 | Alexander Mansfield Burrill - 1870 - 674 페이지
...are necessary, (or at least highly probable,) and not merely possible implications. 2 Bl. Com. 382. In construing a will, conjecture must not be taken...necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed. Lord Eldon, C. 1... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Chancery - 1871 - 1008 페이지
...us that which wo find in Lord Eldon's judgment in the case of Wilkinson v. Adam (5) ; that is, that necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that a contrary intention cannot be supposed. The question, then, resolves itself into this : whether, having... | |
 | Nathaniel Cleveland Moak - 1874 - 922 페이지
...Adam, (*): "In construing a will, conjecture *must not be taken for implication, but neces- [277 sary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." Strong observations... | |
 | John Barbee Minor - 1877 - 1150 페이지
...The implication which is to prevail must be not merely a possible, but a necesMtry implication, which means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that imputed to the testator cannot be supposed, because it would be absurd.... | |
 | 1922 - 1158 페이지
...• * * On the same subject, it is said in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 336; ' » * * A necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of an intention that one contrary to that which is imputed to the party using the language cannot be supposed.'... | |
 | 1886 - 832 페이지
...repeat what I have before stated, from a note of Lord Hardwicke's judgment in Corilon v. Hellier ; that in construing a will, conjecture must not be taken...necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to tbe testator can not be supposed." Again, Lord Mansfield,... | |
 | 1911 - 1172 페이지
...repeat, what I have before stated from a note of Lord Hardwicte's Judgment In Coriton v. Heller, that In construing a will conjecture must not be taken...necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which Is imputed to the testntor cannot be supposed." In Р.Ыюр v.... | |
 | 1901 - 1162 페이지
...rule as stated by Jannan took its final form, however, from a remark of Lord Eldon in 1813, — that "necessary implication" means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." Wilkinson v. Adam,... | |
 | Gilbert Stuart Henderson - 1889 - 614 페이지
...dates," the nephew is appointed an executor by implication.* ' Necessary implication,' it was said, means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed.6 An executor by... | |
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I will repeat what I have before stated from a note of Lord Hardwicke's judgment in Cotton v. Helyar (2 Cox Ch. 348), that, in construing a will, conjecture must not be taken for implication; but 'necessary implication' means not natural necessity, but... 
