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gage beyond the time of receiving such proceeds. Matter of Babcock, 2 Connoly 82. See also, as to the necessity for presentment of such claims, Estate of Hildebrandt, 92 Cal. 433; California (Code C. P. § 1493); Green v. Russell, 132 Mass. 536.

He cannot retain his own debt as against preferred claims of a higher class, Dolman v. Clark, 1 McCart. 56; and the validity of his claim, as well as the legality of his action in retaining the amount of his debt, are subject to the approval of the Probate Court. Kinnan v. Wight, 12 Stew. (N. J.) 501. And his claim must take its pro rata, share with other claims of equal degree. Ex parte Meason, 5 Binn. 167; Lenoir v. Winn, 4 Desaus. 65; Matter of Gray, 3 Dem. 208; Berry v. Graddy, 1 Met. (Ky.) 553; Smith v. Bryant, 60 Ala. 235. See, however, Page v. Patton, 5 Pet. 304 (Va.).

At common law the receipt of assets applicable to the debt of the personal representative operated as an extinguishment of the debt, Glenn v. Glenn, 41 Ala. 571; Chaffin v. Hanes, 4 Dev. 103; Smith v. Watkins, 8 Humph. 331; although the debt was due him as executor of another. Thomas v. Chamberlain, 39 O. St. 112. But such presumption will not arise in favor of payment of his debt until a reasonable time has elapsed after the assets are converted into money and the court has ordered the payment of the debt, Miller v. Irby, 63 Ala. 477; nor will it extinguish a debt due to the administrator's firm. Davis v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523. If he turns over the assets to his successor, he should retain the amount of his claim. Beadle v. Steele, 86 Ala. 413; Hankins v. Hughes, 60 Id. 316. But his receiving sufficient assets and turning them over to his successor, in specie, for the express purpose of being free to prose

cute his claim, will be no extinguishment of it. Harris v. Henderson, 7 Heisk. 315, overruling Smith . Watkins, ubi supra. If the executor dies without having asserted his claim, it will be presumed to have been paid. Ellwood v. Northrup, 106 N. Y. 172.

As the executor can bring no suit against himself, the Statute of Limitations will not run in favor of the estate against his claim between the testator's death and the settlement of the executor's accounts. Matter of Powers, 124 N. Y. 361; Matter of Macomber, 31 N. Y. S. R. 962.

So far as the right of retainer exists at all, it applies to joint debts, due to the executor with others, as well as to those due to him alone, Hosack r. Rogers, 6 Paige 415; and to a debt due him in a representative capacity, Green v. Thompson, 84 Va. 376; or due to a wife from her deceased husband. Personette v. Personette, 8 Stew. (N. J.) 472. So, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, to a verbal promise made by the deceased to the administrator, Berry v. Graddy, 1 Met. (Ky.) 553; or a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations. Harwood v. Harper, 54 Ala. 659; Payne v. Pusey, 8 Bush. 504. But he cannot thereby deprive the heir of his right to set up the Statute of Limitations against an application to have lands sold for the payment of the debt. Payne v. Pusey, ubi supra. If the administrator is entitled to a specific lien (e. g., a landlord's lien on crops), he may retain the property which is subject to it, but he can only use the surplus proceeds in payment of other debts not entitled to a lien security (e. g., rent of former year) pro rata with other unsecured claims. Smith v. Bryant, 60 Ala. 235.

*BOOK THE THIRD.

OF THE DUTIES OF AN EXECUTOR WITH RESPECT TO LEGACIES.

Having thus considered the office of an executor in regard to the payment of debts according to the order prescribed by law, it now becomes necessary to treat of the duties which next demand his attention, viz., those which respect the payment of legacies.

A legacy is defined to be "some particular thing or things given or left, either by a testator in his testament wherein an Definition of legexecutor is appointed, to be paid or performed by his acy. executor, or by an intestate in a codicil or last will, wherein no executor is appointed, to be paid or performed by an administrator" (a).

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

WHO IS CAPABLE OF BEING A LEGATEE: AND HEREWITH OF BEQUESTS TO CHARITABLE USES.

SECTION I.

Who is capable of being a legatee.

The subject of the present section has been in some degree anticipated, by the inquiry as to the capability for the office of executor. The same rule applies in both matters, that every person is capable, excepting such as are expressly forbidden (b).1

(a) Godolph. Pt. 3, c. 1, s. 1. Where a testator directed that every "legatee" under his will should contribute £1 per cent, out of their "legacies" to Mrs. W. and her children, it was held that specific legatees and annuitants and residuary legatees were bound to contribute: Ward v. Grey, 26 Beav. 485. (b) Ante, p. *183.

