filiation of natural children, that the man, in his declaration, admits his carnal knowledge of the mother, but cautiously refers it to a distance of ten months or more before her delivery. It also sometimes happens that witnesses swear to circumstances of familiarity between the parties, or perhaps to something more, but still to things which happened beyond any allowable period of gestation. In such cases it is reasonable for the judge to consider the situation and circumstances of the parties at a later period; and if these are still such as afford them the like temptations and opportunities of meeting,-as, for instance, in the case of master and servant, or fellow-servants in the same family, or lodgers in the same house,— it is natural to presume that such an intercourse once commenced does not cease while those opportunities continue. At least such a presumption may fairly have weight thus far, that the woman shall be admitted to confirm it by her oath in supplement. This doctrine is illustrated by the case, 12th Dec. 1799, Brown v. Smith, where the circumstances were sworn as occurring in the end of harvest, while the child was not born until 12th October of the following year. But the woman was the defender's domestic servant up to Whitsunday previous to the birth. Baron Hume also refers to the cases of Leckie and Prott in Feb. 1810, and Wightman in 1807, Hume's Decisions 33.

2. In an action before the justices of Roxburghshire, the oath of the woman was admitted on acknowledgments of intercourse at times, in the statement of which she varied, but the longest interval was seven months and four days, and the shortest five lunar months and a half. The Court affirmed.—11th Feb. 1800, Elliot v. Scott, Hume's Decisions 33.

3. Where the man offered to submit to discipline of the church, if the woman would swear that she had not within a twelvemonth had criminal correspondence with any other but him, the oath in supplement was admitted.-Caldwal (no date), 5 Brown's Sup. 555.

4. Where the man went into the same bed with the woman, who was sleeping with her brother, and who deponed to their struggling together, and where the birth of the child corresponded in time, the woman's oath was allowed.-Lyon (no date), 5 Brown's Sup. 556.

5. The oath was admitted on judicial declaration, and a letter confessing having been guilty with the woman, but denying being the father of the child. The Lord Ordinary assoilzied, on the ground, that though the oath might be received to supply an imperfect proof, it cannot be admitted to the effect of contradicting the only evidence which has been brought in the cause.' The Court at first adhered, but on a second petition, altered by a majority, 'chiefly moved by the letter, which it was observed contained no limitation of time.'-17th Nov. 1807, Wightman, App. to Mor. Proof, No. 5.

6. A woman sued for aliment of a child born 22d September 1813. The defender admitted connection on 8th September 1812, but not thereafter. This admission, joined to subsequent opportunity, was held sufficient to admit the woman's oath. The Lords were quite clear that the defender's admissions superseded the necessity of any other proof.'-24th May 1814, Hunter, Fac. Coll.

7. A servant girl pursued her master for aliment of a bastard. A fellow-servant swore, that on the defender returning late at night on horseback, he desired the pursuer to rise and get a candle to show him to put up his horse, and that it was a considerable time before she returned to bed. And that on another occasion, she, on passing the stable-door, heard the pursuer say, 'Haud awa, Hugh;' but she did not see the defender, but believed the woman was speaking to him. The Court, by a majority, held this sufficient to admit the woman's oath.-15th Jan. 1811, Hunter, Fac. Coll.

8. Where there was proof that 'an uncommon degree of familiarity had subsisted between the parties, considering the difference of their situations in life,' and they had been seen in suspicious circumstances on one occasion, and denial of facts proved, the oath was admitted.-14th Nov. 1821, Binny, 1 S. D. 134.

9. The oath was admitted on proof by two witnesses that the defender, a grocer, was seen standing with the pursuer, a collier girl, at the back of a village at twelve o'clock at night; and another person saw him walking with her after dark; and at a subsequent period giving her gingerbread. Per Lord Alloway: The evidence

showed a familiarity which could hardly have existed between parties in their different situations in life, without being corroborative of what is sworn to as having taken place about nine months before the child was born.'-11th July 1822, Aitken, 1 S. D. 559.

10. The parties resided about twenty-five miles distant from each other. It was proved that they had met together on some occasions in public-houses, and generally asked a room for themselves, and on one occasion went away when they could not be so accommodated; that on one occasion the man was found with his arm round the woman's neck, and kissing her. And another witness said, 'They sat together as lad and lass will do, but saw no familiarity pass between them.' The sheriff admitted the oath, and the Court by a majority affirmed. Lord Robertson 'did not consider that the circumstance of parties in the lower ranks of life being together in an open room in common tippling-houses, affords any reasonable ground of suspicion, the more especially as it seems not to have created the least suspicion in the witnesses accustomed to the habits of that rank of life.'-8th July 1826, Hutchison, 4 S. D. 815. This case came back on the oath.—10th July 1828, 6 S. D. 1131.

