his allies, will consent to establish the negociations on the footing of these three principles, as well as to carry into the calculation of conditions that spirit of justice and moderation which animates them, in order that the arrangement may be brought to a conclusion speedily, and with mutual satisfaction.

If these bases should not be adopted, the undersigned are not authorised to receive or propose any other.

REPLY OF THE MINISTERS OF THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS.

Paris, Sept. 22, 1815. The undersigned, &c. &c. have received the note in which Messieurs the Plenipotentiaries of France have replied to the communications made to them in the conference of the 20th of this month, with reference to a definitive arrangement. They have been surprised to find in it a long series of observations on the right of conquest, on the nature of those wars to which it is applicable, and on the reasons which should induce the Contracting Powers not to recur to it in the present instance. The undersigned consider themselves so much the more fully exempted from the necessity of following the Plenipotentiaries of France in their reasoning, inasmuch as no one of the propositions which they have made, by command of their august Sovereigns, with a view to the regulation of the present and future relation between Europe and France, was founded on the right of conquest, and because they have carefully avoided in their VOL. LVII.

communications whatever might lead to a discussion of that right. The Allied Powers always considering the restoration of order, and the confirmation of the royal authority in France, as the prin cipal object of their proceedings, but persuaded at the same time that France cannot enjoy a solid peace whilst neighbouring nations continue to cherish with regard to her either bitter animosities or perpetual alarms, have recognised the principle of a just satisfaction for losses and past sacrifices, as well as that of a sufficient guarantee for the future security of neighbouring countries, as the only means of putting an end to all discontents and apprehensions, and consequently as the only true bases of every solid and durable arrangement.

It is only upon these two principles that the Allied Powers have fixed their propositions, and in drawing up the projet which the undersigned have had the honour to transmit to the Plenipotentiaries of France, they were distinctly expressed in every one of its articles.

The Plenipotentiaries of France themselves admit the first of these principles, whilst they remain silent with respect to the second. It is, however, abundantly clear, that the necessity of guarantees for the future, has become more sensible and urgent than at the period of the signature of the Treaty of Paris. The subsequent events have carried consternation and alarm to every part of Europe; at a moment when the Sovereigns and their people flattered themselves that, after so many afflic

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tions, they were about to enjoy a long interval of peace, these events, have every where produced agitation, as well as the burthens and sacrifices inseparable from a general arming. It is impossible so soon to efface from the minds of cotemporaries the recollection of such a convulsion. That which was sufficient to satisfy them in 1814, cannot content them in 1815. The line of demarcation which appeared to guarantee the security of the States bordering on France at the Epoch of the treaty of the 30th of May, can no longer satisfy the just pretensions which they now prefer.

It is indispensable that France should offer some new pledge of security. She ought to take this step, as well from sentiments of justice and expediency, as from her own interest well understood. For, in order that the French may be happy and tranquil, it is absolutely necessary that their neighbours should be happy and tranquil also.

Such are the powerful considerations that have induced the Allied Powers to demand of France some territorial cessions. The inconsiderable extent of these cessions, and the selection of the points upon which they bear, sufficiently prove, that they have nothing in common with views of aggrandizement and conquest, and that the security of bordering nations is their only object. These cessions are not of a nature to compromise the substantial integrity of France. They embrace only detached districts or points remote from her territory; they cannot really weaken her in any

relation either administrative or military, nor can her defensive system be affected by them. France will remain not the less one of the best rounded and best fortified States of Europe, as well as one of the richest in means of every description for resisting the danger of invasion.

Without entering into these higher considerations, the Plenipotentiaries of France admit, however, the principle of territorial cession, as far as respects the points added to old France by the treaty of Paris.

The undersigned find it difficult to understand upon what this distinction can be founded, or, under the point of view adopted by the Allied Powers, in what the essential difference between ancient and recent territory consists. It is impossible to suppose, that the Plenipotentiaries of France wish to revive in the actual state of affairs the doctrine of the pretended inviolability of the French territory. They too well know that this doctrine, put forward by the chiefs and apostles of the revolutionary system, formed one of the most revolting chapters in that arbitrary code which they wished to impose on Europe. It would be to destroy entirely every idea of equality between the different Powers, if it were once established as a principle, that France may without difficulty extend her limits, acquire new provinces, and unite them to her territory, either by conquest or treaty, whilst she alone shall enjoy the privilege of never losing any of her ancient possessions, either by the misfortunes of war,

or by the political arrangements that may result from it.

With regard to the latter part of the note of the Plenipotentiaries of France, the undersigned reserve themselves for a serious explanation in the next conference which they will have the honour of proposing to the Plenipotentiaries of France.

(Signed)

RASUMOFFSKY, CAPO D'ISTRIA, WEISSENBERG, HUMBOLDT, METTERNICH, HARDENBERG, CASTLEREAGH.

Protocol respecting the Partition of the Seven Hundred Millions to be paid by France to the Allied Powers, and which Protocol is to be instead of a Special Convention on that Subject.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, agreeing to fix the principles of the partition of the sums to be paid by France, in virtue of the Treaty of Paris, of the 20th of November, 1815, among their respective Courts and the other allied States; and taking into consideration, that it appears to be superfluous to conclude a special convention on the subject of this agreement, have resolved to set forth in the present Protocol every thing that relates to this object, and to regard this Protocol as having the same force and effect as a special and formal convention, in virtue of their full powers and instructions from their respective Courts.

