plaintiff and made a bargain with her as to the terms upon which they would take care of him. He was broken in health, nervous and irritable. He was a cousin of plaintiff's wife's father. Held, That plaintiff was entitled to recover.-Webster v. Nichols, 566.

4. It was shown by the defense that testator did a little work about the house and sometimes bought some supplies; and this was urged as a fulfillment of his promise of payment. Held, That it was proper for plaintiff to show the amount of his property, and that testator was reasonably well off. —Id.

5. Where an executor resists such a claim and reduces it one third, no costs should be allowed against him below or here.Id.

See APPEAL, 23; CONTRACT, 5; NEW YORK CITY, 1.

SET OFF.

See AGENCY, 2, 3; BANKS, 6; MASTER AND SERVANT, 6.

SHERIFFS.

1. When the sureties on a bond of indemnity given to a sheriff bind themselves absolutely to keep him harmless from any judgment which may be recovered against him for the seizure and sale of property under an execution, they are bound by the regular recovery, of a judgment against him although they were not notified of the proceedings in the action resulting in its recovery and it is not necessary that the judgment should have been paid before the sheriff can proceed against them on the bond.-Connor et al. v. Reeves et al., 252.

2. The sureties on such a bond will be bound when the judgment against defendant has been recovered in good faith and without collusion or fraud, and the consent of the sheriff to its entry, alone, when it may be given in good faith and as the best alternative which can be adopted, will not render a judgment collusive.— Id.

See ATTACHMENT, 8; EXECUTION, 9; INDEMNITY, 3; REPLEVIN, 2.

SLANDER.

1. The death of one partner does not abate an action of slander originally brought in the name of all the partners.-Shale et al. v. Schantz, 294.

2. Communications by a resident of a school district to the school commissioner relative to the moral character of the school

teacher in that district are qualifiedly privileged. It was error to refuse to charge the jury that if defendant went to the commissioner and in good faith stated what he believed to be true about plaintiff it was a privileged communication. Decker v. Gaylord et al., 360.

3. A person vested with the control of a public institution and its employees, subject to the decision of its board of trustees or its executive committee, is within the class of persons whose communications made to his superior in the discharge of a duty are prima facie privileged.Halstead v. Nelson, 371.

4. The fact that the meeting of the committee at which such communication was made was not held on a day fixed by the by-laws will not render the occasion an unprivileged one.—Id.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. A parol promise by the owner of land to give it to another, accompanied by actual delivery of the possession thereof to him, will be enforced in equity where the promisee is induced by such promise to make substantial improvements and considerable expenditures on the premises with the knowledge of the promisor.— Van Arsdale v. Perry, 116.

2. Where the owner of land promised to give to his newly married daughter one of his farms if she would abandon her intention of removing to another county and take up her residence near him, and she and her husband, relying upon such promise, and in pursuance thereof, took possession, cultivated it, erected buildings and made other substantial improvements and continued in sole possession for twenty years, it was held that her heirs were entitled to specific performance.— Id.

3. Where the testator devises his real estate charged generally with debts, the devisee, after three years from the granting of letters testamentary, can give to a bona fide purchaser a good title, free and discharged of such debts.-White v. Kane, 180.

See CONTRACT, 3, 4; RAILROADS, 14.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See CONTRACT, 8, 12; FRAUD, 8; MARRIAGE, 3. STATUTES.

1. Section 38 of Chap. 568, Laws of 1880, being but a re-enactment of the provisions of the charter of 1859, and expressly adopting the system of the Revised Stat

utes in respect to the number of jurors required, the provisions of the amendment of 1875 to the Revised Statutes are not to be deemed incorporated therein.In re altering Main St., 207.

2. The provision contained in § 6 of Ch. 459, Laws of 1877, and § 7 of Ch. 467, Laws of 1879, was not intended to restrict said acts to officers thereafter elected or appointed. It has reference to § 18 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, which does not apply to officers whose salaries are fixed.— Mangam v. The City of Brooklyn, 405.

See ABANDONMENT; CANALS; CHILDREN; CORPORATIONS, 20; CURTESY, 1; FERRIES; MANDAMUS, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 20; OFFICE; RECEIVERS, 3, 4; SCHOOLS, 1; TAXES, 9; TOWN BONDS, 2.

STOCKHOLDERS.

See CORPORATIONS, 9-12, 18, 19.

STOCKS.

1. The committee on securities of the N. Y. Stock Exchange has no jurisdiction to determine the legality of a tender or delivery of bonds to a purchaser who refuses to receive them upon the ground that the seller cannot convey a good title.--Morris v. Grant et al., 123.

