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“Acts of this nature,” says Story, J.,' “are to be interpreted not according to the abstract propriety of the language, but according to the known usage of trade and business at home and abroad. If an article has one appellation abroad and another at home, not with one class of citizens merely, whether merchants, grocers or manufacturers, but with the community at large, who are buyers and sellers, doubtless our laws are to be interpreted according to that domestic sense; but where the foreign name is well known here and no different appellation exists in domestic use, we must presume that in commercial law the legislature used the word in the foreign sense. And so in reference to what rule ought to prevail where the article is known by one name among merchants and by another name among manufacturers or the community at large, interpreting the legislative meaning in the traffic act. Congress, under such circumstances, may, perhaps, be fairly presumed to use it in the more general and the more usual sense rather than in that which belongs to a single class of citizens."
$ 255. Statutory use of words.- A word repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. The intention is obvious to use the word marry in a different sense from that implied in the word married in the provision fixing a penalty against a person who“ being married” should“ marry” again.” Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such stat
8 604; The Dunelm, L R. 9 P. Div. 2 Rhodes v. Weldey, 46 Ohio St. 171; Roosevelt v. Maxwell, 3 Blatchf. 234; Pitte v. Shipley, 46 Cal. 154, 160 ; 391 ; “Gin,” Webb v. Knight, 2 Q. B. Reg. v. Poor Law Commissioners, 6 Div. 530; Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. Ad. & E. 68; Courtauld v. Legh, L R. S. 108; United States v. Clement, 4 Ex. 126; Smith v. Brown, L. R. 6 Crabbe, 499; Commonwealth v. Gilti- Q. B. 729; Re Kirkstall Brewery, 5 nan, 64 Pa. St. 100; Reg. v. Wood, L. Ch. Div. 535. See County Seat Linn Rep. 4 Q. B. 559; Aerated Bread Co. v. Co. 15 Kan, 500. Gregg, L. R. 8 Q. B. 355.
8 Reg. v. Allen, L. R. 1 C. C. 367. 1 United States v. Breed, 1 Sumn. 159.
ute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words. And if the legislature use words which have received a judicial interpretation they are presumed to be used in that sense, unless the contrary intent can be gathered from the statute. But where the same language is not preserved, but is substantially varied, it shows a different intention. And so the context may show that the same word used repeatedly in the same act is not used in the same sense.
$ 256. Change of phraseology of statute.—“It has been a general rule,” says Blackburn, J., "for drawing legal documents from the earliest times, which one is taught when one first becomes a pupil to a conveyancer, never to change the form of words unless you are going to change the meaning; and it would be as well if those who are engaged in the preparation of acts of parliament would bear in mind that that is the real principle of construction." 5 Whether the change be by omission, addition or substitution of words, the principle applies. Every change of phraseology, however, does not indicate a change of substance and intent. The change may be made to
1 Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mat- Pa. St. 569, 573; State v. Clark, 57 tichand, 8 Moore, P. C. 4; United Mo. 25; Reg. v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860. States v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330; The See Coxson v. Doland, 2 Daly, 66 ; Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440; Wallace v. State v. Smith, 46 Iowa, 670; WinterTaliaferro, 2 Call (Va.), 389; 6 Bac. field v. Stauss, 24 Wis. 394; LehAbr. 379; Campbell, Ex parte, L. R. 5 man, Durr & Co. v. Robinson, 59 Ala. Ch. 703; State v. Brewer, 22 La. Ann. 219; Burgess v. Hargrove, 64 Tex. 110. 273; United States v. Wilson, Baldw. 4 McMicken v. Commonwealth, 58 78, 95; McKee v. McKee, 17 Md. 352; Pa. St. 213. Woolsey v. Cade, 54 Ala. 378; County 5 Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. 457; Seat of Linn Co. 15 Kan. 500; Will- Dickenson v. Fletcher, L. R. 9 C. P. 8; iams v. Lear, L. R. 7 Q. B. 285. Casement v. Fulton, 5 Moore's P. C.
2 McKee v. McKee, 17 Md. 352; 141. Huddleston v. Askey, 56 Ala. 218; 6 Lawrence v. King, L. R. 3 Q. B. Posey v. Pressley, 60 id. 243; Daw- 345; Reg. v. Bullock, L. R. 1 C. C. 117; son v. Dawson, 23 Mo. App. 169. Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. St. 569, 573; 3 Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154, Reg. v. Price, L. R. 6 Q. B. 411; West v.
