stances made out that the contract for the carriage of the spirits was a contract between the carriers and the consignee (Stein) alone. THE LORDS adopted this view of the case, and affirmed the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in error: Dawes & Son. from Ex parte Watkins. The custom of the trade extended to THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH was of the same epinion, L. JJ. Equity. July 1. Bankruptcy-Joint and separate Estate-Partner proving against separate Estate of Co-partner. In re ORIENTAL INLAND STEAM COMPANY. J. Pearson, Q.C., and Murten, Q.C., for the appellants. sitting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. In this matter which has been repeatedly before the Courts of Bankruptcy and Chancery (see Ex parte Morley, Law Rep. 8 Ch. 214, 1026; Morley v. White, Law Rep. 8 Ch. 731), a claim was made by the receiver in the Chancery suit to prove on behalf of the separate estate of W. White, deceased, against the separate estate of his son W. T. White in bankruptcy for a sum of Solicitors: Tilleard, Godden, & Holme; Hollams, Son, & Coward. 19651. Order and Disposition-Reputed Ownership-Bonded Warehouse. Couston & Co., who were wine and spirit merchants at Liverpool, on the 9th of January, 1872, sold to Vaux & Co. at Sunderland a quantity of whisky in casks, then in the bonded warehouse of W. Muir at Leith. The price of the whisky was paid by an acceptance of Vaux & Co. W. T. White was partner with his father during his life, and was his acting executor. After his father's death he carried on the business, and employed in it the rents of certain houses which belonged to the private estate of his father. It was on account of these rents that the receiver claimed to prove against his separate estate. The registrar refused the claim, being of opinion that it came within the rule that a partner could not prove against the estate of his co-partner till all the partnership debts had been paid in full. The receiver appealed from this decision. De Gex, Q.C., Winslow, Q.C., and Finlay Knight, for the trustee of W. T. White's estate. THE LORD JUSTICE JAMES said that the claim in this case was for a devastavit committed by the executor, who had made use of the testator's assets in his own business. Such a case did not come within the rule referred to, although it might happen that the executor had been partner with his testator. All the debt was incurred since the testator's death, when the partnership was at an end. THE LORD JUSTICE MELLISH concurred. L. JJ. VAUGHAN v. HALLIDAY. Unaccepted Bills. July 6. The whisky was allowed to remain in Muir's warehouse in the name of the vendors. On the 26th of February, 1872, Couston Securities for Bills of Exchange-Doctrine of Ex parte Waring— & Co. filed their petition for liquidation, and a trustee was appointed. On the 28th of February a delivery order was sent by Couston & Co. to Vaux & Co., who claimed the whisky from Muir. On the other hand, the trustee in the liquidation claimed the whisky as having been at the date of the petition in the reputed ownership of the vendors with the consent of the purchasers. The Chief Judge took this view, and ordered the whisky to be given up to the trustee. Vaux & Co. appealed from this decision. Milward, Q.C., and W. Potter, for the trustee, distinguished the present case from the case cited, where the goods were in the vendor's own bonded warehouse, whereas in the present case they were in the warehouse of a third party, in the order and disposition of the vendors. (ante, p. 70). The facts are stated in the previous note. The plaintiffs relied on the principle of Ex parte Waring (19 Ves. 235), and claimed that the drafts which had been sent to cover the bills, which they held, were applicable towards payment of the bills. The Vice-Chancellor having decided in favour of the plaintiff the trustee of the estate of Ashton, on whom the bills had been drawn, but who had refused to accept them, appealed. De Gex, Q.C., and Winslow, Q.C., for the appellant. Bardswell, for the trustee of the estate of Ryder & Co., the drawers of the bills. THE LORDS JUSTICES were of opinion that the principle of Ex parte Waring only applied where there were equities to adjust between the estates of parties who have become insolvent, and THE LORDS JUSTICES affirmed the decision. Ince, for the appellant. the adjustment operated for the benefit of a third party. Here | The Vice-Chancellor Malins held that Ann Cole was meant, as Ashton never accepted the bills, and was not liable on them; noted ante, p. 99. and the holders of the bills had not therefore a double right of proof against the two estates. There were, therefore, no equities to adjust between the two estates. Ex parte Waring could not apply in cases where there was no double right of proof. The bill must be dismissed against both the defendants. Solicitors: Phelps & Sidgwick, for Sale, Shipman, & Seddon, Manchester; Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland, for Brooks, Marshall, & Brooks, Manchester; Chester, Urquhart, & Co., for Laces, Banner, & Co., Liverpool. L. JJ. MAYOR, &C., OF HASTINGS v. IVALL. Security for Costs-Appeal. July 7. In this case the Vice-Chancellor Malins had made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs (as noted ante, p. 132), and the defendant had appealed. Glasse, Q.C., and