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any recommendation the jury might make in, part from either, and mere identifying referthe matter, but the jury can only recommend ence by title or otherwise is insufficient, though and cannot control the discretion vested in entire proposal, as affected by amendments, the judge. Kelley v. State, 133 Ark. 261, need not be spread on journal of either house 202 S. W. 49.

Other errors are assigned and are discussed by learned counsel for appellants, but we do not think these asisgnments of error are of sufficient importance to require discussion by us.

It is the opinion of the majority that no error was committed, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

MCADAMS et al. v. HENLEY. (No. 77.) (Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 29, 1925.) 1. Courts 92-Former Supreme Court decisions held decisive as to receipt of number of votes required to adopt constitutional amendment, though validity thereof was not directly involved.

Former decisions of Supreme Court held decisive as to receipt of requisite number of votes for adoption of Const. Amend. 12, prohibiting passage of local laws by Legislature, though validity thereof was not directly involved.

at same place or time. 6. Constitutional law ~~7 Constitutional amendment held invalid as not entered on journals of both houses of Legislature.

Omission of House amendments to Senate resolution, proposing constitutional amendment No. 12, prohibiting passage of local laws by Legislature, from Senate journals, held to invalidate amendment for noncompliance with Const. art. 19, § 22, requiring that proposal be entered on journals with yeas and nays.

7. Constitutional law 70(3)-Questions of policy not for courts, which can only pass on constitutionality of law or whether constitutional amendment was approved in constitutional manner.

Questions of policy are not for courts, which can only decide whether constitutional limita

tions are infringed on by statute, or whether proposed constitutional amendment has been approved by people in manner prescribed by Constitution.

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Acts 1925, No. 53, authorizing road improvement district created by Road Laws 1919, 33-Judicial notice of contents vol. 1, p. 174, to use district funds in part payof Legislature's journals.

2. Evidence

ment of cost of building new bridge over small void as impairing vested rights or authorizing nonnavigable river crossed by road, held not

Supreme Court takes judicial notice of contents of journals of two houses of General As-diversion of tax moneys to other uses than sembly.

3. Constitutional law 7-No presumption that two houses of Legislature agreed on proposed constitutional amendment, where amendment of Senate resolution by lower House was never entered on Senate journals.

In determining whether Const. Amend. 12, prohibiting passage of local laws by Legislature, was proposed by General Assembly by entry on journals with yeas and nays, as required by Const. art. 19, § 22, there is no presumption, as in dealing with validity or construction of statute, that recitals of House Journal as to adoption of amendment, never entered on Senate Journal, on first and second reading, followed by adoption of Senate resolution, meant that amendment was receded from and original resolution finally adopted, or that two houses agreed on same proposal.

4. Constitutional law 6-Constitution can be amended only in accordance with rules prescribed thereby.

Constitution is supreme and paramount law, which can be amended only in accordance with rules thereby prescribed.

those for which tax was levied, in violation of

Const. art. 16, § 11; statute constituting legislative determination, which Supreme Court cannot set aside unless demonstrably arbitrary and unwarranted, that bridge is not independent project, but part of construction of road. 9. Highways 122-Constitutional prohibition of use of tax moneys for other purpose than that for which tax was levied inapplicable to local assessments.

Const. art. 16, § 11, prohibiting use of tax moneys for any other purpose than that for which tax was levied, applies only to general taxation, not to local assessments.

Wood and Humphreys, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Craighead Chancery Court; J. M. Futrell, Chancellor.

Suit by A. W. Henley against H. H. McAdams and others. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded,

with directions.