Wills v. Russell, 100 U. S. 621; Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737; Reg. v. IngRich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. St. 86, 89; ham, 5 B. & S. 257; Bond v. Rosling, Buck v. Spofford, 31 Me. 34; Pingree 1 id. 371; Parker v. Taswell, 2 DeG. & v. Snell, 42 Me. 53; Poe v. State, 85 J.559; Tidey v. Mollett, 16 C. B. (N. S.) Tenn. 495; Broaddus v. Broaddus, 298. 10 Bush, 299; Eliot v. Himrod, 108
express more clearly the same intent or merely to improve the diction. The change is often found to be the result of carelessness or slovenliness of the draftsman. The changes of phraseology may result from the act being the production of many minds, and from being compiled from different sources.' Hence the presumption of a change of intention from a change of language is of no great weight, and must mainly depend on the intrinsic difference as resulting from the modification. A mere change in the words of a revision will not be deemed a change in the law unless it appears that such was the intention. The intent to change the law must be evident and certain; there must be such substantial change as to import such intention, or it must otherwise be manifest from other guides of interpretation, or the difference of phraseology will not be deemed expressive of a different intention. Revisions naturally involve some modifications of expression to bring the laws into system and uniformity.
In the interpretation of re-enacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously
1 Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. 457; Sandf. 374; Theriat v. Hart, 2 Hill, Re Wright, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 78; Reg. 380; People v. Deming, 1 Hilt. 271; v. Frost, 9 C. & P. 127.
Coxson v. Doland, 2 Daly, 66 • Cros2 Re Wood, L. R. 7 Ch. 306; Reg. v. well v. Crane, 7 Barb. 191; Hoffman Buttle, L. R. 1 C. C. 250.
v. Delihanty, 13 Abb. Pr. 388; Doug3 Endlich on St. 9 378.
las v. Douglas, 5 Hun, 140 ; Parra4 See Hudston v. Midland R. Co. more v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220, 242; L R. 4 Q. B. 366; Rolle v. Whyte, Hughes v. Farrar, 45 Me. 72; Trigg L. R. 3 Q. B. 305; Sherborn v. Wells, V. State, 49 Tex. 645; Overfield v. 3 B. & S. 784; Bosley v. Davies, 1 Sutton, 1 Metc. (Ky), 621; Allen v. Q. B. Div. 84; Skinner v. Usher, L. R. Ramsey, id. 635; Duramus v. Har7 Q. B. 423; Curtis v. Embery, L. R. rison, 26 Ala. 326; Anthony v. State, 7 Ex. 369; Reg. v. South Weald, 5 B. & 29 Ala. 27; McNamara v. R. R. Co. 12 S. 391; Jarman, Ex parte, 4 Ch. Div. Minn. 388; Gaston v. Merriam, 33 id. 835; Haldane v. Beauclerk, 3 Ex. 271; Glass v. State, 30 Ala. 529; 658; Montague v Smith, 17 Q. B. Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 249 ; 688; Cates v. Knight, 3 T. R. 442; Bradley v. State, 69 Ala. 318; ChamMurray v. Keyes, 35 Pa. St. 384, 390; bers v. Carson, 2 Whart. 9; CommonRich v. Keyser, 54 id. 86; Reg. v. Pratt, wealth v. Rainey, 4 W. & S. 186; 4 E. & B. 860; Read v. Edwards, 17 Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis. 522; Conger C. B. (N. S.) 245.
v. Barker, 11 Ohio St. 1; Fosdick v. 5 Landford v. Dunklin, 71 Ala. 594; Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; Ennis v. Dudley, Adm'r, v. Steele, id. 423; Re Crump, 6 Tex. 34; McMicken v. ComBrown, 21 Wend. 316; Yates' Case, 4 monwealth, 58 Pa. St. 213; Smith v. John. 318; Domick v. Michael, 4 Mitchell, Rice (S. C.), 315.
in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had, and by re-enactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. So statutes originally enacted in another state, when adopted, are deemed to be taken with the settled construction given them in the state from which they are copied.?
