The Solicitors' Journal & Reporter

THE CHANCERY CAUSE LIST for the present term presents some remarkable features. On the first day of term there were only 21 causes set down before ViceChancellor Kindersley, while there were 135 before Vice-Chancellor Stuart, 113 before Vice-Chancellor Wood, and 88 before the Master of the Rolls. We are not able to account satisfactorily for the remarkable contrasts which these figures present. They certainly cannot be considered as indicating the proportionate amount of business which is usually disposed of in these respective courts, as in this respect the Rolls would probably take the lead, numerically followed by the court of ViceChancellor Stuart. The number of causes, moreover, is not a fair test of the amount of work got through, for everybody knows that in Vice-Chancellor Wood's court the ordinary run of business is frequently impeded for several days successively by heavy and protracted motions, which have now become the characteristic of that court, and which are attributable to the fact that an unusually great number of important causes are set down there. But although the number of the causes set down in any court is not an infallible criterion of the amount of favour with which it is regarded in the profession, it is nevertheless one test, and may be a very significant one, as we think it is in the case of Vice-Chancellor Kindersley's court. The fact that it is avoided by the general body of practitioners cannot any longer be disputed. Why it is so is also well known. While the average number of all the causes, including motions for decree, which are heard in any year, considerably exceeds 1,000, the average number heard by Vice-Chancellor Kindersley within the last three or four years, has not much exceeded 100; in other words, while the business that falls to his lot is one-fourth of the whole, he gets through hardly one-tenth. If, therefore, the average number of causes were set down before Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, the hearing of a large proportion of them must either be postponed a year or two beyond the usual time in other branches of the court, or else there must be periodical transfers. Now transfers are very inconvenient, and sometimes, indeed, very expensive. is not uncommon, before filing a bill, or, at all events, soon afterwards, for the parties to retain and consult leading counsel practising in the particular court to which the cause is assigned. As a rule Queen's counsel will not follow the cause so transferred, and therefore upon a transfer being made, it becomes necessary either to give a special fee to the Queen's counsel originally retained, or else to retain others in the court to which the transfer has been made. This would of itself be enough to deter persons from resorting to a court where there was a special risk of transfer. It is, however, a notable

though not unnatural result that the very desire to avoid this risk in one quarter, makes it almost inevitable in others, for although the Master of the Rolls and ViceChancellor Stuart get through a very large number of cases, it must sometimes happen that they will be overweighted if the rush to their courts continues. There is no judge upon the equity bench who is more laborious and assiduous than Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, nor is there any who is more highly respected and esteemed. His conduct of business is always characterized by the most scrupulous regard to the interests of suitors, and he is unsparing in the pains that he bestows upon the cases which come before him, and no doubt it is this very anxiety which so much protracts their decision. But the fact remains that this branch of the court falls very far below the others in point of business; and if all were to proceed at the same rate, four or five additional Vice-Chancellors would be necessary.

THE ALEXANDRA CASE is not to come before the court, on the bill of exceptions which was tendered at the trial, but not then formally drawn up, to the ruling of the Lord Chief Baron. It seems that there is some difference in the views of the counsel for the Crown and that learned judge as to the language used by the latter in directing the jury, and a difficulty has arisen in consequence with respect to the paper forming the bill of exceptions. Under these circumstances an application was made to the Court of Exchequer on Tuesday by the Attorney-General to enlarge the time for applying for a new trial beyond the four days allowed, in case the Lord Chief Baron should refuse to sign the bill of exceptions. The Court, however, intimated that this could only be done in the usual way, and thereupon the Attorney-General stated that by the fourth day they would have considered whether the case could be brought within the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, so as to allow an appeal to the Court of Error in case of a refusal, and that he would mention the case again or take further steps in the matter. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the Attorney-General asked their Lordships to make a new rule, under section 26 of the Act for regulating the office of Queen's Remembrancer, applying to proceedings on the revenue side of the Court of Exchequer the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, with respect to appeals from decisions of the Court on motions for new trials. To this application the Court acceded, and during the course of the day the Queen's remembrancer read a new rule, framed by the judges of the Court of Exchequer under the Act referred to, as craved by the Attorney-General. Thursday the Attorney-General accordingly moved for a new trial, on the ground of the verdict being against the evidence, and of misdirection, the bill of exceptions being abandoned, and it being understood that no appeal will lie from the decision of the Court, under the new rule. After hearing the Attorney-General, whose speech was one of remarkable force and ability, the Court made a rule to show cause why the verdict should

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The Solicitors' Journal & Reporter, 8권