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When an execu

on an arbitration commenced testator.

The authority of an arbitrator is determined by the death of either party before award made even where the submission tor may proceed is by order of nisi prius, and a verdict is taken for the by plaintiff, subject to the award (g). But it is now usual to insert in the order of reference a clause providing, that in the case of the death of either of the parties before the making of the award, it shall be delivered to their personal representatives (h). And where such a clause is inserted in the order of nisi prius or rule of court, or deed or other *instrument under which the submission to arbitration is effected, an award made after the death of either party appears to be valid and available for or against the executors or administrators (i). This, however, must be understood as limited to an action in which the cause of action survives for or against the personal representatives of the deceased party. So where the parties to an action for a tort agreed before trial to refer the matter in dispute to an arbitrator, the order of reference containing a clause that the arbitrator should publish his award, "ready to be delivered to the parties in difference or such of them as require the same (or their respective personal representatives if either of the said parties die before the making of the award)," and, where after the hearing of the reference had been concluded, but before the award was made, the plaintiff died, it was held that the cause of action, being in tort, died with the plaintiff, and did not pass to his personal representatives by force of the clause above-mentioned, which in an action of tort was inoperative, and the executors who took up the award were not entitled to be substituted for their testator as plaintiff (k).

(g) Potts v. Ward, 1 Marsh. 366. Toussaint v. Hartop, 7 Taunt. 571. Cooper v. Johnson, 2 B. & A. 394. Rhodes v. Haigh, 2 Barn. & Cress. 345. It is extremely questionable, as a general proposition of law, whether the death of one of the parties on one side avoids an award: Per Tindal, C. J., In re Hare, 6 Bingh. N. C. 163. But where an action would not abate by reason of the death of one party it seems probable that a reference of that action is not vacated by such death, but that the power of the arbitrator remains to bind the survivors though not the personal representatives of the deceased:

Edmunds v. Cox, 2 Chitt. 432. Russell on Arbitrators, 5th edit. 161.

(h) See the observations of Abbott, C. J., in Cooper v. Johnson, 2 Barn. & Ald. 395.

(i) Tyler v. Jones, 3 B. & C. 144. Clarke . Crofts, 4 Bingh. 143. Macdougall v. Robertson, 2 Y. & Jerv. 11. Rogers v. Stanton, 7 Taunt. 575 (n). But it cannot be enforced by attachment: Newton v. Walker, Willes, 315. 3 B. & C. 146.

(k) Bowker v. Evans, 15 Q. B. D. 565. Aliter where the cause of action has been determined and the damages only are referred to an arbitrator for assessment: Chapman v. Day, 48 L. T. 907.

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In an action where the cause of action survives for, and against,, personal representatives, if either party dies after the award is made. under an order of nisi prius, where a verdict has been taken, subject to the award, judgment may be entered notwithstanding the death, under the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XVII. rule 1. The power of the court to order judgment. to be entered nunc pro tunc has been already referred to ante, p. *779. It may be here mentioned that the authority of an attorney in a cause is determined by the death of his client: conse- The authority of quently, if, after a verdict for the plaintiff, and pending a rule *for a new trial, the plaintiff dies, no cause can death of his be shown against the rule until there is a personal client. representative (1) Cause cannot be shown on behalf of the attorney who claims a lien on the verdict for his costs (m). So where money is paid into court by a defendant who dies before verdict or interlocutory judgment, if the suit abates, the money can be paid out of court, only to the personal representative of the defendant; and an application on the part of his attorney will not be entertained (n). By stat. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 26, no trustee, executor or administrator making any payment or doing any act 26. bona fide under any power of attorney shall be liable by reason that the person who gave the power of attorney not to be liable by reason of the was then dead, or had done some act to avoid the death of power party giving such without the knowledge of the trustee, executor, or power. administrator.

(Shoman v. Allen, 1 Man. & Gr. 96, note (c). But where after a verdict for the defendant, he died, and then the plaintiff obtained a rule for a new trial calling on the "legal representatives of the defendant or their attorneys," to show cause, and it was served on the latter; it was held that cause might be shown by counsel instructed by the attorneys acting for the executors named in the will, though they

Abatement-American statutes. In most of the United States an action does not abate by the death of a party if the cause of action survive, but it may be continued by or against his representatives. This is so, in Cali

22 & 23 Vict. c. 35,

Executor making

payments under

power of attorney

had not proved it; and the court distinguished Shoman v. Allen, on the ground that in that case there was no person who could be served with the rule; in the present case there was: Thomas v. Dunn, 1 C. B. 139.

(m) Shoman v. Allen, 1 M. & Gr. 96, n. (c).