$ 257. Other statutes adopted by general reference.When so adopted, only such portion is in force as relates to the particular subject of the adopting act." Such adoption does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent. Nor will the repeal of the statute so adopted affect its operation as part of the statute adopting it. The effect may be thus comprehensively stated: Where a statute is incorporated in another, the effect is the same as if the provisions of the former were re-enacted in the latter, for all the purposes of the latter statute; and the repeal of the former statute does not repeal its provisions so far as they have been incorporated in an act which is not repealed, where the adoption was for the purpose of providing for a subject matter not within the original stat
1O'Byrnes V. State, 51 Ala. 25; 242; People v. Irvin, 21 Wend. 128; Roundtree, Ex parte, id. 42; Posey v. Kirkpatrick v. Gibson, 2 Brock. 388; Pressley, 60 id. 243; State v. Brewer, Harrison v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476 ; 22 La. Ann. 274; Huddleston v. As- Daniels v. Clegg, 28 id. 32; Greiner v. key, 56 Ala. 218; McKee v. McKee, 17 Klein, id. 17; Attorney-General v. Md. 352; Jenkins v. Ewin, 8 Heisk. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Pike's Estate, 45 456; Morrison v. Stevenson, 69 Ala. id. 391. 443; Matthews, Ex parte, 52 id. 51; 3 Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 270; MatWoolsey v. Cade, 54 id. 378; Harring- thews v. Sands, 29 Ala. 136. ton v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43.
4 Darmstaetter v. Moloney, 45 Mich. 2 Morgan v. Davenport, 60 Tex. 230; 621; Schlaudecker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Tex. 475; St. 200; United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. Trigg v. State, 49 id. 645; Snoddy v. 141; Kendall v. United States, 12 id. Cage, 5 id. 106; Brothers v. Mundell, 524; Nunes v. Wellisch, 12 Bush, 363; 60 id. 240; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; In re Comm’rs of Lunatic Asylums, Carney v. Hampton, 3 T. B. Mon. 8 Irish Rep., Eq. series, 366; Knapp 231; Botanico-Med College v. Atchi- v. Brooklyn, 97 N. Y. 520; Re Main St. son, 41 Miss. 188; Jessup v. Carnegie, 98 id. 454; State v. Davis, 22 La. Ann. 80 N. Y. 441; Leonard v. Columbia N. 77. See Allen, Ball & Co. v. Mayor, Co. 81 N. Y. 48; Marqueze v. Caldwell, 9 Ga. 286. 48 Miss. 23; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 id. 5 Clarke F. Bradlaug, L. R. 8 Q. B. 213; Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. Div. 69.
ute. “ It is a sound rule of construction,” said Lord Denman, C. J.,
“applicable to modern as well as ancient statutes, perhaps even more so from necessity in consequence of the looseness of expression which now prevails, that ‘in construction of general references in acts of parliament, such reference must be made as will stand with reason and right.”” 2 In deciding whether words of reference are to be understood in the largest or in the narrowest sense, whether they extend to the whole or to a part only of any act, the court considers the subject-matter of the section in which such words are found, and contrasts it with that of the preceding sections." Thus, where a section which dealt with a new subject used the words “nothing hereinbefore contained,” it was held that the reference was confined to matters contained in that section and did not extend to earlier portions of the act.*
$ 258. Interpretation with reference to grammatical sense.— Statutes as well as other writings are to be read and understood primarily according to their grammatical sense, unless it is apparent that the author intended something different. In other words, it is presumed that the writer intended to be understood according to the grammatical purport of the language he has employed to express his meaning." This presumption gives way when it appears from a perusal of the context or the whole statute that the legislature did not grammatically express its intention. It is only one rule of interpretation to follow the grammatical sense when it does not appear to conflict with the true intent.? A statute entitled a man to be registered as a voter who, on or before a certain date, has paid “all poor rates that have become payable by
1 In re Comm’rs of Lunatic Asylums, M. & W. 191; Everett v. Wells, 2 8 Irish Rep., Eq. series, 366; Reg. v. Man. & Gr. 269; Richards v. McBride, Stock, 8 Ad. & E. 405.
L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 119; Smith v. Bell, 2 Reg. v. Badcock, 6 Q. B. 787, at 10 M. & W. 378; Cull v. Austin, L R.
7 C. P. 234; Atty-Gen'l v. Lockwood, 3 Wilb. on St. 187.
9 M. & W. 398; Waugh v. Middleton, 4 Id.; In re Cambrian R’y Co.'s 8 Ex. 356; Christophersen v. Lotinga, Scheme, L. R. 3 Ch. 278.
33 L. J. C. P. 123; 15 C. B. (N. S.) 809. 5 Dame's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 417, 422; 6 George v. Board of Education, 33 Macdougall v. Paterson, 11 C. B. 755, Ga. 344. 769; Warburton v. Loveland, 1 Hud- 7 Fisher v. Connard, 100 Pa. St. 63, son & Brooke, 648; Becke v. Smith, 2 69.