that force is composed of. We must remember that a very large proportion of the officers in it cannot devote themselves day by day, or even for some hours during specified weeks in the winter, to learn what we would like to teach them. We have to take them as they are. As practical men, if we cannot have a whole loaf we must be contented to take half. If a man has a gap in his fence and cannot afford to have an iron gate, he must be prepared to put up with a wooden one. That is the way in which we must look at the Volunteer force.'

The italics are my own, as elsewhere in this article. We poor civilians are to be content with walls of half-burnt bricks and gates of wood. Against this exasperating theory I protested strongly in the article referred to, and I do so now again. About the same time Lord Lansdowne, the then Secretary of State for War, stated that 'he was informed on the best authority that there never was a time when the Volunteer force, in point of discipline and efficiency, stood higher than at present.' But this is beside the mark, for mere better than bad is not necessarily good. The Commissioners were appointed to inquire into efficiency and numbers; it might be possible that the other forms of defence in this country are so strong and trustworthy that walls of half-burnt bricks' and 'gates of wood' would do very well, as being ornamental rather than for actual use; it might be, on the other hand, that owing to the progress of modern warfare, the altered conditions of sea warfare, and the huge expansion of the Empire in the last five years, half-burnt bricks' and 'gates of wood,' even in the places assigned them, would be about of as little value to us inhabitants of the British Isles as the Noah's ark in the children's nursery would have been to Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japhet in the days of the Flood. So the Commissioners were bound to ascertain at the very outset the functions of the forces. If an owner hands over a racing colt for training, the trainer is not likely to bring him out a winner if he is left in doubt as to whether the owner intends to run the colt for a six-furlong race, or the Derby, or the Grand National.

Naturally, therefore, the Commissioners commenced with an inquiry at the War Office as to the views held there on the subject. In response they received a document, a memorandum headed: The Organisation of the Auxiliary Forces considered in relation to the Military Defence of the Empire.' Lieut.-General Sir W. Nicholson, the then Director-General of Military Intelligence and Mobilisation, was careful, however, to explain that it was an authoritative expression of the present views (19th of May, 1903) of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State only-i.e., Earl Roberts and Mr. Brodrick. They then tried to ascertain the views held at the Admiralty on the subject of invasion, inasmuch as in the War Office memorandum the Auxiliary Forces were reckoned on in the defence. This information the Admiralty declined to give, but suggested application to the Committee of Imperial Defence. So in a dignified letter of the 26th

of May, signed by the Duke of Norfolk, the Commission asked the Committee of Defence, of which the Duke of Devonshire was chairman, two questions:

1. To arrive at a conclusion as to what should be the strength of the Auxiliary Forces, it is necessary to have an approximate idea of the strength of the invading force which the land forces may be called on to meet. What do the Committee of Defence consider to be the maximum and minimum limits between which the strength of the invading force would probably be fixed?

2. Is it contemplated that the duty of meeting the invading force should fall mainly on the Auxiliary Forces? In other words, is the Royal Commission justified in believing that the contingency may arise in which the number of fighting units of the Regular Army left in the country will be very small?

These are questions of a kind which would enter into many an operation of war, and which would need to be answered before arriving at a decision not only on the conduct of the operations, but also on the number and kind of the forces to be employed. At the time of sending in the questions two or three witnesses only besides Sir W. Nicholson had been under examination; but nearly a month elapsed before any reply was received from the Duke of Devonshire, who then, in a memorandum, calmly informed the Duke of Norfolk that the reference to the Royal Commission was not intended to cover an inquiry into the numbers of either Regular or Auxiliary Forces which should be maintained for Home Defence or for other services'; and yet the terms of reference distinctly state that the Commission is to ascertain what changes may be necessary to maintain these forces, not merely in a condition of military efficiency, but also at an adequate strength. Mr. Akers-Douglas, the Minister who signed the Royal Warrant, specifies 'adequate strength' as one of the two necessary conditions of the Forces, one of the two objects to be aimed at. Just two months later, the Duke of Devonshire, another Minister, says that the consideration of adequacy does not enter into their work. But by this time the Commission, which had been working hard, had been collecting most valuable opinions on this same question of adequacy.

The Duke of Devonshire recommended, however, that the numbers given in the present mobilisation scheme of the War Office should be accepted, and, he added, 'it may be assumed that if these forces should be required to resist an invasion, it might be after a considerable portion of the Regular Troops might have left the country.' When this communication was received, the Commission had entered on the investigation of other branches of the inquiry, so, apparently, the numbers given in the mobilisation scheme were not at once asked for; but shortly before the autumnal adjournment there came from the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee a letter and a memorandum, dated the 22nd of July, both of a most remarkable character. It must be borne in mind that the scope of the inquiry

by the Commission was laid down in a Royal Warrant, in which the King himself speaks, first gives greeting to each individual member, and then specifies the task they have to carry out, and in one clause says: Our further will and pleasure is that you do, with as little delay as possible, report to Us under your hands and seals, or under the hands and seals of any three or more of you, your opinion upon the matters herein submitted for your consideration.' The warrant is signed By his Majesty's command. A. Akers-Douglas.' The letter of the 22nd of July gives as the object in sending the memorandum the 'defining more clearly the scope of the inquiries to be undertaken, by the Commission and the Committee respectively. The memorandum warns the Commission that the War Office memorandum originally furnished to it is not to be taken by it as authoritative'; and then follow passages which must be given in extenso :

It appears to the Committee of Imperial Defence that it would be most unfortunate if the Royal Commission should, with necessarily imperfect opportunities of examining the question, incorporate into its Report an expression of opinion as to the liability to invasion or as to the strength of the force which should be maintained for the defence of the United Kingdom or for the other purposes referred to, which may afterwards be found to be at variance with the deliberate and authoritative decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose special function it has been to examine these questions with a full command of all the sources of information at the disposal both of the Admiralty and of the War Office.

