« 이전계속 »
Iu Eaton v. Deleware, etc., R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382, it is a structure lawfully created in the navigable bed of a held that the conductor of a freight train has no au- river is injured by a collision caused by the negligent thority to consent to the carrying of a person upon a management of a vessel, the owner of sucb structure caboose attached to such train, but designed for the may proceed in an admiralty court by action in peraccommodation of employees, and in such case the sonam against the owners of the vessel, or in rem presumption is that the person carried is not lawfully agaiust the vessel itself. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Iowa, there. On the other hand, this presumption may be May, 1883. The Arkansas. Opinion by Love, J. overthrown by the special circumstances, as in the case of Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9, where the plaintiff was riding on a construction train, and in the cases of Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R. Co., 23 Penn. St. 384, and Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Co.,
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. 10 Cush. 228, where the plaintiff was riding on a gravel train. Where a drover riding on an engine, in an
MARITIME LAW-PERIL OF SEA-BILL OF LADINGaction for negligence of the railroad company causing
CARRIER.— A collision between two vessels, brought an injury to him, claims that he was riding on the
about by the negligence of either of them, without the engine by the consent of the engineer to look after his
waves or wind or difficulty of navigation contributing cattle, as was customary, and the defendant claims
to the accident, is not “a peril of the sea ” within the that it was contrary to orders for anybody to ride on
terms of that exception in a bill of lading. Ct. of App., an engine, the question to be left to the jury to deter
March 21, 1883. Woadley v. Michell. Opinion by Britt, mine is whether the defendant bad, notwithstanding
Cotton and Bowen, L. JJ. (L. R., 11 Q. B. D. 47.) its rules for the government of its employees, by its conduct held out its employees to the plaintiff as au
NEGLIGENCE-OF CONTRACTOR IN BUILDING CAUSthorized under the circumstances to consent to his
ING PARTY-WALL TO FALL-OWNER'S LIABILITY.-The being carried on the train with his cattle. U. S. Cir.
appellant and respondent were owners of adjoining Ct., N. D. New York, May 4, 1883. Waterbury v.
houses between which was a party-wall, the property New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.
of both. The appellant's house also adjoined B.'s Opinion by Wallace, J.
house and between them was a party-wall. The ap
pellant employed a builder to pull down his house and NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO SEAMAN - WHEN SHIP NOT
rebuild it on a plan which involved the tying together LIABLE FOR-RIGHTS OF SEAMAN.-A claim by a sea
of the new house and the party-wall between it and man to recover damages for personal injuries from a
the respondent's house, so that if one fell the other fall on board ship upou the high seas, through the would be damaged. In the course of the rebuilding negligence of others of the ship's company, is gov
the builder's workmen in fixing a staircase negligently erned by the rules of the maritime law, rather than of
and without the knowledge of the appellant cut into municipal law, and the analogies of the latter are not
the party-wall between the appellant's house and B.'s necessarily applicable to the former. The vavigation house, in consequence of which the appellant's house of a ship constitutes one common employment, for fell, and the fall dragged over the party-wall between which all the ship's company are employed. Neither
it and the respondent's house and injured the respondthe vessel nor her owners therefore would be liable,
ent's house. The cutting into the party-wall was not according to the principles of the municipal law, for authorized by the contract between the appellant and injuries happening to a seaman through the negli
his builder. Held, affirming the decision of the Court gence of any of his associates in the performance of
of Appeal, that the law cast a duty upon the appellant their ordinary duties. By the maritime law, ancient
to see that reasonable care and skill were exercised in and modern, a seaman, in case of any accident received
those operations which involved a use of the partyin the service of the ship, is entitled to medical care,
wall belonging to himself and the respondent, exposnursing, and attendance, and to cure, so far as cure is
ing it to the risk above mentioned; and that the appossible, at the expense of the ship, and to wages to
pellant could not get rid of responsibility by delegatthe end of the voyage, and no more. This right of the ing the performance to a third person; and was liable seaman is without reference to any question of ordi
to the respondent for the injury to his house. House nary uegligence of himself or his associates, and is
of Lords, June 4, 1883. Hughes v. Percival. Opinions neither increased nor diminished by the one or the
by Lords Blackburn, Watson, and Fitzgerald. (L. R.. other. The only qualification arises from the willful
and App. Cas. 443.) and gross misconduct of himself or associates, in which case the expense may be charged against the wages of the wrong-doer. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S.
