Compare with "right" and "wrong," "upright," "regular," "rectitude;' 66 error, "transgression," "tortous." "Upright" is palpable enough; regular" is according to rule, and therefore according to the ordered. "Rectitude," is just the straight line-the ordered or directed one (rego). "Error is an erring (erro)-wandering from this straight line of "rectitude.” “Transgression" is a transgressing (trans gradior),— a going beyond this ordered line. "Tortous from "tort," has also relation to what is "injurious," (which is in jus, jubeo; that is, contrary to the commanded, too,) or wrong.

From all of which words the wise will derive a lecture on a "higher law," (with a vengeance!); and the unwise find only subject matter for their own condemnation.

"Sense" and "æsthetics," have an analogous origin, aesthetic being the Greek αἰσθητικός from αἰσθάνομαι, to feel, or perceive, and sense being from sentio, the corresponding Latin verb. Their employment, one should say, was frequent enough to render them familiar. By the way, our poor friend "æsthetic" is worthy of commiseration. Born but a quarter of a century ago, he has fallen in the full blush of his glory; and he who assisted at his cradling, has lived to see his disgrace and death. Read the following note to an article by Carlyle, on Jean Paul Richter, and inserted in the Edinburgh Review, of 1827:-“ Æsthetics from alotávoμai, to feel. A word invented by Baumgarten (some eighty years ago), to express generally, the Science of the Fine Arts, and now in universal use among the Germans. Perhaps we, also, might as well adopt it, at least if any such science should ever arise amongst us."

As for whether the "science" has ever arisen among us, we shall not pretend to decide; but compare the Then, with the Now when our flunkeys and our milliners talk nothing short of æsthetically.

"Hei mihi, qualis erat! quantum mutatus ab illo Esthetico!"

A man of "sense," then, is a man of feeling-and only men of feeling are men of sense?......It may be too sweeping; but, certes, between the man of noble heart and he of great good sense, there is a close enough connection; and perhaps there is a profounder veracity than we might be apt to suppose in the old maxim: Quantum sumus scimus. At least it might do us no harm to have a little mere faith in heart-tellings and a little less in the mere dictates of mortality.

"We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths;

In feelings, not in figures on a dial,
We should count time by heart-throbs."

So saith Festus. And so did we, through childhood's "long, various, agonizing years, in our child home, away far up in the " green, airy Pentlands," -lulled by the mellow music of thy dashing waters, thou loveliest waterfa' of Habbies How. Then we measured time, not by the rigid exactitude of days and weeks, and months and years; but years by the springing of the primroses on the sun-kissed braes; and months and weeks, and days, by the exuberance of our emotions, and that was boundless.

as

Again, what an eminently unreasonable word is that "reason," especially if we take it from the Latin ratio, through the French raison; for ratio we know to be from reor; and reor is either a verbification (excuse the word; it is, however, suitable enough, since verbificatio is classical), from res-thus according, in its elements, with "thought" we saw before;-or it is from péwhich is none other than a fluxus verborum. So, it would seem that our friends of the olden times imagined that he who talked the most glibly, had the most of แ reason "--avait plus que personne la raison, que tout le monde avait,-and was, par consequence, the most reasonable man.

We are all familiar with the Wordsworthean and Coleridgean distinction between "imagination," and "fancy;" we will not repeat it, but merely mention that the root of imagination is imago, an image-it is therefore the imagemaking faculty. "Fancy " (phantasy is nearer the original) is from davrasia—

. ., the power which produces the Pavraoua-the phantasms. Thus we see that the distinction lies more in the application-perhaps more in "imagination" -than in the words themselves. "Fancy," "phantasy," "fantastical,” * "phantom," "phantasm," "phase," and "phenomena," are all of them from the same root—Þaivw, and their significations are apparent enough, Heart," too, what a word that is! And how little have all the thousand complex relations in which we employ it, to do with that poor, palpitating mass of blood and fibre, to which the name properly belongs? And then the long train of relations, poor and rich, that attach themselves to it. "Hearty," "Cordial," (cor, cordis), which is also hearty; "courage,' (through the French, and from cœur), 66 'encourage,' concord," "discord.". K. T. 2.

