken up, and the vessel sunk or injured, the value of the vessel at the time of the breaking up of the voyage measures the owner's liability; and where the vessel is subsequently raised and repaired, the added value by reason of raising it and making such repairs does not increase the owner's liability, it being fixed by the value of the remains of the vessel at the time of the breaking up of the voyage. In case of salvage only, the liability of the owner is measured by the value of the salvage.*

Sec. 221. Who may institute proceedings.- Either the owner of the ship or any damage creditor may institute proceedings against the offending ship and may have it arrested and have the amount of all damages ascertained and distrib

1118 U. S. 468.

2 The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468; Dyer v. National Steam Navigation Co., 118 U. S. 507.

Where a vessel ran on a snag and sunk in shallow water near the landing for which she was destined, but after part of the cargo had been taken off she was raised, it was held that the owner's liability should be determined by her value when she reached the dock,

not just after she sunk. The Anna, 47 Fed. R. 525.

3 The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24.

In the case of The U. S. Grant, 45 Fed. R. 642, it was held that in order to claim the limitation of liability provided by the statute respecting claims arising upon a voyage subsequent to the accru ing of previous liens, the shipowner must surrender the vessel or her proceeds free from such liens.

uted according to the methods of the admiralty courts of this country.

The fact that a vessel is chartered so that the charterers become the owners pro hac vice does not exclude the general owner from claiming the benefit of the act whenever there is a liability on his part. The number of adverse or concurrent claims against the ship makes no difference as to the right of the owner to claim the benefit of the act,

one only is sufficient to enable the owner to claim its benefits.3 All owners are not permitted to take advantage of the act, the statute in express terms limiting it to those who have no privity or knowledge of the damage incurred.*

Sec. 223. To what waters limitation of liability extends. The act of 1851 as amended by the act of June 19, 1886," extends to the owners of vessels engaged in inland navigation. The benefits of a limited liability now extend to the navigation of all waters over which admiralty courts entertain jurisdiction, as well upon the high seas as in the domestic waters of the United States."

The fact that liability arises within the limits of a county of a state is not sufficient to deprive the admiralty courts of jurisdiction, if the liability arises by reason of a maritime tort. The act does not, however, extend to vessels navigating waters exclusively within a state over which admiralty has no jurisdiction."

1 The H. F. Dimock, 52 Fed. R. 598; The Maria & Elizabeth, 11 Fed. R. 520.

2 Quinlan v. Pew, 56 Fed. R. 111. 3 Contra, The Rosa, 53 Fed. R. 132.

wich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104;
Butler v. Boston & S. Steamship
Co., 130 U. S. 554; Moore v. Transp.
Co., 24 How. 1; Walker v. Transp.
Co., 3 Wall. 150.

7 The Scotland, 15 Otto, 24; Ex

4 The Maria & Elizabeth, 11 Fed. parte Garrett, 11 S. Ct. 480; Craig R. 520.

524 U. S. Stat. at L. 79; U. S. Rev. Stat. Supp. 494.

6 Wallace v. The Prov. & Ston. S. S. Co., 14 Fed. R. 56; Ex parte Garrett, 141 U. S. 12; Lawton v. Comer, 40 Fed. R. 480; The Nor

v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638. 8 Butler v. Boston & S. S. Co., 130 U. S. 554; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541.

9 Clyde v. Grover, 54 Pa. St. 251. Where a vessel ran between ports of the same state in connec

Sec. 224. To what vessels applicable.- By the act of June 19, 1886,1 the provisions of the act of 1851 are made applicable "to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes, rivers or inland navigation, including canalboats, barges and lighters." The act of 1851 is declarative of the general admiralty rule on that subject prevailing in most European countries, although never adopted into our system of admiralty jurisprudence until the enactment of the statute. By the enactment of that law and its amendments the rule became a part of the admiralty system of this country, applicable to all waters and to all vessels over which these courts have jurisdiction, except those especially reserved from its operation.

In the case of The Vessel-owners' Towing Co.,3 Judge Blodgett held that a vessel must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to entitle her owners to claim the provisions of the limited liability act. The language of the learned judge was doubtless intended to be restricted in its application to the case under consideration, which did not constitute a marine tort. In its application to the state of facts existing in that case, it is doubtless true, as stated by the learned judge, that the power of congress over the subject of limiting an owner's liability is only found in the provisions of section 8, article 1, of the constitution, which authorizes congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. But, as a general proposition applicable to all cases, it would seem that the principle is not correctly stated. The correct interpretation of the statute is to be found only by basing it upon the constitutional pro

tion with a railroad engaged in interstate traffic, it was held to be within the terms of the act. In re Long Island Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378.

A vessel making voyages on a river between ports of different states is subject to the limited lia

bility legislation of congress. The Katie, 40 Fed. R. 480.

124 U. S. Stat. at L. 79; U. S. R. S. Supp. 494.

2 The Katie, 40 Fed. R. 480.

3 26 Fed. R. 169; In re Petition of the Long Island North Shore Passenger & Freight Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599.