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the delay, may not recover the amount stipu- VIII. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND lated.-Ward v. Haren, 167 S. W. 1064.

ASSESSMENT.
(A) Pleading.

§ 85 (Mo.App.) Where a stipulation in a building contract provided for liquidated damages for the contractor's delay in completing 143 (Mo.App.) An allegation in the petition the work within the time specified, but no dam-seeking a recovery for injuries caused by deages were sustained by the owner, the latter fendant's assault that defendant beat and could only recover nominal damages.-Ward v. wounded plaintiff by striking him in and about Haren, 167 S. W. 1064. the right eye and on the nose is sufficiently general to permit recovery for the breaking of plaintiff's nose.-Ellis v. Wahl, 167 S. w.

Where the amount stipulated in a contract becomes the measure of actual damages sustained, a party seeking to recover for a breach must show a breach and that substantial damages accrued in consequence thereof, and then the stipulation fixes the recovery.-Id.

VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

(B) Injuries to Property.

§ 110 (Mo.App.) Where top soil was washed from plaintiff's land as a result of defendant's breach of a contract to construct an embankment, the measure of damage was the difference in value of the land before and after the injury. Coffman v. Saline Valley R. Co., 167 S. W. 1053.

$111 (Mo.App.) Measure of damages for injury to plaintiff's building from defendant's excavation in an adjacent alley held, the difference between the value of the building and lot just preceding the injury and its value after the injury.-McGrath v. Heman Const. Co., 167 S. W. 1086.

§ 112 (Mo.App.) The measure of damages for the destruction by fire of numerous small forest trees ranging in height from eight inches to three feet is the difference between the value of the land before and after the fire.-Miller v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 167 S. W. 469. The measure of damages for the destruction of a meadow about ready to harvest is the value of the crop of hay and the cost of reseeding the meadow.-Id.

The measure of damages for the destruction by fire of a meadow is the cost of re-seeding the land.-Id.

§ 112 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to growing crops, the measure of damage is the value of crops destroyed which were standing at the time of the injury.-Coffman v. Saline Valley R. Co., 167 S. W. 1053.

VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE

DAMAGES.

§ 132 (Mo.) Verdict for $10,000 for injuries from electric shock, by which plaintiff practically lost the use of both hands, and the tendons and muscles were permanently burned and destroyed, held not excessive.-Riley v. City of Independence, 167 S. W. 1022.

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§ 132 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to a young woman, causing disfigurement and serious pain, suffering and mental shock, a verdict awarding her $4,000 was not excessive.-Hays v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 167 S. W. 656.

§ 132 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to a traveler by being struck by a car, a verdict awarding plaintiff $6,000 held not so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice.-Warren v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 167 S. W. 672.

$ 132 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries resulting in a Pott's fracture of plaintiff's leg, causing a permanent injury, a verdict of $5,000 held not excessive.-Cowgill v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1157.

§ 138 (Mo.App.) Evidence, in an action for damages for injury to plaintiff's building from defendant's excavation in an adjacent alley, held to sustain a judgment for plaintiff for $2,100.-McGrath v. Heman Const. Co., 167 S. W. 1086.

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582.

§ 158 (Mo.App.) Where a petition alleged a severe laceration of plaintiff's knee, the allegation authorized evidence that the knee was swollen.-Foster v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 167 S. W. 643.

(B) Evidence.

§ 177 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries, evidence as to a physician's charge for medical and surgical services rendered to plaintiff was admissible, where she was personally liable therefor.-Cowgill v. City of St. Joseph, 167 S. W. 1157.

§ 185 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action for personal injury to plaintiff's wife from falling while alighting from a car, in which defendant claimed that plaintiff was deliberately attempting to defraud, held to sustain a verdict for defendant.-Bryning v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 167 S. W. 826.

(C) Proceedings for Assessment. § 216 (Mo.) In action for personal injuries, instruction as to measure of damages held not erroneous.-Riley v. City of Independence, 167 S. W. 1022.

DEATH.

