"no question of a war, but of an 'execution' in a local matter.72 But Austria had explained on the 24th to Sir Edward Grey that the Austrian note was not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, but a "demarche with a time limit" to be followed, if not complied with, by "military preparations, not operations." 73 And Sir Edward Grey, who already on July 24th, in view of the seriousness of the situation, had suggested that the four great Powers not directly interested-Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain-"should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening," 74 took advantage of the further respite thus promised before "any irretrievable steps were taken" 75 to continue his efforts to find a peaceful solution. of the situation. In the course of these efforts one suggestion after another was put forward, abandoned, and then perhaps recurred to; and sometimes two or more plans were being tried out simultaneously. At the same time, events were moving so rapidly that instructions given in the morning by telegraph became out of date before they could possibly be carried out, and had to be superseded by others, later in the day.

For the sake of orderly statement, it seems desirable to consider these various plans separately, so far as possible, bearing in mind, however, that, as the dates in the foot-notes will show, they were not considered separately by the negotiators, but were intertwined with one another in almost kaleidoscopic confusion. It should also be remembered that although these plans are ordinarily and properly referred to as Sir Ed72 French Yellow Book, No. 43, July 25th, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 186.

73 British White Paper, No. 14, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir George Buchanan, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 268, 269. In Count Berchtold's original instructions to the Austrian Ambassador in London the Ambassador was directed to communicate this information as "strictly confidential." (Austrian Red Book, No. 17.)

74 British White Paper, No. 11, July 24th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, Counselor of the British Embassy at Berlin, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266. See also British White Paper, No. 10, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 265.

75 British White Paper, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 276, 277.

ward Grey's plans, and although he was their chief initiator, and on account of the peculiar position which Engand held to the situation, of necessity their chief proponent, his efforts were ably seconded by the French and Russian Foreign Offices, and by the Ambassadors of the three Entente Powers, particularly by M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, whose contributions to the negotiations will be more particularly referred to later on.

The Suggestion that Austria Should Regard the Servian Reply as a Basis for Discussion

When first advised by the British Chargé in Belgrade of what the substance of the Servian reply was expected to be, Sir Edward Grey expressed to the German Ambassador the hope "that the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it." 76 This suggestion was at once seconded at Berlin and Vienna by the Italian Government." But the most that the German Government would do with this suggestion was to "pass it on" to the Cabinet at Vienna.7 78 It came to nothing; but its fate is not even recorded in the published correspondence. After the full text of the Servian reply had been received in London on July 27th, Sir Edward Grey again urged upon the German Ambassador that it should "at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause," and that the "German Government should urge this at Vienna." 79 This suggestion was also transmitted to Vienna by the German Government; 80 but the Austrian Government declined to act on Sir Edward Grey's suggestion. The grounds of its refusal are stated in a memorandum transmitted to the German Govern76 British White Paper, No. 27, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir George Buchanan, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 277.

77 British White Paper, No. 63, July 28, 1914, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 304.

78 British White Paper, No. 34, July 26, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 281.

79 British White Paper, No. 46, July 27th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 291.

80 German official memorandum, German White Book, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 377; British White Paper, No. 67, July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 305, 306; Austrian Red Book, No. 43, July 28th, Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny in Berlin.

ment on July 29th, after the opening of hostilities between Austria and Servia. They are, first,

that Servia's reply by no means conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reservations in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee for the realization of our object.81

And second, that the Austrian Government

to its sincere regret, no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when the German request was presented here, a state of war already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events. 81

The German official memorandum on the negotiations, published in the German White Book, only makes mention of the second ground upon which Austria refused to regard the Servian note as a basis for discussion. The German memorandum on this point reads:

The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.82

Sir Edward Grey had, however, also telegraphed his suggestion that the Servian note be made the basis for discussion and pause, direct to the British Ambassador at Vienna, and it was presented on July 28th, before the Austrian declaration of war. But to no avail. Sir M. de Bunsen reports that the "Minister for Foreign Affairs said, quietly but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable." 83 It would seem,

81 Austrian Red Book, No. 44, Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.

82 German White Book, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 377. See also British White Paper, No. 75, July 29, 1914, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 311.

83 British White Paper, No. 62, July 28th, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 303.

therefore, that the refusal of the Austrian Government to consider Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that the Servian reply be made a basis for discussion-a suggestion twice presented in Vienna before the Austrian declaration of war-must be defended, if at all, upon the unsatisfactory character of the reply, and not upon the ground that the suggestion came too late for consideration.

Although the Austrian declaration of war on Servia naturally put an end to the idea of further discussions on the basis of the Servian reply, between Austria and Servia, substantially the same idea recurs again. and again during the negotiations in the various proposals for conversations between Austria and Russia, with a view to so modifying or interpreting the Austrian note as to admit of its acceptance by Servia.

Mediation by a Conference of the Four Powers

Sir Edward Grey's original suggestion that the four great Powers not directly interested-Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain--should use their influence at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of peace was. cordially accepted and supported by France.84 Italy was evidently ready to do her part 85 and the German Foreign Office appeared to regard the general suggestion hopefully. As early as July 25th the British Embassy at Berlin reported to Sir Edward Grey that the German Secretary of State had said that "if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg." 86 Sir Edward Grey had pointed out that he was interested in the matter not because of any British interest in the original difference between Austria and Servia, but solely because the peace of Europe

84 French Yellow Book, No. 56, July 26, 1914, Circular instruction of M. BienvenuMartin, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 196; French Yellow Book, No. 50, July 26, 1914; British White Paper, No. 51, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 296.

85 French Yellow Book, No. 51, July 26, 1914, M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 193.

86 British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 71, 72; French Yellow Book, No. 67, July 27, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 205.

might become involved 87 through the entry of Russia into the conflict. The German Foreign Office emphasized this point of view, and made it clear that it would not be a party to any interposition between Austria and Servia.88 This distinction, however, obviously could have no practical meaning since the difference between Austria and Russia resulted from the difference between Austria and Servia and could only be adjusted by adjusting that difference.89 And difficulties speedily developed when it was sought to put the proposed plan for four Power mediation into practice.

On July 26th Sir Edward Grey suggested that the Ambassadors of France, Italy and Germany be instructed to confer with him at London "for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications," Servia, Austria and Russia meanwhile being requested to suspend "active military operations," pending the conference.90 France 91 and Italy 92 accepted this proposition at once.93 The Russian Foreign Minister replied that he had begun conversations with the AustroHungarian Ambassador, under conditions which led him to hope for favorable results; but if these conversations proved ineffectual, he was 87 British White Paper, No. 25, July 25, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 276.

88 German White Book, Annex 13, July 25, 1914, telegram from the Imperial German Chancellor to the German Ambassador to London, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 403.

89 French Yellow Book, No. 74, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 210; Austrian Red Book, No. 47, July 29, 1914, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold.

90 British White Paper, No. 36, July 26, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir R. Rodd, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 282.

91 French Yellow Book, No. 70, July 27, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 207; British White Paper, No. 42, July 27, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 288; British White Paper, No. 51, July 27, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 296; British White Paper, No. 52, July 28, note communicated by the French Embassy, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 297.

92 British White Paper, No. 35, July 26, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 281; British White Paper, No. 49, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 294, 295.

93 Italy accepted the same day the proposition was made-July 26th-France on July 27th.