manner. We are always vibrating between economy and efficiency, o-day we discharge thousands of our best seamen, and the next day, we offer these men high bounties to man our ships.

While these facts are patent with respect to our men, the same reckless extravagance is visible in our dock-yards and harbours. And none more so than at Alderney. But we approach Alderney with caution, for we are treading upon eggs. There is a very proper amount of mystery about the "works" at Alderney. The place lies out of the way-it is difficult to approach. There is no jumping into a railway and getting there at once. We must cross the channel and go to Guernsey, and then take another steamer and go to Alderney, through 20 miles of sea beset with rocks and troubled water. Fortunately the place is out of the Channel, course, and but few wrecks happen there, at least so says the wreck chart. And yet upon this out of the way rock hundreds of thousands of pounds have been voted for the purpose of constructing a harbour of refuge, which turns out at last, to be no harbour of refuge at all, but a port d'aggression, or a port to watch or scourge Cherbourg.

We certainly are a strange people and do things like nobody else. We first commence constructing a harbour at Alderney ostensibly as a refuge harbour, where it would be useless. Then we propose to convert it into a harbour of aggression to watch Cherbourg. * But as we have before shown in this magazine the sheltered area at Alderney is so small that it will be utterly useless as a port to control Cherbourg, for unless there is some legerdemain, by which ships are to be stowed away, it appears impossible for above one or two ships of the line to lie here at the same time.

Oh! but the harbour is to be enlarged, the original plan is to be altered, and a much larger space enclosed, at least so say its advocates. To do this the engineer must plunge his piers into 10, 12, and 15 fathom water, and an enormous outlay will be required if the piers are extended so as to enclose a large sea space. But even then the dimensions would be too small to contain a fleet powerful enough to check such a fleet as could be sheltered at Cherbourg. We very much fear that the loftiness of these aims will be dwarfed by the realities of their performance.

We believe we express the opinion of many naval officers,when we state that Alderney had better have been left a bare rock, without a gun than armed and fortified. In its normal condition, it was a smugglers' isle, where tobacco was introduced into France. Now it is a temporary bait in time of war, and an eyesore in time of peace, to our faithful ally. It is too near to the opposite coast to prevent a surprise, and to fortify it the whole island must be turned into a barrack. This to a sensitive people like the French, will be so aggressive in its aspect that they will never rest until they get it. Indeed one of the commonest remarks now made in Cherbourg, when allusion is made to the "works" at Alderney, is an exhibition of this desire.

But even if we can convert the whole island into a second Sebastopol,

*See the No. for Augt. 1857.

and make the present puny harbour a trifle larger, still it is the opinion of many eminent judges of naval affairs, that a large expenditure of money at Alderney is injudicious. As we have before remarked, extend your piers as far as the natural capabilities of the locality will allow, and then such extended harbour would not be large enough to contain a sufficient attacking force to be a scourge to Cherbourg. Indeed the reverse might be the case, for a gallant enemy might be tempted out, and destroy the fleet cooped up there like rats in a trap.

However, time alone will show the effect to be produced by our new system of propelling ships of war, and the utility of ports d'aggression in the Channel. We believe that the tactics of all future wars on the ocean have to be learnt. Steam has not yet been fairly tried-we must not measure our future success by past experience, for within the last quarter of a century practical science has altered the tactics of our seamen, and may change the destiny of nations. We breathe in an atmosphere of progress. The steamship-the rail, and the telegraph, have become familiar to us within the last dozen years, and it would be difficult to predict what futurity may be expected to perform with these Titanic forces; we are perhaps on the eve of new wonders. Perseverance, skill, and capital are working prodigies. It was but the other day that the Britannia Bridge set us a gaping, and now it is the Atlantic Cable. Yesterday it was the Crystal Palace, and to-day it is the ship Leviathan,-what may be achieved by this last colossal effort of human audacity in naval architecture is still in the regions of speculation. She threatens us with a new era in navigation.