Horace Sloan, of Jonesboro, for appellants. Arthur L. Adams, of Jonesboro, for ap

5. Constitutional law 7-Proposed constitu- pellee.

tional amendment must be entered in extenso on journals of both houses of Legislature. McCULLOCH, C. J. This case involves Under Const. art. 19, § 22, proposed amend- the validity of a statute enacted by the Genment to Constitution is void, unless entered in eral Assembly of 1925 (Act No. 53, unpubextenso on journals of each house of General lished), authorizing a road improvement disAssembly, without omission of any substantial trict in Craighead county to contribute of For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

its funds a specified amount in the construc-approval or rejection at the next general election of a bridge spanning Cache river, in tion for Senators and Representatives, if a mathe route of the road; and the primarily jority of the electors voting at such election controlling question in the case is whether adopt such amendment, the same shall become a part of the Constitution of the state of Aror not proposed Amendment No. 12, which kansas, to wit: would prohibit the Legislature from passing "Section 1. No local or special bill shall be bills for local laws, and which was voted on passed by the General Assembly of the state of at the general election of October 7, 1924, Arkansas. Counties and municipalities shall was legally adopted. The validity of the have the power of legislation as to all local and amendment is assailed, on the ground that it special legislation of every character in and for was not proposed by the General Assembly their respective municipalities and counties, the in the manner prescribed by the Constitu-islation shall be enacted contrary to the Constimanner to be provided by law; but no local legtion, in that the proposal was not "entered tution or contrary to any general law of the on the journals with the yeas and nays." Constitution 1874, art. 19, § 22.

state, and any general law shall have the effect of repealing any local legislation which is in conflict therewith.

[1] The validity of this amendment was not directly involved in the decisions of this "Municipalities may provide for the exercise court in the recent cases of Brickhouse v. of the initiative and referendum as to their loHill, and Arlitt v. Hill, 268 S. W. 865, but cal legislation. General laws shall be enacted those cases are decisive that this amend-referendum for local acts passed as herein proproviding for the exercise of the initiative and ment received the requisite number of fa- vided as to the counties. vorable votes for its adoption.

The Constitution of 1874 (art. 19, § 22) prescribes the following method for proposing and adopting amendments thereto:

"Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to by a majority of all members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals with the yeas and nays, and published in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for six months immediately preceding the next general election for Senators and Representatives, at which time the same shall be submitted to the electors of the state for approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendments the same shall become a part of this Constitution; but no more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately."

[2] It has often been decided by this court that we take judicial notice of the contents of the journals of the two houses of the General Assembly, and in doing so in the present case we find the following state of the record with reference to the proposal for the adoption of said Amendment No. 12.

The proposal originated in the Senate, and was designated on the journal as "Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 by Norfleet and Caldwell," and the resolution was spread at large on the Journal in the following form:

"Senate Joint Resolution No. 9. "Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.

"Be it resolved by the Senate of the state of Arkansas and the House of Representatives of the state of Arkansas, a majority of all the members elected to each house agreeing thereto, that the following is hereby proposed as an amendment to section 26 of article VI of the Constitution of the state of Arkansas, and upon

"Fifteen per cent. of the legal voters of any municipality or county may order the referendum or invoke the initiative upon any local or special measure.

"In municipalities the number of signatures required upon petition shall be computed upon the total vote cast for the office of mayor at the last preceding general election; in counties upon the office of circuit clerk.

"In municipalities and counties the time for filing an initiative petition shall not be fixed at less than sixty nor more than ninety days before the election at which it is to be voted upon; and for a referendum petition, not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days after the passage of such measure by a municipal council.

"Sec. 2. This amendment shall take effect and be in force and operation sixty days after its approval and adoption by the people of the state of Arkansas."

On a later day the Senaté adopted the resolution by the necessary two-thirds vote, and the resolution, as originally introduced and entered on the journal, was re-entered on the journal, together with the yeas and nays vote thereon, showing the adoption. The resolution as adopted by the Senate was then transmitted to the House, and was read the first time, and spread at large upon the journals of the House. There was, according to the recitals in the journal, a motion to table the resolution, but the motion failed of adoption. On a subsequent day a member of the House offered the following amendment to Senate Resolution No. 9:

"Amendment to Senate Joint Resolution No. 9:

"Amend Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 by striking out the following words in line 1 of section 1, to wit: 'Or special.'

"Also by striking out the following words from the first paragraph of section 1, to wit: 'And any general law shall have the effect of repealing any local legislation which is in conflict therewith.'