11. Justices of Haddington admitted the woman's oath, chiefly on the ground that, when charged with the paternity, the man had paid her £20, on getting a letter declaring he was not the father. This, he said, was to purchase the peace of his family, he being a married man. The Lord Ordinary altered, but the Court affirmed the decision of the justices. Lord Gillies observed: The disclamation obtained from her affords strong evidence that he was the father of the child, and that he procured it in order to avoid any investigation into the truth of the matter.' Per Lord President: If, as the defender alleges, he was acting under the influence of securing the peace of his family, he ought to have resisted her demands. He seems, however, to have been satisfied that she had fixed on the right man.'-23d Dec. 1826, M'Kenzie, 5 S. D. 189.

12. The defender admitted that he and his father slept in one bed, and the pursuer in another in the same apartment, and that his father was sometimes absent when there was no other person but themselves in the bed-room. In addition, it was proved that he had used some familiarity with the woman. And in answer to the question, Whether he would take with the child? he answered, That if he thought the child was his, then he would take it.' The sheriff admitted the oath, and the Court (Lord Craigie dissenting) affirmed.-19th Feb. 1829, Bertram, 7 S. D. 434.

13. Where a woman of facile disposition was treated with spirits by the defender, who used familiarities with her, and they were often together in a bed-room, the woman's oath was admitted. The child was born 14th Feb. 1827, and in her declaration before the kirk-session she stated that the last act of connection with the defender was 'about a fortnight before the 1st of May previous,' ten months before the birth. The Lord Ordinary (Mackenzie) observed: That a child is not to be thrown on the parish where there is a strong semiplena probatio, and an oath in supplement, merely because the woman may formerly have said something not consistent with the statement to which she ultimately adheres.'-16th Dec. 1829, Grassie, 8 S. D. B. 259.

14. Justices, both in Petty and Quarter Sessions, allowed the woman's oath on admission that the parties slept in the same apartment-the man, who was a small farmer, with a lad-and the woman, who was his cousin and housekeeper, with a female servant; that he had visited her previously when she was his father's servant; and that he had on some occasions laid his arm on her neck. He denied ever having been in her bed; but this was proved by two witnesses. The Court affirmed the decision of the justices: they held that sleeping in the same apartment does not of itself, in that rank of life, give rise to suspicion, but it undoubtedly affords opportunities. It is clear that no case of this sort can be a precedent in any others, as every such case must rest on its own circumstances.' Lord Gillies defined a semiplena to be something less than proof, and more than suspicion.' Lord Craigie dissented, and observed: 'I had considerable experience of these sort of cases in the Sheriff Court of Dumfriesshire; and the result of my observation is, that the presumptions are generally against and not in favour of a man having connection with his own servant.'-9th June 1831, M'Crone, 9 S. D. B. 692.

15. A married woman, but whose husband was abroad, sued for aliment of a child. The man admitted connection four times about six months or so' before the birth, and he was resident in the same town for a month previous. The man offered to prove that the child was full grown, which was refused. The sheriff and Court of Session admitted the woman's oath. The Court held the plea founded on the woman being married completely obviated by the clear evidence of her husband's absence from the country; that the legal presumption is, that the defender might have had previous connection to the time admitted; and that, according to Lord Stair, the birth of the child any time from six to ten months would be sufficient.'22d Dec. 1825, Robertson, 4 S. D. 333. But see case of Folley, infra.

16. A married woman (her husband being abroad) pursued for aliment of a child, and proved that before her marriage she had been repeatedly alone with the defender, who had acknowledged to a medical friend having had connection with her, and had her examined before the marriage, when she was found to be four months gone with child, and the child, which was full grown, was born within six months after the marriage. After much discussion and considerable hesitation, the woman's oath was allowed, and aliment decerned for; reserving all questions as to the legitimacy of the child.—30th May 1832, Jobson, 10 S. D. B. 594. The presumption of legitimacy may be redargued by proof.-23d Feb. 1855, Webster, 27 Jur. 206.

17. A woman, aged forty, and who had previously had a bastard, prosecuted a lad of eighteen as the father of her second child. There was no proof of indecent familiarity, but of long intimacy, first in a country town and next in Edinburgh, with letters passing between them, and one of which had been destroyed by the lad. He took an interest in the mother during the pregnancy, and afterwards in the child. The sheriff refused to admit her oath. Lord Mackenzie reversed, holding ‘the probability that the defender and no other was the father, sufficient to warrant the oath in supplement.' The Inner House allowed further evidence. Lord Moncreiff, in a very long and learned note, adopting the opinion of President Blair in Craig, 1809, found the proof insufficient: Possibilities are proved, but no more. Mere suspicion depends on the imagination and habits and ways of thinking of the individual who is to judge, and on the other hand some persons are so hard of belief that nothing but direct evidence of the fact would satisfy them. The evidence as it stands is not such as to induce a reasonable belief that the defender is the father of the child.' Per Lord Justice-Clerk: 'My opinion is formed from the defender's own line of conduct, for I cannot reconcile his words either with the behaviour of an innocent man, or with his own statement that he spurned the charge of being the father to the pursuer's child as an attempt at imposition.' The Court, Lords Justice-Clerk and Medwyn contra Lord Glenlee, reversed Lord Moncreiff's interlocutor, and allowed the oath of the woman.-17th Jan. 1835, Glendinning, 13 S. 270.

