the place of muster-master general in that dependency of the manor, and he will judge whether such a muster-master-general would or would not be like to go snacks with the colonels of regiments, and whether or not the muster-rolls would contain any paper soldiers for whom the public were to pay as effective men. We shall say neither the one thing, nor the other, and only hope that, as Mr. Thomas Merryman has been since trounced by a verdict against him of 1500 livres, from criminal conversation with the wife of a brother officer and bosom friend, he will no more be able to intrude himself upon the public notice, and will profit by his retirement from the world to amend his morals.

CHAPTER XIV.

SOME SAGE REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR ELECTIONS.--AND EXAMPLES OF PERSONS IN HIGH LIFE, WHO HAVE BURNT THEIR FINGERS BY

OFFICIOUSLY

MEDDLING WITH THEM.

WHERE the executive and legislative powers are vested in the same person, there can be no liberty, because that person may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner. There is also no liberty if the judiciary power be not severed from the executive and legislative powers; were it joined to the latter, the judge would determine according to his will; and if to the former, the life and property of the subject would be liable to arbitrary controul.

Liberty, in its rational sense of the word, is that security which one enjoys for his person and: property, and that cannot exist where the same man, or body of men, exercise the whole three

or any two of these powers, as may be rendered plain to the meanest capacity, by an attention to the common occurrences of life.

As the people are too numerous and dispersed, to meet in consultation on every occasion, representatives are necessary. These ought to act according to the general sense of their constituents, where it can be come at; where it cannot, they are bound to take such steps as shall appear to them most consistent with their interest, without having the least regard to private interest, unless as an individual of the same society.

Now where, as was the case in Freeland, the legislative body were to be chosen as well from the tenantry as the gentry, what liberty could exist, if the executive power made use of the public money to controul their elections, and buy over their representatives to wink at this scandalous profusion? The legislative power, in such case, is in the executive, and then, as we have said before, there can be no liberty.

It is for the admirable precision with which these powers are distinguished, allotted, and kept asunder, that the president Montesquicu gives the preference to the English constitution over

all others."Whoever," says he, "shall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful system was invented first in the woods. As all human things have an end, the state we are speaking of will lose its liberty, it will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, perished? It' will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt than the executive!"-Far, far distant be the day!

But to return to Freeland; where this corrupt state really existed, and matters appeared to be hastening to that end which all human things have. Several preceding Lords of the manor had attempted to exert undue influence over the electors and the elected, and some of them had cause to rue the attempt, as we may collect from the following extract, from an ancient dedication to a subsequent lord-one lord William. We shall make no apology to the reader for introdu cing it, as it will apply to any emperor, king potentate, or sovereign, as well as to any lord of a manor, in a similar situation.

"When our lord's mansion-house is on fire, and his beloved person is in the midst of the flames, the meanest of his tenants hath the privilege to give him warning of his danger; and this, I am afraid, sir, is too near our case, or I would not have assumed the boldness to disturb your tenants, or have placed myself so disadvantageously before your lordship, as I must expect to appear under the character of a public censor of your household. I know the common answer to these kinds of complaints is, that it is more easy to find faults than remedies. If you please, sir, we will consider of remedies:-first, be pleased to remove from your person, councils, and offices of trust, men bred up and confirmed in principles destructive to our constitution, and who rob you of the affections of your liege te

"A Freeland lord, is the greatest lord upon earth, where he rules over the hearts of his tenants; and all other methods to power and greatness have been found ineffectual in Freeland."

"Purgatives will not alone perfect the cure of your household, and restore it to perfect health;