This was the first formal authorized statement to the public of the general principles upon which America proposed to govern the country." It was objected to as dealing in generalities which might, after the Spanish custom, be ignored after the insurgents had laid down their arms.

But the proclamation had a very decided effect upon Filipino opinion. The leading people in Manila were satisfied with it and at once commenced active work designed to put an end to the war. Probably at their instigation, Colonel Arguellos came from Aguinaldo asking for a suspension of hostilities in order that the scattered Filipino Congress could be collected to consider conditions of peace. This was denied by General Otis. Arguellos' report of the conference with the American commissioners was so satisfactory that he, with another officer, was sent back to Manila with a letter signed by Mabini asking for a suspension of hostilities and for an armistice of three weeks. With these parties the commission discussed the situation with such effect that Arguellos expressed himself as satisfied and willing to accept the sovereignty of the United States. In reply to his request for the details of a plan of government which would be adopted, the commission outlined what they would recommend to the president, and later Secretary Hay's reply was submitted to them.25 The conference accomplished nothing. The Filipinos demanded independence in some form, and that, of course, could not be conceded by the commission, or even by the president. They were informed that the matter of the sovereignty of the

24 Rept. (Schurman) Phil. Com., 1900, I, p. 3. For a reply prepared by Mabini, see Harper's History, p. 158, and Sen. Hoar's speech in the Senate on April 17, 1900.

25 On May 5, 1899, Secretary Hay telegraphed, "You are authorized to propose that under the military power of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippines shall consist of a Governor-General appointed by the President; Cabinet appointed by the Govenor-General; a general advisory council elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined; and the Governor-General to have absolute veto; Judiciary strong and independent; principal judges appointed by the President. The Cabinet and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippines at an early date shall have the largest measure of self-government consistent with peace and good order."

United States could not be discussed, and that, "after a careful consideration and study, it was the opinion of the Commission that the Philippine people were not capable of independent selfgovernment, and that independence for which some of them said they were fighting was, in the opinion of the Commission, an ideal at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but because of their inability to preserve it among the nations even if it were granted."2

Colonel Arguellos, upon his return, seems to have expressed his satisfaction with the American attitude a trifle too enthusiastically, and for his treasonable sentiments and advice was expelled from the army and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment." Nevertheless, there were among Aguinaldo's advisers a few sane men who agreed with the discredited emissary. We may fairly assume that such men as Arellano and Torres regarded the Philippine Republic as a temporary expedient for bridging a period which would be followed by some form of government under American control. As early as June, 1898, Arellano, then acting as secretary for foreign affairs, had outlined a plan for cooperation with the Americans and had advised a correspondent to "avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable government it will be time enough to make laws."

In October of the same year Arellano and Pardo de Tavera had urged that the United States be asked to acknowledge the independence of the islands under a protectorate, and the plan had been approved by Aguinaldo and his cabinet. But a radical leader named Sandico is said to have induced Aguinaldo to abandon this plan by assuring him that the Japanese government had agreed to aid the Filipinos in their struggle for absolute independence. Nothing more clearly shows the incapacity of the Filipino leaders for large affairs than their childish belief that foreign powers would involve themselves in war with the

26 Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, I, p. 7. For Secretary Hay's letter of May 5, see Ibid., p. 9.

27 No attempt was made to execute the sentence.

United States on behalf of a people in whom they had not the remotest financial or political interest.28

Aguinaldo was also encouraged by letters from Agoncillo from Washington assuring him that the majority of the American people favored the independence of the Filipinos.

Arellano and Pardo de Tavera withdrew from the cabinet, and the radicals, under the lead of Mabini were left in control. If we are to believe Buencamino, after the capture of Malolos in April, 1899, the majority of the congress began to see the advantages of Arellano's plan for a protectorate. But so long as Mabini controlled the policy of the government there was no possibility of the acceptance of American sovereignty. This remarkable young man, of fragile and paralytic frame, but of a keen, subtle and logical intellect, was a fierce, irreconcilable hater of the American government. With him no compromise was possible. But the proclamation issued by the commission, following the military successes of MacArthur and Lawton, so encouraged the conservatives that they took the aggressive. Early in May whatever was available of the congress was assembled at San Isidro, and voted for ending the war and for peace on the basis of the announcement which had been made by

28 On November 15, 1899, Aguinaldo, or probably Mabini over Aguinaldo's signature, wrote to one of the chiefs that "The quadruple alliance between France, Russia, Germany and Spain is a fact. Before December we will know our fate. Throughout Europe there is sympathy for our cause. American Democrats are already in our favor." Rept. War Dept., 1901.

On May 16, 1899, Sandico (the officer who in February had issued the order to the faithful in Manila to rise, slay and spare no one of the white blood) issued an appeal in which he said, "The latest Eastern question may bring about an international conflict which would oblige America to abandon her policy with regard to the Philippines. The justice of our cause, together with the circumstance that you have aided America to banish and destroy the Spanish Government in these islands, has won the sympathy of the press of Europe and Japan, in fact that of all nations. We should exhaust

all the resources of diplomacy, put in play before foreign countries every inducement which we can offer with the aid of the tribune and the press, now giving up coaling stations, and now offering concessions to commerce and concessions to build railroads and to mine." Ibid., p. 361.

