out, by the Hon. gentleman, in this debate, we should probably have had one half of Europe united with France against us; and no one will fuppofe, that, in fuch a cafe, we could for one year have preferved our fuperiority at fea, confidering the great number of fhips of war we must always keep at home, for protecting our trade and preventing an invafion. We find, Sir, that what we have as yet done, has not had the effect which the French expected and wished for: We find, that our feizing the French ships, and our endeavouring to intercept the troops they fend to America, have not made any ally of France look upon us as the aggreffors; but I fear we are upon the verge of the precipice, and that one step further would make us drop into the gulph of perdition. Even the allies of France are now mediating between us, and endeavouring to prevail with that court to agree to reasonable terms of accommodation. What would they think, fhould we, whilst they are thus employed, order fuch a bill as this to be brought in? I am perfuaded, that they would look upon it not only as a hectoring menace against France, but as an affront to themfelves. Nay, I am afraid, they would begin to look upon us as real pyrates, which the French have been reprefenting us to be at every court in Europe; for as yet they confider our feizing the fhips of France as done with no other views but fuch as we really had, which were, that we might have fomething in our hands to restore in cafe honourable terms of peace fhould be offered; and, 2dly, That we might poffefs ourselves of fome thoufands of French feamen, which in cafe of war might be employed against us. But if we fhould order Those fhips to be appropriated to the captors, moft foreign courts would begin to think, that we had feized those Thips without any other view but that of gain, which is the proper character of pirates. Thus, Sir, it is evident, that our agreeing to this motion, might be attended with the most dangerous confequences, with regard to our foreign affairs, and with regard to our domestick, it is really what we cannot in juftice do, at leaft fo far as relates to the ships already taken: The property of them is already vefted in the crown; and every one knows, that we never pass any bill by which the property of the crown may be affectfent of our fovereign figned to us by ed, without having first had the conmeffage. Nay, we never pafs a bill by which the property of any private man may be affected without making good to him the damage or lofs he may thereby fuffer. Our agreeing to this motion would therefore be a trefpass upon prudence, as the fhips taken before a declaration of war, are often in whole or in part applied to make good the damage private men had fuffered by what occafioned the war, or they are restored upon a renewal of peace. Thus the hips taken from the Spaof war, were partly applied, towards niards in 1739, before the declaration making good the damage which our merchants had fuffered, by their depredations; and the ships taken from them, in the year 1718, were reftosed upon the renewal of peace, in 1721. Nay, fome French fhips that had been feized by our ships of war, before the declaration of war between on pretence of their being Spanish, France and us, 1744, were reftor ed, even during the continuance of the war, upon its having been made appear that they were truly French fhips. Therefore, I muft think, that it would be inconfiftent with prudence to enact, that the property of all fhips, taken before the declaration of war, fhould become vested in the captors as foon as war should be declared, and the ships condemned. Having thus fhewn, Sir, that our agreeing to this motion can do little or no good, but may do a great deal of harm, and that our paffing fuch a bill as as this would be inconfiftent with both juftice and prudence, I am for following the example fet us by a former minifter: He was againft paffing fuch a bill as this in the year 1738, because it was not then neceffary; but he was for it in 1739, because it was then become neceffary: And he was probably for its going the length of the 3d reading, to prevent any oppofition being made to it when it should become neceffary. But as this laft circumftance cannot now ferve any purpose, we have no occafion to take up our time with preparing and reading any fuch bill, until it does become neceffary. So that my conduct at this time, does not properly differ from the conduct of that great minifter, whom I fhall always be proud to imitate, and fhall never be ashamed of having been one of his conftant friends. Whatever fome gentlemen may