bile for jitney and taxi service, retaining the title to the car until the purchase price had been paid. But the payment had not been made on the date aforesaid. After purchasing the car, Jones, without the knowledge or consent of appellant, fitted the car with copper tanks having an aggregate capacity of 70 to 80 gallons of liquid, and, with the car thus camouflaged, proceeded to transport intoxicating liquor from Caruthersville, Missouri, into and through Mississippi county, Arkansas, in violation of the laws of this state. The sheriff of that county arrested the occupants of the car, who were fined for their violation of the law, and an order of the court was made confiscating the car.

Appellant brought replevin against the sheriff to recover the car, and the cause was heard upon an agreed statement of facts, containing, in addition to the above recitals, the statement that appellant was not a party to any of the procedure above outlined, and had no knowledge of the tanks or of the use to which they were put, but, on the contrary, had no reason to believe the car was being used for any purpose other than that for which it was sold to Jones, to wit, for taxi and jitney service.

Appellant has prosecuted this appeal to reverse the judgment of the court refusing to award it the possession of the car.

The car was confiscated under the provisions of § 6 of Act No. 13 of the Acts of 1917, vol. 1, p. 41, prohibiting the shipment of intoxicating liquors into this state, and otherwise restricting the sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. The relevant portions of the section referred to are as follows: "That no property rights of any kind shall exist in the liquors mentioned in section 1 of this act,

or

in any vessel, fixture, furniture, implements, or vehicles, when the said liquors or other property mentioned are kept, stored or used for the purpose of violating any law of

this state, nor in any such liquors, bitters and drinks when received, possessed, kept or stored at any forbidden place; and in all such cases the liquors, bitters and drinks aforesaid, and said property herein named are forfeited to the state of Arkansas and may be seized, or searched for and seized, under the laws of this state and ordered to be destroyed in the manner and under the rules prescribed by law respecting contraband liquors, or by order of the judge or court after a conviction.

Appellant cites and relies upon the case of Moody v. McKinney, 73 S. C. 438, 53 S. E. 543. That was a suit to recover the possession of a horse and buggy which had been used in the transportation of liquor, in violation of a statute of South Carolina which provided as follows: "Any wagon, cart, boat, or any other conveyance, together with horses, mules, or other animal or animals and harness, accompanying the same, transporting liquors at night, other than regular passenger or freight steamers and railway cars, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation. ." S. C. Crim. Code 1902, § 594.

•

In that case, however, the violator of the Liquor Laws had possession of the horse and buggy without the knowledge or consent of the owner thereof, and the supreme court of that state held that the statute quoted did not apply under the facts stated.

Without expressing an opinion as to what our holding would be under similar facts, it suffices to say that we have here a different case. The purchaser of the car had the possession thereof with the knowledge and consent of the appellant company. Indeed, the sale itself gave this right of possession, and the violation of the law was committed under the possession thus conferred.

There are a number of cases in the Federal courts, upholding the right of seizure and confiscation of property used for an unlawful pur

pose, under statutes forfeiting property rights in property so used.

In the case of United States v. One Black Horse (D. C.) 129 Fed. 167, it was held that a vehicle and horse owned and let by a liveryman, used in smuggling liquor across the line into the United States, was subject to seizure and forfeiture, though the liveryman, who owned them, had no knowledge of the purpose for which the team and vehicle were to be used.

And in the case of United States v. Two Bay Mules (D. C.) 36 Fed. 84, it was said: "When property becomes liable to forfeiture under the positive provisions of a statute, owners who have in no way participated in the frauds which caused the forfeiture must seek redress from the wrongdoers who unlawfully used the property with which they were intrusted; or they can apply to the officers of the government invested with the authority to remit forfeitures."

The case of Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 24 L. ed. 637, gives support to the view that one may forfeit his property by permitting another to have its use and possession who devotes it to an uniawful purpose without the owner's knowledge or consent.

A statute similar in principle to the one here under consideration was construed in the case of United States v. Distillery, 11 Blatchf. 255, Fed. Cas. No. 14,963, in which the court said that it is expected that the owner of property will see to the use made of it, at his peril.

The case of Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, supra, is annotated in 10 Rose's Notes to United States Supreme Court Reports, p. 193, and numerous cases are there cited which support judgments similar to the one here assailed. See also Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C. 219, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997, 51 S. E. 992.

There appears to be no question about the constitutionality of statutes similar to our own. Indeed, under the common law, property thus illegally used would be forfeitable, ipso facto, without a statute.

We conclude, therefore, that, as the appellant company had voluntarily parted with the possession of the car, it cannot Sale-conditionー complain against illegal usethe judgment of confiscation rendered against it because of the unlawful use made of it by persons who were in possession of it with the appellant's knowledge and consent. Judgment affirmed.

It will be observed that the statute governing the reported case (WHITE AUTO Co. v. COLLINS, ante, 1594) is unqualified.

In State ex rel. Robertson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co. (State ex rel. Robertson v. Lane) (1914) 126 Minn. 78, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 147 N. W. 951, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 549, it was held that an owner of personal property covered by a contract of conditional sale, executed prior to the enactment of a statute providing for the sale of movable personalty

care and diligence; every defendant being presumed to have known the general reputation of the place.

But the interest of an innocent vendor of an automobile, sold conditionally, is not liable to forfeiture for illegal use of the vehicle in transporting liquor, where the statute provides that the vehicle shall be sold should it appear that it was "so used with the knowledge of the owner or lessee," and this is true although only a part of such interest is evidenced by written instrument of record, the balance not being represented by writing. Whites v. State (1919) Ga. App. -, 98 S. E. 171, where the court said: "Clearly the state occupied no better position with respect to the portion of the purchase price not covered by any written instrument of record than a third person would occupy who had extended no credit, parted with no rights, and suffered no injury by reason of the apparent ownership by the vendee of property in fact owned by someone else." This decision is mainly based on Shrouder v. Sweat (1918) 148 Ga. 378, 96 S. E. 881, where it was

similarly held in case of one who sold an automobile on credit, taking a note secured by mortgage for the purchase price.

While not strictly within the scope of this note, reference may be here made to Skinner v. Thomas (1916) 171 N. C. 98, L.R.A.1916E, 338, 87 N. Ε. 976, where the owner sold an automobile, taking back a mortgage for the price, and it was held that a statute providing for forfeiture of the interest in a vehicle used for transporting intoxicating liquor intended for illegal use, of a defendant convicted of its illegal possession, does not apply to the interest of an innocent mortgagee.

It may be noted that it was held in Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate (1916) 135 Tenn. 509, L.R.A.1916F, 935, 188 S. W. 54, that the lien given by statute upon an automobile for injury done by it, whether done by the owner, his agent, or any other person using the same by loan, hire, or otherwise, has no precedence on the rights of a conditional vendor of the machine.

B. B. B.

v.

-effect of statute.

2. An accident is not an act provided by law to be done, within a provision of a statute declaring that the time in which an act is provided by law to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded, so as to extend an accident insurance policy to cover an accident occurring after the date of the expiration, which proves to be a holiday.

- act to be performed by contract.

3. An accident is not within the operation of a statute providing that whenever any act of a secular nature is appointed by contract to be performed upon a particular day which falls upon a holiday, it may be performed upon the next business day, so as to cause an accident policy to cover an accident occurring the day after the expiration of the policy.

- effect of option to renew.

4. That an accident policy gives an