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The acts of his government have hitherto corresponded with these fair professions; aud, as a pledge of their sincerity, he has received into his councils men of sound principles, and whose integrity he had hmself exposed to the severest proof.

This consummation of the late glorious contes though far more glorious than any which is most sanguine, supporters have even imagined, is not entirely to the satisfaction of the old governmenis. They had rather see Bonaparte at the head of his army than surrounded by wise and just counsellors; and they are right. He is, in his present attitude, more formidable to the "social system," as exemplified in the late Congress at Vienna, than when he was thundering at the gates of that capital. But why the people should be disturbed at the view of Napoleon in his present attitude, I dont understand, unless, indeed, their comforts depend on the security of two or three thrones, and the insecurity of the rest, according to the principles established at the said Congress. Yours, &c. MORRIS BIRKBECK.

THE ENDYMION AND PRESIDENT
FRIGATES.

the Endymion, which, no one ever doubted, would be published in the Gazette. The Gazette appeared; but it contained no particulars from Captain Hope as to the actual engagement, or any detail by which it could be ascertained whether he fought the President single handed or not, or whether that ship surrendered to the Endymion or to another vessel belonging to our squadron. But from other accounts in the same Gazette, and particu larly from the American official account, it turned out, as I had supposed, that more than one of our frigates was engaged; that the Poone also had fought with the enemy; that it was to this ship the President actually struck; and that at the very moment this happened, a ship of the line, another frigate, and a sicop of war, belonging to us, were fast bearing down to attack her. It was plain, therefore,. that the President had not surrendered to the Endymion, but that she surrendered to a British squadron, consisting of one sail of the line, three frigates and a sloop. of war! It was also clear, that had the President and the Endymion fought single. handed, the latter must have fallen inte the hands of the former. Where then was the ground for exultation? Where the proof, that the capture of the President "redeemed all the naval glory which this country had lost during the

“cans?" I see, by files of papers which I have received from Philadelphia, that the conductors of newspapers at Bermuda, had imitated the example of our vile press, and had, like them, endeavoured to detract from the character of Commodore Decatur, by representing that he had surrendered the President to a single British frigate. To expose the fallacy of this statement, the American Commodore addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, au extract of which I have given below. This letter puts it beyond all question, that the President was consider

When the news of the capture of the latter of these vessels reached this country, it was given out by our corrupt press, that she had surrendered to the former," previous contest at sea with the Ameriwith whom she had fought single-handed, and that no other of our ships of war had fired a shot at the President. This was trumpeted abroad by the Times and the Courier, and never to this hour has any of these venal prints retracted the assertion. On the contrary, they repeated it, again and again, and gravely assured their readers, that the result of the conflict betwixt the President and the Endymion, had redeemed all the naval glory, which this country had lost during the previous contest at sea, with the Americans! I was satisfied, on the first blush of the transaction, that the President had been en-ed, even by the commander of our own gaged with more of our frigates than one, fleet, as a capture by the squadron, and and, instead of the enemy losing any of not by a single ship. It proves that the the renown he had acquired, that this Endymion had on board, in addition to her. battle, when the particulars came fully to usual complement, 50 men, one lieutenant, be known, would increase the splendour and one masters' mate, which shews that of his achievements. I said to those with the crew of the Endymion, the chief rewhom I conversed on the subject, that Iliance of every vessel of war, was more was willing to abide by the account of numerous than that of her rival. It also the battle, as given by Captain Hope of proves that the Endymion was completely

disabled in the action, and would, it is, and fatigues. Natives of different states

more than probable, have become a prize to the President, had not the rest of our squadron come to her relief.

acting together for the first time in this camp; differing in habits and in language, instead of viewing in these circumstances the germ of distrust and division, you have made them the source of n honourable emulation, and from the eds of discord itself have reaped the fruits of an honourable union. This day completes the fourth week since fifteen hun