2 A determination by a committee of the N. Y. Stock Exchange of such a question between members of the Exchange, one of whom is the purchaser of certain bonds from the other, who is a pledgee of the same, and who is selling them to pay his loan, is not binding upon the pledgor, who is not a member of said Stock Exchange, and has had no notice of the proceedings resulting in such determination nor opportunity to be heard therein.-Id.

3. The purchaser of bonds regularly sold by a bona fide pledgee of the same has no right to refuse to receive them for the reason that intermediate the sale and the delivery a third party has served a notice upon the pledgee that he claims said bonds upon the ground that they were deposited by him with the pledgor as collateral security for a loan, and that the latter had no authority to pledge them. Such a notice does not prevent the pledgee's conveying a good title upon such sale.Id.

4. An agreement by which the parties unite in purchasing stock and agree that one shall hold the same until they agree on a sale is not unlawful. Hope or expectation of a rise does not make the contract a wager one. A defense that the transaction sued upon was a wager contract must be pleaded.-Vischer v. Bagg, 399.

5. Pledges may be retained until the purposes for which they were given have been accomplished.-Id.

See ATTORNEYS, 4, 5; CORPORATIONS, 18-20; FRAUD, 5.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

See CURTESY, 2; LEASE, 9.

SUPERIOR COURT.

See COSTS, 2, 3.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.

1. The provisions of the Code of Civ. Proc. relative to proceedings subsequent to execution are not applicable where the judgment on which execution issued was recovered in the Municipal Court of the City of Rochester for less than $25 damages.-Mason v. Hackett, 79.

2. No order for the examination of defendant in proceedings supplementary to execution can be based on a return to an execution, made at plaintiff's request, that real estate had been levied on and advertised for sale and that no other property could be found.—Marx et al. v. Spaulding et al., 275.

3. An order for the examination of a defendant in supplementary proceedings cannot be upheld upon a motion to vacate it for the reason that it is based upon a return to the execution which did not warrant its granting, upon proof that a sufficient return should have been made. The remedy is to require the sheriff to make the proper return and, if he refuses, to move to compel him to do so.-Id.

4. The court has no power to order the judgment debtor to pay over to the receiver money received and retained by him in another state or due to him there; the most that can be done is to require him to transfer his title to the money to the receiver.-Buchanan v. Hunt, 288. See TAXES, 4.

SURETYSHIP.

1. An agreement with one of two co-obligors, jointly and severally bound, not to sue him does not discharge the other obligor, but the other is liable for only one-half the debt.-Benedict v. Rea, 73.

2. In 1880 defendant with others executed as surety a bond to secure the performance by a bank, designated as a depository for canal tolls, of an agreement as to such deposits made by it with the State. At the end of 1880 the bank had on hand a large State deposit. In 1881 the bank

was again designated and a new bond given and accepted by the state upon which defendant was not a surety but one Z. was, the other sureties remaining the same. In 1882 the bank failed. In an action on the bond of 1880 to recover the balance due the State at the end of that year, Held, that in the absence of any proof that the bond of 1881 was agreed to be taken by the State in lieu of the bond of 1880, or that the latter bond was cancelled or surrendered, defendant was liable.-The People v. Cushing, 261.

3. The sureties on a bond for faithful performance by their principal of the duties of his position are not discharged by the imposition of new duties which are separable and distinct from those protected by the bond, unless such new duties render impossible or materially hinder or impede the proper performance of the duties guaranteed, even though the new employment exposes their principal to temptation or gives a broader opportunity for dishonesty.--The Mayor, &c., of N. Y. v. Kelly et al., 326.

4. Where a surety would escape liability by reason of a request to the creditor to sue the principal debtor, he must show that the latter was solvent at the time of the request, and has since become insolvent. -Wheeler et al. v. Benedict et al., 336.

5. Where the payee and holder of a note past due told the surety that he did not consider him holden upon it, but it did not appear that the surety intended or was able, at the time, to pay the holder, nor that by the holder's statement the surety was prevented or influenced not to pay the holder at that time; nor that if the surety had then paid it he could have then collected the amount of the principal debtor, Held, That the holder was not estopped, and could recover of the surety.-Id.

See EXECUTION, 8; LEASE, 7, 8; TRESPASS, 3.

SURROGATES.

1. A petition for payment of a debt set forth that the claim had been presented to the executors and not rejected or paid, and that the statutory time had elapsed. The executors orally denied the allegagations. Proof was given of presentation of the claim to one of the executors, that it had not been rejected, and that the personal estate was sufficient to pay it. The executors did not ask for an accounting, or show the existence of other debts. The surrogate decreed payment. Held, No error.-Lambert v. Craft, 181.

2. A petition under § 2717 of the Code need not set forth the facts which make out the debt.-Id.

3. The written answer of the executor under § 2718 must set forth facts showing that the validity or legality of the claim is doubtful, and also a denial of its validity or legality. Both conditions must concur.-Id.