1. Personal capacity to take a devise or bequest belongs in general to all persons, although under other legal dis

abilities and not sui juris. E. g., a member of a religious order may take, notwithstanding vows of poverty. Lynch v. Loretta, 4 Dem. 312. A life convict for murder may take, Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317; even for the murder of the testator. Preston v. Palmer, 42 Hun 388. A slave may take, in the absence of prohibitory legislation, Le Grand v. Darnall, 2 Pet. 664; and if prohibited, a trustee may hold for him until emancipation. Hoover v. Brem, [*897] [*898]

A bankrupt may be a legatee; but where a legacy belongs to, or is vested in, a bankrupt at the commencement of his bankruptcy, or is acquired by, or devolves on, him before

Bankrupt.

43 Miss. 603. In Louisiana, however, the testator's concubine cannot take under his will more than one-tenth of his estate, Gibson v. Dooley, 32 La. An. 959; and a larger gift will be reduced to that amount. Succession of Hamilton, 35 Id. 640.

CORPORATIONS, like natural persons, may take by bequest or devise, where they are not restricted by statute. These restrictions, which are commonly in the form of mortmain acts. will be considered in a later note. It has been held, however, that a corporation is not a "person" authorized to take by will under the New York statute. Matter of Fox, 52 N. Y. 530. And, in general, a corporation cannot take for a purpose foreign to its incorporation. American Colonization Society v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448. Where the object of the incorporation is defined by statute, it is strictly construed. Thus a diocesan convention incorporated for the purpose of "receiving subscriptions" cannot take a devise for the same objects. Brown v. Thompkins, 49 Md. 423. In New Jersey, general corporations are expressly authorized by statute to take (1877 Rev. 177, § 1).

In states providing by general act for the incorporation of religious, literary and charitable institutions, provision is frequently made for power to take by devise or bequest, as also in special charters creating such corporations. And these statutes are liberally construed, e. g., to apply to a historical society, incorporated under the Act for Benevolent and Literary Societies. Carpenter v. Historical Society, 2 Dem. 574. But an enabling act passed after testator's death is of no avail. Will of Bonard, 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. 128. A corpora

tion authorized to take may, however, do so notwithstanding a charge upon the gift of an annuity to A., which it would not have been capable of administering as a trust for A. Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215; Currier . Fanning, 13 Hun 458; Curran v. Sears, 2 Redf. 526. So, it may take in trust for a foreign corporation which was incorporated as its auxiliary. Sheldon e. Chappele, 47 Hun 59. And a corporation not authorized to take real property may take proceeds of land as money under a direction for conversion. Church Extension v. Smith, 56 Md. 362.

In like manner a foreign corporation can take real property, if authorized by the law of its domicil, unless expressly restricted by statute where the land lies, Hollis . Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166; Harris v. American Bible Society, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 316; Burbank . Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44; Santa Clara Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Ill. 375; Taylor v. Bryn Mawr College, 7 Stew. (N. J.) 101; Missionary Society . Calvert, 32 Gratt. 357; University v. Tucker, 31 W. Va. 621; Doty v. Hendrix, 16 N. Y. Supp. 284; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; Sherwood. American Bible Society, 1 Keyes 561; although misdescribed as in the city of New York where it only had an unincorporated auxiliary, American Bible Society v. American Colonization Society, 50 Hun 194; even though it could not have taken as a domestic corporation, White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342; General Assembly Presbyterian Church v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125; S. C., 6 L. R. A. 321; Thompson v. Swoope, 24 Pa. St. 474; Riley v. Diggs, 2 Dem.

his discharge, it vests in the trustee in his bankruptcy and is divisible amongst his creditors (c).

Matter

184. Its authority to take, in the absence of express restrictions, depends on the law of its own domicil. of Huss, 126 N. Y. 537; Thompson v. Swoope, 24 Pa. St. 474; Methodist Episcopal Church . Remington, 1 Watts 218. But in Boyce v. St. Louis, 29 Barb. 650, it was held that a foreign corporation (in this case a municipal corporation) not expressly authorized by the law of its own domicil, could not take a devise of land in New York, it being suggested that any other view would open the door to fraudulent evasion of the New York restrictions. The right of a foreign corporation to take personal property is to be determined by the law of its own domicil. White . Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; Draper t. Harvard College, 57 How. Pr. 269; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, ubi supra; Sherwood v. American Bible Society, ubi supra.

In New Jersey, foreign corporations are expressly authorized to take lands devised for the benevolent or charitable purposes of their incorporation (Act of 1883, Rev. Supp. 146 § 6), or in general for business in New Jersey or satisfaction of mortgage debts (Act of 1882, Id. §5). So, in New York, to acquire real property so far as necessary for their corporate purposes in the transaction of business in New York (Laws 1892, c. 687, § 17). And in Alabama a devise may be made to any corporation capable of holding real estate (1886 Code, § 1946).