Ellis, now asked that the defendant might be ordered to give security for the costs of the appeal, on the ground that he was unable to pay any costs, and was a merely nominal defendant, the suit being in fact that of a person named Moreing. Cotton, Q.C., and Hemming, opposed. THEIR LORDSHIPS said that if there was no precedent they would make one, and ordered security to be given. Solicitors: Lydall; Walker & Martineau. L. JJ. July 8 REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA V. IMPERIAL BANK. Affidavit of Documents-Dismissal of Bill-Time. The bill in this case was filed on the 6th of December, 1871, and under it the sum of 4000. had been paid into Court. The Vice-Chancellor Malins, on the 31st of May, 1873, made an order, on an application of one of the defendants, for an affidavit of documents, as reported Law Rep. 16 Eq. 179. Affidavits were filed, which were insufficient, and on the 23rd of April, 1874, the Vice-Chancellor Malins made an order dismissing the bill unless a sufficient affidavit was filed before the 12th of July. The plaintiffs, on the 2nd of July, moved to discharge the order, but the Vice-Chancellor Malins refused to hear the motion, thinking it a proper case for the Court of Appeal. The application was now made to the Court of Appeal. Glasse, Q.C, and B. B. Rogers, for the plaintiffs, said that there were great difficulties in getting a proper affidavit from Liberia, and the plaintiffs were willing to submit to terms, but not to have the bill dismissed. Higgins, Q.C., and Langley, for the defendant. THEIR LORDSHIPS said that a suit could not be allowed to go on indefinitely when a plaintiff did not comply with the orders of the Court. This matter had been repeatedly before the ViceChancellor, and he had thought fit to order the bill to be dismissed unless a proper affidavit was filed before the 12th of July. Their Lordships understood that a mail was expected from Liberia, and on that ground alone would extend the time to the 28th of July. The plaintiffs must, however, pay the costs of the applications, which their Lordships would fix, subject to taxation, at 757. Solicitor: E. Smith; Flux & Co. J. Pearson, Q.C., and Oswald, for the respondent. Solicitors: Doyle & Edwards; Wood, Street, & Hayter. M. R. June 22. In re MEWBURN'S SETTLED ESTATES. Practice-Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act-PetitionService out of Jurisdiction. Proctor applied for leave to serve a petition, which had been presented in this matter under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, upon a respondent out of the jurisdiction, citing Shurmer v. Hodge (Weekly Notes, 1866, p. 304). THE MASTER OF THE ROLES held that as this was not a proceeding in a suit he had no power to grant the application. Solicitors: Sharp & Ullithorne. Will-Gift of Shares in Bank-Words " My estate and effects in City of London"-Balance at Bankers-Locality of Bank. Testatrix, by her will, bequeathed her shares in the London and County Bank to the persons therein mentioned, and the residue of her money, estate, and effects, to Sophia Rhodes. By a codicil the testatrix devised and bequeathed her estate and interest in certain freehold houses in the city of London and "all and every other my estate and effects in the city of London" to John McLachlan. The testatrix was entitled to twenty shares in the London and County Bank, the head office of which is in the city of London; and had also at the time of her death a balance at her bankers, Messrs. Praeds in Fleet Street, also in the city of London. The question arose whether the said shares and the balance at her bankers respectively passed under the will, or whether they passed under the gift in the codicil, as being part of her estate and effects in the city of London. Fischer, Q.C., and Whitehorne, for the legatee under the codicil. Southgate, Q.C., Lemon, Maclean, and Cookson, for other parties. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the bank shares passed under the bequest in the will, and that the balance at Praeds' bank, being a debt due from the bankers personally, was not affected by the locality of the bank, and did not pass under the gift in the codicil, but to the residuary legatee under the will. Solicitors: Winter, Williams, & Co. ; F. J. & G. J. Braikenridge & Co. Will-Trust for Investment in Purchase of Lands adjoining to or convenient or desirable to be held with Settled Estates-Purchase of Mines and Minerals apart from Surface. John Wright, by his will, dated the 8th of May, 1858, directed his trustees to invest certain funds in the purchase of manors, lands, and hereditaments situate in the county of Chester, adjoining to or convenient or desirable to be held with the hereditaments by his will devised in strict settlement, for any estate or estates of inheritance in fee simple. The suit was instituted for administration of the trusts of the will. It was proposed to invest part of the fund in the purchase of the fee simple of the mines and minerals under eighty-two acres of land, seventy-five of which formed part of the settled estate, and the rest immediately adjoined it; and fan application to sanction the purchase now came before the Court on an ad- and had only tendered the rent after notice had been given that journed summons. In re J. BRAIN. V.