(n) Palmer v. Reiffenstein, 1 Mann. & Gr. 94.

fornia (Code C. P. § 385), Connecticut (1888 G. S. §§ 1005, 1015), Dakota (1887 C. L. § 4878), Delaware (1874 R. C. c. 105, § 1), Florida (1892 R. S. § 990), Idaho (1887 R. S. § 4108), Illinois (1891 R. S. c. 1, § 10), Indiana (1888 R. S. §

271), Maryland (1888 P. G. L. Art. 16, 1, Art. 75, § 24), Michigan (1882 An. Stats. § 7393), Minnesota (1891 G. S. § 5727), Missouri (1889 R. S. §S 2196, 2195), Montana (1887 C. S. p. 63, § 22), Nebraska (1893 C. S. c. 96, § 45, c. 23, § 228), Nevada (1885 G. S. § 3038), New Jersey (1877 Rev. 1), New York (Code C. P. § 755), North Carolina (1883 Code, § 188), Oregon (1892 An. Laws, 38, 39), Pennsylvania (1883 Purd. Dig. p. 53, §§ 10, 11, p. 528, § 104, p. 531, § 118), Tennessee (1884 Code, 3559), Texas (1888 R. S. Art. 1246), Vermont (1880 R. L. § 732), Virginia (1887 Code, § 3306), Washington (1891 An. Stats. § 147), Wisconsin (1889 An. Stats. § 2803). No actions abate except libel, malicious prosecution, and nuisance, in Kansas (1889 G. S. § 2866), Ohio (1890 R. S. SS 5144, 5145). No actions for tort abate, in Georgia (1882 Code, §§ 2967, 3438). No real actions abate, in Maine (1883 R. S. c. 104, 16), Wisconsin (1889 An. Stats. § 2806); nor actions in ejectment, in Mississippi (1892 An. C. § 1654), Pennsylvania (1883 Purd. Dig. p. 531, § 116). Where a party to any action dies, the court may appoint a special administrator to continue the suit, in Arkansas (1884 Dig. Stats. 5232), New Hampshire (1891 P. S. c. 191, §§ 14, 16), New Jersey (1877 Rev. p. 3, §§ 1, 6), New York (Code C. P. §§ 757, 764). And see p. *433, American note. On motion of the opposing party an administrator or executor may be substituted, in Maine (1883 R. S. c. 82, § 36). But no judgment against decedent can be revived against personal representatives except by suit on the judgment, in Alabama (1886 Code, § 2633). For the particular provisions of the above statutes and other practice acts reference must be had to the statutes themselves, which are all local in their character.

Abatement-suits for personal injury. At common law an action in tort to

recover damages resulting from personal injuries received by a passenger through the negligence of a common carrier abates on the death of the party and cannot be revived by his personal representative. Jacksonville &c. Co. C. Chappell, 22 Fla. 616. So, the statutory action given to the representatives of a decedent whose death was caused by the negligence of another abates upon the death of the wrongdoer and an action cannot be maintained against his representative. Hegerich v. Keddie,

99 N. Y. 258; Russell v. Sunbury, 37 O. St. 372. In Illinois, when a plaintiff pending an action brought by him to recover for a personal injury resulting from negligence dies from some other cause than such injury, the action will survive and may be prosecuted in the name of his administrator, Chicago &c. Railroad v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586; Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131; but not where the injury complained of causes his death. Id. In Connecticut, however, an action for injuries to the person survives to the administrator, whether the injuries result in death or not. Murphy . New York &c. Railroad, 29 Conn. 496. And in North Carolina, an action by a passenger against a railroad company for damages to her person does not abate by the death of the plaintiff. Peebles v. North Carolina Railroad Co., 63 N. C. 238. And an action by a husband to recover for loss of the services of the wife and for expenses paid in consequence of injuries to her person resulting from defendant's negligence while she was a passenger survives his death. Cregin v. Brooklyn City Railroad, 75 N. Y. 192; S. C. 83 N. Y. 595. So, an action by a parent for the loss of his son by a negligent explosion on defendant's boat survives to his personal representative. James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162. But at common law the death of a husband or parent was no ground of action, Carey v.

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actions against towns and cities for damages to the person occasioned by defects in the highways survive to the administrator of the person injured. Hooper . Gorham, 45 Me. 209; Demond . Boston, 7 Gray 544.

Death of party before judgment. The substitution of the administrator upon the death of the original plaintiff, and the filing of an amended complaint by the administrator, are only steps in continuation of the original action. Evans . Nealis, 69 Ind. 148; Hawthorne. The State, 57 Id. 286. And the death of one of the parties after reference by rule of court does not operate to revoke the power of the referee, the administrator taking up the action where the deceased left it. Bacon &. Crandon, 15 Pick. 79. If the cause of action survives, the plaintiff's administrator may revive the action, though plaintiff died before the complaint was served. Plumer v. McDonald Lumber Co., 74. Wis. 137. But trespass quare clausum fregit is not within the statute of New Jersey and will not be continued where the plaintiff dies before issue joined. Dickerson v. Stoll, 4 Zab. 550. An action for a tort to the deceased may be revived by his personal representative after his death. Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295. So, an action for false warranty in the exchange of cattle may be continued by the administrator of the plaintiff. Booth v. Northrup, 27 Conn. 325. And a suit on a verbal promise of indemnity by an officer to his deputy against a judgment rendered against the deputy in trover may be revived on the plaintiff's death by his representatives. Robinson v. Bennett, 50 Mich. 560. If the defendant in a suit of detinue dies pending the action, it may be revived by sci. fa. against his executor, only where the goods demanded have come to the executor's possession. Allen v. Harlan,