These are gigantic ideas. They are English ideas, carried out by private enterprise, and the nation has learnt from them to take a deep interest in the prosecution of important works. In all our public departments we are taught a different lesson. Our national dockyards-our ships of war-our system of manning, or rather of unmanning the navy, do not keep pace with public expectation. And the ports d'aggression! of Alderney and Dover are a prominent example of lavish expenditure and inutility. We ought to have had by this time a harbour for our millions spent, and the consequences of our want of energy, in case of a more serious condition of continental politics may be to the people of this kingdom a source of mortification.

A NEW INDIAN ARMY.

We have to fulfil the onerous task of forming a new army for India, an army which shall combine efficiency in the field with a reasonable prospect of security from the recurrence of late scenes. The Sepoy has committed crimes which can be expiated only by extermination, or by what to him is worse than extermination-unceasing exile. Though he was only a mercenary, yet he was a mercenary of an uncommon kind; a brave soldier at small cost, and one

Unlike mercena

in whose custody millions of treasure were safe.* ries in general, he was not a filibuster, an adventurer, or a criminal fleeing from justice. The Bengal Sepoy was commonly either a small land-holder in his own person, or related to an extensive landed proprietor anxious to establish a link connecting him with the British Government. In this manner, through the Bengal army, there were perhaps a couple of millions of people belonging to the agricultural class, who looked up to the British Government with reverence, and who had an intimate conviction that their own prosperity was bound up with the permanence of its rule. Our ability to re-establish this feeling in our new army is a problem which the future must solve. We shall probably be able to save ourselves from another mutiny on the score of religion; but we must not omit the use of every safeguard against the turbulence of the new and motley materials to which we shall probably have recourse. Will their fidelity stand the same tests and temptations which the late army has often undergone, and will the issue of the trial be similar? In proposing new defenders for our Indian possessions, a variety of schemes has appeared before the public. One of the most notable is to compose the new Bengal army entirely of Penjabees or Sikhs. This plan we earnestly deprecate as fraught with danger. To our perception it would be a renewal of our previous error of forming a mercenary army from nearly one class

and one locality. No one can doubt the soldier-like qualities

and fitness for war of this race. On the other hand, they are notoriously turbulent, drunkards on system, and debauchees of the grossest description. They are unquestionably much more free from religious prejudice than other Hindoos; but any infringement of such prejudices as they do retain would be met with a fanaticism not less intense than what we have just witnessed. A large infusion into our new ranks of these martial Hindoos (for they too are Hindoos) is no doubt expedient, but

It is the fashion to exalt the Madras and Bombay outcaste soldiers at the expense of the Bengal army. From an excellent essay on the Indian Army, by the Rev. G. R. Gleig, we make the following extract, quoted by him from a document relative to the Madras army, furnished by General Briggs :

"From a review of the native Courts-martial, I find that between the years 1800 and 1830, there were 331 native officers (commissioned) of the Madras army brought to trial on the following charges :

Drunkenness on duty

137

Insubordination

29

Mutiny and sedition, with the intention of murdering the officers

46

Robbery, usury, and peculation

Perjury, and subornation of evidence

5

"Of the above number, 267 were convicted:"-Drunkenness 137; robbery, burglary, and theft among commissioned officers!!!

Who ever heard of such crimes among even the privates of the army of Bengal. If we adopt the lowest castes into that army, we must take them with all their vices; of which drunkenness is one of the most prevailing.

to make that infusion predominant would be, according to our view, to revive the former danger in a four-fold degree.

From another quarter, indeed from many quarters, we are advised to trust almost solely to European soldiers, who, we are told, have given evidence of their power to endure with impunity the most trying exposure to the Indian climate at its worst period. The trial has not been completed. Under the excitement of a campaign, above all of a campaign like this, it is well known that soldiers can endure extraordinary exposure and fatigue without immediate suffering. But the penalty of overstraining the frame almost invariably follows. We dread the calm and re-action which will follow when the rebellion has been quelled. To make exposure to the Indian sun the ordinary routine of an English soldier's life, is an inhumanity to which fortunately our interests are opposed. He is too expensive an article to be thrown away lavishly. In spite of every precaution, and of every comfort, he cannot escape from the deleterious effects of a sun whose heat in spring and autumn equals that of the summer of Italy.