"Also by striking out from section 2 the fol

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The journals recite that this amendment journals of the original Senate resolution; to the resolution was read the first and sec- but that is not the question in this case in ond time and adopted, and immediately fol- determining the validity of the proposal, nor lowing the vote there is a recital in the are we dealing with the question of presumpHouse Journal that Senate Joint Resolution tion to determine whether or not the two No. 9 was read the third time and placed on houses of the General Assembly agreed upfinal passage, and that the resolution was on the same proposal. The real question is adopted. This occurred, according to the whether the omission from the Senate jourjournal, on March 6, 1923, and in connection nals of the House amendment, and the subwith this recital in the journal the resolu- stantial difference between the amendment tion as it came from the Senate was again entered on the journal of the Senate and the spread at large, with a recital of the vote one submitted to the people renders the adopby yeas and nays, showing the adoption of tion by the people ineffectual. the resolution by more than two-thirds of [4] At an early date in the history of the the House. The last recital of the House state it was decided by this court in State Journal, which was on the same day as the v. Cox, 8 Ark. 436, that in amending the adoption of the resolution, was that "Senate Constitution the General Assembly "does not Joint Resolution No. 9 was ordered immedi- act in the exercise of its ordinary legislaately transmitted to the Senate." The re-tive authority of its general powers; but it citals of the Senate Journal on March 7, possesses and acts in the character and ca1923, are as follows:

"Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 by Norfleet

and Caldwell was read the third time and placed on final passage; the question being, Shall the bill pass? The secretary called the roll, and the following voted in the affirmative: [Then follows the entry of the vote by yeas and nays showing the adoption of the amendment.]"

pacity of a convention." This doctrine was repeated in the recent cases of Whittemore v. Terral, 140 Ark. 493, 215 S. W. 686, and Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515, 241 S. W. 10. In the last-cited case we decided that it is not essential that a resolution of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, be submitted to the Governor for approval, and that the Governor has no power under the Constitution to veto such a resolution. In the case of Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark. 442, 96 S. W. 396, the court quoted with approval the language of another court in announcing fundamental principles which must be controlling in the present inquiry. That language is as follows:

"The Constitution is the supreme and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it is clearly defined. It is said that certain acts are to be done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what purpose are these acts required or the requisitions enjoined, if the Legislature or any other department of the would be to violate the instrument they are government can dispense with them? To do so sworn to support; and every principle of public law and sound constitutional policy requires the court to pronounce against every amendment which is shown not to have been made in ac

There is no reference anywhere on the Senate Journal as to any amendment of the resolution in the house. The Senate Journal on March 6, 1923, contains a copy of the message from the House announcing the adoption "of Senate Resolution No. 9 by Senator Caldwell and others," but that announcement makes no mention of any amendment by the House. The last entry on the Senate Journal is a report from the committee on enrolled bills, to the effect that Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 by Senator Caldwell had been presented to the Governor for his approval. The enrolled resolution on file in the office of the Secretary of State omits the words specified in the House amendment to the resolution, and in this form the proposed amendment was duly advertised and submitted to the voters on the ballot at the general election in 1924. [3] It is thus seen that the House amend-cordance with the rules prescribed by the fundamental law. Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. ment to the resolution was never entered on 108." the journals of the Senate, and that the proposed amendment, which was entered at large on the journals of the Senate, is materially different in its language and import from that which was submitted to the people at the next general election.

If we were dealing with the validity or with the construction of a statute enacted by the Legislature, it would be a matter of interpretation or rather a matter of presumption whether the recitals of the House Journal meant that the amendment to the resolution was receded from and the original Senate resolution finally adopted, or whether the amended resolution was adopted, notwithstanding the entry at that place on the

[5] We find, in fact, from an examination of the authorities that they are unanimous, with two exceptions, in holding that provisions of the Constitution with reference to the method of adopting amendments are mandatory and must be complied with in order to amend the Constitution. The only conflict in the authorities is in the interpretation of certain requirements, particularly the one now under consideration, to be found in most Constitutions, to the effect that proposals submitted by the Legislature shall be entered on the journals. The only exceptions to this rule are found in the Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700, to

which we will later advert, and in the case | parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 P. 319, 6 A. L. of West v. State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 So. 412, R. 1216. There is a case note in 6 A. L. R. where it was held that the constitutional 1227, which fully reviews the authorities on provision in question was merely directory. It follows, therefore, from the overwhelming weight of authority, that, if the language of our Constitution be interpreted to mean that a proposal of an amendment to the Constitution must be entered in extenso on the journals of each of the houses, this amendment was not legally adopted, for it is clear that the amendment submitted to and voted on by the people was not the same in substance as that found to be entered at large on the journals of the Senate.

