tions of primary importance. The boundaries thus formed have ceased to be national; but we quote part of two articles, as they serve to explain in some measure that intricate part of our history.

"Art. 2.-The southern boundary of the United States, which divides their territories from the Spanish colonies of East and. West Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the river Mississippi, at the northernmost part of the thirty. first degree of latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the middle of the river Appalachicola, or Chattahooche, thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint; thence straight to the head of St. Mary's river, and thence down the middle thereof to the Atlantic ocean."

"Art. 4.-It is likewise agreed, that the western boundary of the United States, which separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is in the middle of the channel, or bed of the river Mississippi, from the northern boundary of the said states, to the completion of the 31st degree of latitude north from the equator. And his catholic majesty has likewise agreed, that the navigation of said river, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other powers by special convention."

"Art. 22.-And in consequence of the stipulations contained in the fourth article, his catholic majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposite their merchandises and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty, than a fair price for the hire of the stores; and his majesty promises, either to continue this permission, if he finds during that time, that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain; or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign them, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment."*

It must have been obvious to every reflecting person, on the mere reading of the treaty of San Lorenzo el Real, that, though it fixed the southern and western boundaries of the United States, the real difficulties between the two governments were rendered greatly more intricate. In a commercial point of view, the people of the United States were placed in a much worse situation than they were before its ratification. The king of Spain was now authorised by a solemn treaty to open the navigation of the Mississippi to Great Britain or any other nation; and the right of deposit at New Orleans, was made a contingency, depending on royal caprice. In fine, the acquisition of Louisiana, or the loss of their immense possessions beyond the spine of the Appalachian mountains, were presented as alternatives to the people of the United States. Nothing but embarrassment could be expected from such a treaty; and nothing but increasing vexations were its fruits. By Art. 3 it was stipulated that

Lyman's Diplomacy, vol. i. page 253. VOL. XVIII.-PART I.

.

"Each party is to furnish a commissioner and surveyor, to meet at Natchez, within six months after ratification, to run the boundary line, make plans, keep journals, &c."

In virtue of this article, the United States appointed as commissioner on their part, Andrew Ellicott, who arrived at Natchez on the 24th of February 1797, and on the same day notified his arrival and commission to the Spanish governor by the following note:

"Sir, It is with pleasure that I announce to you my arrival as commissioner on behalf of the United States, for carrying into effect the third article of the treaty lately concluded between the said United States and his Catholic Majesty.

"I wish to be informed when it will be convenient to your Excellency to receive my credentials. "I am, sir, with due respect, your humble servant, "ANDREW ELLICOTT.

"His Excellency, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos."+

To this communication, a not very polite note was returned, and neither day nor place was named to receive the credentials of the United States' commissioner; who, on the 27th, addressed himself directly to the governor general of Louisiana, the Baron de Carondelet, at the city of New Orleans, and hoisted the colours of the United States at his cantonment in sight of the governor's house.

Mr. Ellicott makes the following statement, in page 44 of his Journal, and in a subjoined note observes, "The original letter has been in my hands."

"Before we encamped (at Natchez) the following intelligence was communicated to me through confidential channels. First, that in September previous to my arrival in that country, the Baron de Carondelet, in a private conversation, declared that the treaty would not be carried into effect; that he, as principal commissioner, should evade or delay, from one pretence or other, the commencement of the operations.

"Secondly, that a letter had been written, bearing date June 16th, 1796, by governor Gayoso, to a confidential friend, stating, that the treaty was not intended to be carried into effect, and that delay on their part would reduce it to a dead letter.

"And thirdly, that the country either was, or would be ceded to the republic of France!"

From the subsequent advance of the negotiations between the agents of the United States and those of Spain, the correctness of Mr. Ellicott's previous information was confirmed. Every obstacle, short of armed resistance, was opposed to the execution of the treaty. If we revert to the former intrigues at Paris, when the preliminary treaty of peace was signed between the United States and Great Britain, we were at little loss to account for the impediments intentionally placed in the way of fulfilling the conditions of the treaty of San Lorenzo el Real.

