Thus a very important difficulty arofe from comparing the extent of the country to be governed, with the kind of government which it would be proper to establish in it. It has been an opinion, countenanced by high authority, "that the natural property of fmall ftates is to be governed as a republic; of middling ones, to be subject to a monarch; and of large empires, to be fwayed by a defpotic prince; and that the confequence is, that, in order to preferve the principles of the established government, the ftate must be fupported in the extent it has acquired; and that the spirit of the state will alter in proportion as it extends or contracts its limits *." This opinion feems to be fupported rather than contradicted, by the hiftory of the governments in the old world. Here then the difficulty appeared in full view. On one hand, the United States containing an immenfe extent of territory, according to the foregoing opinion, a defpotic government was beft adapted to that extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that, however the citizens of the United States might, with pleasure, fubmit to the legitimate restraints of a republican conftitution, they would reject, with indignation, the fetters of defpotifm. What then was to be done? The idea of a confederate republic prefented itfelf. A kind of conftitution which has been thought to have all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government." Its defcription is," a convention, by which several states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of affemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of encreafing by means of farther affociation t." The expanding quality of fuch a government is peculiarly fitted for the United States, the greatest part of whofe territory is yet uncultivated. But while this form of government enabled them to furmount the difficulty laft mentioned, it conducted them to another. It left them almost without precedent or guide; and confequently, without the benefit of that inftruction, which, in many cafes, may be derived from the conftitution, hiftory and experience of other nations. Several affociations have frequently been called by the name of confederate ftates, which have not, in propriety of language, deserved it. The Swifs Cantons are connected only by alliances. The United Netherlands are indeed an af femblage of focieties; but this affemblage conftitutes no new one; and therefore, it does not correfpond with the full definition of a confederate republic. The Germanic body is composed of such disproportioned and *Montesquieu, b. 8. c. 20. Montefquieu, b. 9. c. I. difcordant difcordant materials, and its ftructure is fo intricate and complex, that little useful knowledge could be drawn from it. Ancient history difclofes, and barely difclofes to our view, fome confederate republics-the Achaean league- the Lycian confederacy, and the AmphyЄtyonic council. But the facts recorded concerning their conftitutions are fo few and general, and their hiftories are fo unmarked and defective, that no fatisfactory information can be collected from them concerning many parti cular circumstances; from an accurate difcernment and comparison of which alone, legitimate and practical inferences can be made from one conftitution to another. Befides, the fituation and dimenfions of thofe confederacies, and the state of society, manners and habits in them, were fo different from thofe of the United States, that the most correct defcriptions could have fupplied but a very small fund of applicable remarks. Thus, in forming this fyftem, they were deprived of many advantages, which the history and experience of other ages and other countries would, in other cafes, have afforded them. We may add, in this place, that the fcience of government itself, feems yet to be almost in its ftate of infancy. Governments, in general, have been the refult of force, of frand, and of accident. After a period of fix thousand years has elapfed, fince the creation, the United States exhibit to the world, the first inftance, as far as we can learn, of a nation, unattacked by external force, unconvulfed by domeftic infurrections, affembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, and deciding calmly, concerning that fyftem of government, under which they would wish that they and their pofterity fhould live. The ancients, fo enlightened on other fubjects, were very uninformed with regard to this. They feem fcarcely to have had any idea of any other kind of governments, than the three fimple forms, defigned by the epithets, monarchial, ariftocratical and democratical. Much and pleafing ingenuity has been exerted, in modern times, in drawing entertaining parallels between fome of the an cient conftitutions and fome of the mixed governments that have fince exifted in Europe. But on ftrict examination, the inflances of refemblance will be found to be few and weak; to be suggested by the improvements, which, in fubfequent ages, have been made in government, and not to be drawn immediately from the ancient conftitutions themfelves, as they were intended and understood by those who framed them. One thing is very certain, that the doctrine of reprefentation in government was altogether unknown to the ancients. The knowledge and practice of which, is effential to every fyftem, that can poffefs the qualities of freedom, wifdom and energy. Reprefentation Representation is the chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they have committed the exercife of the powers of government. This chain may confift of one or more links; but in all cafes it should be fufficiently ftrong and difcernable. To be left without guide or precedent was not the only difficulty, in which the convention were involved, by propofing to their conftituents a plan of a confederate republic. They found themfelves embarraffed with another, of peculiar delicacy and importance; I mean that of drawing a proper line between the national government, and the governments of the several states. It was eafy to discover a proper and fatisfactory principle on the fubject. Whatever object of government is confined in its operation and effects within the bounds of a particular ftate, fhould be confidered as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be confidered as belonging to the government of the United States; but though this principle is found and fatisfactory, its application to particular cafes would be accompanied with much difficulty; because in its application, room must be allowed for great difcretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In