The authorities bearing on an interpretation of the language in other Constitutions, identical with, or similar to, that found in the Constitution of this state, concerning the method of proposing amendments, are not harmonious, nor are they very abundant. There are many decisions referring to the question of legal methods of proposing and adopting constitutional amendments, but, when we come down to the very question involved in this case, the authorities are not numerous, and in several of the states the decisions of the courts of last resort are hopelessly conflicting. In a note to a case in 9 Ann. Cas. we find, on page 587, the following statement of the law:

"A distinction has been drawn between the rules governing acts proposing constitutional amendments and those applying to ordinary statutes which are assailed as not having been constitutionally enacted. Where it is provided in the Constitution that any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or Assembly, and if twothirds of all the members elected to each of the two houses shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered in their journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and it shall be the duty of the Legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people,' etc., it is held that the journal must show the amendment and vote thereon, and that the court will look to the journals to ascertain if the proper steps were taken. It is further held that the journal is the record from which it must appear that the amendment has been enacted in the form required by the Constitution, and that the rule whereby a statute which has been enrolled, authenticated, and deposited with the Secretary of State cannot be impeached by reference to the legislative journals has no application."

The cases holding that this constitutional requirement is satisfied merely by an entry which sufficiently identifies the proposal by reference to title, or otherwise, seem to be in the majority. Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Worman v Hagen, 78 Md. 152, 27 A. 616, 21 L. R. A. 716; Oakland Paving Co. v. Tompkins, 72 Cal. 5, 12 P. 801, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17; People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34; State v. Herried, 10 S. D. 109, 72 N. W. 93; Postel v.

this subject. On the other hand, there are cases holding that, where the language of the Constitution requires that a proposed amendment shall be "entered on the journals," this language means that it must be entered in extenso and not merely by ref erence to title, or otherwise, and that an omission to strictly comply with the provision invalidates the proposal. Koehler V. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609; Bailey v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa, 250, 84 N. W 1064; People v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751; Durfree v, Harper, 22 Mont. 354, 56 P. 582; In re Senate File, 25 Neb. 864, 41 N. W. 981. It is thus seen that the two conflicting rules of interpretation are supported by respectable authority, and we feel at liberty to adopt that line of authority which is consistent with our own conception of the better reasoning on the subject, and that which appears to us to have been the intention of the framers of this provision of our Constitution, when read and considered in connection with other provisions thereof.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, in the Prohibitory Amendment Cases, supra, is generally cited as the chief exponent of the doctrine that a mere identifying reference on the journals of the General Assembly is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the proposed amendment must be "entered on the journals." The opinion in that case was written by Judge Brewer, and for that reason, if for no other, commands the utmost respect. The opinion, however, is much weakened by the fact that it is out of line wth the almost unanimous authority in holding that a provision of this kind is not mandatory but merely directory. In fact, it was not decided in that case by the distinguished jurist that the words, "shall be entered on the journal," meant that a mere identifying reference to the amendment could be entered on the journal and was sufficient compliance with that language, but he held that the requirement was merely directory, and that the will of the people, as expressed at the ballot box, could not be overthrown by a failure on the part of the Legislature or of its agents to enter the proposed amendment on the journals. He propounds the inquiry, "Is the failure to enter this amendment at length on the journals fatal?" and answers it by stating that the "two important, vital elements in any constitutional amendment are the assent of twothirds of the Legislature, and a majority of the popular vote," and that a failure to comply with the provision with reference to making the proper record of the legislative proceeding does not defeat the amendment, which has in fact been proposed by two