The southern boundary, along N. Lat. 31°, and thence by the rivers Chattahooche and St. Mary's,

and the intermediate space, was but partially traced between 1797 and 1800; and in the latter year, Mr. Ellicott returned to Philadelphia. The United States had, however, in the mean time, gained full possession of its territory to the 31st degree of north latitude, and the right of deposit, if under the recent treaty it could be called a right, remained undisturbed until on the 2d day of October 1802, the then intendant of Louisiana suspended the privilege by proclamation. The commerce of the inhabitants on its shores, flows as naturally towards its mouth, as do the waters of the Mississippi; therefore, the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans, was a declaration of war with the people along the numerous streams above that city; and to place a deposit at that time at any other place on the Mississippi, would have been mockery, therefore the proclamation of Morales was an embargo on all the vast valley of the Mississippi, as far as the United States were interested. A state of irritation preceded the closing of the port of New Orleans, arising from petty vexations met with by the citizens of the United States, from the Spanish officers. Rage and menace followed. Thomas Jefferson was then president of the United States, who, fortunately for the people, saw the root of the mischief, and as far as on him depended the results, prepared to apply the remedy. That remedy was, to wrest Louisiana from European domination, and annex it to the United States.

Louisiana was an original colony of France, founded by that nation at the end of the 17th century, but ceded to Spain in 1762. The cession was made at a time when the Bourbon family had sunk in France to a depth far below its due weight in European policy, and the nation felt and regretted the losses to which it was exposed by an imbecile government. Amongst these losses none was more bitterly remembered than Louisiana. To France, in the decline of her marine, her American colonies were precarious in their tenure; but nations never reason, and the moment when a chance of regaining Louisiana offered, it was seized on with avidity. Indeed, we have already shown in this sketch, that France was secretly at the bottom of most of the diplomatic difficulties between Spain and the United States.

Long before the port of New Orleans was closed, vague reports were propagated, both in the United States and Europe, that the colony of Louisiana was to be re-ceded to France, and as subsequently developed, such was the case, in October 1800, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso.

The clause of cession stands unique in treaty stipulation. It runs thus: "His Catholic Majesty engages to retrocede to the French Republic six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations above recited, relative to His Royal Highness the duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, and

that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be, after the treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers.”*

It will probably forever remain a secret, whether France really intended a recolonization of Louisiana, or merely gained the legal power over that country with ulterior views of negotiation with the United States. Whatever was, however, the motive, the peace of Amiens, signed the 27th of March 1802, left France free to announce the secret article of that of St. Ildefonso; an ar ticle which totally changed the political relations of the United States, as regarded the whole western and south-western border of the republic. To admit France to succeed Spain along the Mississippi, was an alternative to which war itself would have been almost unanimously preferred not only by the whole western inhabitants of the United States, but generally over most sections of the confederacy.

From the commencement of their struggle with Great Britain, it was fortunate for the United States that the French government and people possessed no adequate means to revive their power in America. In 1802, with all its real, and its much greater apparent power, and with a very precarious peace with Great Britain, it was beyond any exertion France could have made, to regain a solid footing in Louisiana. Grasping in reality, as was its administration at the epoch before us, it combined too much of political talent, to so far mistake their relative position. But there were advantages to be gained by pretending to re-occupy New Orleans, and those advantages were gained.

The promulgation of the actual retrocession of Louisiana from Spain to France, though suspected, produced all the effects of violent surprise in the United States. The worst fears were realised.

"The administration," says Lyman, "watched with an anxious and vigilant eye the movements in Europe and in its own neighbourhood. The people, at large, were probably little aware of the danger with which they were menaced; and though any great portion of secresy appears impossible in the operations of this government, yet the whole business was managed with remarkable caution and discretion. It is far, indeed, from being imaginary, that the executive looked forward at that period to the contingency of a war."

The government of the United States seems, however, to have gradually unfolded its own views, and to have shown that the actual purchase of all Louisiana was not the original conception. In a despatch, dated the 11th day of May 1802, from the secretary of state to the United States minister in Spain, are the following remarkable passages:

"Should the cession (from Spain to France) actually fail, and Spain retain New Orleans and the Floridas, I repeat to you the wish of the President, that every effort and address be employed to obtain the arrangement, by which the territory on the east side of the Mississippi, including New Or

leans, may be ceded to the United States, and the Mississippi made a common boundary, with the common use of its navigation to them and Spain. The inducements to be held out to Spain were intimated in your original instructions on this point. I am charged by the President now to add, that you may not only receive and transmit a proposition of guarantee of her territory beyond the Mississippi, as a condition of her ceding to the United States the territory including New Orleans on this side, but in case it be necessary, may make the proposition yourself, in the forms required by our constitution."*