WASHINGTON, March 14. Extract of a letter from Com. Stephen Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New York, March 6th, 1815. "In my official letter of the 18th January, I omitted to state, that a consi-dred of you attacked treble your number derable number of my killed and wounded was from the fire of the Pomone; and that the Endymion had on board, in addition to her own crew, one Ligutenant, one Master's mate, and 50 men belonging to the Saturn, and when the action ceased, was left motionless and urmanagable until she bent new sails, Tove new rigging and fished her spars, nor did she rejoin the squadron for six hours after the action, and three hours after the surrender of the President. My sword was delivered to Capt. Hays, of the Majestic, the senior efficer of the squadron, on his quarterdeck, which he with great politeness immediately returned. I have the honor to enclose you my parole, by which you will perceive that the British admit that the President was captured by the squadron. I should have deemed it necessary to have drawn your attention to this document, had not the fact been stated differently by the Bermuda Gazette on our arrival there, which statement, however, the editor was compelled to retract through the interference of the governor and some of the British officers of the squadron."

of men who boasted of their discipline, and their services under a celebrated leader in a long and eventful war-attacked them in their camp the moment they had profaned the soil of freedom with their hostile trade, and inflicted a blow which was a prelude to the final result of their attempt to conquer, or their poor contrivances to divide us.A few hours was sufficient to unite the gallant band; at the moment they received the welcome order to march they were separated many leagues in different directions from the city. The gay rapidity of the march, the cheerful countenances of the officers and men, would have induced a belief that some festive entertainment, not the strife of battle, was the object to which they hastened with so much eagerness and hilarity. In the conflict that ensued, the same spirit was supported, and my communications to the executive of the United States, have testified the sense I entertained of the corps and officers that were engaged. Resting on the field of battle, they retired in perfect order on the next morning to these lines, destined to become the scene of future victories, which they were to share with the rest of you,

After the disastrous retreat of the British army at New Orleans, General Jack-my brave companions in arms.-Reacon, the American commander, published an animated and spirited Address to his army The following passages will shew with what ardour and unanimity the soldiers of Liberty will always combat, when their rights and independence are in danger :

"Citizens and Fellow Soldiers,―The enemy has retreated and your General has now time to proclaim to the world what he has noticed with admiration and pride your undaunted courage, your patriotism, and patience under hardships

soning always from false principles the enemy expected little opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform; who were ignorant of the rules of dress, and who had never been caned into discipline-Fatal mistake! a fire inces santly kept up, directed with calmness and with unerring aim, strewed the field with the brave officers and men of the column which slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European tactics, and was cut down by the untutored age of American militia.

Printed and Published by G. HOUSTON, No. 192, Strand; where all Communications addressed to the Editor, are requested to be forwarded.

VOL. XXVII. No. 20.] LONDON, SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1815. [Price Is.

609]

TO THE FUND-HOLDERS,
On the supposed approaching war against

France.

Of all the classes of people in this country you appear to me to have been, and still to be, the most misguided, as to all questions of politics, and especially as to the important question of peace or war. I will now do my best to enable you to judge correctly upon this subject, as far, at least, as your interests are more immediately connected with it.

Your great characteristic is anxiety for the safety of your property; but, though self-preservation is the first of nature's laws, and though, in general, men who are alive to little else, are extremely alive, and even very skilful, in cases where their own interests are at stake, you do not appear to me to perceive how your interests have been, or how they will be, effected by war. You entertain a sort of vague apprehension, that, unless Napoleon be destroyed, you shall have your property taken away. You look up to the government, that is, in your sense of the word, to the Minister for the time being, as the guardian of your property. Hence you are always found on their side on the question of war, or peace. If they say war, you are for war: if they say peace, you are for peace.

On the subject of the Corn Bill, you were against the Ministers; because that was a question, as you thought, involving no danger to your property. But, in fact, you were more interested in the passing of the Corn Bill than any other class of the community; and, in explaining this seeming paradox to you, I shall, in the easiest way, introduce the remarks which propose to make with regard to the effect, which war has upon the quality of your property, and upon your chances of security, or insecurity.

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What you most desire is, to have the interest of your stock regularly paid in full, and to prevent any insecurity to your capital. Your interest is paid almost wholly, and, indeed, entirely, by the land.