order to leffen, or remove the difficulty, arifing from difcretionary conftruction on this fubject, an enumeration of particular inftances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted, with much induftry and care. It is only in mathematical science that a line can be defcribed with mathematical precifion. But upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to be fafe and unexceptionable; and accurate too in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected, in a fubject of this nature. After all, it was neceffary, that, on a fubject so peculiarly delicate as this, much prudence, much candour, much moderation and much liberality, fhould be exercised and difplayed, both by the federal government and by the governments of the several states. And it is to be hoped, that these virtues will continue to be exercised and displayed, when we confider, that the powers of the federal government and those of the state governments are drawn from fources equally pure. If a difference can be difcovered between them, it is in favor of the federal government, becaufe that government is founded on a reprefentation of the whole union; whereas the government of any particular flate is founded only on the representation of a part, inconfiderable when compared with the whole. Is it not more reafonable to fuppofe, that the counfels of the whole will embrace the intereft of every part, than that the counfels of any part will embrace the intercfts of the whole ? Having enumerated fome of the difficulties, which the convention were obliged to encounter in the courfe of their proceedings, let us view the end, which they propofed to accomplish. In forming this fyftem, it was proper to give minute attention to the interest of all the parts; but there was a duty of ftill higher importto feel and to shew a predominating regard to the fuperior interefts of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance. The aim of the convention, was to form a fyftem of good and effici ent government on the more extenfive fcale of the United States. In this, and in every other inftance, the work fhould be judged with the fame fpirit, with which it was performed. A principle of duty as well as candour demands this. It has been remarked, that civil government is neceffary to the perfection of fociety: We remark that civil liberty is neceffary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested only of that part, which, placed in the government, produces more good and happinefs to the community, than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows, that civil liberty, while it refigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the human faculties, fo far as it is compatible with the public welfare. In confidering and developing the nature and end of the fyftem before us, it is neceffary to mention another kind of liberty, which may be distinguished by the appellation of federal liberty. When a fingle government is inftituted, the individuals, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their natural independence, which they be fore enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is inftituted, the communities, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as ftates. The principles, which directed, in the former cafe, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give fimilar directions in the latter cafe. The ftates fhould refign, to the national government, that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole, than if it had remained in the feveral ftates. While they refign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercife of all their other faculties as ftates, fo far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and fuperintending confederacy. Since fates as well as citizens are reprefented in the conftitution before us, and form the objects on which that conftitution is propofed to operate, operate, it was neceffary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty. We now fee the great end which they propofed to accomplish. It was to frame, for their conftituents, one federal and national conftitution-a conftitution, that would produce the advantages of good, and prevent the inconveniencies of bad government-a conftitution, whose beneficence and energy would pervade the whole union; and bind and embrace the interefts of every part-a conftitution, that would enfure peace, freedom and happiness, to the ftates and people of America. We are now naturally led to examine the means, by which they propofed to accomplish this end. But previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper to ftate fome general and leading principles of government, which will receive particular application in the course of our investigations. There neceffarily exifts in every government, a power from which there is no appeal; and which, for that reafon, may be termed fupreme, abfolute and uncontrollable. Where does this power refide? To this queftion, writers on different governments will give different answers. According to Blackstone, in this country, this power is lodged in the British parliament, and the parliament may alter the form of government; and its power is abfolute without control. The idea of a conftitution, limiting and fuperintending the operations of legislative authority, feems not to have been accurately understood in this kingdom. There are, at least no traces of practice, conformable to fuch a principle. To control the power and conduct of the legiflature by an over-ruling conftitution, was an improvement in the science and practice of government, referved to the American ftates. Perhaps fome politician, who has not confidered, with fufficient accuracy, their political fyftems, would anfwer, that in their governments, the fupreme power was vefted in the conftitutions. This opinion approaches a ftep nearer to the truth; but does not reach it. The truth is, that, in the American governments, the fupreme, abfolute and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As their conftitutions are fuperior to their legislatures; fo the people are fuperior to their conftitutions. Indeed the fuperiority, in this laft inftance, is much greater; for the people poffefs, over their conftitutions, control in ac, as well as in right. The confequence is, that the people may change the constitutions, whenever, and however they please. This is a right, of which no pofitive inftitution can ever deprive them. Thefe important truths, are far from being merely fpeculative: To their operation, we are to afcribe the scene, hitherto unparallelled, which 3 America |
