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qualified electors of the state to vote for state and district officers, where their residence was not such as to authorize them to vote for county officers at the time and place of their offering to vote.

Our government is founded on the elective franchise. The right to exercise this franchise is declared, defined, and guarantied by organic provisions superior to any of the departments of the government. The legislature cannot enlarge it or restrict it, and can only regulate it so far as their authority to do so is expressly, or by necessary implication, given in the constitution. Much less may the courts presume to restrict it by construction. On the contrary, the whole spirit of our institutions constrains the courts to give our organic provisions, on the subject of the enjoyment of the right of suffrage, such a construction as will permit the most liberal exercise of this supreme right which is at all reasonably consistent with the terms of those provisions. From a very careful consideration of the subject, I am of the opinion that, for all that is shown in this bill of information, said J. P. Kramer was entitled to vote at the time and place mentioned, and that the motion should be sustained; and it is so ordered.

erty of the debtor. It is ancillary to the original suit, ai & mode of attaching property to secure any judgment tained against the principal defendant. A response is quired to all questions tending to draw out facts that w disclose property in the possession of the garnishee might render him liable. To this extent the inquiry ma Whether the questions propounded are proper or not i depend upon the circumstances of each case, and no pa ular rules, universally applicable, can be laid down. I question tending to further the object of the examinati

material and proper.

The examination in this case shows a general assign to the garnishee by the defendant for the benefit of credi and be expresses the opinion that he “had at the time o service of the garnishee summons no property of the de: ant in my possession or under my control.” Such ge answer is not the extent to which inquiry may go with ence to such assignment. The plaintiffs are entitle answers to all questions which might show the garnisl party to a fraudulent assignment. If upon “full disclo it should appear that the garnishee had no property, m or effects of the defendant in his possession or control, if the plaintiffs desire to attack the assignment for the r that, in their opinion, it is void, they must pursue the pointed out in section 174, p. 735, Young's Statutes of nesota.

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OBERTEUFFER and others v. HARWOOD, and Petit, Garnishee.

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The garnishee must answer the interrogatories. Drake on Attachments, $ 650, and authorities cited,

1. GARNISHMENT_INTERROGATION OF GARNISIEE.

A garnishee may be required to answer questions tending to show that he was party to a fraudulent assignment by the defendant in the suit. —[ED.

NELSON, D. J. The garnishee declines to answer certain questions, under the advice of his counsel, for the reason "that the line of inquiry has nothing to do with garnishee proceedings," and the design is "to furnish information bearing on other litigation."

The object of the garnishee proceedings is to reach prop

erty of the debtor. It is ancillary to the original suit, and is a mode of attaching property to secure any judgment obtained against the principal defendant. A response is required to all questions tending to draw out facts that would disclose property in the possession of the garnishee which might render him liable. To this extent the inquiry may go. Whether the questions propounded are proper or not must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and no particular rules, universally applicable, can be laid down. Every question tending to further the object of the examination is material and proper.

The examination in this case shows a general assignment to the garnishee by the defendant for the benefit of creditors, and he expresses the opinion that he “had at the time of the service of the garnishee summons no property of the defendant in my possession or under my control.” Such general answer is not the extent to which inquiry may go with reference to such assignment. The plaintiffs are entitled to answers to all questions which might show the garnishee a party to a fraudulent assignment. If upon "full disclosure" it should appear that the garnishee had no property, money, or effects of the defendant in his possession or control, then, if the plaintiffs desire to attack the assignment for the reason that, in their opinion, it is void, they must pursue the course pointed out in section 174, p. 735, Young's Statutes of Minnesota.

The garnishee must answer the interrogatories. See Drake on Attachments, $ 650, and authorities cited.

THE HUDSON.

(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. April 21, 1881.)

1. HANDS ON STEAM-BOAT – COMPLETION OF VOYAGE — UNLOADING

CARGO.

Libellants were employed as hands on a steam-boat, on a trip from Pittsburgh to Cincinnati and back. They had nothing to do with the navigation of the boat, but the handling of the cargo was part of their employment. Held, that they had no right to quit the boat as soon as she was fastened to the wharf at Pittsburgh, but that it was

their duty to remain and assist in unloading her cargo. 2. SAME-DEDUCTIONS FROM WAGES.

Held, further, that the respondents could deduct from libellants' wages the reasonable sums necessarily paid for the discharge of such

cargo. 3. PRACTICE-PAYMENT TO MARSIIAL_PAYMENT INTO COURT-COSTs.

stinately refused to do, and the respondents were comp to hire laborers to take their places and perform their in discharging the cargo. The respondents had a rig pursue this course and deduct the necessary sums paid t laborers from the libellants' wages. 1 Conk. 131. After boat was unloaded a tender was made to the libellants of wages, less the reasonable sums paid the laborers who formed the libellants' work. The libellants refused the ter and subsequently filed their libel in this case. Upon se of process the respondents (under protest) paid to the ma the amount claimed by the libellants, and the costs up to time, and the marshal paid the money into court. It have been more regular had the respondents, under granted, paid the amount of wages tendered into court a time their answer was filed, in support of the tender se in their answer. But, substantially, this was done, fo

marshal had paid the money into court before answer

Under the proofs in the case, I am of opinion that the must be dismissed, with costs,

THE MARIEL,

(District Court, S. D. Nero York. January 18, 1881.)

In Admiralty.
Albert York Smith, for libellant.
Isaac S. Van Voorhis, contra.

ACHESON, D. J. The amount in controversy here is small, but to the libellants who sue for their wages the matter is of consequence. Moreover, the principle involved is important. The case, therefore, deserves and has received careful consideration. The better opinion seems to be that unless there is some express or implied agreement or established usage to dispense with their further services, seamen are bound to remain with the ship upon the completion of the voyage and assist in the delivery of her cargo, if made in a reasonable time. 1 Conk. Adm. 131; Dixon v. The Cyrus, 2 Pet. Adm. 413; Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sumn. 377.

