ADDITIONAL PROCUREMENT OF M-16 RIFLES WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 1968 U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL M-16 RIFLE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE The subcommittee (composed of Senators Cannon (chairman), Stennis, Smith, and Miller) met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 224, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Howard W. Cannon presiding. Present: Senators Cannon, Smith, and Miller. Also present: Senator Thurmond of the full Preparedness Subcommittee. James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Samuel R. Shaw and Robert M. Neal, professional staff members. Senator CANNON. The hearing will come to order. Today we open our hearing into the Army's issuance of contracts for additional procurement of M-16 rifles. It should be noted that this is really a continuation of previous investigations into the Army's rifle problem. A report on our last investigation into the rifle program was published only a little over a year ago, on May 31, 1967. We were assured by the Army at that time that it was their intention to accelerate the production of the M-16. Apparently the acceleration they had applied to the program turned out to be inadequate. At the end of March 1968, they found it necessary to terminate the competitive bidding procedure they were then following, to establish a second commercial source. This was done, we have been informed, because the amounts planned for that procurement were too small, and the production time was too extended. In the procedures followed in placing contracts with Harrington & Richardson and General Motors, it now appears that the question of price did not enter into the elimination of two companies otherwise adjudged competent to do the work. The ceiling prices fixed for the two successful offerors, even though subject to subsequent downward negotiation, were so high that they have drawn considerable public attention and adverse criticism. The shortcutting of competitive bidding procedures seems to have been the result of a sudden recognition of needs, which, it seems reasonable to believe, had long ago been expressed by responsible field commanders and their intervening superiors. The Congress is entitled to a full explanation of and justification for events leading to this situation. The propriety and justification for the abrupt change of course in the planned procurement is one of the primary subjects for this hearing. Another primary area of interest is the degree which even this abrupt change in method will satisfy our requirements for the rifle in a timely and orderly fashion. It is apparent that the months of preparation for the previous procurement plan were suddenly cast aside for an accelerated procurement. This raises some question about the soundness and logic of plans for distributing the rifle among its future recipients. There is a requirement for an explanation of how the proposed production schedules will fill, in timely fashion, the requirements previously described to the Congress. Today we will hear from the Army and will explore its version of the situation. In subsequent hearings, we will have witnesses from at least two companies involved in the M-16 procurement process. We are conducting the hearings in closed session so we can be completely free to receive both classified information and information from the companies involved which they may consider as privileged matters. Our witness today is Hon. Robert A. Brooks, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics. We appreciate his attendance and the information he is about to give us. You may proceed. STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BROOKS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. ROLAND B. ANDERSON, DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL ACQUISITION, OFFICE, ASA (I. & L.); COL. WALTER P. CUMBIE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MONITOR M-16 RIFLE; AND JOHN MERITT, OFFICE, ASA (I. & L.), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Dr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee to clarify the Army's actions with respect to the M-16 procurement and to answer any questions that you might have. I have with me Maj. Gen. Roland B. Anderson, Director of Materiel Acquisition in my office. REQUIREMENTS FOR M-16 RIFLES A number of general questions have been raised. Principally, these questions relate to the increased requirements for the M-16 rifle which necessitated a modification in our original procurement plan; and to the method and propriety of our selection of the two additional sources of production for the M-16 rifle. Although the subject was covered in my letter to the chairman on May 31, 1968, I would like to review the developments which resulted in a dramatic increase in our requirements for the weapon. As of January of this year, our total planned deliveries for calendar year 1968 numbered about 350,000 M-16 rifles. Deliveries planned for calendar year 1969 were slightly higher. This rate of delivery would have provided, by August 1968, the additional rifles earmarked under the then current plans for United States, South Vietnamese, and other free world forces in Southeast Asia. Beginning in February 1968, however, a series of decisions were taken at the highest level of Government which substantially increased the requirements for rifles as well as for other weapons and equipment items. The central decision relevant to rifle requirements was that the South Vietnamese forces, both regular and territorial, were to be equipped and trained to assume a larger share of the combat against the enemy in South Vietnam. Underlying this decision were two principal factors: first, the improved performance of