CHAPTER VI. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. [The statutes contained in former editions under this head are here, for purposes of condensation, omitted. They will be found in the sixth edition, between § 1870 and 1887; and the decisions on them, and on subsequent statutes, are incorporated in the following pages.] OFFENCES GENERALLY. I. IN WHAT THE OFFENCE CON- (a.) Goods must have been stolen. Tes- (b.) Guilty knowledge, and how it is to be proved, § 1889. (c.) Presumption from recent posses- (d.) Proof of larceny incompatible with (g.) Joint reception, and how it is to be (h.) Goods must be received from felon or his agents, § 1893. (i.) Receiving from thief to obtain a (j.) Husband and wife, § 1896. (1.) Reception against will of thief, § 1897 a. (m.) Receiving goods stolen in another state, § 1898. (n.) What is evidence of reception in a county, § 1898. (0.) Receiving goods embezzled, &c., § 1898 a. II. INDICTMENT, § 1899. (a.) Name of thief, § 1899. (b.) Not necessary to aver conviction (c.) Intent, § 1899. (e.) Time and place, § 1900. (f.) "Take and carry away," § 1900. (g.) Description of goods, § 1901. (h.) "Feloniously" and "fraudulently," § 1901. (i.) Value, § 1902. (j.) Counts may vary with ownership, § 1902. (k.) Concealing, &c., § 1903. (1.) Joinder of larceny and receiving, § 1903. (m.) Receiving simultaneously articles of different owners, § 1903. I. IN WHAT THE OFFENCE CONSISTS. § 1888. (a.) Goods must have been stolen. Testimony and confession of thief. The first point to be shown, in an indictment for receiving stolen goods, is that the goods were stolen, and to prove this fact the thief is a competent witness. c His testimony, however, like that of all other accomplices, e is to be severely weighed, and upon it, if uncorroborated, a conviction c R. v. Haslem, 1 Leach, 418. e Ante, § 785. should not be permitted to rest. f And bare possession of the stolen property is not sufficient corroboration. g The confession of the thief himself, being the principal, is not admissible against any of his accessaries. h But it is otherwise when the admission of guilt is made by the thief in the receiver's presence, even though the thief was at the time in custody. i § 1889. (b.) Guilty knowledge and how it is to be proved.· Guilty knowledge, on the part of the defendant, is essential to the constitution of the offence. This may be shown either directly, by the evidence of the principal felon, supported by corroborating facts, j or circumstantially, by proving that the defendant bought them very much under their value, k or denied their being in his possession, or the like. To show a guilty knowledge, other instances of receiving may be proved; even though they be the subject of other indictments antecedent to the receiving in question. m Belief, without actual knowledge, is sufficient to sustain the charge.n But to justify a conviction in the case of goods found, it is not sufficient to show that the prisoner had a general knowl edge of the circumstances under which the goods were taken, unless the jury is also satisfied that he knew that the circumstances were such as constituted a larceny. o (c.) Presumption from recent possession. The presumption in this case is the same as in larceny.p § 1890. (d.) Proof of larceny incompatible with indictment for receiving. As an elementary principle, if larceny by the defendant be proved, though the offender appear only to be a principal in the second degree, the charge of receiving falls, because the offences are substantially distinct, and because there can be no guilty reception unless there be a prior stealing by limits to this, see Com. v. Hills, 10 Cush. 530. See f R. v. Robinson, 4 F. & F. 43. h R. v. Turner, 1 Moody C. C. 347. 1 R. v. Dunn, 1 Mood. C. C. 146; Devoto v. Com. 3 Metc. Ky. 417. See on this point generally, ante, § 631-5, 639-40, 647-51; and as indicating m R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177; 2 Russell, 251. n R. v. White, 1 F. & F. 665Bramwell. See State v. Scovell, 1 Rep. Con. St. 274. o R. v. Adams, 1 F. & F. 86. p R. v. Langmead, L. & C. 427. See ante, § 728, and cases cited post, note x. another. q But this reasoning fails, when on an indictment for receiving, proof transpires to show that the defendant was also an accessary before the fact. The offences are so distinct that one can neither be said to merge in the other, nor is commission. of the one in any way incompatible with conviction of the other. Hence, in defiance of such testimony, the defendant, if there be sufficient evidence of guilty receiving, may be convicted of such receiving. r § 1891. (e.) Claim of title a defence. - Evidence that the thief had at one time been lawfully employed to sell such articles to the prisoner will warrant an acquittal, in the absence of any evidence that the prisoner knew that the authority had been withdrawn. 8 § 1891 a. (f.) Intent. If the intent be honest (e. g. to receive goods for owner, or to entrap and detect the thief), of course the offence is not constituted. But, on the other hand, it is not necessary, as in larceny, that the offence should be lucri causa. It is enough if the object be to shelter or accommodate the thief. t And an intent to get by the receiving a reward is, a fortiori, sufficient to satisfy the statutes. u When the statute requires an intent, it must be laid. v If § 1892. (g.) Joint reception, and how it is to be proved. two defendants be indicted jointly for receiving, a joint act of receiving must be proved in order to conviet both. w Proof that the goods were found in their possession is good presumptive evidence of this fact. x But although a joint act of receiving must, under a joint indictment, be proved to sustain a joint conviction, yet, even without this, the indictment, it seems, is good under the English statute, against the one who first received. y Nor is it necessary that all 9 R. v. Perkins, 12 Eng. L. & E. 587; 5 Cox C. C. 554; 2 Den. C. C. 459; R. v. Gruncell, 9 C. & P. 365; State v. Smith, 37 Mo. 58; State v. Ives, 13 Ired. 338; but see R. v. Smith, 33 Eng. L. & E. 531; Dears. C. C. 496; 6 Cox C. C. 554; and R. v. Dyer, 2 East P. C. 767; R. v. Atwell, Ibid. 768. see ante, § 1770; but see Cassels v. State, 4 Yerger, 149; Wright v. State, Yerger, 154. t R. v. Richardson, 6 C. & P. 335; R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177. u Post, § 1295. v Peltz v. State, 3 Black. 