tion at the four answers allowed to the adulterous wife: 1. That she had not broken the marriage (meaning to herself that the marriage was still existing); 2. That she was innocent of the crime (meaning to herself that she had been absolved of the guilt of the crime after confession); 3. That she had not committed adultery (meaning to herself that she had not committed idolatry); 4. That she had not committed adultery (meaning to herself so as to have to tell her husband).1 He must not denounce as wicked the doctrine that a man who has seduced a maiden, on promise of marrying her, is not bound to keep his promise, if he is of considerably higher birth, or if he is considerably richer, whether the victim did or did not know of any disparity between him and herself. If he is a 'good Catholic,' he will hold with the Cardinal Archbishop of Besançon, that on these points 'the 'judgment of Rome should be fully adhered to, and that the 'opinions of the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori should be followed 'and reduced to practice, all doubt whatever being thrown aside.' If not so enthusiastic as the Cardinal Archbishop, yet he is absolutely bound to hold that the above teaching is not erroneous, rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding or misleading to the simple.

We will now examine the Theory of Theft; and we shall see there the same evil as in the case of Equivocation-laxity en

not tell me the letter was his, and I did not tell him that it was his. I went to the plaintiff (Mr. Boyle) of my own accord, and I afterwards communicated with the Cardinal. My object was to endeavour to settle this action." "Surely you can tell us what passed between you?" "No, I do not remember.” "Why how long ago is it since this occurred?" "About a month." "And you mean to swear you have no recollection of what occurred?" "I do; I only recollect what I have told you." "What else did the Cardinal say? What did he say relative to the matter ?" "I don't recollect."'

We have no cause for thinking that Bishop Grant and Father Ignatius are gifted with good memories; therefore we conclude that they have short memories. But it is an interesting inquiry, as a purely speculative question. What must they have done on the received principles of Roman Moral Theology if they had recollected that Cardinal Wiseman had told them that he was the author of the letter signed by his name? They must have done exactly what they did. Otherwise they would have sinned by discovering the truth which they ought to have concealed.' (L. v. 270.) If in a trial the crime is altogether concealed, the witness may, nay he is bound, to say that the defendant has not committed it.' (L. iv. 154.) This would be exactly our hypothetical case: for in matter of fact, the trial was quashed because 'the crime' of having written the libel was 'concealed;' therefore 'the witnesses were bound,' even if they had known the contrary to be true, 'to say the defendant had not committed it.' This is, to say the least, remarkable. We should scarcely have thought it possible-indeed without S. Alfonso's assistance we never should have thought it possible—that when English gentlemen were giving evidence upon their oath in an English court of justice, and were questioned as to whether or no they recollected something taking place, they should be religiously and morally bound not to allow the fact of their recollection or non-recollection to make any difference in their answer. 2 L. iv. 644.

1 L. iv. 162.

couraged by the sanction of authority: and we shall, in another instance, learn what is the nature of that morality which Rome inculcates through her Confessors and her Directors.

'What is theft? It is the secret and unjust taking-away of a thing belonging to another, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.'-L. iv. 518.

This is an awkward beginning. Who is to be the judge, whether the owner is reasonable or unreasonable in wishing to keep his goods himself? If he is likely to have a prejudice on the side of possession, the thief is at least as likely to have a prejudice on the side of abstraction. We suppose that it will be necessary to call in the Director to settle the point between them.1

Having got our definition of theft, we may see what acts of taking other people's goods are not thieving, which unenlightened consciences might conceive to be such. Five kinds of such acts are at once enumerated. The first is that of a man who takes what is another's by way of joke. We may let that pass. 'I only did it in fun,' has always been accounted a sufficient excuse to save a schoolboy from anything beyond a reprimand.

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The next is that of one who takes what is another's for the latter's good or advantage, 'As if a wife take away money from her husband, that he may not waste it on games or feasting, or 'take away wine from him that he may not get drunk, or an 'heretical book that he may not read it; or, if a servant gives a 6 very poor man alms of no very great amount, which his master 'would not be reasonably unwilling that he should give, although 'for shame, or some other reason, he does not dare to ask him.' This is a principle which might be extensively applied, especially if it should happen that a lady were married to an heretical husband. But we shall have occasion again to consider the case of wives, children, and servants, separately.

The third case of taking, not thieving, carries us up at once. to first principles.