FINANCIAL LAW. 213; Wilson v. Merry, L. R., 1 So. & Div. App. 326; Allen v. New Gas Co., 1 Exch. Div. 251; Malone v.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-STIPULATIONS IMPAIRHathaway, 64 N. Y. 5, 9; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 id. 46;
ING NEGOTIABILITY.-Stipulations written upon the Brown v. Orerton, 1 Spr. 462; Croucher v. Oakman,
face and on the back of a promissory note, the effect of 3 Allen, 185; Mosely v. Scott, 14 Am. Law Reg. 599;
which is to divide the sum represented thereby among The Neptune, 1 Pet. Adm. 142; The Ben Flint, 1 Abb.
three different owners held to destroy the negotiability (U. S.) 126. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York, July 3,
of the instrument. The authorities are full and satis1883. The City of Alexandria. Opinion by Brown, J.
factory to the effect, that though the agreement or MARITIME LAW-COLLISION WITH SOLID STRUCTURE written instrument may have to some extent the form IS RIVER-ACTION IN REM AGAINST STRUCTURE NOT of a promissory note, and may use in its body the conALLOWED.-Where a vessel is injured by a collision ventional terms that ordinarily invest such instruwith a structure unlawfully placed in the pavigable ments with the character of negotiability; yet if by a bed of a rirer, the party creating the obstruction may stipulation in the body of the instrument, these elebe sued for the injury in an action in personam in a ments which give it negotiability are limited and proper court of admiralty; but the owners of the ves- qualified, the negotiability of the instrument is desel cannot in such a case proceed in rem against the stroyed. Woods v. North, 84 Penn. St. 407; 8. C., 24 solid structure, whatever it may be, because there can Am. Rep. 201; Farquer v. Fidelity Ius. Co., 13 Alb. L. be no maritime lien upon such a structure to be en- J. 330. It is also well settled that any memorandum forced in the admiralty by its seizure aud sale. Where or agreement of the parties written across the face, or
RELIEF OF COURT OF APPEALS.
on the back of the instrument contemporaneously with its execution, and intended and understood by them to constitute a part of the contract, is a substantial part of
such note, and limits and qualifies it in the same manner as if inserted in the body of the instrument itself, and with it, constitutes a single contract. 1 Daniel Neg. Inst., 59, 60-79-149; Carlin v. Knealey, 12 M. & W. 139; Warrington v. Early, 2 Ellis & Bl. 763; Hartley v. Wilkinson, 4 M. & S. 25; Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 402; Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Camp. 205; Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322; Barnard v. Cushing, 4 Metc. 230; Shaw v. Methodist Soc., 8 id. 223; Fletcher v. Blodgett, 16 Vt. 26; Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; Johnson v. Heagan, 23 Me. 329; Briggs v. Lapham, 12 Metc. 475; Smith v. Nightengale, 2 Stark. 375. Texas Supreme Court, April, 1883. Goldman v. Blum. Opinion by West, J.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal:
Your note of alarm concerning the Court of Appeals has not been sounded prematurely. We want our cases disposed of rapidly, but we must have our work well done, and we dont want to kill all our good judges. There will presently be as many appeals left over at the end of each term as are decided during the term. With the increase of population and business, litigation must also increase, and twelve new Supreme Court justices will aid in clearing the calendars of the lower courts and push the cases to the court of last resort.
The remedy is exceedingly simple. Ameud the Constitution and elect seven more judges. Have two divisions of the court. In making calendars give each division every alternate case on a calendar for each division. The decision of either division on any questiou to be conclusive on the other. In the improbable case of the same question pending simultaneously in both, the whole court to hear argument and decide.
