owner is under any of the disabilities which are protected by the Statutes of Limitations.

Vide, ante, Chapter 3; and the notes thereto.

And, an adverse possession commenced during the existence of a particular estate, cannot prejudice the right of the person entitled in reversion or remainder, until after the termination of such particular estate.

Vide ante, page 37, note [1.] and page, 41 note [1.]

Whether, or not, a possession is adverse, is to be determined by the Jury, and not by the Court.

The question of adverse possession ought to be left to the jury. Jackson ex dem. Jadwin vs. Joy, 9 Johns. Rep. 102. Jackson ex dem. Beekman vs. Stephens, 13 Johns. Rep. 496. Gayetty vs. Bethune, 14 Mass. Rep. 55. Jackson ex dem. Sparkman vs. Porter, 1 Paine's Rep. 466. M'Clung vs. Ross, 5 Wheat. Rep. 124. Cummings vs. Wyman, 10 Mass. Rep 468.

Whether a possession were or were not adverse is a question of fact, and must be determined by the jury. Atherton vs. Johnson, 1 New Hamp. Rep. (R. & W.) 34.

And the judge having directed the jury as to that fact, a new trial was granted. Jackson ex dem. Jadwin vs. Joy, 9 Johns. Rep. 102. & Vide Runcorn vs. Doe ex dem. Cooper, (In Error,) 5 Barnew. & Cress. Rep. 696.

In the case of Pray vs. Pierce, (7 Mass. Rep. 383.) THE COURT Held, That a trespass on the land of another will not amount to an ouster without a knowledge thereof by he owner, either express or implied; and they said; "But whatever may "be the evidence of this notice, it is a fact to be found by the "jury, and the court cannot presume it."

"The court were also of opinion, that with what intention, by "what right, a person entered into land and possessed it, and to "what extent, were facts proper for the consideration and deter"mination of the jury. Helm's Lessee vs. Howard, 2 Har. & M'Hen. Rep. 76.

In the case of Seymour vs. De Lancey & Al., (1 Hopk. Rep. 449) SANFORD, Chancellor, said; "If William Seymour ac"quired a title by adverse possessiou, such a title would preclude "all other inquiries; and the inquiry whether his possession was "adverse or not, and the length of such a possession, are questions "of fact. The inquiry whether the deed from Henry E. Lutter"loh, is genuine or not, is purely a question of fact. These

"questions are peculiarly proper for the trial by jury as the best "method of ascertaining their truth."

If a plea of prescription be received at the trial, the party pleading it must be permitted to submit the fact of his possession to the jury. Porter vs. Dugat, 9 Martin's Rep. 92.

And the question of Disseisin, is to be left to the decision of the jury.

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In the case of Jackson ex dem. Van Alen vs. Rogers, (1 Johns. Cas. 49.) LEWIS, J. said, "The reference of Holland's interest "to the jury was right upon every principle. Whether be was or was not a disseisor, is not, as has been mistakenly supposed, a "question of law, but of fact. Disseisin, says Lord Mansfield, in "the case last cited, (Taylor ex dem. Atkyns vs. Horde,) is a "fact to be found by a Jury.”

The Statute of Limitations does not, in terms, apply to chancery cases, but the Chancery Courts will never interfere when by lapse of time the Law Judge would not hold jurisdiction. Frame vs. Kenny's heirs & Exors., 2 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 145. Elmendorf vs. Taylor & Al, 10 Wheat. Rep. 152. Marquis of Cholmondeley vs. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. Rep. 192. & Vide Wallace & Al. vs. Duffield & Ux., 2 Serg. & R Rep. 521. MDowell vs. Heath's Exors., 3 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 223. Hamilton, Ex'x. vs. Shepperd, Admr. &c., 3 Murph. Rep. 115. Van Rhyn vs. Vincent's Exors., 1 M'Cord's Ch. Rep. 314.

Twenty years' adverse possession under a legal title is a bar to a bill in Equity, as well as to an Ejectment. Hinton vs. Fox, 3 Littell's Rep. 382. & Vide Demarest & Ux. vs. Wynkoop & AL, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 129. Reed & Glen vs. Bulloch & Al., Littell's selected cases, 512. Shepherd's heirs vs. Young, 1 Monr. Rep. 205.& Vide references ut supra.

It must be 20 years' adverse possession of the land in contest. Spurr & Al. vs. Trimble & Al., 1 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 281.

A mortgagor cannot redeem after a lapse of twenty years, after forfeiture and possession by the mortgagee, (which period has been adopted in Equity by analogy to the Statute of Limitations,) no interest having been paid in the mean, time, and no circumstances appearing to account for the neglect. Hughes & Al vs. Edwards & Ux., 9 Wheat. Rep. 489.

Fifteen years' possession, where no statute disabilities, or special

circumstances equivalent thereto exist, will bar an equity of redemption. Skinner vs. Smith, 1 Day's Rep. 124.

Satisfaction of a mortgage is to be presumed after 20 years' possession by the mortgagor, without payment of interest, demand or acknowledgment. Christophers vs. Sparke, 2 Jac. & Walk. Rep. 223.