It appears to the Committee of Imperial Defence that the main object for which the Royal Commission was appointed was to advise his Majesty's Government and Parliament, not as to the strength at which the Militia and Volunteers should be maintained in the country, but how the establishment of Militia and Volunteers could be maintained at full efficiency, and at the strength which may be eventually decided by his Majesty's Government and Parliament, on the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to be necessary. It is therefore suggested that the present Mobilisation Scheme should be taken as the basis on which the Royal Commission should consider this question, as the principles which they lay down must necessarily be applicable equally to an establishment which may vary within reasonable limits on either side of the existing one.

The Commission at once asked the Committee for a copy of the scheme, and in reply were refused the copy, but were told it would be sufficient if the figures were taken at 100,000 Militia and 200,000 Volunteers.

What a strange state of affairs is here revealed! The chairman of the Defence Committee, in his individual capacity, undertakes to tell the chairman of a Royal Commission what its duties were, or, rather, were not, although the King himself has defined them. Then the Committee further lectures the Commission as to the scope of their respective inquiries, proceeds to make recommendations for omissions from the Report, and finally puts to it the conundrum how to maintain the establishment of the Forces at full efficiency and at the unknown quantity, x-namely, the strength which at some

future time is to be determined by the Government and Parliament. Surely the proper course for the Defence Committee to have taken was, instead of lecturing the Commission on its duties, to have obtained from the King a modification of the duties his Majesty had thought fit to impose on it.

The Commission held on its own way in accordance with the instructions of his Majesty as conveyed to it in the Royal Warrant, and has produced in the Report and in the evidence published with it matter of the highest national value, matter worthy of close and very grave consideration.

The first section of the Report should be printed simply as a broadsheet and be distributed all over the country, in slums and in palatial residences alike, in the smallest agricultural hamlet and the busiest mercantile city. The Commission does not argue; it gives only plain facts.

'Each of the five great Powers of Europe has abandoned the once prevalent idea that war is the exclusive business of a limited class, and has subjected its male population to a thorough training, either naval or military. Accordingly, each of these nations is to-day ready to employ in war the greater part of its able-bodied male population between certain ages, under the guidance of a specially trained body of officers and non-commissioned officers. . . . Each of the great States has also, with a view to war, so organised its material resources, and in particular its means of communication, that they may be fully utilised for naval and military purposes from the very beginning of hostilities . . . . In a war against any of them Great Britain would be in one respect at a grave disadvantage. For while her antagonist by previous organisation would be enabled to devote to the struggle the greater part of its resources both in men and in material, Great Britain would not at the beginning have at her disposal more than a fraction of her population, and her material resources could be very imperfectly applied.'

And now as to invasion.

'The perfection of the means of communication, and in foreign countries, of the control of the State over them, is such that the concentration of a large force at any port or ports is practicable within a very short time; what was formerly a matter of weeks is now an affair of days, possibly even of hours.'

And then, after speaking of the corresponding development and changed conditions of naval warfare, the Report continues:

'Naval warfare is always more concentrated and decisive than land warfare, and the effect of the developments just described is to intensify these characteristics, while, at the same time, the want of experience with the new instruments renders it difficult to predict the issue of a naval conflict. More is staked on a sea fight than ever,

yet it is harder than ever to foresee the results which the destructive force of modern weapons may produce.' . . . 'It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that the next naval war in which this country may be engaged will be on both sides a great experiment.'

6

In the next section, the 'scope of the inquiry,' the Commission, quoting the figures furnished on the one hand by the War Office as required for home defence 330,000 (including 150,000 mobile troops), and, on the other, the 300,000 given by the Imperial Defence Committee, points out, with pitiless logic, that these numbers are irreconcilable either with reliance solely on the Navy for protection against invasion, or against a small raid. An effective force-in other words, an army—of the strength proposed to us, can be required only to meet an invasion. Either invasion is possible or it is not. If not, no military force is required for home defence, and our inquiry could hardly serve any practical purpose. But if invasion is possible, it can be undertaken only by one of the great European Powers, which possess forces highly trained and ready to move in large numbers at the shortest notice.'

And then they proceed to give their interpretation of the meaning of the words in the King's command, 'the condition of military efficiency' in the Auxiliary Forces.

"The Militia exist chiefly, and the Volunteers solely, for the purpose of resisting a possible invasion of the United Kingdom, which would be attempted only by a first-rate army. This purpose will not be fulfilled merely by a brave or creditable, but unsuccessful, resistance; it requires the defeat of the enemy. The standard of efficiency to be aimed at it is therefore not a matter of opinion; the conditions of war and of the battlefield must be met, and no lower standard can be laid down.'

The Commission had, in the absence of more authoritative information, to construct for itself the foundation on which to base its inquiry as to the standard of efficiency, and as to the numbers of the Auxiliary Forces required to carry out their functions; and on the expert evidence laid before them they came to the conclusion that under certain circumstances it was quite possible that the function that these forces would have to fulfil would be the meeting and crushing an invading hostile force of 150,000 picked men, fully and admirably staffed, trained to the highest point of efficiency for acting in close country, led by officers and non-commissioned officers of high individual capacity in all ranks, and, I may add on my own account, possessing from highest to lowest a thorough knowledge of the country, obtained by previous close study of our own Ordnance maps, of which, we may be sure, the invaders would bring with them an ample supply, and on which doubtless they had previously carried out an infinite variety of war games.

It seems to be generally overlooked that no Continental Power