4. A surrogate has power and authority by implication to make an allowance for past maintenance of infants upon an accounting of executors or administrators in a case where such expenditure would have been authorized if an application had been made in advance.—Hyland et al. v. Baxter et al., 426.

5. His determination on such a question is conclusive upon the parties until set aside or reversed.-Id.

6. A writ of prohibition should not be granted to restrain a surrogate from taking proof of a will where the petition for proof stated the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction, but objection was thereafter made that decedent was a resident of another county. The presentation of the petition gave the surrogate jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the objection raised an issue which the surrogate had power to determine as incident to the subject matter, and his decision if erroneous could be reviewed on appeal, but not assailed collaterally.-The People ex rel. James v. Surrogate of Putnam Co., 498.

7. Where a person has two residences at different seasons of the year, that will be deemed his domicil which he himself elects or describes as his home or where he votes or exercises the rights and duties of a citizen.-Id.

8. When upon the judicial settlement of the account of an administratrix whose intestate was the general guardian of a ward who lived with him and whom he had charged for board, the ward is allowed to testify without objection that she did not think that her board bill was correct, and that she should have been credited with the value of services performed by her for her guardian, and an allowance is made her by the surrogate for such services, it is too late to raise the objection upon appeal that the charge for board in the account had not been properly surcharged or objected to as excessive, and that no claim or demand for services had been interposed on behalf of the ward. In re settlement of accounts of Clark, 563.

9. Where a ward boards in the family of her guardian and is charged for board, and while so residing in her guardian's family renders services of value, those services should be allowed as a claim to reduce the charge for board.-Id.

10. Section 2561, Code of Civ. Pro., by which $10 costs may be allowed for each additional day beyond two days where a trial or hearing before the surrogate necessarily occupies more than two days, is equally applicable to a hearing before a referee appointed by the surrogate as to a hearing before the surrogate in person; but the said section does not contemplate or empower any allowance for days on which an adjournment occurs without any actual hearing.-Id.

11. While a surrogate is not chargeable with interest on a fund received and simply retained by him for distribution, yet where he places such fund where it draws interest such interest becomes a part of the fund, belongs to the beneficiaries, and the surrogate will be required to pay it over with the principal.-În re Coffin, 568. See CONTEMPT, 1, 2.

TAXES.

1. The whole amount of a fund held by executors on deposit in trust companies under a decree of a surrogate to await the determination of contested claims against the estate which exceed the amount of the fund is subject to assessment and taxation.-The People ex rel. Osgood v. Tax Comrs., 93, 378.

2. Contested and disputed claims against an estate are not just debts within the meaning of the statute entitling a person assessed as executor, etc., to have deducted the just debts due from him in his representative character.-Id.

3. Ch. 382, Laws of 1879, ch. 402, Laws of 1881, and ch. 516, Laws of 1883, acts which, as to certain counties, provide a new method for the collection and payment of arrears of the state tax, are constitutional.-The People v. The Board of Suprs. of Ulster Co., 258.

4. In supplementary proceedings taken to collect a tax under Chap. 640, Laws of 1881, the affidavit will be sufficient if it state the facts required by 1 of that act; it is not requisite that it state also the facts necessary to show the jurisdiction of the assessors and of the supervisors. -Proceedings to collect tax of Conklin,

329.

5. Where the evidence before the assessors fails to show that the assessment is erroneous in whole or in part it is their province to determine the amount of the property liable to taxation.-The People ex rel. Osgood v. Tax Comrs., 378.

6. A board of supervisors fixed the equalized valuation of a town and entered the same in the assessment roll; it determined

the amount of tax to be raised and its rate, delivered its warrant for the collection of the tax affixed to the assessment roll to the supervisor of the town and adjourned sine die. It had previously directed the supervisor to extend the amount of taxes against each of the persons and their property named and described in the roll. He did so. Held, That the warrant was void and that plaintiff's got no title by a purchase at a sale under the same.-The People v. Hagadorn et al., 430.

7. Where the comptroller sells lands for nonpayment of the taxes for several years, the taxes for some of which years are regular and for other years void, the void taxes will invalidate the sale.-Id.

8. The failure of a telegraph company to make the report required by § 3 of Chap. 471, Laws of 1853, does not deprive the tax commissioners of jurisdiction to assess its property, but in so doing they may proceed upon such information as they have.-The People ex rel. The Mutual Tel. Co. v. Comrs. of Taxes, 438.

9. Ch. 269, Laws of 1880, giving a remedy by certiorari, does not permit a party complaining to lie by without availing himself of the opportunity to remedy his grievance by application to the commissioners.-Id.