"A lapse of less than twenty years from the accrual of the right of suit, is no bar to the assertion of an equitable right in a Court of Chancery, as it would not be to the assertion of a legal right in a Court of Law." Fraily vs. Langford & Al., 1 Marsh. Rep.

(Ky.) 364.

Twenty years at least are required to bar the equity of redemption in cases of mortgages of a legal or equitable interest in real estate. Slee vs. The Manhattan Company, 1 Paige's Ch. Rep.

80.

"We do not suppose that the Statute of Limitations in terms applies to the case, but it is no less obligatory upon a Court of "Equity than upon a Court of Law, and it is considered as the "rule of decision in relation as well to equitable as legal rights. "In reference to the latter, a Court of Equity decides in obedience to the Statute, and in reference to the former, it conforms "to the Statute by acting upon its principles, according to the rule equitas sequitire legem." (Per BOYLE, Ch. J., delivering_the Opinion of the Court,) Lytle & Al. vs. Rowton, 1 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.)

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519.

NOTE (B.)

The following are decisions either upon local or special Acts of Limitations of the several states, as distinguished from the general Acts of Limitations; or upon some peculiar provisions of their general Acts of Limitations.

CONNECTICUT.

Twelve months in the Statute of Limitations are Calendar months. Clark vs. Ely, 2 Root's Rep. 380.

An agreement not reduced to writing is barred by the Statute of Limitations after three years, unless there has been an admission of it by the defendant within that time. Bunnel vs. Taintor's Admr. 4 Conn. Rep. 568.

The Statute of Limitations regarding book debts, as it existed before the revision in 1821, as well as since, is applicable, not to the form of action merely, but to the nature of the indebtedness. Therefore where an action of assumpsit was brought in 1822, for services ordinarily charged on book, rendered in 1811, it was held, that the plaintiff was barred of a recovery. Robbins vs. Harvey, 5 Conn. Rep. 335. Ashley vs. Hill, 6 Conn. Rep. 248.

But in an action of Assumpsit, where the declaration contained a count upon an insimul computassent, and the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. DAGGETT, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "The count upon an insimul computas"sent is the only one, which requires examination. The single question presented for consideration, is, does the Statute which "limits a recovery, in the action of debt by book to six years, "create a bar to this count? Assumpsit upon an insimul compu"tassent, is an action at common law, long established and well "known. When parties account together concerning their mutual transactions, debts, credits and liabilities, and a balance is as"certained, their accounts assume, to some purposes at least, a "new shape. The creditor becomes entitled to recover the bal"ance due to him in an action founded on the fact, that it is ac"knowledged by the debtor on an adjustment of their respective "claims."—"The Statute in force before the revision of 1821, in "the terms of it did not extend to actions on insimul computas"sent; nor do I believe, that it ought to be extended, by con"struction; especially as by a subsequent enactment now in "force, (Stat. 310. tit. 59. s. 3.) this action of Assumpsit is lim

"ited to six years."-"I am of opinion that the plea is insuffi"cient; and that judgment be rendered accordingly." Ashley vs. Hill, 6 Conn. Rep. 246, 248.

A. conveyed a piece of land to B. by an absolute deed, as security for a debt; B. at the same time executed a bond to A., obligating himself to reconvey the land when the debt should be paid. Afterwards it was agreed between them by parol, that A. should deliver up the bond to B. for the purpose of enabling him to assist A. in effecting a settlement with a certain creditor, and that B. should redeliver the bond to A. uncancelled, when the object should be effected. The settlement with the creditor being effected, and the debt due from A. to B. being paid, B. refused to redeliver the bond, and cancelled it. Held, that such parol agreement was within the provisions of the Statute against fraudulent conveyances. Held, also, that more than three years having elapsed between the time of making such agreement, and the commencement of the suit, the cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Gaylord & Al. vs. Couch. (In Error,) 5 Day's Rep. 223.

The Statute of Limitations of New-York cannot be pleaded in bar to a suit brought in Connecticut, on a promissory note executed in New-York, the year previous to the passing of the Statute; the defendant was a resident of Connecticut. THE COURT said; "The "note is not within the Statute, but if it was within the letter, the "Statute would not affect it, being an ex post facto law." Hill vs. Minor, 2 Root's Rep. 223.

In an action for support of a bastard child, judgment being rendered for quarterly payments, the Statute of Limitations does not operate in favour of the bail 'till a year after the last payment. Harris & Ux. vs. Thomas, Kirb. Rep. 267.

In the case of Fanning & Al. vs. Coit, (Kirb. Rep. 423,) where a claim of debt against the estate of a deceased person, had not been exhibited to the administrator within the time limited by the Court of Probate, THE COURT said; "The petitioner "neglecting to exhibit his claim to the administrators within "the time limited by the Court of Probate, was by a positive "Statute, foreclosed from any recovery afterwards; which no "court of law or equity hath right to dispense with, or relieve "against."

The 17th section of the Statute [of Connecticut,] tit. 158. c. 1. Ed. 1808, which prohibits the bringing of suits for drink sold by tavern keepers, "unless the same be brought within two days after such sale and drinking;" is not to be regarded as a mere Act of Limitation having for its object the protection of men

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