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13. Prior to March 3, 1883, a collector of customs in the United States was
required by law, under penalty for non-performance, to ascertain the
dutiable value of imported goods by adding to their cost at the place
of production the cost of transporting them to the place of shipment
to the United States and of the box or case in which they were
enclosed. This aggregate was called their price or value “
board," which, in the absence of fraud, was taken to be their dutiable
value. The act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, c. 121, $ 7, repealed
this provision of law. Shortly after this section took effect, and in
ignorance of its passage, a shipment of goods produced in Switzerland
was made at Antwerp, the consular invoice of which contained in
detail the original cost of the goods in Switzerland, the cost of trans-
portation separately stated, and the aggregate “free on board at
Antwerp.” On their arrival at the port of New York the consignee
cabled for a new invoice, to conform to the changed law. One was
sent, but without a consular certificate. The consignee presented both
invoices at the custom-house and asked to use the second as explana-
tory of the first, and to enter the goods at their net value, charges off.
The weigher's return at the custom-house showed a less quantity of
goods than that stated in the invoice. The custom-house officers
required the importer to enter the goods at their dutiable value
according to the first invoice and gave him to understand that that
was all he could do. The collector decided and the Secretary of the
Treasury affirmed the decision on appeal, that the cost of transpor-
tation, etc., was not to be deducted from the dutiable value of the
goods, and that the duties were to be collected on the quantity as
shown by the invoice; Held, (1) that the levy of duties after March 3,
1883, on a valuation including the charges of transportation from the
place of production to the place of shipment was contrary to law;
(2) that under the circumstances the importer was not bound to ask
for an appraisement under Rev. Stat. § 2926; (3) that the collector
was not entitled to exact a duty upon a deficiency in weight arising
from loss of goods and not from shrinkage; (4) that the payment of
the duties under these circumstances was not voluntary. 1b.
14. Ribbons, composed of silk and cotton, in which silk is the component
material of chief value, used exclusively as trimmings for ornamenting
hats and bonnets, and having a commercial value only for that pur-
pose, are liable to only twenty per cent duty, under the following
provision in “Schedule N. — Sundries,” in $ 2502 of Title 33 of the
Revised Statutes, as enacted by the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 512 :
“ IIats, and so forth, materials for: Braids, plaits, flats, laces, trim-
mings, tissues, willow-sheets and squares, used for making or orna-
menting hats, bonnets and hoods, composed of straw, chip, grass,
palm-leaf, willow, hair, whalebone, or any other substance or material,
not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, twenty per centum
ad valorem;" and are not liable to fifty per cent duty, under the
following clause in “ Schedule L. — Silk and Silk Goods,” in the same
section, Id. 510: “All goods, wares and merchandise, not specially
enumerated or provided for in this act, made of silk, or of which silk
is the component material of chief value, fifty per centum ad valorem.”
Robertson v. Edelhoff, 614.
15. Plaintiff imported into the United States a quantity of iron advertising
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, having a right to
sue and be sued, and is subject to the ordinary rules that govern the
law of procedure between private persons. Metropolitan Railroad Co.
v. District of Columbia, 1.
2. The Maryland statute of limitations of 1715, which is in force in the
District of Columbia, embraces municipal corporations. Ib.
3. The sovereign power of the District of Columbia is lodged in the
government of the United States, and not in the corporation of the
In the courts of the United States an action of ejectment is an action at
law, and the plaintiff, must recover on the legal title. Redfield v.
1. A decision of a District Court, in equity, on a question of fact, affirined
by the Circuit Court, will not be disturbed by this court unless the
error is clear. Dravo v. Fabel, 487.
2. A suit to enforce a mechanic's lien under a territorial statute author-
izing the court to order the real estate subject to the lien to be sold,
and any deficiency to be paid by the owner, as in suits for the fore-
closure of mortgages, is in the nature of a suit in equity: Idaho and
Oregon Land Improvement Co. v. Bradbury, 509.
3. A court of equity need not formally set aside the verdict of a jury upon
issues submitted to it, before making a decree according to its own
view of the evidence. Ib.
4. In a suit in the nature of a suit in equity, a territorial court, after a
jury has found upon special issues submitted to it, and has also
returned a general verdict, may set aside the general verdict, and sub-
stitute its own findings of fact for the special findings of the jury. Ib.
