and hardship may properly exert an influence in giving a construction to a statute when its language is ambiguous or uncertain and doubtful, but not when it is plain and explicit.' The same may be said of the consideration of convenience, and in fact of any consequences. If the intention is expressed so plainly as to exclude all controversy, and is one not controlled or affected by any provision of the constitution, it is the law, and courts have no concern with the effects and consequences; their simple duty is to execute it. The argument of inconvenience is very strong when the statute is ambiguous and fairly open to two constructions. Then the argument of inconvenience, like the argument of absurdity, may be used with great force; but when the construction is clear beyond controversy, it is no answer to say that there are some consequences which will cause inconvenience which were probably not contemplated by the framers. The master of the rolls. said: "With regard to inconvenience I think that is a most dangerous doctrine. I agree if the inconvenience is not only great but what I may call absurd inconvenience, by reading an act in its ordinary sense, whereas if you read it in a manner in which it is capable of being read, though not its ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all, there would be reason why you should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning." The same has been said of listening to hardship. Such arguments are applicable only to considerations of convenience and hardship which generally spring from a particular construction, not such as may occur St. 36; Mayor, etc. v. Root, 8 Md. 95; Pittsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. S. W. Pa. R'y Co. 77 Pa. St. 173; Samuels v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 491; Coy v. Coy, 15 Minn. 119; Swift's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 516; S. C. 2 Cent. Rep. 311; Rex v. Dorsetshire, 15 East, 200; Rex v. Yorkshire, 1 Doug. 192; In re Wainewright, 1 Phil. 258; Quin v. O'Keeffe, 10 Ir. C. L. (N. S.) 411, 412. 1 Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503; Johnson v. R. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 456. 2 Blake v. Heyward, Bailey Eq. 208; Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687. See In re Alma Spinning Co., L. R. 16 4 Reg. v. Tonbridge Overseers, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 342; Rex v. Poor Law Com'rs, 6 Ad. & E. 1, 7. See Rex v. Ramsgate, 6 B. & C. 712, 715; Rex v. Barham, 8 B. & C. 99; Lamond v. Eiffe, 3 Q. B. 910; Everett v. Wells, 2 Scott, N. R. 531; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 97; Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469, 479. 5 Munro v. Butt, 8 E. & B. 754. in an individual or exceptional case. An act should be so construed as to bring it, if possible, within the legislative authority; to limit its general words to the subject-matter or object of the act; as including, justifying or requiring lawful acts and regular proceedings. § 325. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.- This maxim, like all rules of construction, is applicable under certain conditions to determine the intention of the law-maker when it is not otherwise manifest. Under these conditions it leads to safe and satisfactory conclusions; but otherwise the expression of one or more things is not a negation or exclusion of other things. What is expressed is exclusive only when it is creative, or in derogation of some existing law, or of some provisions in the particular act. The maxim is applicable to a statutory provision which grants originally a power or right. In such cases the power or right originates with the statute, and exists only to the extent plainly granted; the right while inchoate, and the power so far as not exercised, cease, if the statute be repealed, and if the statute provides the mode in which they shall be exercised, that mode must be pursued and no other. This conclusion is almost self-evident; for since the statute creates and regulates, there is no ground for claiming or proceeding except according to it.3 In other words, where a statute gives a new right and prescribes a particular remedy, such remedy must be strictly pursued, and the party is confined to that remedy. "The rule is certain," said Lord Mansfield, "that where a statute creates a new offense, by prohibiting and making unlawful anything which was lawful 1 Endl. on St. § 263. 2 Farnum V. Blackstone Canal Corp. 1 Sumn. 46; Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; People v. McClave, 99 N. Y. 83. 3 Guerard v. Polhill, R. M. Charlt. 237; post, § 240, 327. 41 Com. Dig. 44-48; Foster's Case, 11 Rep. 566, 64; 9 Bac. Abr. 259, 260; Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 803; Bailey v. Bryan, 3 Jones (N. C.), 357; Lang v. Scott, 1 Blackf. 405; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Almy v. Harris, 5 John. 175; Gedney v. Tewks bury, 3 Mass. 307; Smith v. Drew, 5 id. 514; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Wiley v. Yale, 1 Met. 553; Crosby v. Bennett, 7 id. 17; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; Thurston v. Prentiss, 1 Mich. 193; Conwell v. Hagerstown Canal Co. 2 Ind. 588; McCormack v. Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. 9 Ind. 283; Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcaldy Water-works Com'rs, L. R. 7 Ap. Cas. 706; New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373; Smith v. Stevens, 10 Wall. 321; Dist. Tp or Dubuque v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262. before, and appoints a specific remedy against such new offense (not antecedently unlawful), by a particular sanction and particular method of proceeding, that particular method must be pursued and no other." Where a statute authorizes a public work, and points out a mode in which parties injured thereby may obtain compensation, that remedy is exclusive;2 and the scope of the remedy or points of compensation are confined to the statutory limits. In Arkansas the whole subject of interest, so far as regards contracts for the payment of money, express or implied, was regulated by statute, and it was held these provisions excluded its allowance in other cases than those enumerated. A statute prohibited the sale without license of certain specified liquors, and this specification excluded all others from the prohibition, so that they were unaffected by the requirement to obtain license. When a statute, defining an offense, designates one class of persons as subject to its penalties, all other persons are deemed to be exempted. As a general rule the exclusion of one subject or thing in a statute is the inclusion of all other things. Therefore the exclusion of the power of the court to impose a fine of less than $100, by implication gives the power to impose a fine of more than that sum. A grant contained several restrictions; a subsequent statute repeated the grant in general terms and repealed all inconsistent acts, with a saving clause including one of the restrictions; it was held that all the other restrictions were repealed. A general statute provided a gen 1 Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. at p. 803; Castle's Case, Cro. Jac. 644; Stephens v. Watson, 1 Salk. 45; Sturgeon v. State, 1 Blackf. 