Flores, the Secretary of War, called it "this palpitating international question."

29 For a study of Mabini's life and character, see an article by Jorge Bocobo, an intelligent young Filipino, educated in the United States, in the magazine, The Filipino People, for August, 1913.

the Schurman Commission.30 Mabini now retired, and his place was taken by Pedro Paterno, with Felipe Buencamino for his leading supporter. The first act of the new cabinet was to authorize Buencamino, Maximo Paterno, Torres, Pablo Ocampo, Arsenio Hererra, José Albert and two military officers to proceed to Manila and negotiate a peace.*

31

The American commissioners thus had good reasons to rejoice over the apparent success of their policy. The Philippine Republic itself had been won over. The congress had voted for peace, and Aguinaldo had acquiesced. The irreconcilable Mabini was out and a cabinet in sympathy with the new policy was in power. But the unfortunate land was not to be thus easily pacified. General Luna and other military leaders succeeded in reversing the policy which Aguinaldo's government had adopted. "In its patriotic effort to bring about peace," says Doctor Schurman, "the Philippine Republic itself suffered collapse. Done to death by its own false friends, I shall never forget that its last expiring voice was for peace and reconciliation on the basis of the proclamation issued by our Commission. But what the congress, cabinet and president of the Philippine Republic so unanimously resolved, Luna, the general commanding their army, as completely frustrated. He arrested the delegates who had been so solemnly authorized by congress, cabinet and president to proceed to Manila, accused them of treason and sentenced some to imprisonment and others to death."32

Luna and the military party thus made it impossible for the commissioners who had been appointed to proceed to Manila,

30 By this time the congress had become badly demoralized. But sixteen members were present, and fifteen voted for the new peace policy.

31 Later Buencamino wrote to Gen. MacArthur, "Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Pedro Paterno, without any previous agreement, saw a door through which they could enter into friendly and harmonious relations with the Americans. All the members of the congress adopted the policy with the exception of a few partisans of Mabini, who was at that time president of the cabinet. Hence, it is that at the first meeting of congress in San Isidro Nueva Ecija, the first day of May, 1899, it was resolved to change the war policy for one of peace with the United States." Rept. War Dept., 1901, Part 2, p. 118.

32 Philippine Affairs, p. 13. See testimony of Dr. José Albert before the Phil. Com., May 30, 1899. Rept. Schurman Čom. (1890), II, pp. 127-129.

33

but shortly thereafter Aguinaldo named other representatives, who met the American commissioners on May 22, 1899, and again urged an armistice. Señor Barretto claimed that the congress which had voted to end the war had been so reduced in numbers that it was not really representative of the people, and that some sort of a constituent assembly ought to be called to consider a matter of such grave importance to the country. He frankly stated that the leaders feared to take the responsibility of making peace. He expressed himself as satisfied with the plan outlined for a provisional government and with the statement contained in the telegram from Secretary Hay of May 4, but said that the Filipinos were not willing to trust the American Congress with the power of devising a permanent form of government at some time in the future. As that was necessary, the conference resulted in nothing but an interesting exchange of views.

The conservative leaders now abandoned Aguinaldo and found their way to Manila, where the best of them thereafter aided the Americans in the work of establishing order throughout the country. The congress was heard of no more. General Luna himself was killed by Aguinaldo's guards in front of the convent at Cabanatuan, and Aguinaldo took the active command of what

33 General Gregario del Pilar, Gracio Gonzago and Alberto Barretto.

34 Mabini's account of the death of Luna (published after Mabini's death) is printed in El Commercio for July 23, 1902, and in part in Le Roy, II, p. 94, note, from which the following extracts are taken:

"Aguinaldo telegraphed to Luna asking him to come to see him in Cabanatuan to confer with him; but when Luna arrived in the appointed place, he did not find Aguinaldo in his residence, and was traitorously assassinated by the soldiers on guard there . . I can not believe even now that Luna was working for the overthrow of Señor Aguinaldo from the elevated position which he occupied; but it is certain that he aspired to be chief of the Cabinet in place of Señor Paterno, with whom he was not in agreement because the autonomous_program of the latter was an infraction of the fundamental law of the State and as such constituted a punishable offense. When he received the telegram from Señor Aguinaldo summoning him to Cabanatuan, Luna may perhaps have thought that the object of the conference would be the new Cabinet: he did not expect that they were planning to assassinate him Señor Aguinaldo, in order to get rid of Luna, made use of the same soldiers whom Luna had punished for infractions of discipline; Señor Aguinaldo, then, slew discipline, destroying his own army. The fall of Luna, coming back with full force upon the head of Aguinaldo, caused in turn his own moral death, a thousand times more bitter than physical death."