executioner; the duties are performed each time by a different prisoner. This commission of an instant is always followed by a fu'l pardon. In former times, in England and Ireland, a public execution was always considered a holiday by the lower classes, and they perfected their plans accordingly. The scaffold was generally erected in one of the public squares, and consequently every one had an unobstructed view of all the proceedings. Beer and sandwiches were sold in large quantities from carts and other vehicles, and the sales of intoxicants did not improve the temper or the conduct of the multitude. Obscene jokes and songs, ribald jests and drunken laughter were to be heard on every side. On such occasions the ordinary police protection was generally deemed inadequate, and special police were sworn in in large numbers. These last were plentifully supplied with beer and sandwiches, which had a powerful effect in drawing volunteers from the lower classes and dregs of society. Just as the American public enjoy an exciting base-ball game so the English public took a morbid delight in witnessing executions. Public executions in England were carried out according to law and every detail was carefully looked after. Legal executions in America have always been held in jails and prisons. Public executions in America are lynchings; viz., taking a prisoner's life by mob force without a trial and contrary to law. In America we never had a public execution; that duty was delegated to the sheriff in whose custody the prisoner was remanded. The hideous scaffold and drop have now given way to the electric chair, and the executioner has been supplanted by the mechanical electrician. A study of the present day methods of executing criminals is extremely interesting. The grim guillotine is still in force and used at the present day in France. The hideous knife and the basket which receives the head of the condemned one are too well known to students to require any comment from me. The idea of the modern gallows was evidently derived from the published pictures of the Crucifixion. The cross was raised by the Jews by means of ropes, and from this we can trace the birth of the modern scaffold. The modern electric chair with its switch-board contrivances, has no doubt eliminated many of the hideous and gruesome features of the oldtime scaffold. The electric chair was first used in New York State upon one William Kemmler, and the protested against its use upon him claiming that it was a cruel and unusual punishment and so was in violation of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a well considered opinion, held that capital punishment by means of electricity was neither But the majority of the United States still cling to the gallows of olden times, and the antiquated drop. cruel nor barbarous. After the vengeance of the law has been satisfied, the body is ready for disposal according to the court's order. In England until recent years the body was buried in quick-lime within the precincts of the prison where the execution took place. Until 7 and 8 George the Fourth, Chapter 28, was passed, a man who fled from trial forfeited all his goods and chattels, even though as a result of the trial he was acquitted. Prior to the enactment of the statute 54 George the Third, Chapter 146, the dead bodies of victims of the law were not sacred. In America we never denied a Christian burial to a victim of the law, and bodies after execution were always turned over to relatives or whoever claimed the same. Capital punishment does not prohibit homicide; it is a well known fact that in states where capital punishment has been abolished there have been fewer murders. New York puts a man to death in the electric chair almost every week, and the death house is already becoming too small. When we abolish capital punishment we are only returning to our ancient procedure which was in vogue for centuries and gave perfect satisfaction to all. For the benefit of the reader I will inform him that it was always possible to compound a felony in England until the power to do so was abolished in 1819 by the now meaningless looking statute 39 George the Third, Chapter 46. Among the ancient Irish capital punishment was unknown; a fine or "eric" was the penalty inflicted for capital offences. The ancient Lombards, Gauls, Franks, Swedes, Danes, Germans, and Saxons exacted fixed and rigid fines for the murder of specified perThe Anglo-Saxons called the price or value set upon a man his "Wergild" which is synonymous with the German " Wehrgeld." The amount of the "Wergild" depended on the rank of the man and the amount of property he possessed. The " Wergild" is found in the laws of Ine, Alfred, Edward the Elder, Aethelstan, and Edmund. It also appears in the laws of Ethelred, Canute, Edward the Confessor, and William the Conqueror. sons. William the Conqueror fixed the amount of" Wergild" to be paid; the largest portion to the widow of the slain and the remainder to his nearest surviving relatives. In the compilation of laws under Henry the First the "Wergild" clearly appears as a distinguishing part of the English law; the amount to be paid is fixed and definite except that it is increased for crimes committed on Holy Days, Sundays, All Saints' Day, Ascension Day, etc. This opposition to capital punishment is no creation of the twentieth century ; it is simply an appeal to all fair-minded people to return to the old English jurisprudence of centuries ago when law, equity, justice, and mercy were administered alike to the highest chieftain and the meanest vassal. (The Canadian Law Review.) ALIBI. Excerpt from Editorial Notes of John F. Gecting-11 American Criminal Reports, 77. As to the nature of the defence of an alibi, as to whether it is an affirmative or a negative defence: as to whether it shifts the burden of proof: as to whether it is necessary to establish it by a preponderance of evidence or by sufficient evidence to simply raise a reasonable doubt, etc.