Art. I. The Allied Powers, con

vinced of the necessity of securing the tranquillity of the countries bordering on France by the fortification of some of the most threatened points, destine for this purpose a part of the sums which France has to pay, whilst they appropriate the remainder of those sums for general partition, as indemnities. The sums destined for the erection of these fortresses, shall form the fourth part of the total which France has to pay; but as the cession of the fortress of Saar Louis, a measure equally founded on motives of general security, renders the erection of new fortifications on the side where that fortress is situated, superfluous; and as the sums for the above purpose were estimated by the Commission appointed by the Council of Ministers, at fifty millions, therefore this fortress, in the amount of the sums destined for fortifications, shall be reckoned at fifty millions, in such way that the above-mentioned fourth shall not be deducted from the actual 700 millions promised by France, but from 750 millions, thus including the cession of Saar-Louis.

In conformity to this regulation, the sum destined for the erection of fortresses is fixed at 187 millions, viz. at 137 millions of actual money, and 50 millions included in the valued cession of the fortress of Saar-Louis.

Art. II. In the partition of these 137 millions, among the States bordering on France, the undersigned Ministers take into consideration partly, the more or less urgent wants of these States to establish new fortresses, the more or less considerable expense in

their erection, and partly the means which these States possess or may acquire through the present Treaty. In consequence of these principles,

The King of the Netherlands receives 60 millions; the King of Prussia 20 millions; the King of Bavaria, or any other Sovereign of the country bordering on France between the Rhine and the Prussian territory, 15 millions; the King of Spain, 7 millions; the King of Sardinia, 10 millions. Of the remaining 25 millions, 5 millions are destined for the fortifications of Mentz; and for the building of a new League Fortress on the Upper Rhine, 20 millions. The application of these sums shall take place according to plans and regulations which the Allied Powers shall settle in that behalf.

Art. III. After the deduction of the sums destined for fortifications, there remain 562 millions, appropriated for indemnities, the partition of which shall take place as follows:

Art. IV. Although all the Allied States have displayed equal zeal and devotedness to the common cause, yet there are some who, like Sweden, dispensed from all active co-operation, from the first, and on account of the difficulty of transporting her troops across the Baltic, have made no efforts; or, who, actually making such, like Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, were prevented, by the rapidity of events, from actually contributing to the result. Switzerland, which has done very essential service to the common cause, did not accede to the treaty of the 25th of March under the there expressed conditions, like the other powers. As

to these States, they find themselves in a different situation, which does not permit them to be elassed with the other allied States, according to the number of their troops; it has, therefore, been agreed, that they shall receive, as far as circumstances will permit, an equitable indemnity, and that the sum of 12 millions shall, with that view, be divided among them, in such way that Spain shall receive five millions, Portugal two millions, Denmark two millions and a half, Switzerland three millions.-Total, 12 millions.

Art. V. As the burthen of the war fell chiefly on the armies under the command of the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher, and these armies besides took Paris, it is therefore agreed, that out of the French contributions, a sum of 25 millions shall be assigned to Great Britain, and 25 millions to Prussia, without prejudice to the arrangements which Great Britain may conclude, in regard to the sum thus coming to her, with the Powers whose troops formed part of the Duke of Wellington's army.

Art. VI. The 500 millions, which still remain, after the deduction of the sums fixed in the preceding articles, shall be so divided that Prussia, Austria, Russia, and England shall each receive a fifth.

Art. VII. Although the States, who acceded to the treaty of the 25th of March last, set on foot a less number of troops than each of the Allied Chief Powers, it is nevertheless determined, that no regard shall be paid to this inequality. In consequence, these

States shall receive conjunctly the fifth,which remains after the appropriation of the 500 millions, contained in the preceding article. Art. VIII. The partition of this fifth among the different acceding States shall be regulated by the number of troops respectively set on foot by them, and also in conformity to treaties, and particularly to the way in which they shared in the sum of 100 millions, whichwere assigned by the French Government for the pay of the troops.

Art. IX. As the King of Sardinia recovers that part of Sardinia, and the King of the Netherlands, besides the fortresses of Marienburg and Philipeville, obtains that part of Belgium, which the treaty of Paris of the 20th of May left to France; and as these two Sovereigns in this enlargement of their territories find a fair indemnity for their efforts, they, therefore, shall have no share in the money-indemnities, and their proportion, as fixed in the table adjoined to the preceding article, shall be divided between Prussia and Austria.

Art. X. As the payments of the French government are to be made at periods fixed by the treaty of the 20th of November, 1815, and the conventions thereto annexed, it is agreed thateach state, which, according to the present Protocol, shares in these payments, shall receive at each of these periods the pro rata part of his proportion; and the same also shall be the case, when a state has its share thereof under different titles at the same time; as, for instance, Austria for her fifth and for her allotted share of the pro

portion of Belgium and Sardinia. This principle shall, in like manner, be followed, when in the event of the default of payment by the French Government, it should be necessary to sell a part of the inscriptions, which serve as pledges.

Art XI. As Prussia and Austria have urgently represented the advantage, which they would naturally derive from the receipt of a larger sum than the general division assigns to them, in the first months, Russia and England have agreed, in order to facilitate the general arrangement, that each of these two powers shall, from the date of the first payment, receive an advance of 10 millions of francs on their shares, under the condition that they account to them for this sum, in the following years.

Art. XII. This repayment shall be made by instalments, so that Austria and Prussia shall pay each, from its share in each of the four following years, the sum of 2 millions of francs to Russia and England.

Art. XIII. To avoid the numerous inconveniences which might arise from want of unity in levying the sums to be paid by France, it is resolved, that a Commission residing at Paris shall alone be charged with the receipt of those sums, and that none of the powers which have a share in these payments, shall negociate for itself on this head with the French Government; none shall ask or receive from the French Government the bons in which the payments will be made immediately, and without the intervention of the said Commission. This Com