-C. M. July 1. Petition of Right-Free Miners—Grant of Gale—Non-payment of Rent-Right of Crown to re-enter. This was a petition of right presented to the Crown praying that a declaration of the forfeiture of a gale might be set aside under the following circumstances:-In August, 1864, a "gale" or licence to work a colliery, called the Alexandra Colliery, in the Forest of Dean, was granted to John Brain, a free miner of the forest, for a term of five years, a rent of 2d. per ton upon all coal brought out being reserved, with a proviso that if less than 24.000 tons should be worked in any year there should still be paid a minimum rent of 2001. per annum. The colliery was never worked, but the rent of 2001. per annum was paid up to the year 1869, when upon application by J. Brain to the deputy gaveller of the forest a new term of five years was granted to him. From that time no rent had been paid by J. Brain, and in consequence thereof frequent applications were made to him for payment, until on the 17th of July, 1871, the deputy gaveller declared the gale to be forfeited, and on the 21st of July he took possession of the forfeited gale. On the following day an application was made to the deputy gaveller for a grant of the Alexandra Colliery by Benjamin Gwilliam, who was also a free miner of the forest. On the 24th of May, 1872, the deputy gaveller caused a notice to be advertised in the Forester, a newspaper circulating in the district, that he intended to grant the gale to B. Gwilliam. On the day before the grant would have been so made, J. Brain, who had up to that time acquiesced in the forfeiture of the gale, tendered the arrears of rent, with interest thereon, to the deputy gaveller, and protested against the grant being made to Gwilliam. The deputy gaveller, however, refused to accept the tender, but deferred any fresh grant of the gale. This petition of right was then presented by J. Brain to set aside the declaration of forfeiture, and to restrain the grant of the gale to Gwilliam. Cotton, Q.C., and Bevir, in support of the petition, submitted that the Crown had no power either under the grant of the gale or under the Acts of Parliament regulating the management of the forest, to forfeit a gale for non-payment of rent. There were ample provisions made for obtaining payment of rent in arrear, but no power of re-entry on non-payment. But even if the Crown had power of forfeiting the grant, still the Court of Equity would relieve the suppliants in a case of this kind, where they had already paid five years' rent at 2001. per annum, and were now ready to pay up the rent in arrear. The Attorney-General (Sir R. Baggallay), Glasse, Q.C., and W. Korslake, for the Crown, contended that the grant of a gale was a licence to work upon certain conditions, one of which was the payment of rent, and on breach of that condition the Crown had a right of re-entry. Walter Renshaw, for B. Gwilliam. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the first question was whether the Crown had the right to re-enter and resume possession on non-payment of rent, and the second was whether if they had that right, the Court ought to grant relief against the forfeiture. His opinion was that the grant of the gale was a grant upon certain conditions, one of which was that rent should be paid, and upon non-performance of that condition there was a power of re-entry. He was also of opinion that under the Acts of Parliament and the rules sanctioned by those Acts, there was a right of re-entry upon non-performance of the conditions, one of which was payment of rent. Then as to whether the Court ought to interfere to relieve against the forfeiture, he considered that as the suppliant had not filed his petition within six months, but had acquiesced for so long a time in the forfeiture, the gale would be granted to another person, he could not now claim relief, and the petition must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Ewbank & Partington; H. Watson; Jones & Starling. V.-C. M. To of the defendant's witnesses who were resident at Teheran in In this case the plaintiff was desirous of cross-examining some Persia. The defendant proposed that Mr. Talour Thomson, the British Minister at Teheran, should be appointed special examiner for the purpose of taking the cross-examination. this the plaintiff objected on the ground that the witnesses were attached to the British embassy, and were to a certain extent dependent upon Mr. Thomson, and one of them was a personal attendant upon him. It appeared, however, that attempts had been made to find some other properly qualified person to act as special examiner, but without success. were the only resident Englishmen who could be applied to, and The telegraph officers they were not permitted by the telegraph company to take such a duty upon themselves. Glasse, Q.C., and Davey, for the defendant, now applied to the Court to sanction the appointment of Mr. Thomson. J. Pearson, Q.C., and W. Karslake, opposed the application, stating that an examination before Mr. Thomson could not in the opinion of the plaintiff be conducted satisfactorily, owing to his position in relation to the witnesses, although they had no that the witnesses ought to be brought to this country for personal objection against Mr. Thomson. They urged therefore examination. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that as the amount in dispute in this cause did not exceed 1300%., and as it was stated upon good grounds that the witnesses could not be brought here for less 10007, it would be a denial of justice to refuse a special examiner. It appeared that no other efficient person could be applied to, and he could see no objection to the appointment of Mr. Thomson, whose character and position as the representative of this country at Teheran was a guarantee that he was properly qualified to fulfil the office of examiner. He should therefore accede to the application. Solicitors: Finch, Jennings, & Finch; Willoughby & Cox. By the will of the Dowager Duchess of Cleveland, dated the 25th of June, 1860, the mansion-house called Newton House and park and garden held therewith was settled to the use of Harry Vane Russell (deceased) for life, and then to his first and other sons in tail, and on failure of such issue to the petitioner Robert Russell for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail, and on failure of such issue to W. N. Russell for life, and then to his first and other sons in tail, and on failure of such issue to John Russell (deceased), with remainder to his first and other sons in tail, and on failure of such issue to the testatrix's own right heirs for ever. And the will contained a proviso that during the infancy of any tenant for life or in tail the trustees should keep up and maintain in a perfect state of repair and condition the mansion-house and the park, garden, and pleasure grounds belonging thereto, and effect such improvements as might be necessary, but it was her express desire that neither they nor any tenant for life should let her said mansion-house. The testatrix died in January, 1861. Harry Vane Russell died without having been married, and the petitioner Robert Russell, the second tenant for life, attained 21 in 1869, and had ever since been in possession of the mansion-house. W. N. Russell had one son living, and John Russell died in 1863 leaving one son. It was believed that the father of the petitioner was the heir-at-law of the testatrix at the time of her death, but strict proof of such heirship could not be produced. The petition, which was presented under the Settled Estates Act, stated that Newton House was a very extensive mansion, and it required a large income to reside in it. The petitioner had not sufficient means to reside in and keep up the mansion-house in an efficient state of repair, and he now asked the sanction of the Court to its being let for seven years to a gentleman with whom a provisional contract had been entered into. Glasse, Q.C., and Cookson, in support of the petition, stated that it was a most desirable thing both for the petitioner and the other persons entitled after him that the mansion-house should be let; and the next tenant for life fully approved of this application. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said he should be glad to make this order, as it was evidently for the benefit of the parties and of the estate, but in the face of the 26th section of the Settled Estates Act, it was not in his power to do so, there being an express direction in the will that the mansion-house should not be let by any tenant for life. He must therefore refuse the application. Solicitors: Parkin & Pagden. V.-C. M. In re DUKE OF NORFOLK'S ESTATES. July 3. Railway Company-Costs of paying Money into Court. In this case the Brighton Railway Company had taken a piece of land for the purpose of their line, which the Duke of Norfolk claimed as belonging to him. Another person, however, named Bridger, also put in a claim to the land, and the result was that the railway company were obliged to pay the money into Court. The adverse claimants had now settled their dispute, and a petition was presented by the Duke of Norfolk for payment of the money to him, and a question was raised whether the company was to pay the costs of the application. Kekewich, for the petitioner, urged that there was no such "wilful refusal" to convey in this case as would bring it within the 80th section of the Lands Clauses Act, 8 Vict. c. 18, and the Court had no power to refuse the costs to the petitioner. property and to the affairs of the company, and to mortgage, charge, or otherwise incumber all or any part of his freehold and leasehold estate, stocks, shares, and effects in England, and to lease the same for any term of years, and absolutely to sell all his said estates. In August, Charles Bowles, being considerably in debt, went to America, and had not since returned. At the end of October, 1872. Charles Bowles being then indebted to the National Agency Company in the sum of 19357., the directors of the company required W. H. Frith to execute a mortgage to them of the house in the Strand on behalf of Bowles, who was then in America, and in pursuance thereof the mortgage was executed. On the 9th of November, 1872, the company stopped payment, and was ordered to be wound up on the 9th of January, 1873, when J. W. Sully was appointed liquidator of the company. On the 10th of December, 1872, Charles Bowles was adjudicated a bankrupt upon certain acts committed by him, the first of which was in August, 1872, and John Young was appointed trustee of his property. On the 22nd of March, 1873, the mortgaged premises were sold by the trustees of the Liberator Building Society for 36001., and after paying their debt and costs, they paid the balance, amounting to 505l. 9s. 1d. into Court. This petition was presented by the liquidator of the National Agency Company, praying that the said sum of 5051. 