'It is certain that a man who is in extreme necessity may purloin other people's goods, enough to free himself from such a necessity. So the doctors hold," in common," "2 with S. Thomas. The holy Doctor's reason is, that in such a case all things are common, for the law of nations by which a division of goods was made, cannot derogate from natural law by which every man is allowed to provide for himself, so long as he labours under extreme necessity. The same is said when the necessity is next to

In the Homo Apostolicus, the cases in which the owner is regarded as unreasonable in his unwillingness to part with his goods to the thief are when the latter is in extreme necessity, or when he is justly compensating himself, but no such limit to his unreasonableness is laid down in the Theologia Moralis.

2 For the technical meaning of 'common opinion,' and of 'probable and more probable opinion,' we must refer our readers to the Theory of Truthfulness, p. 7.

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extreme, or equivalent to it, for in such a necessity, which is called very grave or quasi-extreme, a man may also provide for himself, by ordinary means, but not by strange and extraordinary. So, in common,' Lugo, Lessius, Sporer, the Salamanca Doctors, Navarrus, Soto, Cajetan, Prado, &c., Viva, Sylvius, Azorius, Croix, Cardenas, Haunoldus, and Tamburini, the last of whom calls the opinion certain. But a very grave necessity of this kind is supposed to exist when a man is in probable risk of incurring death, or indeed in danger of losing some principal member, or some sense, such as an eye; also when a man is in danger of falling into perpetual captivity, or being sent to the galleys, or catching a very grave or lasting disease, or incurring loss of character. For it is not necessary that evils of this kind should be actually upon the man, but it is enough that they are very near him, and morally certain, or indeed-Holzmann says-if there is certainly probable danger of them. But it is doubted whether a father is supposed to labour under the same necessity if he is in danger of prostituting his daughter through want. Bonacina says Yes, and Mazzotta, Cajetan, Suarez, &c., agree. But "with greater probability" the Salamanca Doctors say No, because no necessity can compel a man to sin when there any other way of relieving his necessity, such as at least he has in begging. But what, if a nobleman is very much ashamed to beg or to work, can he provide for himself out of other people's goods? The Salamanca Doctors say No, with Soto and Prado, on the ground that this must be rather counted grave than extreme necessity, temporal goods being ordained only for preserving life, not for keeping honour. But Viva says Yes, and Roncaglia and Mazzotta, as well as Lessius, Palao, and Diocastillo in Croix : so do Bannez and Serra. And this seems to me the "more probable," if he is so ashamed of begging that he would rather die than beg.-L. iv. 520.

is

Six times in the course of three pages in his Homo Apostolicus, sixteen times in the course of one section of a chapter in his Theologia Moralis, Liguori lays down the principle that, as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity, all goods become common, and, more than this, that the thief has a right to what belongs to others. We need not say that we here find ourselves referred to the fundamental principle of Communism, just as Mariana appeals to the fundamental principle of Red Republicanism, when he asserts that every private man has a right to stab the king who has been declared a public enemy.1

Any private man, whoever he may be, has a right equal to the best, to kill the king declared a public enemy: let him only have the will to fling away hopes of impunity, despise the risk, and dare attempt to serve his country. I never will believe that he who makes essay to slay him has done anything whatever which he has not a right to do... . It is indeed more virtuous and more magnanimous openly to satisfy the grudge and fall upon the country's enemy before the eyes of all the world. But there is more prudence in trying to catch him, as in a trap, by artifice. For then the happy issue comes without tumult, and with the certainty of less danger, public as well as private.... Whether open force is resorted to, and he is struck down in the midst of insurrection and arms publicly taken up . or with greater caution he dies by stratagem or device, a single man devoting himself, or a few sworn together secretly against his life, and struggling, each at his own peril, to redeem his country safe! Suppose that they escape! Like great demi-deities they are revered their whole life long. And if they fall, they fall a sacrifice grateful to the gods and grateful unto men, in a noble undertaking, and are illustrious to all posterity!'-Mariana, pp. 60, 65, as quoted in Cases of Conscience, p. 51.