What a fearfully physical origin is that of 66 remorse:" remordeo depicting, with an appalling vividness, the gnawings or bitings that go on within the soul after the commission of any unmanliness or ungodliness. So scruple, which is just scrupulus, the little bit of gravel which was wont so often to get into the very open shoes of the Romans, and produce trouble and hesitancy. There is a scruple for you! Theory" and “speculation,"‡ both of them imply a mere seeing or contemplating, abstractedly, and without reference to the "practical - (πρακτικός - the acting, the executive, the business-like faculty). "Vision" and "visionary" (video, to see) have also a generic alliance with the preceding; so, too, has "contemplation," but only a secondary one. "Contemplation," Webster tells us, "is the act of the mind in considering with attention." This signification, of course, it receives from the verb to contemplate. origin of the word is dubious. Crabb, in his wretched book on "Synonyms," says that it comes from " contemplor, and that from templum, a temple-that being the place most fitted for contemplation!" Leverett, however, in his Latin lexicon, makes it from con and templum, i. e., a place from which there is a free prospect on all sides.

The

A "simple" man is just a homo simplex -sine plica-without doubling, without fold in his character; the honesty of whose disposition is perfectly luminous.

Is it altogether honorable to human nature that this beautifully ingenious word should be abused as it is, and form the root of that other word, expressive of everything that is weak in intellect, "simpleton ?" A man of " duplicity," on the contrary, is a man of a double fold in his character-a man of double dealing. A "subtle," or “subtile”. person is one whose motives of action are "fine spun "-subtilis, i. e., subtextilis. So, too, an "acute" person is none other than a "sharp" person. And it will doubtless be readily conceded that we all have our "mission," and are all "apostles" of something or otherwhen the latter only asserts that we are sent, and the former but declares the object of this envoy.

Once more, a rational "skepticism," is not a bad, but, on the other hand rather a desirable thing. It is, in fact, the great conservative principle in human belief: OKÉлтоμаι-I consider, I deliberate, I try conclusions with you. Besides, its analogue “doubt,” gives us a glimpse into a pretty profound veracity: dubitus, dubius, duo-I look at the (duo) two, the double phases of things; and, keeping them both in sight, I suspend my conclusion. And the province of the true, the honest skeptic (much though the debasing tendencies of mankind have placed these words, "honest" and "skeptic" at variance with each other) is to say-"Why stick to your one side when there are two to be taken into consideration, and a thousand things in heaven and earth that are not dreamed of in your philosophy?" For there are two sides to everything, however tenuous it may be; there are the phenomenal and the real; there are the relative and the absolute; and every teaching of life or morals points hitherward and thitherward, too. And we may venture to say that there is not a dogma which can possibly be brought up but what any of us may, to a partial extent, floor. Will you try philosophy?" Cogito ergo 8um." But, as the pupil in Schiller's "Philosophers" says:

full of "buts" and "provisos;" and we find ourselves sticking on the horns of a dilemma with, or without, a moment's warning. Materialism is true, to a certain extent; and so is idealism, and mysticisin, and skepticism, and heathenism, and bibleism-but we cannot say that any one or all of them is truth; that exists only in the profundities of the divine heart. And so it is with things universally; we see and have to do with things relatively; the absolute, to us, exists only in the desire.

And this, then, is the true ground for the skeptic; not of unbelieving and proud universal denying; not the shallow levity of intellect; far less a vain Tom Paineism and mocking of everything that is good and venerable; but a generous credulity in the boundlessness of truth, whether found in infinitesimalest of gold-grains sown universewide or in solid ingots, hid in the thesaurus of a faith or a system.

And in this sense is it that skepticism is the great conservative or preservative principle in human belief. And this species of skepticism is it that must be induced into our age, before we can hope to arrive at the day-star of truth. It is the lack of our era. For people must be brought to doubt that they are in the best possible condition, before we can hope to remedy them. They must come into violent contact with some hard rocks of truth, whose existence they did not dream of, before they can be made to appreciate that they are not altogether in the right, and that other people are not altogether in the wrong. They must be made suspicious of themselves-rendered. . . . σKETTIKOL-thinkers!

But this is getting mortally wearisome (this is supposed to be spoken "aside " you know); so, revenons à nos moutons -which, in this instance, means, back to our "roots." Let us have some words.

Profound," "Recondite," "Time," "Past," ""Future," "Present," "Skill," Probity," "Providence," 66 Sincere,' "Serious," 22 "Frugal," Exist," Religion," ," "Intrinsic," "Interest," Instinct," Enthusiasm," "Essence,"

66

sence.

66

Quintes

There is a score. But only a score, out of the thousand and one (literally) that we have amassed as illustrative of this same portion of our theme.

*Sartor Resartus.