be pleased to say of the character of that minifter, I wish they would not make quite fo free with the character of parliament, in his time. To talk of a venal majority at his beck, in parliament, may teach the people without doors to think at least, if not to talk, of a venal majority in our prefent parliament. That minifter, it is true, had a very great influence for many years in parliament, but it proceeded from the rectitude of his measures, and his abilities in explaining them to the house. He was always for keep ing his countrymen in peace, if poffible; and we cannot boaft much of what we have got by war fince his refignation. From what had before happened to him, we know, indeed, that there may be a venal majority in parliament, for he innocently fuffered by one; and I wish he had never had reafon to fuppofe, that there may be a factious majority in parliament'; for they are equally dangerous to our conftitution, but the latter is by far the moft dangerous to the peace and fafety of the kingdom. [This JOURNAL to be continued in our next.] An Enquiry concerning the Nature and End of a national Militia, wherein from firft Principles, and a bort Reviero of our prefent Condition, both at Home and Abroad, is deduced the Practicability and immediate Neceffity of fuch an Establishment. TH HIS excellent Performance, which elegant Stile, a Chain of the moft conveys in a nervous yet clear and forcible Reasoning on a very interefting and important Subject, highly deferves uncommon Attention. The Author firft explains the Foundations and End of the natural Force, of every political Society; and fhews that it is the fame Force, under a different Modification, which at the fame time fupports the Liberties of the People, and gives Energy and independance to the Prerogative of the Magiftrate. He next confiders the Ufe and Confequences of a regular and ftanding Army; and then applies the preceding general Principles to our own particular Circumftances, having first taken a View of our present Condition both at Home and Abroad, as from that arise the most preffing Arguments for our doing inftantly, and without the leaft Delay, what he had made appear from the preceding Confiderations was never improper to be done. "We have the Happiness to live in a Nation, where Liberty is not only enjoyed, but eftablished upon the moft lafting and generous Principles; The Freedom of the Prefs, and the Freedom of Debate, have vanquished and put to Silence the moft ftrenuous Defenders of Tyranny; and it is now univerfally acknowledged, that Government is nothing more than a political Compact among Men, for the better Prefervation of their Lives, Liberties, and Poffeffions. That the Magiftrate, in the Nature of the Thing, can be intitled to no other Priviledge, Power, or Prerogative, than what is neceffary for the better Attain ment ment of that End. That all the Power of the Magiftrate is, and must be, derived from the People.-That the Magiftrate, who poffeffes a Strength independant of, and fuperior to the People, is a Tyrant; and the People Slaves. "That in all Debates concerning Government, the End of its Inftitution fhould be chiefly regarded; and that in Cafe of inevitable Changes in the Circumstances of political Society, the Prerogative of the Magiftrate fhould be limited, or extended, fo as beft to answer the End for which it was at first inftituted; namely, the Freedom and Safety of the Whole. "Men, then, having a Right to be as free as the Nature of Government will allow, and Force being neceffary to retain or recover that Freedom when loft; it will follow that the People should be poffeffed of fuch a Degree of Force, as will be neceffary for that Purpose: on the other Hand, the juft Prerogative of the Magiftrate being effential to the Wellbeing of the State; it is neceffary he fhould be strongly armed, as well for the Prefervation of his juft Rights, the Execution of the Laws and Maintenance of the publick Peace, as for the Defence of the State against the ambition of foreign Enemies. Upon this State of the Cafe, the following Questions will naturally arife-In what Manner the Magiftrate can be armed for the Purposes of Government, without deftroying the Freedom of the People? And what that Strength is, which the People may poffefs, without reftraining the juft Prerogative of the Magif trate ? In Anfwer to the former, the Author obferves, that the natural power of the Magiftrate does not confift in any diftinct and peculiar Strength of his own, but in this only, that he alone can give direction and Activity to the Strength, difciplined; or natutal, of every