-there is a positive conflict in the courts of last resort. The general rule, that the accused is presumed innocent and that no conviction should be had unless upon all the evidence considered together guilt is manifest beyond reasonable doubt, places the burden of proof upon the prosecution, throughout the entire trial, of proving the commission of a crime, the grade of it, and that the same was committed by the defendant; hence, evidence offered to show that the accused was not present at the time and place of the alleged crime is negative and not affirmative proof. The material inquiry in such case is whether or not the defendant was present at the time and place of the alleged crime. If in the course of the denial of such fact it is shown that the defendant was elsewhere, that is but a corroborating circumstance, and in good practice the order of proof will so demonstrate. Thus the prosecution offers proof that the defendant committed an assault, at nine o'clock P. M., July 1, at State and Madison streets, Chicago. The defendant produces a witness who testifies that between the hours of seven and ten P. M. of that day he was continuously in the company of the defendant. The question is then asked. "Was the defendant during that time in the locality of State and Madison streets, Chicago? To which the witness responds, "No sir, he was not." Here is a positive and complete denial, as a matter of law sufficient of itself, and presenting a proper field for cross-examination; but the prosecuting attorney may waive cross-examination, and the jurors may not be satisfied with a mere denial; accordingly the defendant's counsel, by way of corroboration, asks: "Where were you and the defendant during that time?" to which the answer comes, "We were in Milwaukee. We took supper that evening at seven P. M, at-hotel, and then went to-theatre, remaining there until after ten o'clock." If this general plan for introducing the testimony was followed on all occasions, the erroneous doctrine that an alibi is an affirmative defence, would soon disappear, for the method of offering the proof would demonstrate the absurdity of holding that an alibi is an affirmative defence. The legitimate use of the defence termed "an alibi" is in cases where circumstances indicate the defendant as the guilty party; or where he is the victim of malice or perjury; or in cases of mistaken identity; the inquiry being as to whether or not he committed the alleged unlawful act or acts. Whether he was at some distant place, or simply out of the immediate locality, or was present and did not participate in the alleged crime, does not change the general nature of the defence, for in each instance he simply endeavours to rebut the testimony connecting him with the allege crime. For example, three men are standing together, two being engaged in angry words: one of them attempts to leave, and while he is so doing is violently struck by the third man with sufficient force to throw him to the ground. By the force of the circumstances, and, it may be, aided by a vivid imagination, the victim believes the blow to have been given by his late antagonist, and causes his arrest upon the charge of assault and battery. On the trial a disinterested bystander testifies that the defendant remaining still did not strike the blow, and was five feet distant when it was struck by his silent but over-zealous friend. There is no essential distinction between that defence and where the accused is at a far distant place. The popular notion, that a defendant un lertakes to prove an alibi, finds support in the methods often used by defendant's counsel to gain favour with the jury. Frequently defendant's counsel joins with the public prosecutor in telling the jury that a heinous and inexcusable crime has been committed, meriting extreme punishment but that he will demonstrate, to the entire satisfaction of the jury, that his client is innocent, by proving that at the time of the commission of the offence the defendant was at a locality or place so distant as to render participation in the act impossible. Counsel thereby assumes a burden which the law does not impose. The court and the jury are liable to accept the offer, as one made in accordance with the requirements of law; while the public prosecutor seizes upon the opportunity and comments on the real or imaginary insufficiencies in the proof of the alihi as incontrovertible evidence of guilt. As similar instances of this class become frequent, public opinion becomes fixed as to what is supposed to be the law upon that subject, and the judicial mind lulled into accepting repeated errors as precedent. If counsel for the defendant, when making the defence, popularly known as "an alibi," would always assume and insist that the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the defendant was present and committed the alleged crime, and that the material inquiry is, whether the defendant was present at the alleged crime, and not whether he was at some other specific and distant place, a large majority of the trial judges would refuse to cast the burden of proving his whereabouts at the time of the alleged offence on the defendant, even though such be the announced doctrine of the higher courts of their respective localities. The use of the term "alibi," as designating a particular class of defence, should be discontinued, meaning as it does, "elsewhere" or "in another place" (Webster), as it naturally suggests a legal fiction or delusion, namely, that "an alibi" is an affirmative defence incumbent upon the defendant to establish. It raises a distinction that does not, and should not, exist. It diverts the attention from the true issues to be determined. It raises and creates the illogical, incoherent legal paradox, that while it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time and place of the alleged crime, nevertheless, the |