Now that a case might arise in which circumstances would justify appropriation is a proposition which we do not deny, and it is this modicum of truth which blinds Liguori and his followers in the instance before us. If it be true that it might happen, under very peculiar circumstances, that a man might be justified in appropriating what was not his, it does not follow that it should be laid down as a general rule to guide practice that as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity he is relieved from paying any regard to the laws of property: and then that the term 'extreme necessity' should be so liberally interpreted as to include under it every distressed nobleman. Take this last case and analyze it. It is precisely the case of the Unjust Steward, provided that the latter was a man of high birth, or indeed even that would not be necessary, for vir honoratus would scarcely mean more than a man holding a respectable position. This parable has caused much difficulty to such commentators as did not mark that 'the lord' there spoken of is like the Steward himself, a man of the earth, earthy, and, in addition, that the commendation does not belong to the morality of the act done, but to the cleverness displayed in doing it. No such difficulties need be felt by them if they will take Liguori for their guide. 'I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed.' Then, says S. Alfonso, you are justified in clandestinely taking. 'If a 'man in an honourable position is very much ashamed to beg or to work, may he provide for himself out of other persons' goods? The Salamanca Doctors, &c. say No-but Viva, &c. say "Yes, and this seems to me the "more probable." The ingenuity which has contrived to bring the distressed nobleman into the category of those labouring under extreme necessity, is as commendable as the Unjust Steward's own cleverness. The method in which it is done is as follows:-It was necessary to make some kind of explanation of what extreme necessity is. In doing this it appeared hard to be too strict and rigid, and so extreme necessity was softened down into grave necessity. So Lessius, Malderus, &c. Here, however, Innocent XI. stepped in that same Innocent, who, as we have seen, attempted to put a stop to the practice of Mental Restriction. But he and his Jansenist morality has fared no better in the matter of Theft than in that of Untruthfulness. Then, as we may recollect, on his condemning mental restriction, mental restriction was divided into two classes, morally undistinguishable, pure mental restriction, and non-pure mental restriction, and his condemnation was confined by the Casuists to the former. Here he condemns the proposition that it is allowable to steal not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.' The Casuists hear and obey the Papal voice. But the Pontiff spoke only of grave, he said nothing of very grave necessity: so gravi is changed into gravissimâ, and the

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Jansenist Pope's decree goes for nothing. To permit a man to steal in grave necessity is immoral, says Innocent. True; but to permit a man to steal in very grave necessity is moral, reply the Casuists, and we have the privilege of explaining what 'very grave' means. This they accordingly proceed to do. And first a man is to be considered labouring under very grave necessity, if he is in probable danger of incurring death-next, if he is in danger of losing a principal limb-then, if he is in very near risk of being imprisoned for life—or of being sent to the galleys -or of catching a very bad disease-or of incurring disgrace. This last heading covers the case of the distressed nobleman. He would feel disgraced if he were to dig or to beg; therefore he is unable to have recourse to this method of relieving his wants, and is labouring under very grave or quasi-extreme need. That is all that is necessary. At once the laws of meum and tuum, so far as he is concerned, have perished. He may take what he wants. In providing for his needs out of other people's goods he cannot steal if he would. But if a man's want is so pressing that he is in risk of prostituting his daughter, the same authority tells us that that does not justify him in providing for himself. To save his own character in the eyes of men he may take clandestinely. To save his daughter's ruin of body and soul he may not.

In connexion with this subject of extreme necessity, there are, says Liguori, many difficult questions. They are, 1., whether men in captivity to the Turks may purloin what is not theirs, and whether rich men are bound to redeem them. To the latter part of this question Rome's oracle replies: "In this doubt, 'which has heaped upon me a mighty confusion, and on which 'the Doctors speak so obscurely, I dare not decide anything. It 'is enough to have put forward the arguments of both sides. 'Let the wiser judge.' Question 2. is, whether a poor man in extreme necessity may secretly purloin (occulte alienum surripere) without going through the previous ceremony of begging. To this Coninchius answers in the negative; Lessius, Layman, and Concina, in a qualified affirmative; Cardinal Lugo and Liguori have recourse to a distinguendum. In reply to Question 3. we learn that no one is bound to spend so much as 6007. or '800l. to save another man's life, although the donor should 'not lose his station by giving more.' Question 4. asks if the thief who consumes what he has taken away in extreme necessity has to restore it. Palao, Coninchius, Navarrus, Diana, Sporer, Lessius, and Tamburini, are on the negative side, 'on the grounds that, as in extreme necessity all things become common, the thief has not only the right of taking others' 'goods, but also of consuming them, just as he has the right 'of purloining again.' Lessius, Sylvius, Armilla, Azorius, and