day a far more popular sentiment is the one that is hinted at in such expressions as "the competitive system," the merit system," and "the square deal." What are the inducements that lead men in the public service to give their time and energy to political activity? Political bosses have long used them. Can we in any way destroy their willingness thus to be used or the possibility of their rendering such services? In the first place we must all recognize that the most effective influence formerly in the hands of the political leader was the power to appoint his willing henchmen to office. The expectation of reward, the knowledge that appointment had come because of partisan service, and in many cases the sense of personal or party loyalty to those whom the appointee recognized as responsible for his selection, all these tended to make the officeholder a strenuous worker in the management of his party. It was not fear alone in the case of very many that kept them firmly in line. Loyalty and a sense of gratitude sometimes have been found even stronger motives for adherence to the machine. Further, many officeholders cherish the social ties they have formed in ward committee or ward political club, and do not willingly break them upon entering the public service. The friends of the Merit System have done well in directing their first and chief attention to the entrance to the public service, in order, first, to render it impossible for any political manager to guarantee an appointment to a worker, and, second, to make it perfectly apparent to every appointee that his selection was due wholly, or at least in very large part, to his own merits and qualifications for the position. It has been found that, with the gates up against the possibility of political and personal appointments, it is safe to allow rather a free power of dismissal. The possibility of appointing political friends has always formed the main inducement for turning out political opponents, and there is no question that the careful guarding of the appointments from partisan influence has gone very far to remove public offices from political influence and to free the employees from the domination of the party machine. To one familiar with the administration of public offices it is perfectly clear, however, that there is quite too much of politics still in them. Most employees do not require a written communication to inform them of the political wishes of their superiors, nor does the official headsman need to approach them with axe in hand before they are ready to perform the political services that they suspect he desires of them. A policeman in a great city may have been appointed after a competitive examination and may know that he owes his position all to his own merit, but he watches very carefully the change in the political atmosphere at the City Hall. If he gauges correctly the direction of the wind and makes his conduct correspond, he finds himself on a pleasant day beat, on a quiet street, or by a railroad station or theatre where unofficial courtesies may be looked for; while, if his guess is wrong or his neck is stiff, he finds himself patroling the Tenderloin in the small hours of the night, persecuted with constant charges of dereliction and of graft, and with his hours of freedom encroached on every week by attendance at court or other extra duties. In the one case, the hope of pleasant work and of possible promotion is constantly in the man's mind to cheer him in the sense of political duty well performed. In the other, the spark of heroism that may have warmed him for a time is in danger of extinction, as he looks forward to recurring charges, culminating at last in reduction or dismissal from the force. It is not necessary to cite particular instances nor further to amplify the thought that, even with a competitive system well installed, there are still weighty arguments that drive public officeholders into political services from which many of them would be glad to be freed and which some of them at least wholly despise. Is there any way in which a further safeguard can be erected against this compulsory political activity? Let us examine the attempts that have been made in various jurisdictions. In the Federal Government the limitation of political activity of persons in the classified service has been largely a matter of executive order. These limitations as well as the reasons justifying them are expressed in brief in a sentence in a letter from President Roosevelt to the Civil Service Commission, dated June 13, 1902. this letter he says: "In consideration of fixity of tenure and of appointment in no way due to political considerations, the man in the classified service, while retaining his right to vote as he pleases and to express privately his opinions on all political subjects, 'should not take any active part in political management or in political campaigns, for precisely the same reasons that a judge, an army officer, a regular soldier or a policeman is debarred from taking such active part.'" In the City of Boston the subject has been dealt with by an ordinace known as the Burrage Ordinance: *"No salaried officer or employee of the city, not elected by popular vote, shall be an officer of any political caucus or a member of any political committee or convention." In Los Angeles, California, the subject has been dealt with by a rule, adopted apparently