M. CANANDAIGUA, N. Y.
RESCISSION OF CONTRACT-PURCHASE OF NOTE AFTER ATTACHMENT—The plaintiffs were the owners of a promissory note made by a firm in New Orleans. The note was sold by note brokers of New York to the defendant. On the same day, an hour before the sale of the note, an attachment, upon which their establishment was seized, was issued against the makers of the note by local creditors. The money received by the note brokers for the note being paid into court, the question remained whether the plaintiffs or the defendant, both parties being ignorant of the attachment and acting in good faith, should bear the loss. Held, that the defendant might rescind the contract for the purchase of the note and recover back what it paid therefor, on the same principle that the plaintiffs would have been allowed to rescind had the note been paid for the day following in bills of an insolvent bank. The almost unbroken line of authority seems to establish the doctrine that if bills of a broken bank, or the notes of a party who has previously failed, are transferred in payment of a debt, both parties being ignorant of the failure and innocent of fraud, the creditor may repudiate the payment upon a tender or return of the dishonored note, and recover the amount due. It is a mutual mistake of fact. Lightbody v. Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 9; Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, 13 id. 101 ; Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 182; Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill, 340; Harley v. Thornton, 2 id. (S. C.) 509; Fogg v. Sawyer, 9 N. H. 365; Westfall v. Braley, 10 Obio St. 188; Roberts v. Fisher, 43 N. Y. 159; Baldwiu v. Van Deusen, 37 id. 487; Houghton v. Adams, 18 Barb. 545; Townsends v. Bank of Racine, 7 Wis. 185; Leger v. Bonnaffe, 2 Barb. 475; Stewart v. Orvis, 47 How. Pr. 518. U. S. Ciro. Ct., S. D. New York, April, 1883. Harris v. Hanover National Bank. Opinion by Coxe, J.(15 F. R. 786).
Editor of the Albany Law Journal :
I suggest that two departments of Court of Appeals be established. Each department to have five members. Let department No. 1 have exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from questions of practice, divorce, usury, crimes, husband and wife, married woman, guardian and ward, surrogates' decrees, replevin, etc. Let department No. 2 have all other appeals. By a little study about one-half the business could be given to each department. Let each department have its own reporter. When an appeal involves questions belonging to both departments; let that case go to department No. 1. If a dispute arises as to which department the case belongs, let it be decided upon mo. tion in the first department as a final determination of that question. Let subordinate courts be bound by the decisions of the department having exclusive jurisdiction of the question. I see there will be some objections; but no infallible scheme can be obtained with two courts of equal power. This scheme will relieve the labor of the judges. It will obtain the opinion of five judges as to what the judgment should be in that case. The two courts can never be in collision on question, because each must follow the rule established by its co-ordinate department. A willful refusal to follow such rule should be made a crime in the judge refusing. I might continue to explain, but I conclude that you will see the end. If this mode has been fully explored and abandoned I need not waste time. I hope what I have written may help a little to solve the problem.
M. M. MEAD. ELMIRA, Dec. 29, 1883.
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
To the Members of the Executive Committee:
GENTLEMEN-The annual meeting of this committee will be held at my office, No. 79 Chapel street, corner Maiden Lane, at 7:30 P. M., January 7, 1884.
A full attendance is desired, as important matters will be considered at said meeting. Very respectfully yours, CHARLES J. BUCHANAN,
The Albany Law Journal.
in a somewhat rough-and-ready fashion, that the plaintiff shall be put to his election between reduc
ing the damages to £500, or undergoing the enorALBANY, JANUARY 12, 1884.
mous cost of a new trial.” And the Law JOURNAL
says: “Let us hope that we shall be spared any CURRENT TOPICS.
