tion 1495 of the Civil Code.-Allen v. Chatfield, 172 Cal. 60, 156 Pac. 47.

2. Section 2074 of the Code of Civil Procedure dispenses with the production and proffer of money, personal property or a written instrument, when the same is described and tendered in the offer, if the offer is not accepted, and the provisions of section 2076 preclude one who receives a tender in writing without objection from afterward urging an objection with respect to the particular elements of a tender mentioned in the section, but neither of these sections dispenses with any other essential of a valid tender, or stops the person receiving such offer from afterward taking advantage of a lack thereof.-Allen v. Chatfield, 172 Cal. 60, 156 Pac. 47.

3. A premature offer or performance is ineffectual to put the other party in default, or for any other purpose.-Allen v. Chatfield, 172 Cal. 60, 156 Pac. 47.

§ 2077.

1.

Descriptions of land-Rules for construing. The addition of the description of a course by angles may well be rejected as being opposed to the description of a definite course well known and fixed.-Wheatley v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 169 Cal. 505, 147 Pac. 135.

2. Under the rule laid down in subdivision 6 construing the descriptive part of a conveyance, a map referred to in the description, when inconsistent with other particulars, controls the description if it appears that both parties acted with reference to it.Wheatley v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 169 Cal. 505, 147 Pac. 135.

3. Measurements always give way to monuments, and parol evidence can always be given to show that the actual distance is different from the distance given in the notes of survey.-Cords v. Goodwin, 173 Cal. 61, 159 Pac. 138.

4. A fence which the defendant in ejectment asserts has marked the boundary for forty years or more between his land and that of the plaintiff is a "monument."Perich v. Maurer, 29 Cal. App. 293, 155 Pac. 471.

§ 2102.

1. Questions of fact addressed to court.It is within the province of the court to construe the language used by the board of supervisors in describing the boundaries of a supervisorial district.-People v. Williams, 29 Cal. App. 552, 156 Pac. 882.

84.

1. Construction of code. - The various sections of the code are to be read together and harmonized, if reasonably possible.People v. Pryal, 25 Cal. App. 779, 147 Pac. 114.

87.

DEFINITION OF WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. Construction of section-Subdivision 1. 2, 3. Subdivision 4.

4. Corpus delicti.

1.

Construction of section—Subdivision 1. -When the word "willfully" is used in connection with a specific statement showing a purpose to injure another, it implies a criminal intent, when the doing of that act with that purpose is a criminal act.-People v. Okomoto, 26 Cal. App. 568, 147 Pac. 598. 2. -Subdivision 4.-This does not define such "malice" as is defined in section 188. There can, however, be no prejudicial error in giving both definitions in a prosecution for murder.-People v. Harris, 169 Cal. 53, 145 Pac. 520.

3. This code definition is applicable to all cases where the word "malicious" is used as a part of the definition of an offense. It is only in cases where in the description of the offense some qualification is made as to the meaning of that term or as to the proof thereof, that a defendant has a right to further instruction upon that subject. People v. Wilkinson, 30 Cal. App. 473, 158 Pac. 1067.

4. "Corpus delicti" means the body of the offense, the essence of the crime.-People v. Wagner, 29 Cal. App. 363, 155 Pac. 649.

provided for, and are not applicable in the matter of city, town and county ordinances. -In re Isch, 53 Cal. Dec. 43, 162 Pac. 1026.

§ 19.

1. Punishment for misdemeanor not otherwise prescribed—Construction.—An ordinance enacted by a board of supervisors prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within the county outside of municipal corporations, which prescribes as a penalty for the violation of the provisions of the ordinance a fine not exceeding six hundred dollars, or an imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding seven months, is not void, as being in conflict with section 19 of the Penal Code, which provides that "except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by this code, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both."-In re Isch, 53 Cal. Dec. 43, 162 Pac. 1026.

2. This section does not limit the punishment which may be fixed by a municipal body as a penalty for the commission of forbidden acts within the police power of the body.-People v. Fages, 32 Cal. App. 137, 162 Pac. 137.

§ 22.