under the authority of the Municipal Charter. The provision on the subject is as follows: "Participation of employees in the classified civil service in partisan politics, except to vote, is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and subversive of the best interests of civil service. And such participation is hereby strictly prohibited. The violation of this rule by a civil service employee shall be sufficient grounds for his removal." In Pennsylvania the Shern Act, applying only to the City of Philadelphia, provides: § "No officer, clerk or employee of any city of the first class, or of any department, trust or commission thereof, shall be a member of, or delegate or alternate to, any political convention, nor shall he be present at any such convention except in the performance of his official *Boston City Ordinances, Revision of 1905, Section 26. Third Annual Report of the Civil Service Department of Los Angeles, California, page 87, Rule 7, Section 8. § Pamphlet Laws of Pennsylvania, 1906, pages 20 and 21. duty. No officer, clerk or employee of any city of the first class, or of any department, trust or commission thereof, shall serve as a member of, or attend the meetings of, any committee of any political party, or take any active part in political management or in political campaigns, or use his office to influence political movements, or influence the political action of any other officer, clerk or employee of any such city, department, trust or commission. No officer, clerk or employee of any city of the first class shall in any way or manner interfere with the conduct of any election, or the preparation therefor, at the polling-place, or with the election officers, while counting the vote or returning the ballot-boxes, books and papers to the place provided by law for that purpose, save only for the purpose of marking and depositing his ballot as speedily as it can reasonably be done; (or) be within any polling-place, or within fifty feet thereof, except for purposes of ordinary travel or residence, during the period of time beginning with one hour preceeding the opening of the polls for holding such election and ending with the time when the election officers shall have finished counting the votes, and have left the polling-place for the purpose of depositing the ballot-boxes and papers in the place provided by law for that purpose, excepting only officers of the Bureau of Police, who may temporarily approach or enter the polling-place in order to make any arrest permitted by law, or for the purpose of preserving order, and in each such case only long enough to accomplish the duties aforesaid, after which the said officers shall at once withdraw. Any officer, clerk or employee of any city of the first class, or of any department, trust or commission thereof, violating any of the provisions of this section shall be immediately dismissed by the mayor, or by the head of the department, trust or commission in which he is employed.' Thus, in four different jurisdictions, we have had attempts to limit the political activity of the officeholder by definite rule or ordinance. A comparison of their terms may prove suggestive. The Federal rule is the result of experience and evolution. It has been given careful interpretation and limitation, and, while broad and effective, does not limit unduly the rights of the officeholder as a private citizen. The Boston Ordinance is narrower than the others in its scope. It merely prescribes that no appointive public employee "shall be an officer of any political caucus or a member of any political committee or convention." Other forms of political activity, including attendance at such politcal meetings, is not restricted. The Los Angeles rule, in language, forbids the "participation of employees in the classified civil service in partisan politics, except to vote," but its interpretation in a number of instances in which it has been enforced by the discharge of employees has been just and reasonable and indicates that its intention is to follow in large measure the Federal rule. The Pennsylvania statute is, perhaps, the most remarkable of all. Passed by a Legislature that had been elected by old-time influences, later brought under the goad, however, of a tremendous public sentiment, it not only forbids the public employee to be a member of a political committee or a delegate to a convention, or to be present at their meetings, but also excludes him from "any active part in political management or in political campaigns," and actually prohibits his presence on election day within fifty feet of a polling booth except for the purpose of casting his own ballot or of ordinary travel along the highway. A more vital thought in connection with these various rules in the manner in which it is proposed to enforce them. Let us not make the mistake of loading our statute books or our civil service regulations with enactments whose language is high-sounding and sonorous unless we put behind them the penalty and the power of enforcement. We must not fail to provide the sting for the whip, and to put it in hands willing to use it. Violations of the Federal rule may be punished by the appointing officer. The Pennsylvania statute provides that any violation of its provisions shall be followed by immediate dismissal by the mayor or by the head of the appropriate department. The Boston ordinance contains |