[610

You will start and swell here, and ask whether commerce and manufactures, and trades and professions, pay nothing? Yes, portion to the prosperity of agriculture. they do; but, they pay precisely in proThat is to say, in proportion to the height of prices. If the land, out of which all the farmers and all the labourers receive the great receive their increase, and all their profits and their wages, yield little, little can all these pay to tradesmen and manufacturers, little will be the profits of was 20s. a bushel, the landlord and the commerce and of professions. When wheat farmer had three times as much money to lay out as they have now. Hence the preof trade; hence the numerous bankruptsent universal out-cry about the dulness cies; hence the stagnation of commerce and manufactures.

that

of taxes together

dially with you in your opposition to the Though, therefore, I agreed most corCorn Bill, the grounds of our opposition were very different indeed. I knew, a Corn Bill was neces-ary to enable the by the government; but I wished the sym land to pay the sum of taxes, demanded of taxes to be diminished have Corn Cheup, and Y ished to not to be diminished. These were impossible. They could not, and they cannot, co-exist. If you are asked, at property, do you not always answer, that any time, what security you have for your your security is on the land of the nation? Do you not say, that the estates of all the land-owners are mortgaged to you? This is a great mistake; for, it is only the revenues which are mortgaged to you; but, to obviate all difficulty upon this score, take it for granted that you have a bona fide mortgage upon all the land in England. Can it, then, be your interest, that the land should be unable to pay you your annual demands ? The land, Can you, then, be gainers by its produce upon your own principle is partly yours. being depreciated? A certain farm, for instance, pays a hundred pounds a year towards your annual demands. If produce fall so low as to disable this farm from

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paying you more than fifty pounds a year, how are you to be paid your dividends in full? Hence, it is clear, that the Corn Bill was more for your protection than for the protection of the farmers, who really eats and drinks of his own produce. Your expences of living would keep pace with the price of the produce of the land. In the end, the thing might be the same; but, if one half of your dividends was deducted, on account of the fall in the price of produce, you would soon discover, that a Corn Bill, or any other such measure, was more for your security than for that of the farmer.

But, what is it, which has rendered high prices necessary to your security? WAR. War, which has augmented the taxes on the land, and which land, to be able to pay those taxes, must now have a high price for its produce. War, therefore, has been your great enemy, and not the landlords and farmers, as you have been taught to suppose.

of social order.

To go no further, therefore, you, above all people, ought to regret the renewal of war. You cry out against those who are opposed to war; you accuse them of seditious, and almost, of treasonable motives. You call them enemies of law and And for what? Because you look upon war against Napoleon as necessary to the security of your property; when the fact is, as I will now proceed to show, that war has been, and must be, ruinous to that property, which, though no part has been violently seized on; which, though you have still continued to receive your dividends to the full nominal amount, has imperceptibly passed away from you to the amount of more than one half of what you really possessed in the year 1792. Your property has passed from your possession in two ways first in point of credit, or the value of the capital; and next, as to the currency in which the interest is paid. This will clearly appear from the following statement of the price, the settled peace price, of three per cent. stock during the peace, previous to the first war against the Republicans of France, and of the subsequent peace prices.

In 1792, before the war against France, the steady peace price of the Three per Cents.

was

During the Peace of Amiens in 1802, it was
After the Peace of Paris, in 1814, it was

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This statement exhibits the fall in the value of the capital; the fall in the value of any estate in the funds. That which was worth 95 pounds, in 1792, was worth only 77 pounds in 1802, and only 66 pounds in 1814. But, far is this view of the matter short of the real mark; for the currency, in which funds are bought and sold has also fallen in as great a proportion. A guinea is risen to 28 shillings; and, therefore, in real money, a hundred three per cents, at 66, as they were during the peace of Paris, last year, were worth only 49 pounds; and, at this moment, they are worth only about 44 pounds. In the year 1792, the currency in which the dividends were paid, and in which funds were bought and sold, was equal in value to real money. So that,

In 1792, you could have sold a
hundred Three per Cents.
for....

In May, 1815, you cannot sell
them for more than......

Guineas, Shillings.

90

40

10

19

Is there any one of you, who can deny these facts? And, if you cannot, do you still look upon those as the enemies of your property, who wish for peace? Can you deny, that it is war, which has had this alarming effect upon your property? And, yet, do you blame those, who are against more war?