DRUNKENNESS NO EXCUSE FOR CRIME. 1, 2. Evidence as to intoxication. 3-5. Instructions as to.

1. Evidence as to intoxication.-There is no violation of the rule that proof of drunkenness is admissible for the purpose set forth in this section when the court refused to permit a witness who had been drinking all day with defendant to testify to the number of drinks the defendant had taken just prior to the shooting, where the witness had given his opinion that defendant was drunk and the defendant himself was permitted to tell in detail how often and what he had drunk on that day.-People v. Allen, 166 Cal. 723, 137 Pac. 1148.

2. Mere temporary mental derangement resulting from the use of intoxicants, whether delirium tremens or a milder form, can not operate to absolve one from liability for a criminal act, and testimony disclosing such derangement is admissible only where the existence of a particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element of the crime charged, and then it may be considered by the jury, not as the predicate for

the full exoneration of the accused, but solely to enable or assist them in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act.-People v. Goodrum, 31 Cal. App. 430, 160 Pac. 690.

3. Instructions as to.-An instruction bearing upon the defendant's alleged intoxicated condition at the time of the commission of the homicide, which after stating the rule promulgated by section 22 of the Penal Code, and also declaring that "no act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition," but that "whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or interest is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act," then declares that if the jury believed from the facts in the case that the defendant did kill the deceased or "that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated at that time, you shall find him guilty," is awkwardly phrased as to the italicized portion thereof, but is not subject to the construction that it assumes that the defendant did the shooting or that it in effect informs the jury that if they found the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the shooting they should find him guilty "regardless of whether he did the shooting."-People v. Wong Hing, 28 Cal. App. 230, 151 Pac. 1159.

4. No prejudicial error is committed in giving the following instruction: "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in that condition, but, whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act. It is a well settled rule that drunkenness is no excuse for crime. Insanity produced by intoxication does not destroy responsibility when the party, when sane and responsible, made himself voluntarily intoxicated; drunkenness forms no defense whatever to the fact of guilt, for when a crime is committed by a party while in a fit of intoxication, the law will not allow him to avail himself of his own gross vice and misconduct to shelter himself from the legal consequences of such crime. Such evidence can only be considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime, and for that purpose it must be received with great caution."-People v. Collis, 30 Cal. App. 656, 159 Pac. 229.

5. An instruction that temporary insanity produced by the voluntary use of intoxicating liquor is no excuse for the commission of crime is correct.-People v. Goodrum, 31 Cal. App. 430, 160 Pac. 690.

§ 26.

1. Mental capacity to commit crime-Infant under fourteen (subd. 1).—A boy under fourteen years of age is presumed incapable of committing a crime, and if there is no evidence of his knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, he can not be regarded as an accomplice.-People v. Camp, 26 Cal. App. 385, 147 Pac. 95.

2. Where in a prosecution under section 288 a boy under fourteen was asked whether or not he knew the wrongfulness of the act, and the court sustained the objection on the ground that it was immaterial, there was no prejudicial error unless the counsel crossexamining called the attention of the court to the purpose of his question.-People v. Love, 29 Cal. App. 521, 157 Pac. 9.

3. -Mentally deficient (subd. 3).—One who has sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the character and comprehend the possible or probable consequences of his criminal act, is responsible to the law therefor and is to be adjudged accordingly, however deficient mentally he may be other

wise. People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165.

§ 31.

1. Principals and accessories.-The mere fact that the indictment charged the defendant solely as a principal is not sufficient to prevent his conviction as such principal, even though he acted as an accomplice or accessory.-People v. Liera, 27 Cal. App. 346, 149 Pac. 1004.

2. An instruction which declares as principals all persons concerned in the commission of the crime, whether they directly commit the act, or aid or abet (the statutory language being "aid and abet") in its commission, or not being present have advised and encouraged its commission is not prejudicially erroneous where the jury is also instructed that they must acquit the defendant unless they believe beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that he had the intent and purpose to extort from, or rob, the prosecutor, or to exact money or lands from his relatives or friends.-People v. Fisher, 30 Cal. App. 135, 157 Pac. 7.