both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."

See Callahan v. Bank of Kentucky, 82 Ky. 235.

Although a "Peddler's note" not properly indorsed as such is void as between a holder in due course and the maker, yet the indorser would be liable because he warrants the paper to be valid, dicta, in Union Nat. Bank v. Brown, 101 Ky. 354, 41 S. W. 272, 19 K. L. R. 273.

Since the indorser warrants the genuineness of the paper and his title to it, a bank which pays upon a forged indorsement a forged check upon another bank, and then indorses the check for collection and it is paid, cannot hold the money. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986.

This section makes it unnecessary to prosecute the maker of a negotiable note to insolvency in order to hold the indorser. Williams v. Paintsville Nat. Bank, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S. W. 535.

This section was held to be declarative of the common law. Young v. Exchange Bank, 152 Ky. 293, 153 S. W. 444.

§ 67. Liability of Indorser on Paper Negotiable by Delivery.-"Where a person places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liabilities of an indorser (Sec. 40).”

§ 68. Liability of Indorsers As Between Themselves."As respects one another, inindorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise. Joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally."

For cases decided prior to the passage of this Act, see Denton v. Lytle, 4 Bush 597 and cases cited therein. Lewis v. Williams, 4 Bush 678; Edelen v. White, 6 Bush 408; Bailey v. Wood, 114 Ky. 27, 69 S. W. 1103, 24 K. L. R. 801.

This section is cited in First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 790, to the effect that parol evidence is competent as between indorsers to show the real agreement between themselves.

This section changes the rule laid down in Dodge v. Bank of Kentucky, 2 J. J. Mar. 610 and Higgins v. Morrison, 4 Dana 100, that notice of dishonor to one joint indorser was notice to all. Now notice to one joint indorsers is sufficient to

hold him; but notice to one is not notice to all, and all joint indorsers not given notice are discharged. Williams v. Paintsville Nat. Bank, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S. W. 535.

§ 69. Liability of Agent, Etc.-Without Indorsement. "Where a broker or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by Section 65 of this Act, unless he discloses the name of his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as agent."

ARTICLE VI.

PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

Section 70. Presentment for payment; effect on parties.

74.

Instrument must be exhibited.

75. Presentment where instrument is payable at a bank.

76. Presentment where person primarily liable is dead.

77. Presentment to partners.

78. Presentment to joint debtors not partners.

79. When presentment not required to charge drawer.

80. When presentment not required to charge indorser.

81.

Excuse for delay in making presentment.

82. When presentment may be dispensed

with.

83. Dishonor for non-payment.

84. Liability of person secondarily liable when instrument is dishonored.

85. Maturity; days of grace abolished; Sunday, holidays.

86. Computation of time.

87. Instrument payable at a bank, equivalent to an order on the

bank.

88. Payment in due course.

§ 70. Presentment For Payment-Effect on Parties.-"Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily (Sec. 191) on the instrument; but if the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place (Sec. 87), and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. But except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and indorsers."

Presentment for payment is not necessary to charge the person primarily liable. Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana 136; Pace v. Welmending, 12 Bush 141; Marion Nat. Bank v. Phillip's Admr., 35 S. W. 910, 18 K. L. R. 159.

Compliance with the above provisions as to