Mr. KENDALL. I still don't understand why you tell us on February 14, 1967, that your total requirement was [deleted] million, and you come today with a [deleted] million figure.

Mr. BROOKS. That [deleted] million is not today's requirements. That was the requirement on which the 1967 budget was based back in the development of that budget in late 1965.

Mr. KENDALL. So we want to deal today, then, with the [deleted]. Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir; and that is the objective reflected in chart No. 4, I believe. That is the current rifle authorized acquisition objective.

Mr. KENDALL. I just point out, Mr. Secretary, the Army's submission to the full Committee in November showed, with respect to preferred assets, that you were almost [deleted] short of meeting your active Army requirements insofar as preferred rifles is concerned, and that, insofar as preferred rifles is concerned, you were over [deleted] short of meeting your total requirements. Even if we are going to compare it with your 1968 objective at the end of fiscal year 1967, you will still be considerably short.

Mr. BROOKS. You are referring to the asset figures on the sheet that you gave us now, Mr. Kendall, is that correct?

Mr. KENDALL. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. And the submission of today, so that I can identify it here, is the one that is in chart 5, is that what you are referring us to?

Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. That is the asset figure for today and fiscal year 1967, what we now project the asset to be at the end of fiscal year 1967? Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir. In fiscal year 1967 you will have preferred rifles [deleted] million on hand versus total requirements in fiscal year 1968 of [deleted]?

Mr. BROOKS. I think I can answer that question best, Mr. Kendall, by stating again that the acquisition objective, the current acquisition objective, which is for the total Army, is [deleted] rifles, the one we are working on today, is an objective for the force that will exist on the 30th of June 1968.

Now that force is one which we are reaching through the training of individuals, the activation of units, the activation and the deployment of units to Vietnam, and that process is still continuing.

The requirement as of today is less than that [deleted] figure. In fact, in our charts on the personnel rifle authorizations, we show the current authorizations as of January 1, 1967, and they are less of course than the authorizations will be on June 30, 1968, because some of these units are not in being yet that are authorized to have the rifle. Therefore, the requirement is increasing over the period between now and June 30, 1968. The assets are also increasing, and our assets are keeping pace with the requirement. In other words, we have now enough rifles to equip and support the Army, and we will have, based on these figures, the rifles to equip and support the Army on June 30, 1968.

It is an ascending process, a curve that goes up for both, and the asset curve is consistently above the requirements curve.

Mr. KENDALL. I agree it should be ascending, Mr. Secretary. I am just wondering why it took so long to ascend.

Mr. BROOKS. Which curve, Mr. Kendall?

Mr. KENDALL. The acquisition objective.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, as General Miley explained, there were some omissions from the 1967 requirement. There were other requirements which we could not address at that time, which we depended on the restructuring of units, which essentially generates the requirement for all this equipment, and that was what caused the increase, as well as the basic continuing buildup of the Army.

(Off the record.)

Senator JACKSON. We will resume.

Mr. KENDALL. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe I have done so yet, but I would like to put in the record the chart which I prepared. Senator MILLER. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The chart referred to follows:)

Mr. KENDALL. And also a memorandum furnished to us by the Department of the Army on June 3, 1965, which describes what the requirements up to that year were based on-the requirements which I referred to earlier.

Senator MILLER. Without objection it is so ordered. (The memorandum referred to follows:)

The FY 1959 requirement of [deleted] million rifles was based on Joint Strategic Objective Plans under general war wherein M-Day preceded D-Day by [de leted]. This requirement included initial equipment, mobilization training. [deleted] combat support and [deleted] surface pipeline for Active Army and Ready Reserve Strategic Army Force. Initial equipment for Remaining Reserves was also included in the requirement.

The FY 1960 requirement of [deleted] million rifles was also based on Joint Strategic Objective Plans for general war, without pipeline, plus an additional requirement to support a limited war with pipeline. This requirement represented [deleted] Division Force months of combat.

The FY 1962 requirement of [deleted] million rifles was based on Secretary of Defense Logistic Guidance issued 22 September 1961. This guidance was a significant departure from the FY 59 and FY 60 guidance in that it departed from the use of Joint Strategic Objective Plans as a basis for requirements computations. Requirements for FY 1962 were based on a 22 Division Force but recognized that not all divisions would be committed for the whole [deleted] period, and therefore proposed as a planning figure combat consumption for [deleted] Division Force months, and eliminated pipeline, mobilization training and support for the Remaining Reserves.

The FY 1964 requirement of [deleted] million rifles was based on initial equipment for 22 Division Forces, with 2 Division Forces organized under the new ROAD configuration, and 20 Division Forces under the Non-ROAD or new Pentomic organization. It also included an air pipeline, maintenance float operational projects, mobilization training and combat support for 16 Active Army Divisions using the P-Day concept. The P-Day concept is a means of providing continuous combat support over an indefinite period of time, by providing sufficient inventory to cover combat consumption until the rate of production equals or exceeds the rate of consumption.

The present requirement of [deleted] million rifles is based on Secretary of Defense Logistics Guidance issued 28 August 1964 which provides combat support for the 22 Division Forces (all organized under ROAD) for [deleted] at deployment rates. No pipeline is authorized. Authorization was continued for maintenance float, operational projects, and mobilization training.

M-16 TO REPLACE .30 CALIBER WEAPONS

Mr. KENDALL. Now, Mr. Secretary, you say in your prepared statement that the Army decision, not yet approved by the Secretary of Defense, is to replace the 30-caliber weapons, including the M-1, and the Browning automatic rifle, with the M-16A1. When do you expect

action on that?

Mr. BROOKS. As soon as we can get it, Mr. Kendall. I think that the target that the Secretary of Defense gave us to provide additional information, as I recall it, is about August of this year. However, we expect to improve on that.