further discussion of the case, as it appears to be
one upon which not only no two people agree, but THERE ought to be a statute prohibiting artists upon which not even any two out of three judges
from bringing their quarrels into court. We agree.” have not noticed lately, but we suppose that the case of Feuardent v. Cesnola, about the Cyprus Justice Ingalls, of Troy, is charged with the "mugs,” is still going. It has already cost the following scheme for the relief of our Court of country more than the entire collection is worth. Appeals: “There should be only one appellate The similar case of Belt v. Lawes, in England, has court, the numerical strength of which should not become one of the most celebrated causes of the
be less than twelve judges. The whole court should century, and not the least so because of the disagree-meet every morning at the State Capitol, and should ment of the judges on the appeal. The London be divided into four equal sections. One of these Law Times says: “The question to be answered should hear all questions relating to real estate; was nothing more than this: Has the plaintiff, or another should determine questions of contract; a has he not, been guilty of the deceitful conduct third should hear criminal matters and some other imputed to him by the defendant? Is he, or is he branch, while the fourth should consider miscelnot, entitled to be called an artist? The answer was
laneous matters, not heard in the other sections. not given until forty-three entire days had been Where constitutional questions arise, the full bench consumed, until the plaintiff had executed a bust should hear the arguments, and when the judges of within the precincts of the court, until an enormous any section were not unanimous on any knotty point mass of contradictory evidence had been given on
they could refer it to the entire court for a decision. both sides. When given it was in the negative, and All the General Terms and the appellate powers of the damages were assessed at the undoubtedly high intermediary courts should be abolished, and sum of £5,000. Whether that verdict was right or appeals of every nature should be taken directly to wrong, we are entirely unable to offer an opinion; the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court districts but the defendant and his advisers considered that should be made much smaller, and one Circuit they had grounds for arguing that it was faulty in Judge located in each, whose duty it should be to three respects, as being against the weight of the dispose of all civil business arising in his district, evidence, as the result of misdirection from the holding court every month if necessary. The power bench, as awarding excessive damages. A rule nisi to try civil causes should be taken from the County was accordingly obtained for a new trial, and upon Judges, who should be given jurisdiction of all the plaintiff's argument against the rule, three criminal cases, from petit larceny to murder. Under judgments which, taken together, are perhaps the such a system there would be no need for costly most extraordinary that have ever proceeded from references, appeals to intermediate courts would be the bench, have recently been delivered. First, Mr. dispensed with, business would be greatly expedited, Justice Manisty expressed at length his opinion that and there would be a great pecuniary saving to the the original verdict was perfectly right, that the State and to litigants." We should like to have the libel had been of the most terribly serious kind, judge explain how twelve judges are going to do that there had been no misdirection on the part of the business which nineteen are now unable to perBaron Huddleston, and that the damages were by form, and of what material he expects men to be no means excessive. Upon him followed Mr. Justice made who are to hold court
every morning.” We Denman, not equally certain that there had been no
are now inclined to think that the scheme of misdirection, not so confident in the justice of the assigning certain business to certain sections of the verdict, and clearly of opinion that the damages court is less meritorious than dividing up the busiwere exactly tenfold as large as they ought to be.
ness without regard to its character. Then the Lord Chief Justice delivered a judgment to the effect, that apart from technical principles, there had, morally speaking, been misdirection, and A very high legal authority writes us: that the verdict was against the weight of the evi- that the ghost of Large v. Benedict, will not down. dence. Three more dissimilar opinions upon one You have materialized its spirit in the last number matter it is impossible to conceive, and there must of the ALB. LAW JOUR. I was inclined to make a be at least two out of the three judges to whom the critique, but will content myself with a quotation: 'It compromise eventually made appears thoroughly is not becoming an independent Nation to repair ordiunjust. Lord Coleridge must still think that the narily to the sea shore, to listen for opinions recently defendant is entitled to a new trial, Mr. Justice given in a foreign realm.' For ‘Nation’ read · Editor,' Manisty must still be of opinion that the plaintiff and you will perceive that you are set down upon has been subjected to a great hardship. From these with all the weight of Sullivan's Land Titles, prefdiametrically opposite positions it has been agreed, ace, p. v.” Our distinguished correspondent should
VOL. 29 -- No. 2.
reflect that by resort to the sea side one may get a hole if it was once inserted there. Of this the notion of legal matters that may be valuable. It is London Law Times remarks: " Yet here there is frequently useful to inquire "what are the wild something of a leap over a logical chasm, and waves saying,” even in legal affairs. And that is further, the useful nature of the combination is such, probably the reason that the Supreme Court justices notwithstanding its simplicity, as to lead to the resort to Block Island in the summer, although conclusion that something more than ordinary ostensibly to play whist.
reasoning power was required for its production. The author is therefore driven to admit that the
adverse decision of the court is assailable." The A correspondent writes us to "express the real interest I feel, and the pleasure I have enjoyed in
T'imes also remarks: “Inasmuch as the work is your contributions to our law literature by your primarily intended for American readers, it is sprightly commentaries upon adjudged words and
natural that greater attention should be paid to phrases. Were such criticisms heeded by bench
American than English decisions, and some of the and bar, law-theses and opinions must become more
latter are summarily treated in such a manner as to accurate and reliable. Sentence-constructing in a
render the ratio decidendi a matter of speculation. good and workman like manner, the value of words
The following, for instance, is all that is given conduly considered, the right word adapted to the right cerning a case decided by Malins, V.C.: A tubular and appropriate place, are almost as essential to
rib for umbrellas being in use, it is no invention to judicial opinion as the correct appreciation of the
make such a rib with one side open, like a trough.' law."