28. r State v. Coppenburg, 2 Strobh. State v. Brewster, 7 Vermont R. 118. 273. y R. v. Dovey, 4 Cox C. C. 428; 8 R. v. Wood, 1 F. & F. 497; and 15 Jur. 230; R. v. Messingham, 1 VOL. II. - 29 449 the alleged joint receivers should have had actual possession. The possession may be constructive. z A., B., and C. were jointly indicted for stealing and receiving some fowls. It was proved that A., carrying a sack containing stolen fowls, went with B., at past four in the morning, into the house of C.'s father; that in about ten minutes' time A. (still carrying the sack) came out at the back door with B., preceded by C. with a lighted candle; that C. was the only member of the family up in the house; that the three went together into a stable on the same premises; that the police went into the stable after them, and found the sack lying on the floor, and the three men standing around it as if bargaining. The bench told the jury, that the taking of A. and B. with the stolen goods by C. into the stable over which he had control, for the purpose of negotiating about the buying of them, he well knowing the goods to have been stolen, was a receiving them within the meaning of the statute. The jury convicted A. and B. of stealing the fowls, and C. of receiving the fowls knowing them to have been stolen. Upon a case, stating the above facts, the question asked being, whether the conviction of C. was proper, it was held by a majority of the judges (eight to four), that the conviction was wrong. The majority were of opinion that C. did not receive the fowls, as they all along remained in the mutual possession of A. and B., and were never under C.'s control, and it was not the intention of A. and B. that C. should have them, except on the contingency, which never happened, of his completing a bargain for them. The minority held, that as C. coöperated with A. and B. in the common purpose of carrying the fowls into the stable, he had a joint possession with them, and that as he knew that the fowls were stolen, and assisted in the removing them for the purpose of negotiating about the purchase, he had a possession with a wicked purpose, and therefore might properly be convicted as a receiver. a A master and servant may be jointly convicted of a receiving Moody C. C. 257. Ante, § 434. See post, § 3356 a. The necessity of an election is removed by Stat. 14-15 Vict. under which there can be a conviction of defendants severally. z R. v. Rogers, 37 L. J. M. C. 83. a R. v. Wiley, 2 Den. C. C. 37; 1 Eng. L. & E. R. 567. which took place in the master's absence by the servant under the master's direction. a1 § 1893. (h.) Goods must be received from felon or his agents. -A., who had stolen goods, and had them in his pocket, was caught by the owner, who sent for a policeman. The policeman took the goods out of A.'s pocket, but afterwards, in concert with the owner, gave them back to A., who was told by the owner to go and sell them where he had sold others. A. took and sold them to B., and B. bought them believing them to have been stolen. It was held, that B. could not be convicted as a receiver, the goods having been previously resumed by the owner. b § 1894. So, in a subsequent case, a prisoner was convicted of feloniously receiving stolen goods under the following circumstances: The goods were stolen, and sent by the thief in a parcel by railway, addressed to the prisoner. A policeman belonging to the railway company, from information he had received, examined the parcel at the railway station at the place of its destination, and stopped it. It was called for by one of the thieves on the day of its arrival, and refused to him. A porter of the company, the next day, by the direction of the policeman, took it to a house which the thief who had called for it designated, and it was there received by the prisoner: It was held, that the conviction was wrong, as the goods had ceased to be stolen goods,. within the statute, at the time of the receipt by the prisoner. c § 1895. (i.) Receiving from thief to obtain a reward. — If a stranger, pursuant to an arrangement with one whom he knows has stolen goods, invite an interview with the owner, and afterward receive the goods under the mere color of an agency, but in fact to make a profit out of the larceny, he is within the statute against receiving stolen goods. Thus, in a late case, W., a police justice of the city of New York, having learned that a large amount of funds had been stolen from a bank in Maryland, invited an interview with the agents of the latter, expressing his belief that the property could be recovered. An interview accordingly took place, in which W. proposed to procure the restoration of the property upon condition that the bank would a1 R. v. Parr, 2 M. & Rob. 346. b R. v. Dolan, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 533; Dears. 436; 6 Cox, 449. c R. v. Schmidt, 10 Cox C. C. 172; 1 L. R. C. C. 15. |