The contingency of the recession to France failing, was so far from taking place, that, towards the end of 1802, it was fully ascertained that active preparations were making in the ports of France to take possession. The situation of the United States became extremely embarrassing. By the By the ancient French province of Canada not becoming a part of the confederacy, Great Britain retained her footing to the northward, and now her inveterate rival was, to appearance, ready to recover her position on the south, and again expose the vast frontiers of the United States to their contentions; and what was little less disastrous, to their intrigues. The real danger was, nevertheless, most astonishingly magnified. France was formidable in Europe, but still more formidable were the evident obstacles to an extension of her power into America. It demanded a small share of political knowledge to have seen the flames of war through the parchment on which was written the treaty of Amiens. That treaty "consented to by France," says an elegant and sagacious writer, "to satisfy the public wish, had been on the side of England a concession to much more imperious necessity, and the result of a political situation much more disadvantageous than that of France. Nevertheless, the opposition party from whom this peace had been conquered, never ceased to make it the text for most virulent declamation, and to represent it as a treaty not less injurious to the honor than to the interests of Great Britain. Lord Grenville, who was at that epoch at the head of the opposition in the British parliament, at the opening of the session of 1802, declared, that this peace had been more fatal to England, than could have been the most ruinous war. He attacked the French government with peculiar severity, and depicted it as pressing with all the weight of an absolute tyranny on humiliated Europe; and followed this charge with a detailed enumeration of all the breaches of public faith; encroachments on the rights of neutrals; of all the usurpations of territory, which he could right or wrong impute to the French republic, and terminated with the manifest wish of an immediate rupture."

That rupture was inevitable from still deeper reasons given by our author; reasons which were conclusive as to Great Britain permitting France to regain Louisiana in full sovereignty and possession. "But what was much more inquieting to Great

*Lyman, vol. i. page 374.

Britain than military encroachments, was, that France, by means of her commercial relations and the resources of her industry, assimilated to herself every country over which she had planted her victorious standards. She transplanted every where her habits and her manners. The flexible and penetrating genius of the French was admirably calculated to effect this moral colonization of Europe, and every attending circumstance seemed to favour its development. Ancient barriers fell, and the natural limits were effaced. It was thus that the military roads of the Simplon, of Mount Cenis, and Mount Genevre interlaced France to Italy, and united by short and facile routes the basins of the Rhone and the Po. Other immense works united France to Belgium and the Lower Rhine: rich conquests which restored the ancient importance of Antwerp, and destined it to become again the centre of immense maritime action-an object at the same time most dangerous to Great Britain."

Nor were British statesmen blind to their danger, and war was determined on, though Lord Hawkesbury, who negotiated the treaty of Amiens, and those who advised the measure, exerted themselves to preserve the peace.

The government of the United States seems to have, in a singular manner, at that time, misunderstood the real situation of European policy, if Mr. Lyman has quoted correctly, and we have no doubt of his accuracy in that or any other respect.

"In April and May 1803, Mr. Madison, secretary of state, sent the following confidential and important communications to Messrs Monroe and Livingston in Paris."

"If the French government, instead of friendly arrangements or views, should be found to meditate hostilities, or to have formed projects which will constrain the. United States to resort to hostilities, such communications are then to be held with the British government as will sound its dispositions, and invite its concurrence in the war.

"Notwithstanding the just repugnance of this country to a coalition of any sort with the belligerent parties of Europe, the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of Great Britain, in a war of the United States at this period against France and her allies, are too obvious and too important to be renounced. And, notwithstanding the apparent disinclination of the British councils to a renewal of hostilities with France, it will probably yield to the various motives which will be felt, to have the United States in the scale of Britain against France, and, particularly, for the immediate purpose of defeating a project of the latter, which has evidently created much solicitude in the British government."‡