10. In the City of New York it is not essential to the validity of a tax upon land that the name of the owner should be inserted in the assessment list.-Haight v. The Mayor, &c., of N. Y., 450.

11. The only effect of an omission of, or an error as to, the name of the owner is to deprive the city of its right to collect the tax from the owner's personal property and confine its remedy to the enforcement of the lien on the lands.-Id.

12. The premises No. 108 Second avenue, in the City of New York, belonging to the Swiss Benevolent Society, a corporation incorporated for the purpose of affording pecuniary and other relief to such persons, natives of Switzerland or of Swiss origin, as may be in the United States and in need of assistance, and used to give a temporary home, asylum and relief to the sick, necessitous and others who may be proper objects of its bounty in accordance with its charter, is an "almshouse" within the meaning of sub. 4 of 4. 1 R. S.. 388, and as such is exempt from taxation -The People ex rel. The Swiss Ben. Soc. v Comrs. of Taxes, 492.

13. The committee of the property of a lunatic is a trustee within the meaning of 2 R. S., 7th ed., 789, § 5, and 991, § 10, and the property of the lunatic in his hands is taxable under said statutes, and such property cannot be considered to be in

custodia legis and therefore non-taxable. -The People ex rel. Smith v. Comrs. of Taxes, 543.

See APPEAL, 4; CONTRACT, 4; CORPORATIONS, 27; HIGHWAYS, 8, 9; PARTITION, 1.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

See TAXES, 8.

TENEMENT HOUSE ACT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11-13.

TITLE.

See BANKRUPTCY; CONVERSION, 7; EXECUTORS, 18; LIMITATION, 6; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3; TAXES, 6, 7.

TORT.

1. A release of one joint tort feasor, on satisfaction by him, operates as a discharge for all the wrong doers.-De Long v. Curtiss et al., 134.

See APPEAL, 12.

TOWN AUDITORS.

1. An action by a taxpayer to vacate an audit of bills by the Town Board on the ground that such audit was illegal and without authority may be maintained under Chap. 161, Laws of 1872.Osterhoudt v. Rigney et al., 403.

2. A board of town audit has no power to audit and allow claims which have been rejected by a prior board on the merits. Where a portion of such prior claim is included in an audit in such a manner that it cannot be ascertained how much has been allowed for the new legal charge the whole of such audit should be vacated.-Id.

See PARTIES, 1.

TOWN BONDS.

1. The legislature may, by direct enactment, impose the characteristics of commercial paper on municipal bonds, and may declare innocent purchasers of such bonds, when they are issued by the proper officer having apparent authority, to be bona fide holders and as such protected. -Alvord v. The Syracuse Savings Bank et al., 421.

2. Under Chap. 571, Laws of 1868, the purchaser for value of bonds issued under that act had a right to rest on the determination of the assessor and the act of the commissioner, and was not bound to go behind them.-Id.

3. The board of town officers mentioned in § 1 of that act is the board of town auditors.-Id.

See TOWNS.

TOWNS.

1. An action against the railroad commissioners of a town and others for alleged wrongful conduct in issuing town bonds, by reason whereof the town rights and property may be injuriously affected, may be maintained in the name of the supervisor.-Mitchell v. Strough et al.

225.

2. The bonds were issued by the commissioners in 1872, and delivered to the railroad while the adjudication of the county judge was in force. This action was brought in 1879. Held, That the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.-Id.

TRESPASS.

1. Plaintiff's complaint alleged a wrongful cutting of timber by defendant on lands owned and occupied by plaintiff, named the damage and demanded "judgment for treble damages, amounting to $250.” The answer was a general denial. The verdict assessed plaintiff's actual damages at $12.50, and awarded him treble damages. Held, A claim of title was raised on the pleadings within § 3228, subd. 1. Code Civ. Pro.-Crowell v. Smith, 26.

2. The party injured by a trespass may bring as many actions as there were wrong-doers. He can have but one satisfaction for damages, but may have the costs in all the actions.-Lord et al. v. Tiffany et al., 377.

3. T. commenced separate actions against S. and L. for the same trespass and recovered judgment in each. Upon affirmance he brought actions on the undertakings and recovered. One of the sureties of S. paid nearly the full amount of the judgment against him and assigned to T. his claim for reimbursement against his principal co-surety. Held, That on the payment of a sum sufficient to pay the balance of the damages and the costs in all the actions S. and his sureties would be released, and that the co-surety was entitled to be released from one-half of the judgment against him.-Id.

4. Defendant inherited the land in dispute from his father, who was dead at the time of the trial of this action for trespass. As a witness in his own behalf plaintiff testified that he cut timber on the disputed land in the presence of defendant's father, and that their conversation at the time was friendly. Held, That the evidence was improper under Code, § 829.-Oliver v. Freligh, 411.