"Profound," is just "deep"-profundus; penetrating down to the "bottom" of things. By the way, intellect seems to possess all the dimensions of extension. Thus, we speak of X's great "breadth of thought; of the "lofty" genius of Y; or of the far-seeing intelligence of Z.

"Recondite," again, is what is reconditum-hidden from the superficial, unbelieving gaze. What a story does this tell us of the great "Open Secret" of the universe, as Fichte so appreciatingly terms it; a secret, and yet not a secret"esoteric," (EOTEрos-interior) and yet "exoteric" eswrepos—exterior)—hidden from the wise and prudent (in their own imaginings), and yet "revealed "--revelo -unveiled to those exercising the faith and the humility of babes. Nor does there exist the problem for which benign nature will not give the response, will we but wisely and trustingly interrogate her. For we know that she

"Never did betray

The heart that loved her."

"The answer lies around, written in all colors and motions, uttered in all tones of jubilee and wail, in thousandfigured, thousand-voiced, harmonious nature; but where is the cunning eye to whom that God-written apocalypse will yield articulate meaning? We sit as in a boundless phantasmagoria and dreamgrotto; boundless, for the faintest star, the remotest century, lies not even nearer the verge thereof; sounds and varied-colored visions fit around our sense; but Him, the unslumbering, whose work both dream and dreamer are, we see not-except in rare, halfwaking moments, suspect not."*

There, now! Is not that glorious? Go, then, and venerate the seer.

"Time," we get through the Saxon tima-analogous in all the Teutonic dialects, and allied to the Latin tempus which we know to be from Teuva-and implying, consequently, the cutting off, or separating of day and night by the sun. See how a purely metaphysical relation will take its appellation from an intensely physical radix. "Past," too, if connected, at its base, with the Latin paseo and the Greek Tart, and the Sanscrit pad, to go, denotes but the stepped over, the “by

see

gone;" as, referring to the same figure, we say, "Future," again, is the about to be. Now, this seems metaphysical enough, but let us analyze a little, and what resolution it will give us. แ "Future," we know to be but the future participle-futurus--of the verb esse, to be,-evidently, however, it is from a different i. e. the secondary root.. But this secondary root is, undoubtedly, to be found in the obsolete fuo; which with pú are probably twin offshoots from the Sanscrit bhú. Now, dúo carries the idea of growing, arising, coming into being; but there is a primary signification lying back of this, namely, that of being brought forth, begotten; the "future," therefore, is that which is continually being brought forth from the womb of time. The "present" is the præsens (præes i. e. præ and ens)-the being, the lying before us.

Anent

which, and to wash down all this etymologic jargon, take the following from the Romaunt of the Rose:

"The time that passith night and daie,
And restilesse travailith aie,
And stelith from us privily,
That to us semith sikirly

That it in one poinct dwellith ever,
And certes it ne restith never,
But goeth as fast and passeth aie
That ther n'is man that thinkin maie
What time that now present is,
Askith at these grete clerkis this;
For men thinken redily

Thre timis ben ypassed by
The time that maie not sojourn,
But goth and maie never returne,
As watir that doune runnith aie,

But never droppe returne maie."

"Skill" (Seylan) is the distinguishing, dividing, separating faculty. "Probity' is no other than what is probus-approved of, found good, comme il faut! "Providence" is precisely foresight-and applied to the deity it is indicative of him whose luminous glance penetrates into the obscurest abysses of the coming time; and the uniform and unifold rhythm of whose existence constitutes at once, past, present, and future. "Sincere" (if Webster's derivation of it be worth anything) is sine cerâ—without wax i. e. pure honey,-how expressive! "Serious" is the being unable to "raise" a single laugh (serius i. e. sine risus). "Frugal" is strictly fruit bearing (frugalis, fruges), yielding profit; so it would appear that frugality is not merely a negative, but a decidedly positive

"Essence" is the being-the ensthat which there is of ultimate and spiritual in anything. "Quintessence" is a compound of the preceding; and is, as it implies, the fifth essence, that is, according to the alchemical notion, the last and highest essence of power in a natural body. Perhaps, however, it may have reference to the Pythagorean theory of numbers-of which we all know a little; and from which, could we but get into the centre thereof, we might derive some deep enough lessons. That there be "intrinsic life-numbers in things and their manifold relations" seems to the reflective mind a matter not difficult of credence. And perchance in the great onward rhythm of existence there is more of mathematics than we might be apt to suppose. On the summit of intellectual grandeur, says Madame de Stael, the genius of Homer and of Newton join hand in hand, and so in life. High over us sound the eternal spheremelodies:*