Individual; and unite it all, for the Benefit and Advantage of the Whole. In Answer to the Latter he fhews, that that Strength, which the People may poffefs without reftraining the Prerogative of the Magiftrate, cannot in a Monarchy, be an active or felf-moving Power, fuch a Power being contrary to all Principles of Government and Order; but the Strength of the Individuals; a diffufed, broken, and feparated, Strength, incapable of Union, Concert, or Activity, till Violence and Rapine, univerfally felt, provoke univerfal Refentment and Confufion: In short, 'till Tyranny compels, and Self-prefervation cements their Union. From this Strength, he proves by many Confiderations that a juft Magiftrate has nothing to dread. The next Point he confiders, is, whether there be any Neceffity in the Nature of things that the Force of every Country fhould be difciplined; and with Refpect to this, he fays, that as far as regards the internal Conftitution of any Government perhaps there is not; unless there are any Number of ftanding Troops maintained, and then it becomes neceffary or otherwife, according to the Number of thofe Troops; for 18000 ftanding Forces are more dangerous in an undifciplined Country than three Times the Number, where the People are taught the ufe of Arms; but the abfolute Neceffity of Difcipline is founded in this, that all Nations are fubject to be engaged in foreign Wars; and as every State has a Right to be independent of every other State, it follows that each fhould put itfelf into the most formidable Condition it is fafely capable of, to maintain that Independence. The most formidable Condition any State is fafely capable of, is Difcipline; a Circumstance, which, though it encreases the Strength of a State to a furprising degree in Relation to foreign Nations, yet it makes no kind of Alteration in the the Balance of Power at home, or in any Degree disturbs the Internal Conftitution. With regard to a regular and ftanding Army, this Writer is very far from thinking it in all Cafes unjustifia ble and unneceffary, but that the Number ought to be regulated and limited by the End for which they are eftablished; that is, the Dignity of the Magiftrate, and the Execution of the common Purposes of Juftice: More than is neceffary for thefe Purpofes are useless or dangerous; for the Force that is able to oppofe a powerful Enemy, may be fufficient to fupport an arbitrary Power. "There is is likewise another Cause for the Establishment of a standing Force of ftill more abfolute Neceffity, namely, the garrisoning and fupporting of diftant Poffeffions, which it may be neceffary to retain for the Benefit of Trade; for diftant Poffeffi ons ought not to be retained for any other Reason whatsoever. It follows then, that fuch a number should be added to the national Troops, as are neceffary for that Purpose: and from this Addition I think no great Evil can arife; for as fuch additional Troops must be always employed in thofe Places, they can add very little Weight to the Power of the Magif trate at home. Our Author reprefents in a true Light the manifeft danger of a ftanding Army, even in our own Conftitution, paid by the People: and continued from Year to Year, if increafed to a Number altogether fuperior to the Strength of the People: and in the comprehenfive View he gives of our prefent condition at Home and Abroad, has introduced a moft judicious Account of the present and future Effects of our national Debt (which we would recommend to the diligent Perufal of all our Readers.) He afterwards remarks that it is the Trade, the Colonies, and the maritime Force of France, that we dread, and muft endeavour to reduce, and at the fame VOL. XIII. Time provide in the best Manner for our Defence and Security at Home "Here then (he adds) arifes the important Queftion-In what manner fhall this be done? By an Army, or Militia, or both? .. "If we rely on an Army only, nothing is more clear, than that we must have an Army fully fufficient for our Defence. Who then can fay what Number fuch an Army must confift of? I think we have already in Pay, including Marines, about 100,000 Men. If we confider the Number of Troops which will be neceffary for our Operations in America, for the Defence of Gibraltar, and perhaps of our Leeward Inlands; and if we confider that the Marines must be employed on board the Fleet, I think we cannot fuppofe that above 40,000 will remain for the Defence of Great Britain. Hitherto we have been obliged to keep at home a large Fleet for the Defence of our Coafts, against the threatened Invafions of the Enemy, to the Lofs at least of one ftrong