39; 1 W. Saund. 135, note 4; id. 250, note 3; State v. Loftin, 2 Dev. & Bat. 31; State v. Corwin, 4 Mo. 609; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; New Albany, etc. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 7 Ind. 32; Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 id. 281; United States v. Dickey, Morris (Iowa), 412. 2 Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667. 3 Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcaldy Water-works Com'rs, L. R. 7 Ap. 4 Watkins v. Wassell, 20 Ark. 410, 420. 5 Feldman v. Morrison, 1 Ill. App. 460. 6 Howell v. Stewart, 54 Mo. 400; Jaques v. Golightly, 2 W. Bl. 1073; State v. Jaeger, 63 Mo. 403, 409. Hankins v. People, 106 Ill. 628; Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. 649; Chiles v. State, 2 id. 37. See Stimpson v. Pond, Curtis, 502. 23. McRoberts v. Washburne, 10 Minn. eral saving of rights, penalties and duties. An independent statute provided penalties for selling intoxicating liquors. This act was subsequently repealed with a special saving of pending actions. This saving was held to be governed by the maxim under consideration. Doubtless an absolute repeal without any express saving would have let in the general saving, but the repeal being qualified by a provision in the repealing act, which was narrower than the general saving, and which could have no effect unless it was an exclusive effect, it showed the intention of the legislature to exclude any other saving.' It is moreover within this cognate principle, that specific provisions relating to a particular subject must govern in respect to that subject, as against general provisions in other parts of the law which might otherwise be broad enough to include it. Accordingly where a legislative act contained two sets of provisions, one giving specific and precise directions to do a particular thing, and the other in general terms prohibiting certain acts, which would, in the general sense of the words used, include the particular act before authorized, then the general clause does not control or affect the specific enactment. Every part of a statute must be viewed in connection with the whole, so as to make all its parts harmonize, if practicable, and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each. It is not presumed that the legislature intended any part of a statute to be without meaning. An act which extended one of the previous penal regulations for the government of moneyed corporations to the free banks, making it a misdemeanor for them to issue bills or notes on time or interest, was in truth a legislative assertion, binding on the judiciary, that such regulation did not previously apply, and that none, except the particular one so expressly selected, should thereafter apply, to the free banks." §326. Where authority is given to do a particular thing, and the mode of doing it is prescribed, it is limited to be done in that mode; all other modes are excluded. Such affirmative legislation, and any other which introduces a new rule, imply 1 State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269. 2 Felt v. Felt, 19 Wis. 196. State v. Trenton, 38 N. J. L. 64. 4 Id.; McCartec v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cow. 437; ante, § 249. 5 Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309. a negative. It was required by a statute that "all sales by any sheriff or other officer, by virtue of any execution or other process, shall be made at the court-house of the county, except when personal property too cumbersome to be removed shall be levied on, and, also, except where cattle, hogs, sheep or stock, other than horses and mules, are levied on.” These exceptions were held to exclude others, and therefore to render the statute imperative and mandatory. A provision in a statute that a failure to give a specified notice shall not invalidate an election does not, however, imply that all the other requirements must be complied with as mandatory conditions.3 § 327. Where a statute enumerates the persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of others; there is then a natural inference that its application is not intended to be general. Thus, where a statute enumerates the cases in which a married woman may sue, she is limited to those cases. An act providing for levying the poor rate specified coal mines only, and it was therefore held that no other mines were ratable." An act allowed a house and land to be joined together for the purpose of conferring a qualification; it was held that two different buildings could not be joined for the same purpose. The enumeration of powers granted to national banks in the eighth section of the national bank act is exclusive; being granted the power to loan money on personal security, such banks are precluded from loaning on real estate mortgages; and mortgages to such banks to secure prior loans being expressly permitted, it was held that none given to secure future loans are valid. When a statute specifies the effects of a certain provision, courts will presume that all the effects intended by the law-maker are stated. Where an act 6 Reg. v. Seale, 5 E. & B. 1. Dewhurst v. Feilden, 7 M. & G. 1Smith v. Stevens, 10 Wall. $21; New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373; District Tp of Dubuque v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Childs v. Smith, 55 Barb. 45; Rogers v. Kennard, 54 Tex. 30; Rich v. Rayle, 2 Humph. 404. See Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 751. 2 Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247. 3 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107. 4 Wilb. on St. 190. 182. Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. St. 456, 461. This construction is not disapproved, but only the government can raise the objection to the practice of the bank. Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; Nat. Bank v. Whitney, 103 id. 99. Perkins v. Thornburgh, 10 Cal. 5 Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. St. 170, 172. 189, 191. |