Here, there were no shipping articles or express contract. The libellants were employed as hands on the steam-boat Hudson, on a trip from Pittsburgh to Cincinnati and back. They had nothing to do with the navigation of the boat, but the handling of the cargo was part of their employment. Under the evidence, I think, they had no right to quit the boat as soon as she was fastened to the wharf at Pittsburgh, but that it was their duty to assist in unloading her. This they ob

1. PRACTICEDISMISSAL OF LIBEL_DELAY AFTER ISSUE.

The practice of the court does not authorize the dismissal o for the libellant's delay in bringing the cause to a hearing aft joined. The claimant has an equal right to move the case.

Rules S. D. N. Y. 136, 123.

In Admiralty.

The libel was filed in 1866 for salvage, and iss joined. Both parties noticed the cause for trial, and placed upon the calendar. It was reserved gener 1870, and had not been moved again until 1880. The ants moved to dismiss the libel for failure to prosecut

stinately refused to do, and the respondents were compelled to hire laborers to take their places and perform their work in discharging the cargo. The respondents had a right to pursue this course and deduct the necessary sums paid these laborers from the libellants’ wages. 1 Conk. 131. After the boat was unloaded a tender was made to the libellants of their wages, less the reasonable sums paid the laborers who performed the libellants' work. The libellants refused the tender, and subsequently filed their libel in this case. Upon service of process the respondents (under protest) paid to the marshal the amount claimed by the libellants, and the costs up to that time, and the marshal paid the money into court. It would have been more regular had the respondents, under lea granted, paid the amount of wages tendered into court at the time their answer was filed, in support of the tender set up in their answer. But, substantially, this was done, for the marshal had paid the money into court before answer filed.

Under the proofs in the case, I am of opinion that the libel must be dismissed, with costs.

THE MARIEL.

(District Court, S. D. Nero York. January 18, 1881.)

1. PRACTICE--DISMISSAL OF LIBEL-DELAY AFTER ISSUE.

The practice of the court does not authorize ibe dismissal of a libel for the libellant's delay in bringing the cause to a hearing after issue joined. The claimant has an equal right to move the case.

Rules S. D. N. Y. 136, 123.

In Admiralty.

The libel was filed in 1866 for salvage, and issue was joined. Both parties noticed the cause for trial, and it was placed upon the calendar. It was reserved generally in 1870, and had not been moved again until 1880. The claim. ants moved to dismiss the libel for failure to prosecute.

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thereto it is prayed that & receiver may be appointed a injunction against the assignee granted. The present i is for a provisional injunction against the assignee. pears that a petition pursuant to the statutes of Mi was filed in the state circuit court for the removal of directors and the president of the defendant corporation such proceedings were thereupon had that said rer were decreed, and a special election ordered to fill the i cies thus created in the board of directors. At the tine said court appointed a receiver of the corporate

HUTCHINSON and others v. GREEN and others.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri. April 5, 1881.)

George Chase, for the motion.
La Roy S. Gove, contra.

CHOATE, D.J. I am satisfied that the practice of this court does not authorize the dismissal of a libel under rule 136* for the libellant's delay in bringing the cause to a hearing after issue joined. The claimant has an equal right under rule 123t to move the case. On inquiry as to the practice I learn that such has been the construction put upon this rule here. tofore. Therefore, although there has been delay which woula long ago have barred the claim for staleness if suit had not been brought, or entitled these claimants to a dismissal if libellant had not taken out process; yet rule 123 has at all times put it in the power of the claimant to put an end to the delay. Though it seems that similar rules have elsewhere been differently construed, and though the libellant's delay is extraordinary, yet it would be unjust to dismiss his libe. consistently with the construction which has hitherto prevailed in this court.

Motion denied.

1. INJUNCTION-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTROL OF PROPERTY IN

SESSION OF STATE COURT.

No injunction will be granted by a United States court to int with the possession, control, or disposition of property which

the hands of a state court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. 2. RECEIVER-POSSESSION OF STATE COURT,

The possession of a receiver appointed by a state court is th session of the court itself, and the disposition of the property receiver is a matter to be ordered by the state court, and will

interfered with by a United States court by injunction. 3. SAME-FRAUDULENT ASSIGNMENT-INJUNCTION.

Where a state court has appointed a receiver of the pro of a corporation, and a fraudulent assignment has been subseq? made of the same, a United States court will not enjoin the as: from receiving such corporate property from the receiver, ir the state court having control thereof orders it to be turned o him.

*RULE 136. If the promovent in a libel or information neglects to proceed in the cause with the dispatch the course of the court demands, the respondent or claimant may have the libel or information dismissed on motion, unless the delay is by order of the judge, or the act of the respondent or claimant.

TRULE 123. So soon as issue is joined the respondent or claimant may notice a cause for hearing on his part, and be thereupon entitled to a decree dismissing the same, with costs, or such other decree as the case may demand, unless the libellant shall also notice the cause for the same time and proceed to trial or hearing, or obtain a continuance by order of the court on proper cause shown.

In Equity
E. T. Allen and J. O. Broadhead, for plaintiffs.
James Taussig and I. A. Madill, for defendants.

TREAT, D. J. The plaintiffs, citizens of lowa, bring suit in behalf of themselves and other stockholders who join against the defendant corporation, of which the stockholders, and the assignee of said corporation. The pose of the suit is to have the assignment made by the i ration, through its then corporate authorities, under the

and circumstances alleged, adjudged void; and in ad

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1.6.no.953

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