See Abatement and Revival, §§ 73, 77; Appeal and Error, §§ 171, 193, 238, 877, 1050, 1053, 1056, 1064; Carriers, § 318; Continuance, § 14; Master and Servant, $$ 97, 137, 256, 258, 264, 270, 276, 278, 286, 289, 293; Partnership, $$ 251, 252, 336; Railroads, §§ 259, 347, 348, 395; Street Railroads, § 117; Trial, §§ 191, 194, 253, 296.

II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. section 9 as added by Act April 5, 1910, § 2. §11 (Ark.) Employers' Liability Act, § 1, and create a right of action for the benefit of the widow and children wholly independent of the right of action to the injured person for the pain and suffering endured prior to his death. -Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

(D) Pleading and Evidence.

§ 47 (Ky.) In an action for negligent death, it is sufficient to charge in a general way that the death was caused by the negligence of defendant.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Dawson's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 125.

$ 57 (Ky.) Where plaintiff, suing for negligent death, specifies in the petition the negligence relied on, the facts specified constitute the cause of action, and the right to recover must be confined thereto.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Dawson's Adm'r, 167 S. W. 125.

§ 64 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for a brakeman's death, brought by his representative for the benefit of his widow, etc., testimony of his widow that at the time of his death they owned no property, that they were renting a house in which to live and that he was a good provider out of his wages held admissible.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

§ 67 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for a brakeman's death, evidence that deceased was a brakeman and extra conductor, and stood in line for

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

promotion to be a conductor, when he would | undeniable_proof_of_fraud or undue influence.— receive $45 or $50 per month more held admis- Bevins v. Lowe, 167 S. W. 422. sible as bearing upon his future expectations.Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

§ 68 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for a brakeman's death, testimony of the widow that his habits were good; that he had no bad habits at all that she knew anything about-held admissible on the issues of damages and the amount contributed to the support of the family and the probable duration of his life.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

(E) Damages, Forfeiture, or Fine. § 95 (Ark.) Measure of recovery for benefit of widow and child under the federal Employers' Liability Act and matters proper for consideration, stated.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

§ 99 (Ark.) Verdict of $25,000 reduced to $18,000 for death of brakeman, who left widow and child surviving, and for his conscious pain and suffering, held not excessive.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 167 S. W. 83.

§ 99 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action under the death statute as surviving children of one whose injuries resulted in his death, held, that a verdict of $1,000 for each of the adult plaintiffs who were themselves earning money was not excessive. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Walker, 167 S. W. 199.

$99 (Tex. Civ.App.) A verdict of $7,500 for the death of a brakeman, 43 years old, experienced, sober, industrious, and in line for promotion, and earning from $125 to $140 per month, held not excessive.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Bankruptcy; Creditors' Suit.

DECEDENTS.

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$17 (Mo.) A deed executed by a father to a child in consideration of love and affection, and the agreement of the child to support the grantor for life, is supported by a good and valuable consideration. Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030. (B) Form and Contents of Instruments. § 31 (Tex.Civ.App.) A deed, reciting that it was a conveyance by B., which was not signed by B., but was signed, after her death, by her heirs, does not convey the interest of the heirs in the premises.-Jackson v. Craigen, 167 S. W. 1101. (C) Execution.

§ 45 (Tex.Civ.App.) No interest in land could be predicated on forged deeds.-Green v. Eddins, 167 S. W. 196.

(D) Delivery.

§ 54 (Mo.) A delivery of a deed by the grantor is essential to its validity.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447.

§ 56 (Mo.) Delivery of a deed may be shown by acts without words, or by words without acts, or by both combined, provided an intention appears on the part of the grantor to surrender dominion over the instrument, without power to recall it.-Miles v. Robertson, 167 S. W. 1000.

Facts held sufficient to show valid delivery of a deed by a brother to a sister.—Id.

§ 58 (Mo.) A deed delivered by the grantor to a third person for delivery to the grantee and the delivery by the third person to the grantee is a good delivery, though the grantor is dead at the date of the delivery to the grantee.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447.