18. A servant prosecuted her master, a farmer (a married man). The facts were chiefly a previous lapse on his part-the withdrawal of the wife from her husband's bed -her being locked into her room, whilst he slept near to the pursuer's bed, joined with other circumstances of familiarity. The sheriff-substitute held the proof sufficient to admit the oath. The sheriff reversed, but the Lord Ordinary and the Court unanimously returned to the former judgment. Per Lord Cuninghame, Ordinary: *In the circumstances the defender was instantly condemned by his own wife; and the Lord Ordinary, on reviewing the case, probably more coolly than her jealousy would permit, cannot take a different view of the case. Even if there were any circumstances to afford matter of crimination against both master and (another) servant, the lady would have a right by law, and by the prerogative of her sex, to declare to which of her paramours the child belonged.' Lord Mackenzie: 'I reported the case of Craig, in which President Blair gave the definition of a semiplena probatio, which has been so often referred to since. I am sure I reported the words which he used; and I remember them all the better, because, deep as was my respect for that most eminent judge, I never was quite so well satisfied with the definition as other people seem to have been. It is perhaps not possible to give a precise tangible definition of a semiplena probatio; but were I to attempt to make one, it would be something like this, that a semiplena probatio is such a measure of probation as, taken along with what is to be added to it-viz. the oath of the pursuer-makes a plena probatio: such an amount of proof that, when to it shall be added the oath of the pursuer, it

will be reasonable to be satisfied that the case is established against the defender. President Blair defines it as evidence that induces not suspicion, but a reasonable belief, though it does not amount to complete proof. But it strikes me that evidence which induces a reasonable belief is complete proof. In the Criminal Court, we tell juries to acquit if they have a reasonable doubt of the panel's guilt; and if not, to find the charge proven. Now, if the evidence induces a reasonable belief, the jury having this belief cannot well at the same time have a reasonable doubt, and must therefore find the case proven. Perhaps belief may be taken in a loose sense, including under it the thinking a thing to be probable. But then I feel it difficult to draw the line between that and suspicion, which seems to be just an opinion that a thing is likely or probable.' Lord Jeffrey: 'I entirely concur with Lord Mackenzie. I adopt his Lordship's definition of a semiplena probatio. I have ever had the same opinion, and, if I mistake not, have more than once expressed it, and acted upon it in cases which came before me in the Outer House. With the greatest possible respect for the opinion of Lord President Blair, I cannot adopt his definition; I cannot quite digest his metaphysics, and find its distinctions too subtle for me. Evidence which induces a reasonable belief, I should think pretty well entitled to the character of complete evidence, and I really cannot discriminate between strong suspicion and incomplete belief. I think the true principle of the doctrine of semiplena probatio in all such cases is this, that the mother being a very exceptionable witness, and liable to great bias, ought to be admitted, under any circumstances, only cum nota lata; and that her oath, therefore, should only be allowed where the judge, on the assumption that she will swear affirmative of her libel, is satisfied that her evidence, notwithstanding all the suspicion attaching to her, would, along with the circumstances established in the case, amount to a complete or satisfactory proof. Our law has perhaps gone too far in giving the oath of the woman in such cases very nearly the same effect as an oath on reference. The better rule perhaps would have been to have received and weighed it as that of a suspected witness; and even as it now stands, I may observe that the credit to be given to her testimony, and consequently the admission or rejection of her oath in supplement, may depend, not merely on the strength or amount of the other proofs, but also upon the opinion which may be formed of the character of the woman from the tenor of such proofs, and from the facts and circumstances of the case. Looking to all these as legitimate elements in determining the question, I confess I see no difficulty in solving the problem of semiplena probatio in any such case by the consideration whether that oath, assuming that it will be consistently affirmative of the libel with all the suspicions attaching to it, which may be more or less strong according to the circumstances, will with the other evidence amount to a plena probatio.'— 12th June 1844, M‘Laren v. M Culloch, 6 D. 1133. See Craig's case, infra.