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not, in general, take a devise, Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart, 4 Wheat. 1; Goodell v. Union Association, 2 Stew. (N. J.) 32; and a gift over if legatee unable, &c., takes effect. Riley v. Diggs, 2 Dem. 184. But under the New York act of 1850, c. 122, real and personal property may be held in trust for an unincorporated religious society without restriction as to time of vesting in it upon its incorporation. Church of Redemption v. Grace Church, 68 N. Y. 570. And an unincorporated church will be deemed a corporation under the statute of its foreign domicil for the purpose of receiving donations. Matter of Bullock, 6 Dem. 335.

In some states even charitable institutions which are not incorporated cannot take, White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357; McKeon v. Kearney, 57 How. Pr. 349 ; First Presbyterian Society v. Bowen, 21 Hun 389; Leonard v. Davenport, 58 How. Pr. 384; (although formerly held otherwise as to legacies in New York, Hornbeck v. American Bible Society, 2 Sandf. Ch. 133; Banks v. Phelan, 4 Barb. 80); Brown v. Tompkins, 49 Md. 423; Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 112; Succession of Hardesley, 22 La. Ann. 332; and this is so in Virginia, Philadelphia Baptist Association e. Hart, ubi supra, except so far as it has been modified by recent statutes as to schools. So, courts have refused to support a devise in trust for various unincorporated charities, Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79; Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169; or for the use of a certain church, Id.;

not being or becoming a bankrupt do not in the event of the legatee's bankruptcy pass to the trustee. See post, p. *1131.

Alien.

An alien may be a legatee (d).2

By stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 15 (which, however, does not

or to permit a voluntary religious society to build a church, Gallego v. AttorneyGeneral, 3 Leigh 450; Seaburn v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. 423; and the unincorporated inhabitants of a township cannot take, Barker v. Wood, 9 Mass. 419; nor (under former law of Virginia) trustees for a schoolhouse for poor children, no incorporation being contemplated, Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 356; or for the education of poor children, Janey v. Latane, 4 Leigh 327. So, in West Virginia, trustees cannot take a devise for an unincorporated church, Mong v. Roush, 29 W. Va. 119. So, a devise cannot be made to unincorporated managers of city water works controlled by the city but not furnishing a free water supply, Doughten v. Vandever, 6 Del. Ch. 51. And such devise will not be helped by subsequent incorporation of the donee. Succession

of Hardesley, 22 La. Ann. 332. But incorporation after date of will and before the testator's death is sufficient. Chase v. Stockett, 72 Md. 235. And a municipal corporation may take a charitable bequest for an unincorporated asylum maintained and governed by it. Succession of Vance, 39 La. Ann. 371. So, an incorporated church, sanctioned by the legislature, may take a legacy for the benefit of its unincorporated Sunday school. Eutaw Church v. Shively, 67 Md, 493.

And, in general, an unincorporated religious or charitable society is capable of taking by will. Zeissweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465; Zimmerman v. Anders, 6 Watts &. S. 218; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536; Burr v. Smith. 7 Vt. 241; Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; American Tract Society v. Atwater, 30 O. St. 77;

(d) See the Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, s. 2.

Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44; Burbank . Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Mason v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 12 C. E. Gr. 47. So in Missouri, under the constitution of1875. Lilly . Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477. So, now, in Virginia (1887 Code, § 1398) and West Virginia (1891 Code, c. 57, § 1) a church can take by conveyance for church building, parsonage or cemetery; and in Virginia (Code, § 1420) a deed or devise may be made for schools, other than unincorporated theological seminaries. In Maryland, an unincorporated society may take for a charitable object. Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275. In Tennessee, the statute authorizes gifts of land by deed or otherwise, to any religious denomination or society, incorporated or not (1884 Code, § 2006), for a church building, or (1889, P. L. c. 11) for a parsonage. Executors appointed "to carry out the will are trustees by implica tion. Cobb v Denton, 6 Baxt. 235. And the capacity of an unincorporated Masonic lodge to take a bequest as trustee for its own widows and orphans can only be questioned by the state. Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn. 668. But a bequest of money to an unincorporated church without the interposition of a trustee is void. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 88 Tenn. 637; Reeves r. Reeves, 5 B. J. Lea 644; although a devise coming within the act is not, Reeves v. Reeves, ubi supra.

But where a gift in remainder to an unincorporated charitable society would be bad, it will be sufficient to sustain such a charity if it is incorporated during the prior life estate. Shipman . Rollins, 98 N. Y. 311 (revg. 33 Hun 89); Jones v. Metho

2. At common law, an alien may take a bequest of personal property. Craig

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