§ 64 (Mo.) Acceptance of a deed by the grantee is essential to its validity.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447.

(E) Validity.

§ 68 (Mo.) Sickness and old age do not in and of themselves amount to incapacity to execute a deed.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.

§ 70 (Mo.) The fraud of a grantee which will vitiate a deed consists of acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or eq

See Criminal Law, § 427; Evidence, § 273; uitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, Homicide, §§ 203-218.

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§ 13 (Tex.Civ.App.) The grantees in a deed must be in existence when it is executed, but a deed to the heirs of a dead person is valid if the grantees can be identified, though a deed to the heirs of a living person, without specifying their names is invalid, especially where the heirs are yet unborn.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.

§ 17 (Ky.) A conveyance will not be canceled on the ground of want of consideration, unless the inadequacy is such as will shock the con

and which are injurious to the grantor or by which undue advantage is taken of him.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.

§ 70 (Tex.) A conveyance in fee on the promise of the grantee that he would execute a written agreement to reconvey when his use of the premises had terminated, which he did not at the time intend to perform, was procured by fraud warranting the cancellation of the conveyance.-Cearley v. May, 167 S. W. 725.

III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA

TION.

(A) General Rules of Construction.

§ 93 (Mo.) The court, in construing a deed, must consider all its parts together, and give effect to the intention of the parties, when ascertained.-Warne v. Sorge, 167 S. W. 967.

§ 100 (Mo.) Where a deed is fairly susceptible of different constructions, the court may ascertain the situation of the parties to determine the meaning of the language used.-Warne v. Sorge, 167 S. W. 967.

§ 101 (Mo.) Where a deed is susceptible of more than one meaning, the construction placed on it by the immediate parties thereto will be adopted.-Warne v. Sorge, 167 S. W. 967.

A construction placed on a deed. by a grantee for life is only persuasive in determining its true meaning, and does not estop the remain

§ 105 (Mo.) The word "children" in a deed conveying real estate to a person for life, and at his death to his "children," usually refers to his immediate offspring, and not to grandchildren; but the word may, in furtherance of the intention of the parties, include grandchildren.-Warne v. Sorge, 167 S. W. 967.

§ 105 (Mo.) Where a deed conveyed the land for the use of the grantee and to her nearest blood kin, it passed the remainder to her surviving father and mother, to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters.-Smith v. Egan, 167 S. W. 971.

§ 105 (Tex.Civ.App.) Since the grantees must be in existence, under a deed to grantor's son and to the heirs of grantor and his wife, the son would take all of the land conveyed, if grantor then had no other children.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.

(C) Estates and Interests Created. § 125 (Mo.) Deed construed, and held to create in certain remaindermen a fee subject to be divested on their death without issue, and not an estate tail.-Collier v. Archer, 167 S. W. 511.

§ 133 (Mo.) Where a deed conveyed a life estate to a son, and at his death to the children he might leave surviving him, and entitled by law to inherit his estate, and the son at the time of the deed was only 24 years old, the deed created a vested remainder in his children, so that grandchildren living at the time of his death were entitled to share in the property conveyed. Warne v. Sorge, 167 S. W. 967.

§ 196 (Mo.) That a daughter resided with her aged father as his housekeeper, companion, and nurse did not raise a presumption that a deed, whereby the father conveyed to her one-half his farm, was executed under undue influence.Stanfield v. Hennegar, 167 S. W. 1036.

§ 208 (Mo.) The delivery of a deed and its acceptance may be established by indirect evidence.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447.

Evidence held to sustain a finding of a delivery of a deed to a third person for delivery to the grantee.-Id.

Evidence held to sustain a finding that a grantor accepted the delivery of a deed.-Id.

$210 (Ky.) In a suit to set aside a conveyance on the ground that the grantee by reason of his parental relation obtained the conveyance for a grossly inadequate consideration, evidence held insufficient to show such gross inadequacy as would warrant cancellation.-Bevins v. Lowe, 167 S. W. 422.