That vile and prostituted news-paper, the TIMES, which you all read, sometimes, in drawing a comparison between the situation of France and England, talks about the comparative price of the funds in the two countries; and takes this as a criterion of national prosperity, and of the solidity of the government. Nothing can be more false than this principle; but, suppose it to be true. There is no such great difference in the price of the funds in the two countries at this moment. The French funds are five per cents. Our five per cents are at 88 in paper; in real money, they are worth 67 pounds. And, we see, that the French five per cents are worth, even now, 62 pounds in real money; for, in France, it is gold, with which funds are purchased. So that, if you are to weigh public opinion, popular confidence, and the solidity of governments in this scale, we have, on our side of the water, but little to boast of in the comparison, though France is, 77 at this moment, surrounded by hostile 66 armies, though she is menaced with an

95

invasion by a million of men in arms, and though millions of money are employed, in all probability, to excite dissensions in her cities and provinces. Have you ever seen the matter in this light before? Is it not time, then, for you to begin to think?

Such is the state, to which you have been reduced by the " great statesman now no more" and his successors of both factions. Such is the price that you have paid for your support of those men and their measures. Such is the fruit of those wars, which you were told were to secure you in the enjoyment of your property; wars, which ended in placing the Bourbons, for eleven months, upon the throne of France; in restoring the Pope, the Jesuits, and the Inquisition, and in erecting Holland and Hanover into kingdoms; wars, the success of which you have joined in celebrating!

But, now; if such have been the effects of war upon your property; if, in fact, you, who had estates in the funds in 1792, have lost more than the half of those estates, what are you ALL to expect as the consequences, to you, of another war? I shall lay out of account all the possible dangers from a stoppage of the sinking fund, or any other measure, to which necessity might drive the minister for the time being; I shall suppose that no danger can ever arise to you from internal commotions, produced by the pressure of war; but, I must assume, and I think, you will allow the assumption to be correct, that the thing will, at least, go on as it has done; and, of course, that your estates in the funds will daily grow of less and less value, in proportion as the mass of debt is augmented. You are quite sure, that war will augment this mass; and, yet, you raise not your voices against war, but on the contrary, appear to be disappointed, that blood has not yet been drawn.

The certainty that your estates will continue to melt away as they have melted, is, one would think, quite sufficient to make you deprecate the renewal of war. Having lost 50 guineas out of every 90 guineas that you possessed in 1792, in the first restoration of the Bourbons, one would think, that you would dread a second "success" of the kind as you would dread the hour of death. The late wars lasted 20 years, exclusive of the peace of

Amiens. Another 16 years of the same rate, would take away the rewar, at maining 40 guineas. So that, even in case of a second “ without a penny. success," you would be the thing would travel. The stone that But, it is not thus, that rolls down a hill, even if the surface bę smooth, goes swifter and swifter as it approaches the bottom; and, if it meet with rubs in its way, its bounds add to its velocity, till, at last, it comes, at a single jump, like a ball from the cannon's mouth. So it will be, because, so, from the nature of things, it must be with funded property, if we now enter on a war of any considerable duration.

To be satisfied of the truth of this, you
have only to look at what has taken place
in other countries, where there have been
funding systems, and at the increasing
force of the Debt in England. Since the
wars.
funding system began, we have had seven
as follows:
The debt created by each war is

2nd War, which began in 1702
1st War, which ended in 1697

£21,000,000

$3,000,000

3rd War,

Ditto

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4th War,

Ditto

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5th War, 6th War, 7th War,

Ditto

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Ditto

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Ditto

1803

413,000,000

£992,000,000

There are perhaps, 30 or 40 millions of floating Debt, besides the amount of the arrears of the last war; so that, about eight years of war would, in all human probability, bring the Debt to 1600 millions, at which point it would render the funds possessed in 1792 worth nothing at all. But, the thing would hardly proceed; it would hardly get along, at any rate, to this length. An addition of three or four hundred millions, is, probably, as much as it would bear, before the whole thing would be blown up; for,by that time, the price of the guinea would be so high, and the alarm would become so great, on your part, that at any price, till, at last, there would be you would sell your stock nobody to purchase.

Is not this the natural march of your property? Is there any one of you, who will set his face against the facts, which I have stated? If wars have gone on adding to the Debt in the above manner, why should not the same take place again? If the value of your estates has fallen in

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