See EVIDENCE, 5, 6;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 9 (7);
JURISDICTION A, 1, 7; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 4.
LOCAL LAW, 2;
Where a defendant, on a trial, introduced under the objection of the plain-
1. The petition of a bankrupt in bankruptcy, in which he states under oath
that he owns no real estate and holds no interest in real property is
evidence of the execution and validity of a prior deed of his real estate
in a suit in which he contests both. Dent v. Ferguson, 50.
2. After a suit in equity for the infringement of a patent has been heard
and decided in favor of the defendant on the merits, the plaintiff can-
not put in evidence a disclaimer, except at a rehearing granted upon
such terms as the court sees fit to impose. Roemer v. Bernheim, 103.
3. Before former declarations of a witness can be used to impeach or contra-
dict his testimony, his attention must be drawn to what may be brought
forward, with particularity as to time, place and circumstance, so that
he can deny it, or make an explanation tending to reconcile what he
formerly said with what he is testifying. Ayers v. Watson, 394.
4. After a witness' testimony has been taken, committed to writing and
used in the court, and by death he is placed beyond the power of
explanation, then, in another trial had after his death, former declara.
tions by him, whether by deposition or otherwise, contradictory to
those made by him in that testimony, cannot for the first time be
brought forward and used to impeach it. 16.
5. When the plaintiff in a suit in equity does not waive an answer under
oath, the defendant's answer, directly responsive to the bill, is evidence
in his behalf. Draro v. Fabel, 487.
6. The statute of Pennsylvania providing that a party in a suit in equity
may be examined as a witness by the other party as if under cross-
examination, and that his evidence may be rebutted by counter testi-
mony, has no application to suits in equity in courts of the United
States held within the State. Ib.
7. The party offering in a court of the United States in Pennsylvania a
deposition taken under that statute, makes the witness his own, and is
not at liberty to contend that he is not entitled to credit. Ib.
8. In an action to recover damages for the taking of ore from a mine by
the proprietor of an adjoining mine, who had broken in, a witness for
defendant was asked whether he had a model of the mine, but was not
asked whether it was correct, and did not say that it would illustrate
the subject about which he was testifying. Plaintiff objected to its
production and the objection was sustained. At the hearing in error
in this court no copy of the model was produced; Held, that it was
properly rejected. Patrick v. Graham, 627.
9. The evidence of a person who did not personally know about the
amount of ore taken from the mine was properly rejected at the trial
of such action, and cannot be held to have been admissible under :
stipulation which does not form part of the record. 16.
PATENT FOR INVENTIOX, 12;
Post-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, 7.
1. An exception to the refusal of the presiding judge at a jury trial to
instruct the jury in language prayed for by counsel is of no avail, if
the refusal be followed by instructions in the general charge, substan-
tially to the same effect, but in the language of the court. Anthony
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 172.
2. A general exception to the whole of a charge to the jury will not avail
a plaintiff in error if the charge contains distinct propositions and any
one of them is free from objections. 10.
3. An exception to the refusal to give instructions in the language of
counsel is of no avail if the court substantially gives the same instruc-
tions although in different language. Patrick v. Graham, 627.
See MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM, (6).
A regulation by the President to fix the length of service and compensation
of special deputy marshals, or supervisors of elections, appointed in
pursuance of the provisions in Rev. Stat. $$ 2012, 2016 and 2021, if it
has any validity, cannot have a retroactive effect. United States v.
See Post-OFFICE DEPARTMENT;
PUBLIC LAND, 4.
FINDING OF FACTS.
See Equity, 1, 4;
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
1. An executed agreement by one party to cause the debts of the other to
be cancelled by his creditors, valid in its inception, is not invalidated
as to the debtor by reason of the settlements being effected for a small
percentage, or even by the employment of improper means to effect
them. Dent v. Ferguson, 50.
2. The proof in this case fails to show imbecility, dotage or loss of men-
tal capacity on the part of the appellee at the time when the contract
in dispute was made. 15.
3. The maxim “in pari delicto, potior est conditio defendentis,” is decisive of
this case. 16.
4. A creditor made a compromise with his debtor for sixty cents on the