§ 211 (Ky.) In a suit to set aside a conveyance on the ground of the grantor's insanity, evidence held insufficient to show the grantor's mental incapacity.-Bevins v. Lowe, 167 S. W. 422.

8211 (Ky.) Evidence in partition held to show that the name of plaintiff's ancestor was included among the grantees in a deed by mistake, so that title to all the land was in the other grantees.-Glass v. Bradford, 167 S. W. 926.

$211 (Mo.) Evidence, in a suit to cancel a deed for fraud of the grantee, held to show his A vested remainder exists where property is dealings with the grantor were free from fraud. conveyed to a grantee for life, with remainder-Carter v. Carter, 167 S. W. 570. at his death to another.-Id.

Where a deed creates a doubt as to whether it grantor had mental capacity to execute a deed. 211 (Mo.) Evidence held to show that a was the intention of the grantor to convey a contingent or vested remainder, the doubt should-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030. be resolved in favor of a vested remainder.-Id.

(D) Exceptions and Reservations. § 143 (Tex.Civ.App.) A provision in a deed to grantor's son, reserving to grantor the right to control the land as "guardian of said estate for the benefit" of his son, gave grantor no more rights over the property than he had as the natural guardian of his son, so that the fee-simple title passed to the son free from any trust.-Vineyard v. Heard, 167 S. W. 22.

(E) Conditions and Restrictions.

Evidence held not to show that a deed was

procured by the fraud of the grantee.-Id.

Evidence held not to show that a deed was procured by the undue influence of the grantee. Id.

§ 211 (Mo.) In a suit to cancel a deed from a father to his daughter, evidence held to sustain a finding that the father was of sound mind when he executed the deed.-Stanfield v. Hennegar, 167 S. W. 1036.

In a suit to cancel a deed from a father to one of his daughters who lived with him and cared for him, etc., evidence held to sustain a finding that the deed was not procured executed by undue influence.-Id.

DEFACING BUILDINGS.

§ 165 (Ark.) Upon a breach of a condition subsequent contained in a deed, ipso facto the title reverted and was vested in the grantor, without the necessity of his taking possession in order to effect a forfeiture.-St. Louis South- See Malicious Mischief, §§ 1, 4. western Ry. Co. v. Curtis, 167 S. W. 489.

IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

DEFAMATION.

$194 (Mo.) The presumption of the delivery See Libel and Slander.

of a deed and its acceptance in case of voluntary settlement is stronger than in case of bargain and sale.-Schooler v. Schooler, 167 S. W. 444; Cowsert v. Same, Id. 447.

DEFAULT.

See Judgment, §§ 101-143.

DELAY.

§ 196 (Ky.) There is a presumption that the grantor of land has sufficient capacity to convey, and the burden of proof is upon him who See Insurance, § 602. asserts the grantor's incapacity; the presumption being strengthened where the transaction is old and the property has greatly enhanced in value since conveyance.-Bevins v. Lowe, 167 S. W. 422.

§ 196 (Mo.) In a suit to set aside a deed on the ground of the grantor's mental incapacity, the grantee may rely on the presumption of the grantor's mental capacity; the burden being on plaintiff to rebut the presumption.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.

The presumption is that a grantee obtaining a deed was not guilty of fraud inducing its execution.-Id.

DELIVERY.

See Carriers, §§ 83-94, 105; Deeds, §§ 54-64, 194, 208; Sales, § 72; Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 27, 38, 51, 54, 56, 66, 68, 71.

DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE.

See Criminal Law, § 404.

DEMURRER.

See Pleading, §§ 193-214; Trial, § 156.

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DISHONOR.

$79 (Ky.) In an election contest, contestee held not entitled to have depositions, taken by contestant, quashed because they were not filed See Bills and Notes, §§ 396, 526. within 30 days allowed contestant for taking proof, nor within 20 days allowed contestee for the same purpose.-Potter v. Campbell, 167 S. W. 404.

DEPOSITS.

See Banks and Banking, §§ 140, 154.

DEPOTS.

DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 105, 592, 773; Bail, $65; Habeas Corpus, § 113; Justices of the Peace, § 166; Trial, § 11.

I. VOLUNTARY.

§ 26 (Tex.Civ.App.) On a bill to enjoin tort

See Constitutional Law, § 297; Railroads, §§ feasors, when one of the defendants resides be58, 226.

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. See Abatement and Revival, §§ 73, 77; Adoption, §§ 20, 21; Courts, § 155; Executors and Administrators; Mortgages, § 587; Wills.

III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF HEIRS AND DISTRIBUTEES. (A) Nature and Establishment of Rights in General.

§ 80 (Mo.) Where defendant conducted his mother's business for several years under her immediate direction, and collected moneys for her, and expended or retained same under circumstances satisfactory to her and where no accounting was required of him by her, an action could not be maintained against him by the administrator of his mother's estate for an accounting.-Barnett v. Kemp, 167 S. W. 546.

DESCRIPTION.

yond the jurisdiction of the court, and has not been served with process, the suit may be dismissed as to him, and proceed as to the other. -Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Keys, 167 S. W. 186.

DISORDERLY HOUSE.

§ 17 (Mo.App.) In a prosecution for keeping a bawdyhouse, the evidence of the marshal and his deputy that defendant said she ran the house and had five girls, and that the reputation of the girls and of the house was bad, held sufficient to sustain a conviction.-City of Columbia v. Stout, 167 S. W. 1153.

DISQUALIFICATION.

See Judges, § 44.

DISSOLUTION.

See Injunction, § 186; Partnership, §§ 317, 336.
DISTRICT AND PROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS.

See Boundaries, §§ 3, 5; Deeds, § 105; Refor-
mation of Instruments, §§ 3, 16; Wills, 88 See Criminal Law, §§ 1037, 1055, 1171.
506-559.

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DIVIDENDS.

See Corporations, § 150.

DIVORCE.

II. GROUNDS.

§ 29 (Mo.App.) The use of offensive language by a husband to his wife, his laying of his hand on her shoulder by way of emphasis, and his desertion, all within a few minutes, constitute but single indignity, insufficient under the statute making "indignities" ground for divorce. -Bowling v. Dowling, 167 S. W. 1077.

Neither a husband's declaration, on the morning following a quarrel with his wife, that he was not going to live with her, nor his notification of the landlord and grocer that he would

See Railroads, §§ 338, 348, 360, 400; Street not be responsible for her bills, constituted an Railroads, §§ 93, 103, 112.

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$70 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where complainants did not refuse to answer certain interrogatories as certified by the notary, the court did not err in permitting complainants to testify, and in not regarding the interrogatories as confessed. Connell v. Nickey, 167 S. W. 313.

DISCRETION OF COURT.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 977, 979, 1003; Crim

indignity within the divorce statute.-Id. IV. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF.

(D) Evidence.

§ 124 (Mo.) Evidence, in an action for divorce, held to sustain a finding that there was no common-law marriage.-Cherry v. Cherry, 167 S. W. 539.

§ 128 (Mo.App.) In a suit by a wife for divorce on the ground that her husband had communicated to her a loathsome disease, evidence held to support a finding in her favor.-Darling v. Darling, 167 S. W. 1166.

(F) Judgment or Decree.

§ 172 (Ky.) A judgment granting the wife an absolute divorce on the ground of abandonment,

claim for divorce on similar grounds, held not a bar to the husband's subsequent action against the wife's parents for alienation of her affections, in which he relied upon practically the same evidence as in the divorce suit. Hostetter v. Green, 167 S. W. 919.

(G) Appeal.

§ 184 (Mo.) While on review of a divorce case the finding of the trial court is not absolutely binding, yet, the evidence being conflicting, and much depending on the credibility of witnesses, the finding is of great weight.-Cherry v. Cherry, 167 S. W. 539.

§ 184 (Mo.App.) In divorce, the appellate court will defer much to the findings of the trial court.-Darling v. Darling, 167 S. W. 1166.