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by the votes of a majority of the people. Notwithstanding the learning and ability of that great jurist who wrote that opinion, it is so far out of line with all of the other adjudged cases, on the question upon which the decision rests, that we must discard it as a controlling authority in interpreting the meaning of the language of our Constitution. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of Postel v. Marcus, supra, first decided that the requirement for entering a proposed amendment on the journal of each house meant that it should be entered in extenso and not merely by reference to title or otherwise. The opinion was written by Judge Marshall, but on rehearing the decision was changed and, it was held that an identifying reference on the journals was sufficient. It appears that the original decision of the court resulted in invalidating about twentyfive important constitutional amendments reaching back for many years, and that this fact had its influence on the court in changing the opinion. We feel at liberty in thus commenting on the decision from the fact that this situation in which the court found itself is fully disclosed in the opinions on rehearing, not only that of the Chief Justice, who wrote the additional opinion, but also the dissenting opinion of Judge Marshall and the concurring opinion of another of the Justices.

It will be observed that the case of Koehler v. Hill, supra (Supreme Court of Iowa), and the case of Worman v. Hagen, supra, which are conflicting on this question, were both reviewed by this court in Rice v. Palmer, supra, and the doctrine of the Maryland case was condemned, and the doctrine of the Iowa case approved. It is true the discussion arose over another point, but it related to the question of the adoption of constitutional amendments, and the opinion of our court in Rice v. Palmer shows that the attitude of the Maryland court on that subject did not meet with the approval of this court. The language in the Constitution of the state of Iowa with respect to amendments is almost identical with our Constitution as to the provision requiring the entry of proposed amendments on the journals of the General Assembly. The Supreme Court of that state in Koehler v. Hill, supra, said:

"The evident intent of the Constitution is that the proposed amendment should be entered at length on the journal, or, at least, so entered as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its provisions. This must be so, or the entering of the yeas and nays can be as readily dispensed with as entering the resolution, and yet this is the constitutional mode of ascertaining whether a majority of the members elected to each house agreed to the amendment. ** It seems to us that a simple entering on the journal of the title or object of a proposed amendment does not accomplish the intent of the Constitution, and the thought that this must be so is much strengthened when regard is had to all the provisions of the Constitution.

* *

That instrument provides that upon the final passage of a bill the yeas and nays must be taken, and the same entered upon the journal. This necessitates the entering on the journal of the title or substance of the bill to be voted intended in relation to a constitutional amendupon. This being so, if no more than this was ment, the provision as to entering it on the journal is unnecessary and meaningless. There is no provision requiring a bill to be entered on the journal, but the Constitution does require that a proposed amendment thereto 'shall be entered' on the journals 'with the yeas and shall be spread at length thereon, and the yeas nays.' This must mean that the amendment and nays set out in the journal in full or at length. No distinction between the two can possibly be drawn."

The reasoning of the court in that case precisely fits the present situation under our own Constitution. The Constitution of 1874 (art. 5, § 12) provides:

66 # ** Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings; and from time to time publish the same, except such parts as require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the desire of any five members, be entered on the journals."

The only requirements in the Constitution with respect to what shall be entered on the journals is the one under consideration with reference to amendments, and the one in section 22, art. 5, that "no bill shall become a law unless on its final passage the vote to be taken by yeas and nays, the names of the persons voting for and against the same be entered on the journal, and a majority of each house be recorded thereon as voting in its favor;" and the one in section 15, art. 6, that, in case the Governor vetoes a bill, "he shall return it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated, which house shall enter the objections at large upon their journal and proceed to reconsider it."

It was necessarily assumed by the framers of the Constitution that, so far as concerned the enactment of statutes, the journals should contain some reference to the passage of bills through the two houses, so as to identify them and show the course of the proceedings-this, without any special requirement to that effect. If the framers of the Constitution had intended that nothing more than that was to be required concerning amendments to the Constitution, it would have been unnecessary to put in the additional requirement that amendments shall be "entered on the journals." It will also be observed that the requirement of the Constitution is not merely that the proceeding in regard to proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals-not merely a history of the passage of the proposal through the houses be entered-but it provides that the amendment itself shall be entered on the rec

ords.

The precise language is that "such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals with the yeas and nays." It is our

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