the South Vietnamese forces evidenced through 1967 and confirmed by the increased effectiveness of regular Vietnamese Army units during and since the enemy's Tet offensive; second was the clear change in the enemy's tactics, begun during Tet and persisted in ever since, to conducting open and intensive military operations throughout South Vietnam, using troops increasingly armed with automatic rifles. These decisions and the successive recomputations of rifle requirements to date have increased rifle requirements for South Vietnamese Forces alone by approximately [deleted] rifles. Other increases for free world and U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia have led to a total increase of approximately [deleted] rifles for Southeast Asia forces. Of these, approximately 250,000 have been characterized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being urgently needed. Compared with the new requirements, the previously planned delivery rates for the M-16 rifle were obviously inadequate. At those rates the increased requirements would not be satisfied until late 1970 at the earliest. Therefore, the production base needed to be both expanded and accelerated. The following actions were taken to increase and accelerate production: Colt Firearms Division, the present producer, was requested to expand its monthly capacity from 30,000 to 50,000 rifles to be attained in June 1969. General Motors and Harrington & Richardson were awarded letter contracts to produce 240,000 rifles during a 15month period, with each planned to make initial deliveries in February 1969 and reach a maximum rate of 25,000 per month the following November. By December of 1969, our revised procurement program is expected to produce 444,000 more rifles than the original plan. I shall now deal with the requirements for, and distribution to, specific elements of all supported forces, first in the situation before the decisions discussed earlier, next the present situation, and third in the situation at this time next year, when the increases in rifle production will have begun to take effect. These are depicted on the three charts attached to this statement. None of these charts include requirements for replacing .30-caliber weapons now in the Department of Defense inventory. Present plans are that the caliber .30 weapons will eventually be replaced with the M-16 rifle. REQUIREMENTS FOR 1968 Chart 1 shows worldwide M-16 rifle requirements and assets as of January 1, 1968. The net or unfilled requirement of [deleted] for U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia was for support troops. At this point in time, all of the U.S. combat maneuver battalions had been equipped with the M-16 since August 1967. The unfilled Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces requirement was for the then-constituted regular Army maneuver battalions. All of the U.S., free world, and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces requirements were scheduled to be filled by August 1968 on the then-existing production schedule. After August we were planning to fill progressively the requirements for other worldwide U.S. Forces, amounting to [deleted] rifles. The Army component of the requirement, [deleted] rifles was to reequip non-NATOoriented Army Forces currently armed with M-14 rifles. The Air Force component of the requirement, [deleted] was to replace carbines under the Air Force modernization program. INCREASED REQUIREMENTS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA Chart 2 shows the major increase that has taken place in rifle requirements for Southeast Asia as of June 1, 1968. Most of the increase is in requirements for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, [deleted] rifles. Major components of this increase are [deleted] rifles for the Regional and Popular Forces [deleted] rifles for the Civil Irregular Defense Groups, and [deleted] rifles to equip the total regular Vietnamese Armed Forces. The increase of [deleted] in freeworld force requirements is composed principally of [deleted] for Thai forces, in both Thailand and South Vietnam, and [deleted] for Korean forces in South Vietnam. For U.S. forces in Southeast Asia about [deleted] of the increase was for the Army, to provide for deploying forces, maintenance float and losses. You will note that from January 1 to June 1 we have increased the actual rifle assets in Southeast Asia by [deleted] more than the total unfilled requirement previously scheduled for delivery by August. Vietnamese Army maneuver battalions of the presently constituted forces, for example, are today 94 percent equipped with the M-16 rifle. The other major increase outside Southeast Asia is for the Korean forces in Korea, [deleted] rifles. PROGRESS IN MEETING REQUIREMENTS Chart 3 shows anticipated progress in meeting the new requirements by July 1, 1969, with increased production schedules. At that time all but [deleted] rifles will be available against the U.S. force requirement of [deleted]. This will be for depot stockage and pipeline. Other free-world forces will be equipped except for the Thai Army in Thailand, [deleted] rifles, and Korean support forces in Vietnam, [deleted] rifles. Of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, all South Vietnamese Army maneuver battalions will have the M-16, [deleted] will be in the hands of regional and popular forces, [deleted] with the Vietnamese Marines and the remainder with Vietnamese Army combat support forces. Deliveries to all Southeast Asia forces, a total of [deleted] rifles, will be complete by December 1969. Of these deliveries, 444,000 will have resulted from the new production schedule which will make possible the completion of deliveries at least 1 year earlier than our January production schedule. |