III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF WIDOW.

of dower in lands claimed by defendant but al§ 78 (Mo.) Where, in a suit for the assignment leged to have been owned by the husband during his life, an inchoate right accrued to the wife and something which afterward occurred is relied on to defeat it, it must, under the Code, to be made available as a defense, be pleaded by the defendant.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

116 (Mo.) In a suit for the assignment of dower in land purchased by defendant from the husband in his lifetime, defendant could not have deducted from the dower interest the widow's portion of an amount he had paid for taxes at the purchase of the land.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

DRAINS.

See Municipal Corporations, § 330.

V. ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. 8211 (Mo.App.) While if it appears on a preliminary hearing for alimony pendente lite that the wife's suit for divorce is without any just or reasonable foundation, no allowance should See Intoxicating Liquors. be made, yet making the allowance is largely in the court's discretion.--Scism v. Scism, 167

S. W. 455.

DRAMSHOPS.

DRUGGISTS.

Though all the facts tending to show right to See Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 152, 171. divorce, proved on hearing for alimony pendente lite, are not within the allegations of the petition for divorce, an allowance may be made,

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

as the petition may be amended before final See Constitutional Law, §§ 252-309. hearing. Id.

See Trial, § 11.

DOCKETS.

DOCTORS.

See Physicians and Surgeons.

DOCUMENTS.

See Criminal Law, § 444; Evidence, §§ 348, 368.

DOMICILE.

See Railroads, § 22; Venue, §§ 27, 32.

DOWER.

See Adverse Possession, § 62.

I. NATURE AND REQUISITES. 852 New, vol. 19 Key-No. Series]. (Mo.) Three facts are necessary to the existence of the right of dower; (1) A. lawful marriage; (2) seisin of the husband, or of some other person to his use, during the marriage, of an estate of inheritance in the land; and (3) his death.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

II. INCHOATE INTEREST. (B) Bar, Release, or Forfeiture. § 44 (Mo.) Evidence, in a suit by a widow to set aside conveyances of land and avoid gifts of money by her deceased husband, held to show no fraud, and that the disposition of the property was not to defeat dower, but by way of advancement to their children with her consent.Pollman v. Schaper, 167 S. W. 953.

§ 44 (Mo.) Where a wife did not join her husband in a conveyance, her dower remains outstanding.-Lee v. Lee, 167 S. W. 1030.

$52 (Mo.) The remarriage of a husband after separation from a first wife, though raising a presumption of divorce from the first wife, does not raise the presumption that such divorce was granted for the misconduct or fault of the first wife, so as to defeat her dower rights.-Murray v. Scully, 167 S. W. 1017.

DUPLICITY.

See Indictment and Information, §§ 125, 132, 202.

DYING DECLARATIONS.

See Homicide, §§ 203-218.

EASEMENTS.

See Vendor and Purchaser, § 108.

EJECTMENT.

See Boundaries, § 37; Taxation, §§ 791, 810;
Trespass to Try Title.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DE-
FENSES.

9 (Ky.) In ejectment plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and must show either a title of record or one by adverse possession.-Logan v. Williams, 167 S. W. 124.

III. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE. claimed under a blanket title comprising within $86 (Ky.) A plaintiff suing to recover land its exterior lines a specified number of acres and excluding therefrom a specified number of acres must show that the land in controversy is within the exterior lines and not within the exclusions.-Le Moyne v. Litton, 167 S. W. 912.

§ 90 (Ky.) In ejectment for land, title to which depended upon the boundary line between rely upon the recitals in the deed to defendant, the lots of plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff may particularly where his own deeds refer to the descriptions in defendant's chain of title.— Davis v. Clay, 167 S. W. 915.

IV. TRIAL, JUDGMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, AND REVIEW.

$110 (Mo.) An instruction in ejectment held objectionable, as limiting plaintiff's right to possession to the surface of the ground.-Bimmerle v. Langdeau, 167 S. W. 532.

§ 111 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2389, a verdict for plaintiff in ejectment, which does not find that defendant was in possession at the time of the commencement of the action or

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