Fortrefs, and the great Detriment of our Trade. Can we now fet our Fleets at Liberty, and rely on 40,000 Men for our Defence? I think this will not be faid. France can, upon any Exigence, raife 40,000 Men; and fhe will probably attempt Invafions in different parts of this Island at the fame Time; and what Diftractions may not this occafion? And fhall we hazard this Country upon the Bravery and good Behaviour of 20,000 Men, which is all that, perhaps, we can bring to Action in one Place? Befides which, Ireland may at the fame Time, ftand in need of our Affiftance: or will the Regulars there, aided by the Militia they have lately arrayed, be a fufficient Defence ?Strange! that a Militia fhould be thought ferviceable every where but in Great Britain. It is apparent then that we have not yet provided fufficiently for our Defence: either a large Fleet must be ftill kept at Home to watch the Motions of the French ArX x mies mies, or our Forces be much augmented. If our Fleets be still kept at Home, how fhall we reduce the Enemy; or how are we benefited by the Augmentation already made? We muft, therefore, if we would act confiftently, increase our Troops with 30 or 40,000 Men, and we might then indeed have one fair Battle for our Poffeffions I fay, one Battle only; for a mercenary Army once broken and defeated, in their own Country especially, become dreadful only to their Friends, and face the Enemy rather for Form fake than Victory. be the Receivers of Pay, and be themselves fupported by the weakened Community. A Saving muft, therefore, be made fomewhere to fupport this Expence; and how dreadful is it, to apprehend that fuch faving may be made in the management of the Navy! This will be to lofe fight of the great Object of this War: and if we lofe our Superiority at Sea, how obvious and how inevitable is our Ruin. "But let us fuppofe that all things go well, and that we obtain at last an honourable Peace; are we quite cer tain that this immenfe Army will be difbanded? May not a large standing Army produce fuch Events as may make their Continuance feem neceffary? May they not humbly petition for an Establishment? If they are not disbanded, our Liberties are loft; if they are, the impoverished Land will be filled with Beggars, and sturdy ones too, long trained up in Idlenefs and Debauchery. Thele are fome of the Dangers and Inconveniencies, which a thinking Man may poffibly apprehend, if we truft folely to a Regular Army for our Defence. We will now take a fhort View of the Advantages we may expect to reap from the Establishment of a national Militia. "But let it be admitted, that we may at lat raise an Army fully fufficient for our Defence (tor after all, it will be an Army of Defence only, not of Offence; a Shield, and not a Sword; but which, however, we must pay as if it were engaged in constant Action, and reducing the Enemy to Submiflion) it will be then natural to enquire, how we fhall find the Funds neceffary for its Support. There is a certain point, beyond which our Expences cannot run, without our being involved in fudden Ruin whilft we are avoiding one Danger, we must take care that we do not fall into another. Such an Army of English Forces as will be neceffary for our Defence, will be altogether as numerous, and much more "The firft and most obvious Conexpenfive, than all the Forces we fideration is this, that a General Mipaid laft War; yet we then contract- litia is the greatest Defence any Natied a most immenfe Debt, and confe- on can be poffeffed of: It is the uniquently we are the lefs able to fup- ted ftrength of every Individual in port its Increafe; especially as this the State. As a Militia-Man the War will, in all human Probability, now dreaded Soldier will be equally be of greater Duration than the laft. ufeful, without becoming either danIt should be confidered likewife, that gerous or burthenfome. It is indeed the Increase of our Land Forces does altogether impracticable to difcipline not neceffarily leffen our Ability to the whole Country at once; yet fuch fupport that Increase. Our Army, a Rotation of Militia might easily be has, and must be augmented by La- eftablished, as would, in a fhort time, bourers and Artificers, which will of habituate the whole Nation to the course contract our Trade, and raife Ufe of Arms. A certain Number, the price of Labour; and those very not lefs, I think, than an Hundred Artificers who were heretofore, by Thoufand, cloathed and exercised at their Labour and Confumptions, the, a finall Expence, fhould be confiderPaymasters of our Armies, muit now ed as the Militia actually in being, and fubject |