6 Leigh 42. Where the plaintiff in an action to recover land died after devising to his wife the rents of his real estate for life, the executor to have charge of the same, the action may be continued by the executor. McAlpine v. Daniel, 101 N. C. 550. And where, after a verdict for injury to realty, the defendant filed objections and obtained a continuance and the plaintiff died, the administrator is the proper party to revive the proceeding. Upper Appomattox Co. v. Harding, 11 Gratt. 1. Where an executor moves for order of revivor without notice to the defendant or making proof of his representative character, defendant waives these objections by arguing a demurrer without such objections. Brooks v. Northey, 48 Wis. 455. A special administratrix, moving to open a judgment by default, may appeal as general administratrix after her appointment as such. Jefferson County Bank v. Robbins, 67 Wis. 68. And where an action is dismissed with costs and the plaintiff dies pending appeal, his administratrix may have revivor to prosecute an appeal to relieve herself from liability for costs. Campbell v. Gallagher, 18 Civ. Pro. 90. Where an action is revived by an administrator, he need not give security for costs, under statute authorizing the court to require such security of administrators bringing actions. Sullivan v. Remington, 27 Hun 270. And where a plaintiff dies and his executor continues the action, upon verdict for defendant for an amount and costs, execution may be had for costs against the executor personally. Clarke v. Higgins, 2 Root 398.

Where from any cause the powers of an executor cease, an action commenced by him will not be dismissed, but the court will permit the substitution of the administrator de bonis non and the continuance of the action. Burlington &c. Railroad v. Crockett, 17 Neb. 570;

Wood . Flynn, 30 Hun 444; Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Pa. St. 385. So of a suit in chancery, Fletcher v. Weir, 7 Dana 345; and where the administrator resigns. Russell v. Erwin, 41 Ala. 292. The revival of the action cannot be in the name of the administrator's own administrator, State v. Murray, 8 Ark. 199 ; or the executor's executor. Bardstown &c. Co. v. Howell (Ky.), 17. S. W. Rep. 481. An action brought by an administrator abates if the subsequent administrator fails to prosecute it, but he may be allowed to come in and amend the writ on motion. Merrill v. Woodbury, 61 N. H. 504. An action by an executor as such on a written obligation to him as such may be revived by the administrator de bonis non. Hemphill v. Hamilton, 11 Ark. 425.

Death of party after judgment. Although at common law a judgment must be revived after the death of the party to allow execution thereon, under the statute this is unnecessary and the administrator may have execution without revivor, Wyant v. Wyant, 38 Ind. 48; for a judgment recovered by the deceased vests, upon his death, in his legal representative, who may have execution issued in his own name. Simmons v. Heman, 17 Mo. Ap. 444. An administrator de bonis non may perfect execution already begun by the administrator. Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Pa. St. 385. But an administrator cannot maintain an action to procure the issue of execution on a judgment recovered by the intestate in another court, but execution should be procured by motion in the action in which the judgment was obtained. Lough v. Pitman, 25 Minn. 120. When the plaintiff dies after entry of judgment, his administrators cannot be substituted as plaintiffs in order to issue a testatum fi. fa., but their remedy is a scire facias. Warwick v. Spencer 116. An executor may sue on a judgment in his

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testator's favor without leave of court, although he has also the right to execution thereon. Freeman v. Dutcher, 15 Abb. N. C. 431; Smith v. Britton, 45 How. Pr. 428; Code Civ. Pro. § 1376. And so an administrator de bonis non may maintain an action of debt alleging that the executor recovered judgment against the defendant. Dykes v. Woodhouse, 3 Rand. 287. An administrator suing on a judgment of the intestate need not allege her death or his appointment, which is matter of defense. Hansford v. Van Auken, 79 Ind. 157.

An administrator may sue in one state on a judgment recovered in his representative capacity in another state, in his own name, not as administrator. Talmage v. Chapel, 16 Mass. 71. But in a suit by an administrator, in Georgia, on a foreign judgment obtained by the administrator de bonis non in another state an authenticated exemplification of his letters must be filed as required by the statute. Buck v. Johnson, 67 Ga. 82. Where in action by executors they recovered judgment, and thereafter revived it by scire facias as executors, and an appeal bond was given to the executors as such and judgment obtained on the bond by one of the plaintiffs as surviving executor, the surety cannot object that plaintiffs sued under foreign letters testamentary. Sasscer v. Young, 6 Gill & J. 243. Upon the death of a party after verdict, judgment may be entered as of the term when the verdict was entered, Lewis v. Soper, 44 Me. 72; where plaintiff in trespass quare clausum fregit so died, Goddard v. Bolster, 6 Me. 427; even where the plaintiff died after the commencement of the next term pending a motion for a new trial, but before the hearing of the motion. Corwin v. Lowell, 16 Pick. 170. So, on a verdict for the plaintiff judgment may be entered in his favor after the death of the defendant even in

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