9s. ld. might be paid out to him. The petition was opposed by John Young, the trustee of Charles Bowles under the bankruptcy, who claimed to be entitled to the money. Cotton, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for the petitioner. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said it was clear, from the adjudication in bankruptcy, that the first act of bankruptcy committed by Bowles was in August, 1872, when he went to America in order to defeat his creditors. This was before the mortgage was executed to the National Agency Company, and they must be taken to have known the embarrassed and insolvent position of Bowles at the time it was executed. It was very doubtful whether this was a bona fide transaction, but, at all events, the circumstances rendered it very improper; and in His Honour's opinion the security was invalid, and the petition must be dismissed, with costs. Solicitors: Woolacott & Leonard; R. Jones & Co.; Pattison & Russell. Speed, for the railway company, submitted that the necessity for paying the money into Court arose entirely from the claim of Bridger, who had now withdrawn his claim, and the company ought not to be saddled with the costs of the dispute between V.-C. M. the two claimants. TTE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the costs had in fact been occasioned by the railway company. If they had not disturbed the possession of the Duke of Norfolk by taking the land, the claim of Bridger would never have been made. The company must therefore pay the costs. Solicitors: Few & Co.; Baxter & Co. V.-C. M. July 3. In re BowLES'S MORTGAGE. Mortgage executed while in insolvent circumstances.-Mortgagee affected with Notice of Insolvency-Invalidity of Mortgage. This was a petition stating that on the 6th of January, 1872, Charles Bowles, who was then the promoter of the Joint National Agency Company, and the chairman of the board of directors, took an assignment of a lease for fifty-seven years of a messuage and premises numbered 446, in the Strand, at a rental of 400%. On the 18th of January he mortgaged this lease to the trustees of the Liberator Benefit Building Society, as a security for 3000l., with power of sale. He then let the house and premises to the Joint National Agency for four years, at 1000l. per annum. On the 20th of January, 1872, Charles Bowles gave a power of attorney to W. H. Frith, the secretary of the National Agency Company, enabling him to act on his behalf in all matters relating to his Griffith Smith made an application to the Court to direct an affidavit to be filed, which had been objected to as informal by Edward Grubb, one of the record and writ clerks. The alleged informality was this, that the witness, Elizabeth Down, had signed her name at the side of the affidavit instead of immediately underneath and above the jurat. He referred to 'Daniell's Ch. Pr.,' 2nd ed., p. 1442, where it is stated "that the party swearing the affidavit must subscribe his christian and surname on the left hand thereof. The jurat is written on the right." THE VICE-CHANCELLOR directed the affidavit to be filed. The work of the society consists in making grants of money towards the establishment of elementary schools, and they require the insertion in the trust-deed of every school aided by them a clause declaring that the school shall always be "in union with and conducted according to the principles and in furtherance of the ends and designs" of the society, and it is one of the terms of union that "the children are to be instructed in the Holy Scriptures and in the liturgy and catechism of the Established Church." In the year 1867 the Society in conjunction with another society and with other persons established a church school in the parish of Emanuel, Camberwell, and the usual trust-deed was executed, which however made no provision for the possibility of the alienation of the school by the managers. In the year 1870, the Elementary Education Act of that year was passed. It provided, amongst other things, by the 23rd section, for the transfer to School Boards formed under the Act of existing elementary schools, subject to certain consents, and in particular that when there was any instrument declaring the trusts of a school containing provisions for alienation in any manner, or subject to any consent, any arrangements for transfer to a school board should be made by the persons in the manner and with the consent so provided. In schools so transferred the teaching of any religious catechism or religious formulary distinctive of any particular denomination was by the Act prohibited. The school so established at Camberwell having been transferred by the managers to the School Board of London without the consent of the National Society, this suit was instituted seeking to set aside the transfer as illegal and improper. Cotton, Q.C., and Kekewich, for the plaintiffs. Glasse, Q.C., Speed, and Parke, for the London School Board. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held, upon the construction of the Elementary Education Act, 1870, that the consent of the National Society to the transfer to a school board of a school in union with it was not necessary to its validity, and that if the Society objected to such a transfer, their mode of giving effect to their objections was by appearing before the Educational Department of the Privy Council. Solicitors: G. A. Crawley, Arnold, & Green; Gedge, Kirby, & Millett. V.-C. M. SWETE v. TINDAL. July 7. Power of Appointment-Excessive Exercise-Appointees not Objects -Residuary Gift. By a deed of the 1st of July, 1865, a sum of 16,000l. was vested in trustees upon trust for Mrs. C. S. Swete, then Miss Carrington, for life, and after her death upon trust for all and every or for such one or more exclusively of any other or others of the children of Mrs. Swete as she should by deed or will appoint, and in default of appointment for the children equally, and the deed contained a hotchpot clause for the case of a partial appointment. there were consequently no grandchildren or remoter issue capable of taking under the power of appointment. The suit was instituted to obtain relief in respect to a breach of trust by which a portion of the 16,000, fund had been diverted from its proper investment, and a question incidentally arose as to the operation of the appointment of the 35007. The plaintiffs, who were Mrs. Swete's only son and another person, contended that the 3500. should be considered as appointed out of the 50007. fund, over which Mrs. Swete had a power of appointment extending beyond children, while the first defendant on the record, who was liable for the breach of trust, and claimed to be entitled to be indemnified in respect thereof out of so much of the 35007. as formed part of the 16,000., contended that the appointment was in any event in excess of the power, and that the 35007. must be attributed to the two funds proportionately. Glasse, Q.C., and H. A. Giffard, for the plaintiffs. Higgins, Q.C., and Tremlett, for the first defendant on the record, who was one of the trustees of the 16,000. fund. R. W. E. Forster, for Miss Swete, took no part in the argument. Ingle Joyce, for the other trustee. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that he could not attribute to the testatrix the intention to appoint the 3500, out of the 5000. fund exclusively, and it must be paid rateably out of both funds, and that Miss Swete took a life interest only in the 3500.; and subject thereto it remained unappointed, and did not pass to the son under the residuary gift. It was therefore equally divisible between the son and the daughter, but as to so much of it as was attributable to the 16,000l., the hotchpot clause applied, and he could not take it without bringing his appointed share into account. Solicitors: Bower & Cotton; Woodrooffe & Plaskitt; Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle. A testator, after giving two annuities of 357. each to his mother and his wife, added the words," and I charge the same annuities respectively upon all and singular my leasehold messuages, dwelling-houses or tenements situate in Sheffield aforesaid, hereinafter by me given and bequeathed." He subsequently provided that if the surplus rents and profits of his leasehold premises should be insufficient to pay both annuities in full, that given to his wife should abate in favour of his mother. He disposed of his estate subject to the annui ties. which had been sold under the decree in the suit (which was The mother was dead, and the proceeds of the leasehold estate, for administration of the testator's estate), were insufficient to provide for the annuity to the widow in full. Dunning (Glasse, Q.C., with him), for the plaintiff, the widow. Ince, and A. Whitaker, for the other parties interested. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the annuity was well charged on the corpus of the estate. Solicitors: Pattison, Wigg, & Co.; Doyle & Edwards. V.-C. B. ASTON v. WOOD. By a deed of the 11th of November, 1845, a sum of 5000l. was vested in trustees upon similar trusts, except that the power of appointment included grandchildren and remoter issue born in the lifetime of Mrs. Swete, and it contained no hotchpot clause. Mrs. Swete died on the 15th of November, 1871, having by her will, dated the 11th of September, 1871, after referring generally to these deeds, appointed all such real or personal July 6. estate as she might have power to appoint or otherwise dispose Will-Construction-Legacies-Gift of Residue of a Fund after of, and all her estate and interest, to trustees upon trusts as to failure of Gift of Specific Portion-Renunciation of onerous 35004, for her daughter Miss Swete for life for her separate use, Legacy. without power of anticipation, and after her death leaving lawful issue, for her children as therein mentioned, and if she died without leaving lawful issue she directed that the fund should be held on trust for her son, who was her only other child, to whom also she made a general residuary bequest. At Mrs. Swete's death her daughter was still unmarried, and Thomas Wood, who died on the 15th of December, 1870, by his will dated the 15th of November, 1870, gave (amongst a number of other legacies personal and charitable) to trustees for the purpose of that bequest only, a sum of 10,000l. and other moneys which he had invested in the funds, upon trust to invest such portion thereof upon mortgage of freehold security, in |