The whole document, of which the preceding forms a part, is in itself a proof how very narrowly the United States escaped an entangling alliance to obtain an object which was falling into its hands by the irresistible course of human events. So far from any unwillingness to enter on war with France

early in 1803, no concession that government could make to Great Britain could avert an immediate rupture. Charles James Fox was the only eminent British statesman who raised his voice amid the tempest of passion which attended and followed the deceptive treaty of Amiens. In all the long rivalry of centuries, there was, it may be safely asserted, no other period when national hostility was more violent, and particularly on the part of Great Britain, than from the 27th of March 1802, when the treaty of Amiens was signed, to the 16th May 1803, when war was again declared against France. We have already informed the reader, that an annunciation of her acquisition of Louisiana by cession from Spain, was promulgated by France immediately after the ratification of the treaty of Amiens; and we may very safely say, that without any understanding with the United States, preparations on the part of France to form an establishment at New Orleans contributed its full share to the declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. Here again we may pause upon the reflection, how much and how salutary has been the rivalry of France and Great Britain to the United States. Sanguinary as was that rivalry, some compensations to its evils have been produced, and of those in its remote consequences, if the interests of the whole civilized world are taken into the estimate, was the union or incorporation of the vast regions of central North America with the original United States.

The union of Louisiana with the United States was foreseen by Count Vergennes, but the immediate causes were very different from those anticipated by that French statesman. The conquest of that country from Spain was held in prospect, and it is probable that a feeling that such an attempt would be made on the part of the United States, ass sted to influence Spain to retrocede the whole immense territory to France. It was so retroceded, and so much was the transfer dreaded in the United States, that we have shown that the pacific councils of Jefferson and Madison, considered war with France and alliance with Great Britain as preferable alternatives; and yet, the United States stand indebted to the retrocession to France for the peaceable and comparatively cheap acquisition of Louisiana.

Involved once more in war with great Britain, and awaiting the shock of a coalition, France at once abandoned her scheme, if such a scheme was ever seriously formed, and made an overture to sell the country to the United States for a valuable consideration in money. We have already premised, that the views of the United States government expanded as circumstances developed themselves, and from an inchoate design of obtaining New Orleans and the Floridas, all Louisiana was finally purchased. It is not within the scope of this sketch to go over the negotiations which led to the great result; but we proceed to their happy termination. The convention by which Louisiana was secured to the United States, was signed at Paris, on the 30th of April 1803; the negotiators on the part of

the United States being Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe, and on the part of France, Barbé Marbois; the price, sixty millions of francs, besides a sum paid to American citizens for French spoliations on our commerce; making together a gross sum of about fifteen millions of dollars.

The actual transfer to the United States, was made at the city of New Orleans on the 20th of December 1803, when Louisiana became an inseparable part of the domains of the United States.

Except along the river Mississippi above N. Lat. 31°, and upon a part of the northern shore of the Gulf of Mexico, the boundaries of Louisiana, as ceded by France to the United States, were vague and undetermined. As held by France, previous to the first cession to Spain, the river Perdido formed the boundary between Louisiana and Florida. Spain, becoming mistress of both provinces, extended the name of Florida to the Mississippi, and under that term ceded the country to Great Britain. The latter government divided Florida into two provinces, East Florida, and West Florida; the latter extending from the river Perdido to the Mississippi, and separated from Louisiana by the Iberville and Amite rivers, and lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain. Thus stood those respective provinces, when war between Spain and Great Britain burst forth during the American revolutionary contest. Spain, in possession of New Orleans, and other parts of Louisiana, availing herself of a favourable position, invaded and conquered West Florida, which with East Florida was formally ceded to her by the government of Great Britain in 1783.

The name of West Florida had become established, and that of Louisiana antiquated between the Mississippi and the Perdido rivers, and remained so in common language during the existence of Spanish domination. There was evidently from these historical facts, either an intentional or accidental contradiction in the article of cession from Spain to France, which to save reference we recite: "The colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent, that it already has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it.”

The United States, receiving Louisiana from France, as the latter did from Spain, claimed the Perdido as its eastern boundary; but Spain resisted that construction, and continued to hold all that was included under the relative terms East and West Florida; and of course still exercised dominion on the left bank of the Mississippi, from N. Lat. 31° near the mouth of Red river, down that stream to the outlet of Iberville river. It must be also conceded from the foregoing, that Spain had plausibility if not justice on her side. Mr Lyman enters into a long explanation of this intricate question, but we may safely pronounce that when France obtained the recession, both parties understood by Louisiana "as France possessed it," to mean that the eastern boundary was to be the Perdido, and no man who understands the history of Louisiana can doubt for a moment that if France had actually regained that province, her government would have