Mr. KENDALL. What information is needed or required by the Secretary of Defense in order for him to make a decision?

Mr. BROOKS. Primarily the logistic implications, the support, ammunition.

SAWS RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. KENDALL. Did you say that that was based on the SAW study, that recommendation?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENDALL. The SAWS' recommendation as I understand it was, one, [deleted] which will be as I understand it, hopefully, [deleted]. And, second, to initiate a program [deleted] in sufficient quantities to replace rifles, automatic rifles for infantry maneuver units only.

General MILEY. Mr. Chairman, the Army or rather the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, after reviewing the SAWS' report, the SAW study report, is taking the following actions:

First, that the M-16E1 rifle will be adopted as the standard Army rifle, and it will be classified Standard A, along with the M-14. That procurement plans for the foreseeable future are based on the M-16A1 rifle. In other words, if rifles are to be procured, they will be the M-16A1.

That an additional production source of the M-16A1 will be developed, and that current Army plans, which the Secretary has referred to, visualize the eventual replacement of the caliber 30 and the Browning automatic rifle with the M-16A1, and that Army small arms research and development will be broadened and actively pursued, and that the Army's small arms weapons program is undergoing further intensive study by the Department of the Army.

Briefly put, the Chief of Staff, with the Secretary of the Army, reviewed the SAWS' report and concluded that the SPIW needed some more work in the research and development area, and that is proceeding.

We have proceeded to plan to acquire only the M-16A1 rifle over the next future and subject to a decision by the Secretary of Defense to replace the M-1 series of weapons as rapidly as possible and are moving out to establish a second source to do just that.

Mr. KENDALL. So the SAWS' recommendation was not adopted is what it boils down to.

General MILEY. It was adopted in part, but the return of the SPIW to the research and development category meant that for some portion of time in the future we would have to satisfy our weapons requirements with some other weapon, and the SAW's study recommended that if additional weapons had to be procured, that they be the M-16A1. That is exactly what we are doing.

SPIW EFFORTS DISAPPOINTING

Mr. KENDALL. Indicating that your efforts on the SPIW have been something of a disappointment to date. Would that be accurate?

General MILEY. Well, the SPIW weapon is such a complicated weapon and represents such a breakthrough in small arms weapons that we encountered what we considered to be serious manufacturing problems in producing the SPIW in quantity. The SPIW, as you know, [deleted].

Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir.

General MILEY. [Deleted.] This is a very tricky mechanical problem to solve for a high mass production weapon.

RELIANCE ON SPIW DEVELOPMENT IN 1963

Mr. KENDALL. I think this rather emphasizes, General, what has troubled us about the Army's rifle program, and this problem has been going on since 1954, I believe.

In 1963, as you will recall, the Army decided that it would not buy any more M-14's; that it would buy 85,000 M-16's as a one-time procurement only, and would then stop the procurement program at that point, relying and taking a calculated risk, as Secretary Vance said, on the development of the SPIW, and in the meantime, filling the deficit or meeting the deficit-which was rather large at that timewith the M-1's and the BAR's. Now you are back over 3 years later saying that well, the SPIW hasn't worked out as we hoped it would, and, therefore, we will have to take another route and go into another procurement program to supply our needs.

That history is reasonably accurate, isn't it? I could document it. General MILEY. I think it was in the very atmosphere that you described that the Chief of Staff initiated the SAW study, and the SAW study certainly if you have read anything about it, was an exhaustive approach by the Army to analyze where it stood in the rifle program, what was available in the short term and in the long

term.

A tremendous amount of testing effort, both technical testing and troop testing went on. The conclusions, if you have read the SAW's study, and we furnished you a copy I believe

Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir.

SPIW TO CONTINUE IN R. & D.

General MILEY. Is not as definitive as many people would imagine. We found that among the existing rifles, some people found one rifle to be the best, other groups found another rifle to be the best. Certainly from the SAW's study, the idea that the SPIW was not ready go comes out loud and clear.

to

So based on that, in the fall of 1966, the Chief of Staff looked at this tremendous analysis effort and concluded-developed the course of action that we are following-that we will continue to press in the R&D area on the SPIW and any other weapons that come along, and in the meantime buy this highly popular M-16, to meet our current requirements.

1963 DECISION ON RIFLES

Mr. KENDALL. I don't want to delve too much into history, but it is accurate that at that point in time, which I believe was December of 1963 at least, that is when we were told about it; it may have happened earlier the policy decision was made to discontinue the procurement of the M-14, to buy 85,000 M-16's, and then to rely on the available combination of M-14, M-1, and M-16 rifles until the SPIW had completed its research and development phase and gone into production. That is accurate, isn't it?

General MILEY. Probably in 1963 it was an accurate statement of the situation, but then in 1964 I think the Chief of Staff recognized the situation we were in, and initiated this tremendous SAW study.

1963 DECISION INVOLVED RISKS

Mr. KENDALL. What you are saying, and the decision was referred to as involving certain "risks"-that is the Army's term, not mine; Secretary Vance said it, I think-which the Army decided to take. I don't know whether the Army decided to take them or was told to. In any event, here we are 3 years later, and the SPIW apparently is no further along than it was at that time, or is not appreciably nearer production. It is back in the research and development phase. General MILEY. Yes, sir.

SPIW RESEARCH EFFORTS

Mr. KENDALL. Is the SPIW research efforts going to continue at the same level, both in dollars and personnel, or will it be decreased or increased?

General MILEY. Well, I think the level of effort will result from a reexamination of where we are now. The SPIW project has been returned to a reexamination in the technical area, in the engineering area, to see just what can be done with it.