19. A woman prosecuted her former master for the aliment of a child. One witness swore to finding them at an early hour together in the kitchen. The defender had got this witness to subscribe a letter to be sent to the kirk-session freeing him. The sheriff admitted the mother's oath, which was taken. In an advocation, Lord Jeffrey reversed, observing: 'It is no doubt disagreeable to alter a judgment of this kind after the oath has been actually taken; but this was not regarded in the case of Durham v. Guthrie, 19th May 1827; and if the oath was improperly taken, its import cannot be looked at.' The Court returned to the judgment of the sheriff. Per Lord Justice-Clerk: We must deal with every such case in its own circumstances; but if among these there be an appearance of tampering with the evidence on the part of the accused, it is always most suspicious.—18th June 1835, Shankland v. Byres, 7 Jur. 420.

20. Where the woman had twice in church courts charged another man as the father of her child, she was nevertheless allowed by the Court to give her oath, on proof against the defender on sufficient semiplena proof, altering the judgment of the sheriff and Lord Ordinary.-20th Jan. 1838, Greig. The oath was admitted chiefly on the deposition of one witness, and which the inferior court refused to believe; and which being afterwards contradicted by the woman herself, the man was in the end assoilzied.-9th June 1838, Greig, 10 Jur. 486.

21. The woman's oath was admitted on the evidence of one witness swearing that through a window she saw the parties coming out of bed, and though the

pursuer had first given up another as the father before the kirk-session; but which she afterwards retracted, stating that she had made the accusation on the persuasion of the defender.-30th May 1840, Boyle, 12 Jur. 486.

22. A female servant's oath was admitted against her master, chiefly on proof that he had said that others had to do with her as well as he;' which the Lord Ordinary (Cockburn) held as nothing short of a virtual acknowledgment of intercourse on his part.' After the oath was taken, the Court, in an advocation, by a majority affirmed.-3d June 1841, Ross, 3 D. 84.

23. It was proved, although it had been denied by the man, that the parties had been alone together on a road by night, under unusual circumstances, exactly nine months before the birth, and that he had made certain equivocal statements when informed of the birth. Advocation was found incompetent on the oath being allowed until it was taken; and on a subsequent advocation after the oath, the proof was found sufficient. Per Lord Justice-Clerk: The direct evidence of one witness is always sufficient, supposing the witness to be credible and the facts deponed to be enough.'-10th July 1845, Murdoch, 17 Jur. 525.

24. It was proved that the parties had been together alone in a dark night, and the man made certain admissions of dealings' with the woman. Oath admitted by the sheriff; the Lord Ordinary and the Court by a majority affirmed. The Lord Ordinary (Murray) remitted to the sheriff to take further evidence, and to re-examine the pursuer: A person may make observations partly in joke, or deny paternity, but say, at the same time, what nearly admits it. It is important to know what impression the denial, and the manner in which it was made, gave at the time; in other words, explain whether what the witness saw and heard conveyed at the time any belief to his mind.'—26th Nov. 1845, Patrick, 18 Jur. 61.

25. Proof of the parties being often together in an engine-house at night, and on one occasion with the door bolted, was found sufficient by the sheriff to admit the woman's oath. Lord Robertson reversed; but the Court, by a majority, returned to the judgment of the sheriff. Lord Jeffrey remarked: The question of the sufficiency of a semiplena probatio is complex, and has reference not only to the evidence already led, but to the credit to be attached to the oath which the woman is prepared to give, in so far as her character, the circumstances of the case, and the situation of the defender, affect the question. Thus, if the paternity of her child were ascribed by a woman of loose character to a man of opulence, against whom she could not prove more than a slight familiarity, such proof would be looked on differently from that led by a person of more sober character against a person of small means and inferior station. There is here no impeachment of the woman's general character, and there is no reasonable motive which can be imagined for her selection, except that the defender was really the father.'-15th Nov. 1845, Fitzsimmons, 18 Jur. 9.

26. A defender denied paternity, but admitted familiarities in July, twelve months before the birth of the child. The sheriff, in respect of the date, refused the woman's oath. The Lord Ordinary and the Court altered, holding that the preponderance of the evidence was for September as the true date. Per Lord Jeffrey: There is nothing on which the recollection of witnesses is so little to be relied on, after any considerable interval, as time. The examinations here are fifteen or sixteen months after the occurrence in question; and but for the specification of circumstances which bear upon dates capable of being determined, the mere mention of July, August, or September, is entitled to the least possible regard. In such a question, too, I cannot lay out of view that the woman is stated by the minister of the parish to have been to his knowledge for seven years a regular attender at church, and to have borne a pure character, and that there is not the least surmise of her having been intimate with any other man, or any trace of her having had motives either of a malignant or interested nature to induce her to make a false charge against the defender.'-21st May 1836, Dykes, 14 D. 815.

27. The sheriff refused to admit the oath on certain circumstances of familiarity, especially connected with one meeting in a garden in the dark, which the defender denied in the record. The Lord Ordinary and Court reversed, and allowed the oath. Per Lord Jeffrey: 'It may be true that the date of the meeting may not correspond with the estimated time of conception, but it is not far from it;

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