We would remind the advocates of an army almost exclusively European, of the following warning of Sir John Malcolm on this very subject, which his prescient mind seemed to foresee:

"Confiding too exclusively on European troops, and altogether neglecting and undervaluing our native army. From the day of that fatal error we may date the downfall of our Eastern empire."

Further, if the army of Bengal were to be composed solely of Europeans, we cannot estimate the strength of the force necessary for that extensive presidency alone at less than 6,000 men. The cost of this body would not be less than six or seven millions annually. But there is another question which demands attention equally with this heavy expenditure. According to the above scale, the European army in India would not be much less than one hundred thousand men. None of us have forgotten the difficulty of supplying the numbers required to fill the vacancies in our scanty army during the last war. In the event of a contest with two, or even one of the great powers, where, we would ask, are soldiers to come from to carry on war in Europe-mayhap America, too-and to maintain the above large force in India ? Nay, we might enquire from whence are we to obtain soldiers for the defence of our own shores. We offer this reflection to the consideration of the native army total-abolitionists.

We would also submit for consideration whether this large European army is altogether free from the danger of mutiny or disaffection. If our memory is correct, many years ago a royal regiment in the Bengal Presidency was guilty of mutiny, and was disarmed by a native force. With such a force at their command, the disorderly ambition of a governor-general or commander-inchief might find a field for its exercise. In 1809, when the officers of the Madras army betrayed a spirit of disaffection, the prime mover of the revolt was the Commander-in-Chief, who had been treated with contumely by the Government, and who was supported by the army. The contingency we hint at is, we admit, an oc

currence remote and improbable, but not more remote or improbable than the general mutiny of the Bengal army would have been thought three years ago.

The European army must be of course increased. Its previous smallness was a recognized error, and we cannot again afford to trust to fortune. We may not another time find a Sir John Lawrence to save India-"there was a man sent from God, and his name was John;" as Pius V. said of Don John of Austria. But in increasing the European forces, the extravagance of their cost must not, we repeat, be lost sight of. Fifty-one thousand officers and men have hitherto been maintained at an annual expenditure of five millions and a half sterling; a sum exceeding the cost of the entire native army of India. It appears by a calculation made by the Governor-General in Council (which may be seen in the "Blue Book,") a European regiment amounting to 927 rank and file, costs, exclusive of the officers, about £53,000 a-year.* In this estimate, the expenditure incurred by recruitment, passage to India, the serious difference between fine barracks and huts, the difference of the cost of marching between European and native troops, and, above all, the mortality of the former, have not been calculated. When a native soldier dies, the Government may be said to be a gainer by escaping from the chance of paying a pension; and the vacancy is filled up without difficulty or expense, for in India there is no bounty. When a European soldier dies, it is no exaggeration to say that the Government must expend one hundred pounds before it can provide an efficient successor.†

We may fairly assume that 1000 European soldiers cost as much

as 3500 natives.

If Bengal were garrisoned with 25,000 European infantry, seven regiments of European cavalry, and 6000 men for the artillery, it would seem to be tolerably safe.

The European troops might apparently be greatly economized, by making the Himalaya the ordinary abode of a large portion, good roads being constructed to maintain ready communication with the plains at all seasons. We believe the economy in life which would be the result of this measure would be ample compensation for the outlay in new cantonments. Even the lower ranges of those glorious mountains would afford charming, and in comparison with the plains, most healthy residences. After two years' duty in the plains, to the soldier the transition from the latter steaming region, where half the year he is a prisoner in the barracks twelve hours a day, would be a change from torpor to life and energy. Still the decision of this

*We do not comprehend on what basis this calculation is made; by the calcu lations in the appendix, which are founded on the "Bengal pay-regulations," the pay of a regiment of European foot, of 1000 men (including the officers) amounts to about £52,000 a-year. The numerous other incidental expenses being taken into account, the cost of a regiment of this description is probably not under £65,000 annually.

+A European soldier of Infantry receives (when under fourteen years' service) twelve rupees a month (£1 4s.) in pay, besides daily rations, consisting of bread, 1lb., meat, llb., rice, 4oz., sugar, 12-7th oz., tea or coffee, 2-7th oz., fire-wood, 3lb., salt, 2oz.