We should say that is enough — an admirable state
ment; and the power to make such statements is The attendance on the annual meeting of the New what has enabled the author to put all the essentials York State Bar Association, on the 8th instant, was
of his subject into one volume. Let us bless him
for it. distinguished, but it was not large. In the absence of the president, Chief-Judge Ruger, Governor Cleveland, one of the vice-presidents, called the
It is surprising that the English, who have been meeting to order, and made a few remarks which are
so quick to adopt our reforms in the administration given in another column. The usual routine busi
of the civil law, should be so reluctant to allow ness was transacted. The prize of $250 for the best prisoners to tell their own story as witnesses. They
have sometimes allowed the prisoner's counsel to essay was awarded to Mr. Lemuel Skidmore of New
make a statement York. Mr. Skidmore read his essay, which was
on his behalf, but of course
that has no sanction and no weight. The right to very excellent one, the subject, Trial by Jury. He
do this was denied on the late O'Donnell trial. It recommends the retention of the present system with some modifications, the chief of which was the
seems that two years ago the English judges united permission to allow eight or nine to pronounce a
in the following minute: “At a meeting of all the verdict. All the other contestants for the prize came
judges liable to try prisoners held in the Queen's
Bench room on the 26th of November, 1881 (Present: substantially to the same conclusion. Mr. John G. Milburn, of Buffalo, delivered an address, which he
Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Lord Justice Baghas not entitled, but which we should entitle, the Or- gallay, Lord Justice Brett, Lord Justice Cotton,
Lord Justice Lush, Lord Justice Lindley, Justice igin and Development of Law-a very admirable production, which we shall give in full next week.
Grove, Justice Denman, Baron Pollock, Justice Mr. Milburn is strongly in favor of general codifica- Field, Justice Manisty, Justice Hawkins, Justice tion. Mr. Elliott F. Shepard, of New York, was
Lopes, Justice Fry, Justice Stephen, Justice Bowen, elected president. Thus the awkward and undesi
Justice Mathew, Justice Cave, Justice Kay, Justice rable precedent of re-elections was disregarded, and Chitty, Justice North), Lord Coleridge stated the fit recognition of distinguished executive ability Lord Justice Brett moved the following resolution:
subjects for which the meeting was summo and the most untiring service to the association was shown. A reception and collation in the evening the administration and practice of the criminal law,
• That in the opinion of the judges it is contrary to finished the programme. The association now has some 1,500 members, of which at least one-third
as hitherto allowed, that counsel for prisoners should have been added during the last year.
state to the jury, as alleged existing facts, matters which they have been told in their instructions, on
the authority of the prisoner, but which they do One of the most interesting of recent law books not propose to prove in evidence.' Stephen, J., is “ The Patentability of Inventions,” by Henry moved the following amendment: “That in the Childs Merwin. The curiosities of patent law here opinion of the judges it is undesirable to express an disclosed are often very amusing. Thus, in Recken- opinion upon the matter. This amendment, having dorfer F. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, the patentee had com- been put to the meeting, was negatived by nineteen bined a pencil with a rubber eraser by sticking the votes to two. The original motion was then put, handle of the pencil into a small tube of rubber. and carried by nineteen votes against two (Justice The court beld that there were two simple infer- Hawkins and Justice Stephen dissenting). The ences — that a pencil and an eraser were useful question of the propriety of laying down a rule as together, and that the pencil would stick in the to the practice of allowing prisoners to address the
jury before the summing up of the judge, when their But it should be remembered that intoxication does counsel have addressed the jury, was then consid- not deprive a party of the protection secured by ered, and after some discussion was adjourned for the law to sober people. The plaintiff therefore further consideration.” The prisoner's privilege to forfeited no right by being drunk, if he were testify has been conceded in a number of our States, really so. The drunken man however is placed at and has given general satisfaction.
this disadvantage, while he might act more rashly than he would act if sober, yet his being drunk
does not release him from the duty of being careful NOTES OF OASES.
and cautious, just as if he were sober. Field on
Dam., § 198." N Williams v. Mudgett, Texas Commission of
In Rice v.
