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--As of mid-1970 the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, lease, and deferred payment sales, special muclear material and other materials worth about $437.6 million. The Commission negotiated the sale to Canada of 500 tons of heavy water valued at $29.4 million.
--Ten shipments of spent fuel were received from Canada and Japan for reprocessing in the United States.
--President Nixon announced in his foreign policy report to Congress on
Feburary 25, 1971, that the Administration had consulted with the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy concerning ways in which the United States might assist its allies to construct multinational uranium enrichment facilities. The Commission informed several nations that it was prepared to undertake exploratory discussions on the possibility of making gaseous diffusion technology available outside the U.S. Preliminary discussions were
held in November.
--Seventeen uranium enrichment contracts were executed under agree
ments for cooperation.
--Export shipments to agreement nations totaled approximately 19, 707 kilograms of U-235 under toll enrichment agreements and 1, 264 kilograms
of U-235 under sale and lease agreements.
--As of mid-1971, the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, lease, and deferred payment sales, special nuclear material and other materials worth about $572.3 million, resulting in revenues of $491.9 million.
--The United States participated in the Fourth United Nations Confer
ence of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
--Forty-one facility inspections were carried out by U.S. personnel in the five countries in which safeguards continue to be applied under agree
ments for cooperation.
--Meetings were held with other nuclear material and equipment sup
plier nations to define the extent of their responsibilities under Article III
of the NPT.
--In the interest of strengthening international safeguards for nuclear
materials, the Commission participated with the IAEA and the U. S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency in testing prototype safeguards instru
--The Commission continued to support the objectives of the NPT, in
cluding the IAEA's responsibility for administering the treaty's safeguards
--Discussions continued on the 1967 offer to permit the IAEA to apply
its safeguards to all United States nuclear activities, excluding those with
direct national security significance.
--The Commission provided technical support to the IAEA for safeguards.
--Negotiations, in which the Commission played a major role, Deared completion on a safeguards agreement with the LAEA under which the IAEA will implement safeguards at selected U.S. nuclear facilities.
--The Commiss:oc negotiated bilateral information exchange agreements with five sations covering systematic reciprocal exchanges of data on operating experience and other technical informatition related to the saiety and environmental impact of muclear powerplants.
--In mid-1974, the Commission began a small-scale program of assigning a limited mur.ber of foreign regulatory employees from countries with embryonic nuclear power programs to work for one to two years within the AEC regulatory organization.
PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING THE SAFEGUARDS AND · CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE EURATOM AGREEMENT
The principles which will govern the establishment and operation of the safeguards and control system are as follows: The EURATOM Commission will:
1. Examine the design of equipment, devices and facilities, including nuclear reactors, and approve it for the purpose of assuring that it will not further any military purpose and that it will
permit the effective application of safeguards, if such equipment, devices and facilities:
(a) are made available pursuant to this Agreement; or
ceived from the United States: source or special nuclear ma-
the effective application of safeguards; or (c) use any special nuclear material produced as the result of
the use of equipment or material referred to in subpara
graphs (a) and (b). 2. Requiro the maintenance and production of operating records to assure accountability for source or special nuclear material made Available, or source or special nuclear material used, recovered, or produced as a result of the use of source or special nuclear material, moderator material or any other material relevant to the effective application of safeguards, or as a result of equipment, devices and facilities made available pursuant to this Agreement.
3. Require that progress reports be prepared and delivered to the EURATOM Commission with respect to projects utilizing material, equipment, devices and facilities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Annex.
4. Establish and require the deposit and storage, under continuing safeguards, in EURATOM facilities of any special nuclear material referred to in paragraph 2 of this Annex which is not currently being utilized for peaceful purposes in the Community or otherwise transferred as provided in the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Community
5. Establish an inspection organization which will have access at all times:
(a) to all places and data, and
materials, equipment, devices or facilities safeguarded un
der this Agreement, necessary to assure accounting for source or special nuclear material subject to paragraph 2 of this Annex and to determine whether there is compliance with the guarantees of the Community. The inspection organization will also be in a position to make and will make such independent measurements as are necessary to assure compliance with the provisions of this Annex and the Agreement for Cooperation.
It is the understanding of the Parties that the above principles applicable to the establishment of the Community's inspection and control system are compatible with and are based on Article XII of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,['] Chapter VII of Title Two of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and those adopted by the Government of the United States of America in its comprehensive Agreements for Cooperation.