showing that the note was indorsed by the plaintiff without any consideration, and the indorsement was in fact for the accommodation of the defendant; therefore, all objection on the ground of circuity of action is destroyed. It has been contended that the only evidence of a consideration was the defendant's promise to become a surety for her son, and that as this promise was not in writing the indorsement was not binding upon the defendant. But the plaintiffs are not suing upon a guarantee the case is not within either the words or the spirit of the Statute of Frauds, s. 4. Moreover, verbal evidence of the consideration was admitted, and the complaint ought to have been made to the High Court; but the objection was not sustainable, and the defendant has in truth lost nothing by the omission to apply to that tribunal. It has been contended that the cases which support the contention for the plaintiffs were wrongly decided, and that the law as laid down in Britten v. Webb (1), must in all cases be applied. But it seems to me that Britten v. Webb is quite distinguishable from the decisions which support the contention for the plaintiffs. It has been argued that Steele v. McKinlay (2) shows that when all the facts are proved at the trial, it becomes necessary to give evidence of an agreement in writing; it seems to me that the case has nothing to do with the present. It was there held that the mere fact of a person writing his name on the back of a bill does not make him acceptor, when the names of other parties appear as acceptors. This point does not affect the question before us. When this case was tried before Bowen, J., he acted upon the principles of the law merchant, and I am of opinion that his judgment was quite right.

Solicitors for plaintiffs: G. & W. Webb.
Solicitors for defendant: W. Moon.

Judgment affirmed.

(1) 2 B. & C. 483.

(2) 5 App. Cas. 754.

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