Rice, 50 Mich. 448, it is held that deluan action for an injury sustained by a horse by being sions as to “greenbacks,” or running for or holding driven against a barbed wire fence, erected partly office, or that his wife had courted him do not necesacross a public road, it was held that such fences sarily render a man incompetent to make a will. The are dangerous unless constructed with planks in court said: “ Much of the evidence in the case, connection with the wire. The defenses were set which was put in to prove insanity, had a tendency up that the plaintiff was riding very fast, and that to show delusions on certain subjects. The decedent, he was intoxicated. On these points the court it is said, talked foolishly about 'greenbacks;' he observed : “But there are limits beyond which the imagined himself a high federal officer, and he doctrine of contributory negligence cannot be ex
solicited votes for an office when no election was tended. Suppose, for instance, that the defendant, pending. But we look in vain in the will, whose instead of putting up this barbed wire fence, had provisions were dictated by himself, for any trace placed daggers or barbed wires in the plaintiff's of these delusions, or any evidence that it was in bed, and the plaintiff, in the act of lying down, had any way influenced by them. Conceding the delureceived serious injury, would the defendant be sions therefore does not dispose of the will, or heard to plead that the plaintiff had come home necessarily determine that it should be set aside. drunk and had rashly thrown himself upon his bed Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206. The most reand hurt himself? Now a public road is by no
markable evidence on this branch of the case is of means so sacred as a man's private couch, yet it is statements made by decedent that his wife made entitled to very high privileges and immunities. In the advances in courtship, and that on one or more all ages men have been accustomed, in the country, occasions she inflicted outrageous personal injury to ride rapidly upon public roads, especially at on him after marriage. No attempt was made to nightfall
. The greatest master of the English show that the decedent was really under delusion language and of English customs has canonized this in respect to these matters, and the natural tendency usage in the following words:
of the evidence was to prejudice the jury against "Now spurs the lated traveler apace to gain the timely inn.'
the plaintiff by leading them to believe or to susMACBETH
pect that she was an unworthy person and undeNot only so, but men, women and children are serving of her husband's bounty. But the existence sometimes compelled to ride fast on these roads of a delusion that his wife was unworthy of esteem, The safety of health and life may depend upon the or was abusing him, would be a singular reason for speed with which they travel. The highest con- setting aside a gift which he had deliberately made sideration of public policy requires that our high- | in her favor.” ways should be free from any unnecessary danger which may threaten the safety of travelers. Now, a In Kelleher v. Kernan, 60 Md. 440, a man eighty barbed wire fence is an array of miniature daggers. years old executed an instrument, by which, " in It is dangerous not merely to run against it, but to anticipation of his departure from Baltimore," and touch it. When put up across a public road, or "to provide for possible contingencies," he sold across a line of general travel, without something and transferred to his daughter all his personal to indicate its presence, it is like a man trap or a property, present and future, reserving the use and spring gun. And in our opinion, he who thus the right to dispose of the same otherwise if he heedlessly besets the travel of the country with such thought proper. He made the expected journey, peril is not entitled to demand a very high degree returned safely, and died shortly afterward. Held, of care on the part of those whose flesh is lacerated, that the instrument might be proved as a will. The or whose lives are endangered by his acts. Yet court cited Cross v. Cross, 55 E. C. L. 714; Cock v. we do not think the court erred in admitting the Cooke, L. R., 1 P. & D. 241. In Rehn v. Coles, L. evidence which tended to show that the plaintiff R., 2 P. & D. 362; Att'y-Gen'l v. Jones, 3 Price, and his companions may have been intoxicated at 369; Jackson V. Jackson's Adm'r, 6 Dana, 257; the time. The facts given in evidence for the Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; Watkins v. defendant in this connection were connected, both Dean, 10 Yerg. 321; Walker v. Jones, 23 Ala. 448; circumstantially and in point of time, with the facts McGee v. McCants, 1 McCord, 517; Welburn v. stated by plaintiff. They are parts of the res gesta. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267, Johnson v. Yancey, 20 id, 707;